When planning results in loss of control: intention-based reflexivity and working-memory

Instructional load induces functional connectivity changes linked to task automaticity and mnemonic preference

Learning new rules rapidly and effectively via instructions is ubiquitous in our daily lives, yet the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms are complex. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging we examined the effects of different instructional load conditions (4 vs. 10 stimulus-response rules) on functional couplings during rule implementation (always 4 rules). Focusing on connections of lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) regions, the results emphasized an opposing trend of load-related changes in LPFC-seeded couplings. On the one hand, during the low-load condition LPFC regions were more strongly coupled with cortical areas mostly assigned to networks such as the fronto-parietal network and the dorsal attention network. On the other hand, during the high-load condition, the same LPFC areas were more strongly coupled with default mode network areas. These results suggest differences in automated processing evoked by features of the instruction and an enduring response conflict mediated by lingering episodic long-term memory traces when instructional load exceeds working memory capacity limits. The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) exhibited hemispherical differences regarding whole-brain coupling and practice-related dynamics. Left VLPFC connections showed a persistent load-related effect independent of practice and were associated with 'objective' learning success in overt behavioral performance, consistent with a role in mediating the enduring influence of the initially instructed task rules. Right VLPFC's connections, in turn, were more susceptible to practice-related effects, suggesting a more flexible role possibly related to ongoing rule updating processes throughout rule implementation.

Benefits and costs of self-paced preparation of novel task instructions

Rapidly executing novel instructions is a critical ability. However, it remains unclear whether longer preparation of novel instructions improves performance, and if so, whether this link is modulated by performance benefits and costs of preparation. Regarding the first question, we reanalysed previous data on novel instruction implementation and ran Experiment 1. Experiment 1 consisted of multiple mini-blocks, in which participants prepared four novel stimulus-response (S-R) mappings in a self-paced instruction phase. After participants indicated they were ready, one of the four stimuli was presented and they responded. The reanalysis and Experiment 1 showed that longer preparation indeed led to better performance. To examine if preparation was modulated when the benefits of preparation were reduced, we presented the correct response with the stimulus on some trials in Experiments 2 and 3. Preparation was shorter when the probability that the correct response was presented with the stimulus increased. In Experiment 4, we manipulated the costs of preparation by changing the S-R mappings between the instruction and execution phases on some trials. This had only limited effects on preparation time. In conclusion, self-paced preparation of novel instructions comes with performance benefits and costs, and participants adjust their preparation strategy to the task context.

Learning the Abstract General Task Structure in a Rapidly Changing Task Content

The ability to learn abstract generalized structures of tasks is crucial for humans to adapt to changing environments and novel tasks. In a series of five experiments, we investigated this ability using a Rapid Instructed Task Learning paradigm (RITL) comprising short miniblocks, each involving two novel stimulus-response rules. Each miniblock included (a) instructions for the novel stimulus-response rules, (b) a NEXT phase involving a constant (familiar) intervening task (0–5 trials), (c) execution of the newly instructed rules (2 trials). The results show that including a NEXT phase (and hence, a prospective memory demand) led to relatively more robust abstract learning as indicated by increasingly faster responses with experiment progress. Multilevel modeling suggests that the prospective memory demand was just another aspect of the abstract task structure which has been learned.

Frontoparietal action-oriented codes support novel instruction implementation

A key aspect of human cognitive flexibility concerns the ability to convert complex symbolic instructions into novel behaviors. Previous research proposes that this transformation is supported by two neurocognitive states: an initial declarative maintenance of task knowledge, and an implementation state necessary for optimal task execution. Furthermore, current models predict a crucial role of frontal and parietal brain regions in this process. However, whether declarative and procedural signals independently contribute to implementation remains unknown. We report the results of an fMRI experiment in which participants executed novel instructed stimulus-response associations. We then used a pattern-tracking procedure to quantify the contribution of format-unique signals during instruction implementation. This revealed independent procedural and declarative representations of novel S-Rs in frontoparietal areas, prior to execution. Critically, the degree of procedural activation predicted subsequent behavioral performance. Altogether, our results suggest an important contribution of frontoparietal regions to the neural architecture that regulates cognitive flexibility.

