Considerations regarding appropriate sample size for conducting ferret transmission experiments

Robustness of the Ferret Model for Influenza Risk Assessment Studies: a Cross-Laboratory Exercise

Past pandemic influenza viruses with sustained human-to-human transmissibility have emerged from animal influenza viruses. Employment of experimental models to assess the pandemic risk of emerging zoonotic influenza viruses provides critical information supporting public health efforts. Ferret transmission experiments have been utilized to predict the human-to-human transmission potential of novel influenza viruses. However, small sample sizes and a lack of standardized protocols can introduce interlaboratory variability, complicating interpretation of transmission experimental data. To assess the range of variation in ferret transmission experiments, a global exercise was conducted by 11 laboratories using two common stock H1N1 influenza viruses with different transmission characteristics in ferrets. Parameters known to affect transmission were standardized, including the inoculation route, dose, and volume, as well as a strict 1:1 donor/contact ratio for respiratory droplet transmission. Additional host and environmental parameters likely to affect influenza transmission kinetics were monitored and analyzed. The overall transmission outcomes for both viruses across 11 laboratories were concordant, suggesting the robustness of the ferret model for zoonotic influenza risk assessment. Among environmental parameters that varied across laboratories, donor-to-contact airflow directionality was associated with increased transmissibility. To attain high confidence in identifying viruses with moderate to high transmissibility or low transmissibility under a smaller number of participating laboratories, our analyses support the notion that as few as three but as many as five laboratories, respectively, would need to independently perform viral transmission experiments with concordant results. This exercise facilitates the development of a more homogenous protocol for ferret transmission experiments that are employed for the purposes of risk assessment.

Effects of Buprenorphine Treatment on Influenza Pathogenesis in the Ferret (Mustela putorius furo)

Ferrets are the gold-standard model for influenza A virus (IAV) research due to their natural susceptibility to human and zoonotic IAV, comparable respiratory anatomy and physiology to humans, and development of clinical signs similar to those seen in infected people. Because the presence and progression of clinical signs can be useful in infectious disease research, uncertainty in how analgesics alter research outcomes or compromise characteristics of disease progression have outweighed the concern regarding animal discomfort from these symptoms. Nonetheless, the principles of animal research require consideration of refinements for this important model for IAV research. Opioids offer a possible refinement option that would not directly affect the inflammatory cascade involved in IAV infection. Mirroring pathogenicity studies that use ferrets, 12 ferrets were inoculated intranasally with the A(H3N2) IAV A/Panama/2007/1999 and divided into 3 treatment groups ( n = 4 each), of which 2 groups received buprenorphine treatments on different schedules and the third received a saline control. The duration and location of viral replication, lymphohematopoietic changes, and clinical signs were comparable across all groups at all time points. High quantities of infectious virus in nasal wash specimens were detected in ferrets from all groups through day 5 after inoculation, and peak viral titers from the upper respiratory tract did not differ between ferrets receiving buprenorphine treatments on either schedule. Compared with the saline group, ferrets receiving buprenorphine exhibited transient weight loss and pyrexia, but all groups ultimately achieved similar peaks in both of these measurements. Collectively, these findings support the continued evaluation of buprenorphine as a refinement for IAV-challenged ferrets.

Secondary infection with Streptococcus pneumoniae decreases influenza virus replication and is linked to severe disease

Secondary bacterial infection is a common complication in severe influenza virus infections. During the H1N1 pandemic of 2009, increased mortality was observed among healthy young adults due to secondary bacterial pneumonia, one of the most frequent bacterial species being Streptococcus pneumoniae (Spn). Previous studies in mice and ferrets have suggested a synergistic relationship between Spn and influenza viruses. In this study, the ferret model was used to examine whether secondary Spn infection (strains BHN97 and D39) influence replication and airborne transmission of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (H1N1pdm09). Secondary infection with Spn after H1N1pdm09 infection consistently resulted in a significant decrease in viral titers in the ferret nasal washes. While secondary Spn infection appeared to negatively impact influenza virus replication, animals precolonized with Spn were equally susceptible to H1N1pdm09 airborne transmission. In line with previous work, ferrets with preceding H1N1pdm09 and secondary Spn infection had increased bacterial loads and more severe clinical symptoms as compared to animals infected with H1N1pdm09 or Spn alone. Interestingly, the donor animals that displayed the most severe clinical symptoms had reduced airborne transmission of H1N1pdm09. Based on these data, we propose an asymmetrical relationship between these two pathogens, rather than a synergistic one, since secondary bacterial infection enhances Spn colonization and pathogenesis but decreases viral titers.

