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Aronson JK. When I use a word . . . Medical definitions: Pharmacovigilant surveillance. BMJ 2023; 381:980. [PMID: 37116902 DOI: 10.1136/bmj.p980] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/30/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Jeffrey K Aronson
- Centre for Evidence Based Medicine, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Lin M, Chen H, Jia L, Yang M, Qiu S, Song H, Wang L, Zheng T. Using a grey relational analysis in an improved Grunow-Finke assessment tool to detect unnatural epidemics. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2022; 43:1508-1517. [PMID: 36100578 DOI: 10.1111/risa.14016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
The Grunow-Finke epidemiological assessment tool (GFT) has several limitations in its ability to differentiate between natural and man-made epidemics. Our study aimed to improve the GFT and analyze historical epidemics to validate the model. Using a gray relational analysis (GRA), we improved the GFT by revising the existing standards and adding five new standards. We then removed the artificial weights and final decision threshold. Finally, by using typically unnatural epidemic events as references, we used the GRA to calculate the unnatural probability and obtain assessment results. Using the advanced tool, we conducted retrospective and case analyses to test its performance. In the validation set of 13 historical epidemics, unnatural and natural epidemics were divided into two categories near the unnatural probability of 45%, showing evident differences (p < 0.01) and an assessment accuracy close to 100%. The unnatural probabilities of the Ebola virus disease of 2013 and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome of 2012 were 30.6% and 36.1%, respectively. Our advanced epidemic assessment tool improved the accuracy of the original GFT from approximately 55% to approximately 100% and reduced the impact of human factors on these outcomes effectively.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mengxuan Lin
- Academy of Military Medical Sciences, Academy of Military Science of Chinese PLA, Beijing, China
| | - Hui Chen
- Department of Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Center for Disease Control and Prevention of Chinese People's Liberation Army, Beijing, China
| | - Leili Jia
- Department of Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Center for Disease Control and Prevention of Chinese People's Liberation Army, Beijing, China
| | - Mingjuan Yang
- Department of Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Center for Disease Control and Prevention of Chinese People's Liberation Army, Beijing, China
| | - Shaofu Qiu
- Department of Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Center for Disease Control and Prevention of Chinese People's Liberation Army, Beijing, China
| | - Hongbin Song
- Department of Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Center for Disease Control and Prevention of Chinese People's Liberation Army, Beijing, China
| | - Ligui Wang
- Department of Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Center for Disease Control and Prevention of Chinese People's Liberation Army, Beijing, China
| | - Tao Zheng
- Academy of Military Medical Sciences, Academy of Military Science of Chinese PLA, Beijing, China
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Miro S, Kaufman SG. Anthrax in New Jersey: A Health Education Experience in Bioterrorism Response and Preparedness. Health Promot Pract 2016; 6:430-6. [PMID: 16210685 DOI: 10.1177/1524839904263673] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
The anthrax attack in 2001 created new challenges to health educators working on the response effort in New Jersey. Never before had there been a need for educating a group of people who had been exposed to a biological weapon. Coming on the heels of the catastrophic World Trade Center collapse on September 11, 2001, the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services was entrenched in the response to, and management of, the anthrax attack that placed a heavy emphasis on educating the postal workers of the United States Postal Service Trenton Processing and Distribution Center. This article provides an account of the preparation and delivery of educational materials and activities in the midst of a biological emergency, emphasizes the role health educators play in responding to bioterrorism events, and encourages health educators to become involved in bioterrorism preparedness efforts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Suzanne Miro
- New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services in the Communicable Disease Service in Trenton, New Jersey, USA
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Tambo E, Ai L, Zhou X, Chen JH, Hu W, Bergquist R, Guo JG, Utzinger J, Tanner M, Zhou XN. Surveillance-response systems: the key to elimination of tropical diseases. Infect Dis Poverty 2014; 3:17. [PMID: 24971165 PMCID: PMC4071800 DOI: 10.1186/2049-9957-3-17] [Citation(s) in RCA: 82] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2014] [Accepted: 05/09/2014] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Tropical diseases remain a major cause of morbidity and mortality in developing countries. Although combined health efforts brought about significant improvements over the past 20 years, communities in resource-constrained settings lack the means of strengthening their environment in directions that would provide less favourable conditions for pathogens. Still, the impact of infectious diseases is declining worldwide along with progress made regarding responses to basic health problems and improving health