Prioritized verbal working memory content biases ongoing action

Working memory (WM) holds information temporarily in mind, imparting the ability to guide behavior based on internal goals rather than external stimuli. However, humans often maintain WM content for a future task while performing more immediate actions. Consequently, transient WM representations may inadvertently influence ongoing (but unrelated) motor behavior. Here, we tested the impact of WM on adult human action execution and examined how the attentional or "activation" state of WM content modulates that impact. In 3 dual-task experiments, verbal WM for directional words influenced the trajectory and speed of hand movements performed during WM maintenance. This movement bias was also modulated by the attentional state of the WM content. Prioritized WM content strongly influenced actions during WM maintenance, while de-prioritized WM content was less influential. In summary, WM can unintentionally shape ongoing motor behavior, but the behavioral relevance of WM content determines the degree of influence on motor output. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Theoretical distinction between functional states in working memory and their corresponding neural states

Working memory (WM) is important for guiding behaviour, but not always for the next possible action. Here we define a WM item that is currently relevant for guiding behaviour as the functionally "active" item; whereas items maintained in WM, but not immediately relevant to behaviour, are defined as functionally "latent". Traditional neurophysiological theories of WM proposed that content is maintained via persistent neural activity (e.g., stable attractors); however, more recent theories have highlighted the potential role for "activity-silent" mechanisms (e.g., short-term synaptic plasticity). Given these somewhat parallel dichotomies, functionally active and latent cognitive states of WM have been associated with storage based on persistent-activity and activity-silent neural mechanisms, respectively. However, in this article we caution against a one-to-one correspondence between functional and activity states. We argue that the principal theoretical requirement for active and latent WM is that the corresponding neural states play qualitatively different functional roles. We consider a number of candidate solutions, and conclude that the neurophysiological mechanisms for functionally active and latent WM items are theoretically independent of the distinction between persistent activity-based and activity-silent forms of WM storage.

An Episodic Model of Task Switching Effects: Erasing the Homunculus from Memory

The Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model is a neural network for simulating human performance in speeded response time tasks. It learns with an exemplar-based memory store and it is capable of modelling findings from various subdomains of cognition. In this paper, we show how the PEP model can be designed to follow instructions (e.g., task rules and goals). The extended PEP model is then used to simulate a number of key findings from the task switching domain. These include the switch cost, task-rule congruency effects, response repetition asymmetries, cue repetition benefits, and the full pattern of means from a recent feature integration decomposition of cued task switching (Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016). We demonstrate that the PEP model fits the participant data well, that the model does not possess the flexibility to match any pattern of results, and that a number of competing task switching models fail to account for key observations that the PEP model produces naturally. Given the parsimony and unique explanatory power of the episodic account presented here, our results suggest that feature-integration biases have a far greater power in explaining task-switching performance than previously assumed.

Aftereffects and deactivation of completed prospective memory intentions: A systematic review

Prospective memory, the ability to perform an intended action in the future, is an essential aspect of goal-directed behavior. Intentions influence our behavior and shape the way we process and interact with our environment. One important question for research on prospective memory and goal-directed behavior is whether this influence stops after the intention has been completed successfully. Are intention representations deactivated from memory after their completion, and if so, how? Here, we systematically review 20 years of research on intention deactivation and so-called aftereffects of completed intentions across different research fields to offer an integrative perspective on this topic. We first introduce the currently dominant accounts of aftereffects (inhibition vs. retrieval) and illustrate the paradigms, findings, and interpretations that these accounts developed from. We then review the evidence for each account based on the extant research in these paradigms. While early studies proposed a rapid deactivation or even inhibition of completed intentions, more recent studies mostly suggested that intentions continue to be retrieved even after completion and interfere with subsequent performance. Although these accounts of aftereffects seem mutually exclusive, we will show that they might be two sides of the same coin. That is, intention deactivation and the occurrence of aftereffects are modulated by a multitude of factors that either foster a rapid deactivation or lead to continued retrieval of completed intentions. Lastly, we outline future directions and novel experimental procedures for research on mechanisms and modulators of intention deactivation and discuss practical implications of our findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

On the Assimilation of Instructions: Stimulus-response Associations are Implemented but not Stimulus-task Associations

The assimilation of instructions consists of two stages. First, a task model is formed on the basis of instructions. Second, this model is implemented, resulting in highly accessible representations, which enable reflexive behavior that guides the application of instructions. Research frequently demonstrated that instructions can lead to automatic response activation, which indicates that stimulus-response associations can be implemented on the basis of a task model. However, instructions not only indicate how to respond (stimulus-response mappings) but also when (i.e., the conditions under which mappings apply). Accordingly, we tested whether instruction implementation leads both to the activation of stimulus-response associations and of associations between stimuli and the context or task in which the instructed stimulus-response mappings are relevant (i.e., stimulus-task associations). In four experiments, we measured if implementing newly instructed stimulus-response mappings also leads to bivalence costs (i.e., shorter latencies when a stimulus can only occur in one task compared to when it can occur in two tasks), which indicate the presence of stimulus-task associations. We consistently observed automatic response activation on the basis of instructions, but no bivalence costs. A discrepancy thus exists between information conveyed in an instructed task model and the elements of that task model that are implemented. We propose that future research on automatic effects of instructions should broaden its scope and focus both on the formation of an instructed task model and its subsequent implementation.