Transmissibility and transmission of respiratory viruses

Human respiratory virus infections lead to a spectrum of respiratory symptoms and disease severity, contributing to substantial morbidity, mortality and economic losses worldwide, as seen in the COVID-19 pandemic. Belonging to diverse families, respiratory viruses differ in how easy they spread (transmissibility) and the mechanism (modes) of transmission. Transmissibility as estimated by the basic reproduction number (R₀) or secondary attack rate is heterogeneous for the same virus. Respiratory viruses can be transmitted via four major modes of transmission: direct (physical) contact, indirect contact (fomite), (large) droplets and (fine) aerosols. We know little about the relative contribution of each mode to the transmission of a particular virus in different settings, and how its variation affects transmissibility and transmission dynamics. Discussion on the particle size threshold between droplets and aerosols and the importance of aerosol transmission for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and influenza virus is ongoing. Mechanistic evidence supports the efficacies of non-pharmaceutical interventions with regard to virus reduction; however, more data are needed on their effectiveness in reducing transmission. Understanding the relative contribution of different modes to transmission is crucial to inform the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions in the population. Intervening against multiple modes of transmission should be more effective than acting on a single mode.

Pathogenesis and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in golden hamsters

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a novel coronavirus with high nucleotide identity to SARS-CoV and to SARS-related coronaviruses that have been detected in horseshoe bats, has spread across the world and had a global effect on healthcare systems and economies^1,2. A suitable small animal model is needed to support the development of vaccines and therapies. Here we report the pathogenesis and transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 in golden (Syrian) hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus). Immunohistochemistry assay demonstrated the presence of viral antigens in nasal mucosa, bronchial epithelial cells and areas of lung consolidation on days 2 and 5 after inoculation with SARS-CoV-2, followed by rapid viral clearance and pneumocyte hyperplasia at 7 days after inoculation. We also found viral antigens in epithelial cells of the duodenum, and detected viral RNA in faeces. Notably, SARS-CoV-2 was transmitted efficiently from inoculated hamsters to naive hamsters by direct contact and via aerosols. Transmission via fomites in soiled cages was not as efficient. Although viral RNA was continuously detected in the nasal washes of inoculated hamsters for 14 days, the communicable period was short and correlated with the detection of infectious virus but not viral RNA. Inoculated and naturally infected hamsters showed apparent weight loss on days 6-7 post-inoculation or post-contact; all hamsters returned to their original weight within 14 days and developed neutralizing antibodies. Our results suggest that features associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in golden hamsters resemble those found in humans with mild SARS-CoV-2 infections.

Ferrets as Models for Influenza Virus Transmission Studies and Pandemic Risk Assessments

The ferret transmission model is extensively used to assess the pandemic potential of emerging influenza viruses, yet experimental conditions and reported results vary among laboratories. Such variation can be a critical consideration when contextualizing results from independent risk-assessment studies of novel and emerging influenza viruses. To streamline interpretation of data generated in different laboratories, we provide a consensus on experimental parameters that define risk-assessment experiments of influenza virus transmissibility, including disclosure of variables known or suspected to contribute to experimental variability in this model, and advocate adoption of more standardized practices. We also discuss current limitations of the ferret transmission model and highlight continued refinements and advances to this model ongoing in laboratories. Understanding, disclosing, and standardizing the critical parameters of ferret transmission studies will improve the comparability and reproducibility of pandemic influenza risk assessment and increase the statistical power and, perhaps, accuracy of this model.

Viral factors in influenza pandemic risk assessment

The threat of an influenza A virus pandemic stems from continual virus spillovers from reservoir species, a tiny fraction of which spark sustained transmission in humans. To date, no pandemic emergence of a new influenza strain has been preceded by detection of a closely related precursor in an animal or human. Nonetheless, influenza surveillance efforts are expanding, prompting a need for tools to assess the pandemic risk posed by a detected virus. The goal would be to use genetic sequence and/or biological assays of viral traits to identify those non-human influenza viruses with the greatest risk of evolving into pandemic threats, and/or to understand drivers of such evolution, to prioritize pandemic prevention or response measures. We describe such efforts, identify progress and ongoing challenges, and discuss three specific traits of influenza viruses (hemagglutinin receptor binding specificity, hemagglutinin pH of activation, and polymerase complex efficiency) that contribute to pandemic risk.

