Intervention Strategies for Low-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Control in Italy

Salmonellosis: An Overview of Epidemiology, Pathogenesis, and Innovative Approaches to Mitigate the Antimicrobial Resistant Infections

Salmonella is a major foodborne pathogen and a leading cause of gastroenteritis in humans and animals. Salmonella is highly pathogenic and encompasses more than 2600 characterized serovars. The transmission of Salmonella to humans occurs through the farm-to-fork continuum and is commonly linked to the consumption of animal-derived food products. Among these sources, poultry and poultry products are primary contributors, followed by beef, pork, fish, and non-animal-derived food such as fruits and vegetables. While antibiotics constitute the primary treatment for salmonellosis, the emergence of antibiotic resistance and the rise of multidrug-resistant (MDR) Salmonella strains have highlighted the urgency of developing antibiotic alternatives. Effective infection management necessitates a comprehensive understanding of the pathogen's epidemiology and transmission dynamics. Therefore, this comprehensive review focuses on the epidemiology, sources of infection, risk factors, transmission dynamics, and the host range of Salmonella serotypes. This review also investigates the disease characteristics observed in both humans and animals, antibiotic resistance, pathogenesis, and potential strategies for treatment and control of salmonellosis, emphasizing the most recent antibiotic-alternative approaches for infection control.

Stakeholders' Perceptions of Biosecurity Implementation in Italian Poultry Farms

The level of implementation of biosecurity measures (BMs), the reasons for not implementing BMs and the effectiveness of BMs were assessed according to the perceptions of stakeholders (i.e., farmers and advisors) in Italian poultry farms. For this purpose, data were collected using a questionnaire administered to advisors (n = 37) and farmers (n = 30) of conventional broiler (n = 13) and layer (n = 13), free-range broiler (n = 8) and layer (n = 10), turkey (n = 13), duck (n = 3) and breeder (n = 7) farms between April and September 2021. The frequency of the implementation of BMs was 66.97% and 81.14% according to the answers provided by the advisors and farmers, respectively, with the breeder sector showing the highest level of implementation (85.71%). "Not knowing advantages" (21.49% for advisors) and "other/specific reasons" (21.49% for advisors and 38.32% for farmers) were the most common answers regarding the lack of implementation of BMs for all poultry sectors. Only 31.09% of farmers acknowledged the effectiveness of not-implemented BMs in contrast to 61.02% of advisors, with the layers' stakeholders being the most aware. The findings of this study may be useful for identifying failures in biosecurity and failures to develop intervention strategies to fulfil the biosecurity gaps still present in Italian poultry farms.

Phylodynamic approaches to studying avian influenza virus

Avian influenza viruses can cause severe disease in domestic and wild birds and are a pandemic threat. Phylodynamics is the study of how epidemiological, evolutionary, and immunological processes can interact to shape viral phylogenies. This review summarizes how phylodynamic methods have and could contribute to the study of avian influenza viruses. Specifically, we assess how phylodynamics can be used to examine viral spread within and between wild or domestic bird populations at various geographical scales, identify factors associated with virus dispersal, and determine the order and timing of virus lineage movement between geographic regions or poultry production systems. We discuss factors that can complicate the interpretation of phylodynamic results and identify how future methodological developments could contribute to improved control of the virus.

Assessing Biosecurity Compliance in Poultry Farms: A Survey in a Densely Populated Poultry Area in North East Italy

Biosecurity in poultry farms represents the first line of defense against the entry and spread of pathogens that may have animal health, food safety, and economic consequences. The aim of this study was to assess biosecurity compliance in poultry farms located in a densely populated poultry area in North East Italy. A total of 259 poultry farms (i.e., broilers, turkeys, and layers) were surveyed between 2018 and 2019 using standardized checklists, and differences in biosecurity compliance between the poultry sectors and years (only for turkey farms) were tested for significance. Among the three sectors, turkey farms showed the highest compliance. Farm hygiene, infrastructure condition, cleaning and disinfection tools, and procedures were the biosecurity measures most complied with. Some deficiencies were observed in the cleanliness of the farm hygiene lock in broiler farms, as well as the presence of the house hygiene lock in broiler and layer farms and an adequate coverage of built-up litter in turkey and broiler farms. In conclusion, this study highlighted a generally high level of biosecurity in the visited poultry farms (probably due to the stringent national regulation and the integration of the poultry industry) and identified some measures that still need to be improved.

Two Single Incursions of H7N7 and H5N1 Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in U.K. Broiler Breeders During 2015 and 2016