services delivery to the most vulnerable populations. The London Declaration on Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs), initiated by the World Health Organization's NTD roadmap, set out the path towards control and eventual elimination of several tropical diseases by 2020, providing an impetus for local and regional disease elimination programmes. Tropical diseases are often patchy and erratic, and there are differing priorities in resources-limited and endemic countries at various levels of their public health systems. In order to identify and prioritize strategic research on elimination of tropical diseases, the 'First Forum on Surveillance-Response System Leading to Tropical Diseases Elimination' was convened in Shanghai in June 2012. Current strategies and the NTD roadmap were reviewed, followed by discussions on how to identify and critically examine prevailing challenges and opportunities, including inter-sectoral collaboration and approaches for elimination of several infectious, tropical diseases. A priority research agenda within a 'One Health-One World' frame of global health was developed, including (i) the establishment of a platform for resource-sharing and effective surveillance-response systems for Asia Pacific and Africa with an initial focus on elimination of lymphatic filariasis, malaria and schistosomiasis; (ii) development of new strategies, tools and approaches, such as improved diagnostics and antimalarial therapies; (iii) rigorous validation of surveillance-response systems; and (iv) designing pilot studies to transfer Chinese experiences of successful surveillance-response systems to endemic countries with limited resources.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ernest Tambo
- National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
- Biochemistry Department, Center for Sustainable Malaria Control, Faculty of Natural & Agricultural Sciences, University of Pretoria, Hatfield 0028, South Africa
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Malaria, Schistosomiasis and Filariasis, Key Laboratory of Parasite and Vector Biology, Ministry of Health, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
| | - Lin Ai
- National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Malaria, Schistosomiasis and Filariasis, Key Laboratory of Parasite and Vector Biology, Ministry of Health, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
| | - Xia Zhou
- National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
- Sochow University, Suzhou 215123, People’s Republic of China
| | - Jun-Hu Chen
- National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Malaria, Schistosomiasis and Filariasis, Key Laboratory of Parasite and Vector Biology, Ministry of Health, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
| | - Wei Hu
- National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
- School of Life Science, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, People’s Republic of China
| | | | - Jia-Gang Guo
- National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
- Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, World Health Organization, Avenue Appia 20, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Jürg Utzinger
- Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, P.O. Box, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland
- University of Basel, P.O. Box, CH-4003 Basel, Switzerland
| | - Marcel Tanner
- Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, P.O. Box, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland
- University of Basel, P.O. Box, CH-4003 Basel, Switzerland
| | - Xiao-Nong Zhou
- National Institute of Parasitic Diseases, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Malaria, Schistosomiasis and Filariasis, Key Laboratory of Parasite and Vector Biology, Ministry of Health, Shanghai 200025, People’s Republic of China
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5
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Multigeneration cross contamination of mail with Bacillus species spores by tumbling. Appl Environ Microbiol 2010; 76:4797-804. [PMID: 20511424 DOI: 10.1128/aem.02978-09] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
In 2001, envelopes loaded with Bacillus anthracis spores were mailed to Senators Daschle and Leahy as well as to the New York Post and NBC News buildings. Additional letters may have been mailed to other news agencies because there was confirmed anthrax infection of employees at these locations. These events heightened the awareness of the lack of understanding of the mechanism(s) by which objects contaminated with a biological agent might spread disease. This understanding is crucial for the estimation of the potential for exposure to ensure the appropriate response in the event of future attacks. In this study, equipment to simulate interactions between envelopes and procedures to analyze the spread of spores from a "payload" envelope (i.e., loaded internally with a powdered spore preparation) onto neighboring envelopes were developed. Another process to determine whether an aerosol could be generated by opening contaminated envelopes was developed. Subsequent generations of contaminated envelopes originating from a single payload envelope showed a consistent two-log decrease in the number of spores transferred from one generation to the next. Opening a tertiary contaminated envelope resulted in an aerosol containing 10(3) B. anthracis spores. We developed a procedure for sampling contaminated letters by a nondestructive method aimed at providing information useful for consequence management while preserving the integrity of objects contaminated during the incident and preserving evidence for law enforcement agencies.