Using the Ferret as an Animal Model for Investigating Influenza Antiviral Effectiveness

The concern of the emergence of a pandemic influenza virus has sparked an increased effort toward the development and testing of novel influenza antivirals. Central to this is the animal model of influenza infection, which has played an important role in understanding treatment effectiveness and the effect of antivirals on host immune responses. Among the different animal models of influenza, ferrets can be considered the most suitable for antiviral studies as they display most of the human-like symptoms following influenza infections, they can be infected with human influenza virus without prior viral adaptation and have the ability to transmit influenza virus efficiently between one another. However, an accurate assessment of the effectiveness of an antiviral treatment in ferrets is dependent on three major experimental considerations encompassing firstly, the volume and titer of virus, and the route of viral inoculation. Secondly, the route and dose of drug administration, and lastly, the different methods used to assess clinical symptoms, viral shedding kinetics and host immune responses in the ferrets. A good understanding of these areas is necessary to achieve data that can accurately inform the human use of influenza antivirals. In this review, we discuss the current progress and the challenges faced in these three major areas when using the ferret model to measure influenza antiviral effectiveness.

Animal models for influenza virus transmission studies: a historical perspective

Animal models are used to simulate, under experimental conditions, the complex interactions among host, virus, and environment that affect the person-to-person spread of influenza viruses. The three species that have been most frequently employed, both past and present, as influenza virus transmission models-ferrets, mice, and guinea pigs-have each provided unique insights into the factors governing the efficiency with which these viruses pass from an infected host to a susceptible one. This review will highlight a few of these noteworthy discoveries, with a particular focus on the historical contexts in which each model was developed and the advantages and disadvantages of each species with regard to the study of influenza virus transmission among mammals.

Cross-protection against H7N9 influenza strains using a live-attenuated H7N3 virus vaccine

In 2013, avian H7N9 influenza viruses were detected infecting people in China resulting in high mortality. Influenza H7 vaccines that provide cross-protection against these new viruses are needed until specific H7N9 vaccines are ready to market. In this study, an available H7N3 cold-adapted, temperature sensitive, live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) elicited protective immune responses in ferrets against H7N9 viruses. The H7N3 LAIV administered alone (by intranasal or subcutaneous administration) or in a prime-boost strategy using inactivated H7N9 virus resulted in high HAI titers and protected 100% of the animals against H7N9 challenge. Naïve ferrets passively administered immune serum from H7N3 LAIV infected animals were also protected. In contrast, recombinant HA protein or inactivated viruses did not protect ferrets against challenge and elicited lower antibody titers. Thus, the H7N3 LAIV vaccine was immunogenic in healthy seronegative ferrets and protected these ferrets against the newly emerged H7N9 avian influenza virus.

Identification, characterization, and natural selection of mutations driving airborne transmission of A/H5N1 virus

Recently, A/H5N1 influenza viruses were shown to acquire airborne transmissibility between ferrets upon targeted mutagenesis and virus passage. The critical genetic changes in airborne A/Indonesia/5/05 were not yet identified. Here, five substitutions proved to be sufficient to determine this airborne transmission phenotype. Substitutions in PB1 and PB2 collectively caused enhanced transcription and virus replication. One substitution increased HA thermostability and lowered the pH of membrane fusion. Two substitutions independently changed HA binding preference from α2,3-linked to α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors. The loss of a glycosylation site in HA enhanced overall binding to receptors. The acquired substitutions emerged early during ferret passage as minor variants and became dominant rapidly. Identification of substitutions that are essential for airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between ferrets and their associated phenotypes advances our fundamental understanding of virus transmission and will increase the value of future surveillance programs and public health risk assessments.

