Experimental Infection of Chickens with Intercontinental Reassortant H9N2 Influenza Viruses from Wild Birds

Genetic characterization and pathogenesis of the first H9N2 low pathogenic avian influenza viruses isolated from chickens in Kenyan live bird markets

Poultry production plays an important role in the economy and livelihoods of rural households in Kenya. As part of a surveillance program, avian influenza virus (AIV)-specific real-time RT-PCR (RRT-PCR) was used to screen 282 oropharyngeal swabs collected from chickens at six live bird markets (LBMs) and 33 backyard poultry farms in Kenya and 8 positive samples were detected. Virus was isolated in eggs from five samples, sequenced, and identified as H9N2 low pathogenic AIV (LPAIV) G1 lineage, with highest nucleotide sequence identity (98.6-99.9%) to a 2017 Ugandan H9N2 isolate. The H9N2 contained molecular markers for mammalian receptor specificity, implying their zoonotic potential. Virus pathogenesis and transmissibility was assessed by inoculating low and medium virus doses of a representative Kenyan H9N2 LPAIV isolate into experimental chickens and exposing them to naïve uninfected chickens at 2 -days post inoculation (dpi). Virus shedding was determined at 2/4/7 dpi and 2/5 days post placement (dpp), and seroconversion determined at 14 dpi/12 dpp. None of the directly-inoculated or contact birds exhibited any mortality or clinical disease signs. All directly-inoculated birds in the low dose group shed virus during the experiment, while only one contact bird shed virus at 2 dpp. Only two directly-inoculated birds that shed high virus titers seroconverted in that group. All birds in the medium dose group shed virus at 4/7 dpi and at 5 dpp, and they all seroconverted at 12/14 dpp. This is the first reported detection of H9N2 LPAIV from Kenya and it was shown to be infectious and transmissible in chickens by direct contact and represents a new disease threat to poultry and potentially to people.

Lessons learned from research and surveillance directed at highly pathogenic influenza A viruses in wild birds inhabiting North America

Following detections of highly pathogenic (HP) influenza A viruses (IAVs) in wild birds inhabiting East Asia after the turn of the millennium, the intensity of sampling of wild birds for IAVs increased throughout much of North America. The objectives for many research and surveillance efforts were directed towards detecting Eurasian origin HP IAVs and understanding the potential of such viruses to be maintained and dispersed by wild birds. In this review, we highlight five important lessons learned from research and surveillance directed at HP IAVs in wild birds inhabiting North America: (1) Wild birds may disperse IAVs between North America and adjacent regions via migration, (2) HP IAVs can be introduced to wild birds in North America, (3) HP IAVs may cross the wild bird-poultry interface in North America, (4) The probability of encountering and detecting a specific virus may be low, and (5) Population immunity of wild birds may influence HP IAV outbreaks in North America. We review empirical support derived from research and surveillance efforts for each lesson learned and, furthermore, identify implications for future surveillance efforts, biosecurity, and population health. We conclude our review by identifying five additional areas in which we think future mechanistic research relative to IAVs in wild birds in North America are likely to lead to other important lessons learned in the years ahead.

Avian influenza overview October 2016-August 2017

The A(H5N8) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic occurred in 29 European countries in 2016/2017 and has been the largest ever recorded in the EU in terms of number of poultry outbreaks, geographical extent and number of dead wild birds. Multiple primary incursions temporally related with all major poultry sectors affected but secondary spread was most commonly associated with domestic waterfowl species. A massive effort of all the affected EU Member States (MSs) allowed a descriptive epidemiological overview of the cases in poultry, captive birds and wild birds, providing also information on measures applied at the individual MS level. Data on poultry population structure are required to facilitate data and risk factor analysis, hence to strengthen science-based advice to risk managers. It is suggested to promote common understanding and application of definitions related to control activities and their reporting across MSs. Despite a large number of human exposures to infected poultry occurred during the ongoing outbreaks, no transmission to humans has been identified. Monitoring the avian influenza (AI) situation in other continents indicated a potential risk of long-distance spread of HPAI virus (HPAIV) A(H5N6) from Asia to wintering grounds towards Western Europe, similarly to what happened with HPAIV A(H5N8) and HPAIV A(H5N1) in previous years. Furthermore, the HPAI situation in Africa with A(H5N8) and A(H5N1) is rapidly evolving. Strengthening collaborations at National, EU and Global levels would allow close monitoring of the AI situation, ultimately helping to increase preparedness. No human case was reported in the EU due to AIVs subtypes A(H5N1), A(H5N6), A(H7N9) and A(H9N2). Direct transmission of these viruses to humans has only been reported in areas, mainly in Asia and Egypt, with a substantial involvement of wild bird and/or poultry populations. It is suggested to improve the collection and reporting of exposure events of people to AI.