Low pathogenicity (LP) avian influenza viruses (AIVs) have a natural reservoir in wild birds. These cause few (if any) overt clinical signs, but include H5 and H7 LPAIVs, which are notifiable in poultry. In the European Union, notifiable avian disease (NAD) demands laboratory confirmation with prompt statutory interventions to prevent dissemination of infection to multiple farms. Crucially, for H5 and H7 LPAIVs, movement restrictions and culling limit the further risk of mutation to the corresponding highly pathogenic (HP) H5 and H7 AIVs in gallinaceous poultry. An H7N7 LPAIV outbreak occurred during February 2015 at a broiler breeder chicken premise in England. Full genome sequencing suggested an avian origin closely related to contemporary European H7 LPAIV wild bird strains with no correlates for human adaptation. However, a high similarity of PB2, PB1, and NA genes with H10N7 viruses from European seals during 2014 was observed. An H5N1 LPAIV outbreak during January 2016 affecting broiler breeder chickens in Scotland resulted in rapid within-farm spread. An interesting feature from this case was that although viral tropism occurred in heart and kidney endothelial cells, suggesting HPAIV infection, the H5N1 virus had the molecular cleavage site signature of an LPAIV belonging to an indigenous European H5 lineage. There was no genetic evidence for human adaptation or antiviral drug resistance. The source of the infection was also likely to be via indirect contact with wild birds mediated via fomite spread from the nearby environment. Both LPAIV outbreaks were preceded by local flooding events that attracted wild waterfowl to the premises. Prompt detection of both outbreaks highlighted the value of the "testing to exclude" scheme launched in the United Kingdom for commercial gallinaceous poultry in 2014 as an early warning surveillance mechanism for NAD.

Spatial modelling for low pathogenicity avian influenza virus at the interface of wild birds and backyard poultry

Low pathogenicity avian influenza virus (LPAIV) is endemic in wild birds and poultry in Argentina, and active surveillance has been in place to prevent any eventual virus mutation into a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV), which is exotic in this country. Risk mapping can contribute effectively to disease surveillance and control systems, but it has proven a very challenging task in the absence of disease data. We used a combination of expert opinion elicitation, multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) and ecological niche modelling (ENM) to identify the most suitable areas for the occurrence of LPAIV at the interface between backyard domestic poultry and wild birds in Argentina. This was achieved by calculating a spatially explicit risk index. As evidenced by the validation and sensitivity analyses, our model was successful in identifying high-risk areas for LPAIV occurrence. Also, we show that the risk for virus occurrence is significantly higher in areas closer to commercial poultry farms. Although the active surveillance systems have been successful in detecting LPAIV-positive backyard farms and wild birds in Argentina, our predictions suggest that surveillance efforts in those compartments could be improved by including high-risk areas identified by our model. Our research provides a tool to guide surveillance activities in the future, and presents a mixed methodological approach which could be implemented in areas where the disease is exotic or rare and a knowledge-driven modelling method is necessary.

Avian influenza

Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.

Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): low pathogenic avian influenza

Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of LPAI to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of LPAI according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to LPAI. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective levels. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, LPAI can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in Sections 3 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (c) and (e) of Article 9(1). The animal species to be listed for LPAI according to Article 8(3) criteria are all species of domestic poultry and wild species of mainly Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, as indicated in the present opinion.

Agroterrorism targeting livestock: a review with a focus on early detection systems

Agroterrorism targeting livestock can be described as the intentional introduction of an animal disease agent against livestock with the purpose of causing economic damage, disrupting socioeconomic stability of a country, and creating panic and distress. This type of terrorism can be alluring to terrorists because animal disease agents are easily available. This review addresses the vulnerabilities of the livestock industry to agroterrorism. However, we also show that early detection systems have recently been developed for agroterrorism and deliberate spread of animal pathogens in livestock, including an agroterrorism intelligence cycle, syndromic surveillance programs, and computer-based clinical decision support systems that can be used for early detection of notifiable animal diseases. The development of DIVA-vaccines in the past 10 to 15 years has created, in principle, an excellent response instrument to counter intentional animal disease outbreaks. These developments have made our animal agriculture less vulnerable to agroterrorism. But we cannot relax; there are still many challenges, in particular with respect to integration of first line of defense, law enforcement, and early detection systems for animal diseases.

Design and results of an intensive monitoring programme for avian influenza in meat-type turkey flocks during four epidemics in northern Italy

Surveillance programmes for low pathogenicity (LPAI) and high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) infections in poultry are compulsory for EU Member States; yet, these programmes have rarely been evaluated. In Italy, following a 1999 HPAI epidemic, control measures, including vaccination and monitoring, were implemented in the densely populated poultry area (DPPA) where all epidemics in Italy have been concentrated. We evaluated the monitoring system for its capacity to detect outbreaks rapidly in meat-type turkey flocks. The evaluation was performed in vaccination areas and high-risk areas in the DPPA, in 2000-2005, during which four epidemics occurred. Serum samples and cloacal swabs were taken from vaccinated birds and unvaccinated (sentinel) birds. We compared the detection rate of active, passive and targeted surveillance, by vaccination status, using multinomial logistic regression. A total of 13 275 samplings for serological testing and 4889 samplings for virological testing were performed; 6315 production cycles of different bird species were tested. The outbreaks detection rate in meat-type turkeys was 61% for active surveillance (n = 222/363 outbreaks), 32% for passive surveillance and 7% for targeted surveillance. The maximum likelihood predicted values for the detection rates differed by vaccination status: in unvaccinated flocks, it was 50% for active surveillance, 40% for passive surveillance and 10% for targeted surveillance, compared to respectively 79%, 17% and 4% for vaccinated flocks. Active surveillance seems to be most effective in detecting infection, especially when a vaccination programme is in place. This is the first evaluation of the effectiveness of different types of surveillance in monitoring LPAI infections in vaccinated poultry using field data.