Ethical alternatives to experiments with novel potential pandemic pathogens

Please see later in the article for the Editors' Summary

Avian influenza A viruses: from zoonosis to pandemic

Zoonotic influenza A viruses originating from the animal reservoir pose a threat for humans, as they have the ability to trigger pandemics upon adaptation to and invasion of an immunologically naive population. Of particular concern are the H5N1 viruses that continue to circulate in poultry in numerous countries in Europe, Asia and Africa, and the recently emerged H7N9 viruses in China, due to their relatively high number of human fatalities and pandemic potential. To start a pandemic, zoonotic influenza A viruses should not only acquire the ability to attach to, enter and replicate in the critical target cells in the respiratory tract of the new host, but also efficiently spread between humans by aerosol or respiratory droplet transmission. Here, we discuss the latest advances on the genetic and phenotypic determinants required for avian influenza A viruses to adapt to and transmit between mammals.

Animal models for influenza virus pathogenesis, transmission, and immunology

In humans, infection with an influenza A or B virus manifests typically as an acute and self-limited upper respiratory tract illness characterized by fever, cough, sore throat, and malaise. However, influenza can present along a broad spectrum of disease, ranging from sub-clinical or even asymptomatic infection to a severe primary viral pneumonia requiring advanced medical supportive care. Disease severity depends upon the virulence of the influenza virus strain and the immune competence and previous influenza exposures of the patient. Animal models are used in influenza research not only to elucidate the viral and host factors that affect influenza disease outcomes in and spread among susceptible hosts, but also to evaluate interventions designed to prevent or reduce influenza morbidity and mortality in man. This review will focus on the three animal models currently used most frequently in influenza virus research - mice, ferrets, and guinea pigs - and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each.

Role of receptor binding specificity in influenza A virus transmission and pathogenesis

The recent emergence of a novel avian A/H7N9 influenza virus in poultry and humans in China, as well as laboratory studies on adaptation and transmission of avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses, has shed new light on influenza virus adaptation to mammals. One of the biological traits required for animal influenza viruses to cross the species barrier that received considerable attention in animal model studies, in vitro assays, and structural analyses is receptor binding specificity. Sialylated glycans present on the apical surface of host cells can function as receptors for the influenza virus hemagglutinin (HA) protein. Avian and human influenza viruses typically have a different sialic acid (SA)-binding preference and only few amino acid changes in the HA protein can cause a switch from avian to human receptor specificity. Recent experiments using glycan arrays, virus histochemistry, animal models, and structural analyses of HA have added a wealth of knowledge on receptor binding specificity. Here, we review recent data on the interaction between influenza virus HA and SA receptors of the host, and the impact on virus host range, pathogenesis, and transmission. Remaining challenges and future research priorities are also discussed.

Host adaptation and transmission of influenza A viruses in mammals

A wide range of influenza A viruses of pigs and birds have infected humans in the last decade, sometimes with severe clinical consequences. Each of these so-called zoonotic infections provides an opportunity for virus adaptation to the new host. Fortunately, most of these human infections do not yield viruses with the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission. However, animal influenza viruses have acquired the ability of sustained transmission between humans to cause pandemics on rare occasions in the past, and therefore, influenza virus zoonoses continue to represent threats to public health. Numerous recent studies have shed new light on the mechanisms of adaptation and transmission of avian and swine influenza A viruses in mammals. In particular, several studies provided insights into the genetic and phenotypic traits of influenza A viruses that may determine airborne transmission. Here, we summarize recent studies on molecular determinants of virulence and adaptation of animal influenza A virus and discuss the phenotypic traits associated with airborne transmission of newly emerging influenza A viruses. Increased understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of virulence and transmission may aid in assessing the risks posed by animal influenza viruses to human health, and preparedness for such risks.

Avian influenza virus transmission to mammals

Influenza A viruses cause yearly epidemics and occasional pandemics. In addition, zoonotic influenza A viruses sporadically infect humans and may cause severe respiratory disease and fatalities. Fortunately, most of these viruses do not have the ability to be efficiently spread among humans via aerosols or respiratory droplets (airborne transmission) and to subsequently cause a pandemic. However, adaptation of these zoonotic viruses to humans by mutation or reassortment with human influenza A viruses may result in airborne transmissible viruses with pandemic potential. Although our knowledge of factors that affect mammalian adaptation and transmissibility of influenza viruses is still limited, we are beginning to understand some of the biological traits that drive airborne transmission of influenza viruses among mammals. Increased understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of airborne transmission may aid in assessing the risks posed by avian influenza viruses to human health, and preparedness for such risks. This chapter summarizes recent discoveries on the genetic and phenotypic traits required for avian influenza viruses to become airborne transmissible between mammals.