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Quinn SC, Thomas T, Kumar S. The anthrax vaccine and research: reactions from postal workers and public health professionals. Biosecur Bioterror 2008; 6:321-33. [PMID: 19117431 PMCID: PMC2963592 DOI: 10.1089/bsp.2007.0064] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022]
Abstract
During the 2001 anthrax attacks, public health agencies faced operational and communication decisions about the use of antibiotic prophylaxis and the anthrax vaccine with affected groups, including postal workers. This communication occurred within an evolving situation with incomplete and uncertain data. Guidelines for prophylactic antibiotics changed several times, contributing to confusion and mistrust. At the end of 60 days of taking antibiotics, people were offered an additional 40 days' supply of antibiotics, with or without the anthrax vaccine, the former constituting an investigational new drug protocol. Using data from interviews and focus groups with 65 postal workers in 3 sites and structured interviews with 16 public health professionals, this article examines the challenges for public health professionals who were responsible for communication with postal workers about the vaccine. Multiple factors affected the response, including a lack of trust, risk perception, disagreement about the recommendation, and the controversy over the military's use of the vaccine. Some postal workers reacted with suspicion to the vaccine offer, believing that they were the subjects of research, and some African American workers specifically drew an analogy to the Tuskegee syphilis study. The consent forms required for the protocol heightened mistrust. Postal workers also had complex and ambivalent responses to additional research on their health. The anthrax attacks present us with an opportunity to understand the challenges of communication in the context of uncertain science and suggest key strategies that may improve communications about vaccines and other drugs authorized for experimental use in future public health emergencies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sandra Crouse Quinn
- Department of Behavioral and Community Health Services, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15261, USA.
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Potter MA, Sweeney P, Iuliano AD, Allswede MP. Performance indicators for response to selected infectious disease outbreaks: a review of the published record. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE 2007; 13:510-8. [PMID: 17762697 DOI: 10.1097/01.phh.0000285205.40964.28] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
The purpose of this study was to determine whether published reports of infectious disease outbreaks could serve as a source of evidence for public health practice, particularly in responding to bioterrorism. Such performance indicators are measures of practice and process that lead to optimal health outcomes. We collected data from 116 individual articles that described 59 outbreaks of eight different pathogens with potential for bioterrorist use. Analysis of these reports determined whether they addressed 12 process indicators and four outcome indicators--each generally recognized as a component of effective outbreak response. The results showed that outbreak reports typically included information about these process and outcome indicators, thus validating their practical importance. However, few reports had been written with specificity to document the chronology of outbreak response, or the dissemination of information to protect healthcare workers, or the communication with law enforcement and emergency operations that are important in response to bioterrorism. We conclude that the published record of infectious disease outbreaks can, in the future, be used as a source for practice-based evidence if agreed-upon measures for effective performance become standard components of outbreak reports.
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Affiliation(s)
- Margaret A Potter
- Center for Public Health Practice, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260, USA.
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Staats HF, Alam SM, Scearce RM, Kirwan SM, Zhang JX, Gwinn WM, Haynes BF. In vitro and in vivo characterization of anthrax anti-protective antigen and anti-lethal factor monoclonal antibodies after passive transfer in a mouse lethal toxin challenge model to define correlates of immunity. Infect Immun 2007; 75:5443-52. [PMID: 17709410 PMCID: PMC2168269 DOI: 10.1128/iai.00529-07] [Citation(s) in RCA: 52] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Passive transfer of antibody may be useful for preexposure prophylaxis against biological agents used as weapons of terror, such as Bacillus anthracis. Studies were performed to evaluate the ability of anthrax antiprotective antigen (anti-PA) and antilethal factor (anti-LF) neutralizing monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) to protect against an anthrax lethal toxin (LeTx) challenge in a mouse model and to identify correlates of immunity to LeTx challenge. Despite having similar affinities for their respective antigens, anti-PA (3F11) and anti-LF (9A11), passive transfer of up to 1.5 mg of anti-PA 3F11 mAb did not provide significant protection when transferred to mice 24 h before LeTx challenge, while passive transfer of as low as 0.375 mg of anti-LF 9A11 did provide significant protection. Serum collected 24 h after passive transfer had LeTx-neutralizing activity when tested using a standard LeTx neutralization assay, but neutralization titers measured using this assay did not correlate with protection against LeTx challenge. However, measurement of LeTx-neutralizing serum responses with an LeTx neutralization assay in vitro employing the addition of LeTx to J774A.1 cells 15 min before the addition of the serum did result in neutralization titers that correlated with protection against LeTx challenge. Our results demonstrate that only the LeTx neutralization titers measured utilizing the addition of LeTx to J774A.1 cells 15 min before the addition of sample correlated with protection in vivo. Thus, this LeTx neutralization assay may be a more biologically relevant neutralization assay to predict the in vivo protective capacity of LeTx-neutralizing antibodies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Herman F Staats
- Department of Pathology, Box 3712, DUMC, Durham, NC 27710, USA.