Execution-based and verbal code-based stimulus-response associations: proportion manipulations reveal conflict adaptation processes in item-specific priming

Stimulus-response (S-R) associations consist of two independent components: Stimulus-classification (S-C) and stimulus-action (S-A) associations. Here, we examined whether these S-C and S-A associations were modulated by cognitive control operations. In two item-specific priming experiments, we systematically manipulated the proportion of trials in which item-specific S-C and/or S-A mappings repeated or switched between the single encoding (prime) and single retrieval (probe) instance of each stimulus (i.e., each stimulus appeared only twice). Thus, we assessed the influence of a list-level proportion switch manipulation on the strength of item-specific S-C and S-A associations. Participants responded slower and committed more errors when item-specific S-C or S-A mappings switched rather than repeated between prime and probe (i.e., S-C/S-A switch effects). S-C switch effects were larger when S-C repetitions rather than switches were frequent on the list-level. Similarly, S-A switch effects were modulated by S-A switch proportion. Most importantly, our findings rule out contingency learning and temporal learning as explanations of the observed results and point towards a conflict adaptation mechanism that selectively adapts the encoding and/or retrieval for each S-R component. Finally, we outline how cognitive control over S-R associations operates in the context of item-specific priming.

The instruction-based congruency effect predicts task execution efficiency: Evidence from inter- and intra-individual differences

In contrast to traditional conflict paradigms, which measure interference from (over)trained associations, recent paradigms have been introduced that investigate automatic interference from newly instructed, but never executed, associations. In these prospective-instruction paradigms, participants receive new task instructions (e.g., if cat press left, if dog press right), but before they have to apply the instructions, they are first presented with another task that measures the automatic interference from the instructed task information. The resulting instruction-based congruency (IBC) effect is assumed to reflect the strength with which instructions are encoded and maintained in view of their future application. If this assumption holds true, the IBC effect should be inversely related to the speed with which the task instructions are eventually executed. To test this hypothesis, we administered a prospective-instruction paradigm to a large sample of 184 participants and observed a negative correlation between the IBC effect and mean reaction time on the instructed task. Similarly, an analysis looking at within-subject variations in the IBC effect and instructed task reaction times showed the same negative relation. Finally, we also present additional analyses suggesting this effect is independent from standard (experience-based) interference effects, and report explorative analyses that tested possible correlations with personality trait questionaires. Together, these findings confirm a key assumption of the IBC effect in prospective-instruction paradigms, and further support the use of this paradigm in instruction research.

Rapid instructed task learning (but not automatic effects of instructions) is influenced by working memory load

The ability to efficiently perform actions immediately following instructions and without prior practice has previously been termed Rapid Instructed Task Learning (RITL). In addition, it was found that instructions are so powerful that they can produce automatic effects, reflected in activation of the instructions in an inappropriate task context. RITL is hypothesized to rely on limited working memory (WM) resources for holding not-yet implemented task rules. Similarly, automatic effects of instructions presumably reflect the operation of task rules kept in WM. Therefore, both were predicted to be influenced by WM load. However, while the involvement of WM in RITL is implicated from prior studies, evidence regarding WM involvement in instructions-based automaticity is mixed. In the current study, we manipulated WM load by increasing the number of novel task rules to be held in WM towards performance in the NEXT paradigm. In this task, participants performed a series of novel tasks presented in mini-blocks, each comprising a) instructions of novel task rules; b) a NEXT phase measuring the automatic activation of these instructed rules, in which participants advance the screen using a key-press; and c) a GO phase in which the new rules are first implemented and RITL is measured. In three experiments, we show a dissociation: While RITL (rule implementation) was impaired by increased WM load, the automatic effects of instructions were not robustly influenced by WM load. Theoretical implications are discussed.

How Does the (Re)Presentation of Instructions Influence Their Implementation?