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Dembek ZF, Kortepeter MG, Pavlin JA. Discernment between deliberate and natural infectious disease outbreaks. Epidemiol Infect 2007; 135:353-71. [PMID: 16893485 PMCID: PMC2870591 DOI: 10.1017/s0950268806007011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/24/2006] [Indexed: 11/05/2022] Open
Abstract
Public health authorities should be vigilant to the potential for outbreaks deliberately caused by biological agents (bioterrorism). Such events require a rapid response and incorporation of non-traditional partners for disease investigation and outbreak control. The astute application of infectious disease epidemiological principles can promote an enhanced index of suspicion for such events. We discuss epidemiological indicators that should be considered during outbreak investigations, and also examine their application during bioterrorism incidents, an accidental release of an agent, outbreaks of infections that were alleged to have been deliberately initiated, and a model scenario. The Grunow & Finke epidemiological assessment tool is used to examine these historical events and the model scenario. The results received from this analysis, coupled with an understanding of epidemiological clues to unnatural events, and knowledge of how to manage such events, can aid in the improved response and resolution of epidemics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Z F Dembek
- Department of Medicine, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, MD 21702, USA.
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Uscher-Pines L, Bookbinder SH, Miro S, Burke T. From Bioterrorism Exercise to Real-life Public Health Crisis. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE 2007; 13:16-22. [PMID: 17149095 DOI: 10.1097/00124784-200701000-00004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Although public health agencies routinely operate hotlines to communicate key messages to the public, they are rarely evaluated to improve hotline management. Since its creation in 2003, the New Jersey Department of Health & Senior Services' Emergency Communications Center has confronted two large-scale incidents that have tested its capabilities in this area. The influenza vaccine shortage of 2004 and the April 2005 TOPOFF 3 full-scale bioterrorism exercise provided both real-life and simulated crisis situations from which to derive general insights into the strengths and weaknesses of hotline administration. This article identifies problems in the areas of staff and message management by analyzing call volume data and the qualitative observations of group feedback sessions and semistructured interviews with hotline staff. It also makes recommendations based on lessons learned to improve future hotline operations in public health emergencies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lori Uscher-Pines
- Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland 21205, USA.
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Quinn SC, Thomas T, McAllister C. Postal workers' perspectives on communication during the anthrax attack. Biosecur Bioterror 2006; 3:207-15. [PMID: 16181043 DOI: 10.1089/bsp.2005.3.207] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022]
Abstract
In 2001, the nation experienced its first bioterrorism attack, in the form of anthrax sent through the U.S. Postal Service, and public health professionals were challenged to communicate with a critical audience, U.S. postal workers. Postal workers, the first cohort to receive public health messages during a bioterrorist crisis, offer a crucial viewpoint that can be used in the development of best practices in crisis and emergency risk communication. This article reports results of qualitative interviews and focus groups with 65 postal workers employed at three facilities: Trenton, New Jersey; New York City; and Washington, DC. The social context and changing messages were among the factors that damaged trust between postal workers and public health professionals. Lessons learned from this attack contribute to the growing body of knowledge available to guide communications experts and public health professionals charged with crisis and emergency risk communication with the public.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sandra Crouse Quinn
- Department of Behavioral and Community Health Sciences, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15261, USA.
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Abstract
The diversity of infectious disease threats currently facing humanity is unprecedented because of the remarkable emergence and reemergence of pathogens worldwide. Because of population mobility, globalization of commerce and the food supply, and the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, infections in the developing world must be addressed to prevent infections in industrialized countries. Because pathogens do not recognize national boundaries, the rapidity with which individuals can circumnavigate the globe incubating infections makes the control of communicable diseases an enormous challenge for governments as well as for the public and primary health care systems. A global strategy for dealing with infectious disease threats must be developed and implemented as soon as possible.
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Affiliation(s)
- Deirdre L Church
- Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Calgary, Faculty of Medicine, Health Sciences Centre, 3330 Hospital Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta T2N 4N1, Canada.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Julie A. Pavlin
- Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Silver Spring, Maryland, USA
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Buehler JW, Berkelman RL, Hartley DM, Peters CJ. Syndromic Surveillance. Emerg Infect Dis 2004. [DOI: 10.3201/eid1007.040125] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
| | | | - David M. Hartley
- University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
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M'ikantha NM, Southwell B, Lautenbach E. Automated laboratory reporting of infectious diseases in a climate of bioterrorism. Emerg Infect Dis 2003; 9:1053-7. [PMID: 14519239 PMCID: PMC3016787 DOI: 10.3201/eid0909.020486] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
While newly available electronic transmission methods can increase timeliness and completeness of infectious disease reports, limitations of this technology may unintentionally compromise detection of, and response to, bioterrorism and other outbreaks. We reviewed implementation experiences for five electronic laboratory systems and identified problems with data transmission, sensitivity, specificity, and user interpretation. The results suggest a need for backup transmission methods, validation, standards, preserving human judgment in the process, and provider and end-user involvement. As illustrated, challenges encountered in deployment of existing electronic laboratory reporting systems could guide further refinement and advances in infectious disease surveillance.
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Jernigan DB, Raghunathan PL, Bell BP, Brechner R, Bresnitz EA, Butler JC, Cetron M, Cohen M, Doyle T, Fischer M, Greene C, Griffith KS, Guarner J, Hadler JL, Hayslett JA, Meyer R, Petersen LR, Phillips M, Pinner R, Popovic T, Quinn CP, Reefhuis J, Reissman D, Rosenstein N, Schuchat A, Shieh WJ, Siegal L, Swerdlow DL, Tenover FC, Traeger M, Ward JW, Weisfuse I, Wiersma S, Yeskey K, Zaki S, Ashford DA, Perkins BA, Ostroff S, Hughes J, Fleming D, Koplan JP, Gerberding JL. Investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax, United States, 2001: epidemiologic findings. Emerg Infect Dis 2002; 8:1019-28. [PMID: 12396909 PMCID: PMC2730292 DOI: 10.3201/eid0810.020353] [Citation(s) in RCA: 419] [Impact Index Per Article: 19.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
In October 2001, the first inhalational anthrax case in the United States since 1976 was identified in a media company worker in Florida. A national investigation was initiated to identify additional cases and determine possible exposures to Bacillus anthracis. Surveillance was enhanced through health-care facilities, laboratories, and other means to identify cases, which were defined as clinically compatible illness with laboratory-confirmed B. anthracis infection. From October 4 to November 20, 2001, 22 cases of anthrax (11 inhalational, 11 cutaneous) were identified; 5 of the inhalational cases were fatal. Twenty (91%) case-patients were either mail handlers or were exposed to worksites where contaminated mail was processed or received. B. anthracis isolates from four powder-containing envelopes, 17 specimens from patients, and 106 environmental samples were indistinguishable by molecular subtyping. Illness and death occurred not only at targeted worksites, but also along the path of mail and in other settings. Continued vigilance for cases is needed among health-care providers and members of the public health and law enforcement communities.
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Greene CM, Reefhuis J, Tan C, Fiore AE, Goldstein S, Beach MJ, Redd SC, Valiante D, Burr G, Buehler J, Pinner RW, Bresnitz E, Bell BP. Epidemiologic investigations of bioterrorism-related anthrax, New Jersey, 2001. Emerg Infect Dis 2002; 8:1048-55. [PMID: 12396914 PMCID: PMC2730296 DOI: 10.3201/eid0810.020329] [Citation(s) in RCA: 43] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
At least four Bacillus anthracis-containing envelopes destined for New York City and Washington, D.C. were processed at the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center (PDC) on September 18 and October 9, 2001. When cutaneous anthrax was confirmed in a Trenton postal worker, the PDC was closed. Four cutaneous and two inhalational anthrax cases were identified. Five patients were hospitalized; none died. Four were PDC employees; the others handled or received mail processed there. Onset dates occurred in two clusters following envelope processing at the PDC. The attack rate among the 170 employees present when the B. anthracis-containing letters were sorted on October 9 was 1.2%. Of 137 PDC environmental samples, 57 (42%) were positive. Five (10%) of 50 local post offices each yielded one positive sample. Cutaneous or inhalational anthrax developed in four postal employees at a facility where B. anthracis-containing letters were processed. Cross-contaminated mail or equipment was the likely source of infection in two other case-patients with cutaneous anthrax.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carolyn M Greene
- Centers for Desease Control and Prevention , Atlanta, Georgia 30333, USA.
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