Instructions are so effective that they can sometimes affect performance beyond the instructed context. Such 'automatic' effects of instructions (AEI) have received much interest recently. It has been argued that AEI are restricted to relatively simple and specific S-R tasks or action plans. The present study put this idea further to the test. In a series of experiments based on the NEXT paradigm (Meiran, Pereg, Kessler, Cole, & Braver, 2015a) we investigated the specificity of AEI. In Experiment 1, we presented category-response instructions instead of S-R instructions. Nevertheless, we observed AEI for novel stimuli from the instructed category (Experiment 1a), and abstractness of the category did not modulate the size of the NEXT effect (Experiment 1b). However, Experiment 2 revealed specificity at the response level: AEI were much smaller in conditions where the instructed GO response is semantically related to, but procedurally different from the required NEXT response, compared to a condition where the NEXT and GO responses were the same. Combined, these findings indicate that AEI can occur when S(C)-R instructions are abstract at the stimulus level, arguing against previous proposals. However, AEI does seem to require specificity at the response level. We discuss implications for recent theories of instruction-based learning and AEI.

Can we learn to learn? The influence of procedural working-memory training on rapid instructed-task-learning

Humans have the unique ability to efficiently execute instructions that were never practiced beforehand. In this Rapid Instructed-Task-Learning, not-yet-executed novel rules are presumably held in procedural working-memory (WM), which is assumed to hold stimulus-to-response bindings. In this study, we employed a computerized-cognitive training protocol targeting procedural WM to test this assumption and to examine whether the ability to rapidly learn novel rules can itself be learned. 175 participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: procedural WM training (involving task-switching and N-back elements, all with novel rules; Shahar and Meiran in PLoS One 10(3):e0119992, 2015), active-control training (adaptive visual-search task), and no-contact control. We examined participants' rapid instructed-task-learning abilities before and after training, by administrating 55 novel choice tasks, and measuring their performance in the first two trials (where participants had no practice). While all participants showed shorter reaction-times in post vs. pretest, only participants in the procedural WM training group did not demonstrate an increased error rate at posttest. Evidence accumulation modelling suggested that this result stems from a reduction in decision threshold (the amount of evidence that needs to be gathered to reach a decision), which was more pronounced in the control groups; possibly accompanied by an increased drift-rate (the rate of evidence accumulation) only for the training group. Implication are discussed.

Frequency of prospective use modulates instructed task-set interference

Recent studies have demonstrated that keeping an instructed task set in working memory (WM) for prospective use can interfere with behavior on an intervening task that employs shared stimuli-the prospective task-set-interference effect. One open question is whether people have strategic control over prospective task-set interference based on their expectations of whether task instructions will have to be implemented or recalled. To answer this question, we conducted two experiments that varied the likelihood with which a set of prospective task instructions would have to be implemented or recalled. Based on the hypothesis that participants are able to strategically modulate the manner in which a prospective task set is encoded in WM, we predicted that, as the frequency of implementing task instructions increased, so too would the magnitude of the prospective task-set-interference effect. We found that task instructions held in WM caused significant task-set interference, even in mostly recall conditions, but-crucially-that this interference effect scaled positively with the likelihood of having to implement the prospective set. These data suggest that task instructions are obligatorily encoded as a procedural task set, but that the degree to which this set impinges on ongoing stimulus processing is subject to some strategic control, possibly via modulation of the associations between declarative and procedural WM contents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

The role of motor imagery in learning via instructions

Learning via instructions and learning through physical practice are complementary pathways to obtain skilled performance. Whereas an initial task representation can be formed on the basis of instructions, physically practicing novel instructions leads to a shift in processing mode from controlled processing toward more automatic processing. This shift in processing mode is supposedly caused by the formation of a pragmatic task representation, which includes task parameters needed to attain skilled task execution. In between learning via instructions and physical practice, a third type of learning can be situated, motor imagery. Two experiments are reported that studied the extent to which motor imagery can enhance the application of novel instructions. A procedure was developed in which performance improvement after motor imagery could be measured for behavioral markers of processes underlying response selection (i.e., initiation time of a response sequence) and for behavioral markers of processes underlying movement execution (i.e., completion time of the response sequence). Our results suggest that whereas physical practice improves response selection and movement execution, motor imagery only improves response selection. We propose that motor imagery also leads to a shift in processing mode and to the formation of a pragmatic task representation, albeit a less detailed one as compared to the representation that is formed on the basis of physical practice.

Multiple priming instances increase the impact of practice-based but not verbal code-based stimulus-response associations

Stimulus-response (S-R) associations, the basis of learning and behavioral automaticity, are formed by the (repeated) co-occurrence of stimuli and responses and render stimuli able to automatically trigger associated responses. The strength and behavioral impact of these S-R associations increases with the number of priming instances (i.e., practice). Here we investigated whether multiple priming instances of a special form of instruction, verbal coding, also lead to the formation of stronger S-R associations in comparison to a single instance of priming. Participants either actively classified stimuli or passively attended to verbal codes denoting responses once or four times before S-R associations were probed. We found that whereas S-R associations formed on the basis of active task execution (i.e., practice) were strengthened by multiple priming instances, S-R associations formed on the basis of verbal codes (i.e., instruction) did not benefit from additional priming instances. These findings indicate difference in the mechanisms underlying the encoding and/or retrieval of previously executed and verbally coded S-R associations.

On the efficiency of instruction-based rule encoding

Instructions have long been considered a highly efficient route to knowledge acquisition especially compared to trial-and-error learning. We aimed at substantiating this claim by identifying boundary conditions for such an efficiency gain, including the influence of active learning intention, repeated instructions, and working memory load and span. Our experimental design allowed us to not only assess how well the instructed stimulus-response (S-R) rules were implemented later on, but also to directly measure prior instruction encoding processes. This revealed that instruction encoding was boosted by an active learning intention which in turn entailed better subsequent rule implementation. As should be expected, instruction-based learning took fewer trials than trial-and-error learning to reach a similar performance level. But more importantly, even when performance was measured relative to the identical number of preceding correct implementation trials, this efficiency gain persisted both in accuracy and in speed. This suggests that the naturally greater number of failed attempts in the initial phase of trial-and-error learning also negatively impacted learning in subsequent trials due to the persistence of erroneous memory traces established beforehand. A single instruction trial was sufficient to establish the advantage over trial-and-error learning but repeated instructions were better. Strategic factors and inter-individual differences in WM span - the latter exclusively affecting trial-and-error learning presumably due to the considerably more demanding working memory operations - could reduce or even abolish this advantage, but only in error rates. The same was not true for response time gains suggesting generally more efficient task automatization in instruction-based learning.

A role for proactive control in rapid instructed task learning

Humans are often remarkably fast at learning novel tasks from instructions. Such rapid instructed task learning (RITL) likely depends upon the formation of new associations between long-term memory representations, which must then be actively maintained to enable successful task implementation. Consequently, we hypothesized that RITL relies more heavily on a proactive mode of cognitive control, in which goal-relevant information is actively maintained in preparation for anticipated high control demands. We tested this hypothesis using a recently developed cognitive paradigm consisting of 60 novel tasks involving RITL and 4 practiced tasks, with identical task rules and stimuli used across both task types. A robust behavioral cost was found in novel relative to practiced task performance, which was present even when the two were randomly inter-mixed, such that task-switching effects were equated. Novelty costs were most prominent under time-limited preparation conditions. In self-paced conditions, increased preparation time was found for novel trials, and was selectively associated with enhanced performance, suggesting greater proactive control for novel tasks. These results suggest a key role for proactive cognitive control in the ability to rapidly learn novel tasks from instructions.

Cognitive control over prospective task-set interference

Recent studies have demonstrated that maintaining task-sets in working memory (WM) for prospective implementation can interfere with performance on an intervening task when the same stimulus requires incompatible responses in the ongoing versus the prospective task. This prospective task-set interference effect has previously been conceptualized as an obligatory process, resulting from instruction-based reflexivity (IBR). However, the extent to which strategic control can be exerted over interference in ongoing behavior from prospective task-sets held in WM has heretofore not been tested directly. To probe for strategic control over this effect, the authors conducted 3 experiments using a common inducer-diagnostic task design that manipulated the proportion compatibility of trials in the ongoing task. They hypothesized that if prospective task-set interference were malleable by control, participants would suppress the influence of the prospective set on ongoing processing when incompatible trials are frequent. Consistent with this prediction, the results show that prospective task-set interference is subject to modulation by strategic control such that the magnitude of interference is reduced, eliminated, or reversed in the presence of frequent incompatible trials. Thus, the influence on ongoing behavior of a prospective task-set held in WM is not obligatory, but subject to strategic control. (PsycINFO Database Record

The task novelty paradox: Flexible control of inflexible neural pathways during rapid instructed task learning

Rapid instructed task learning (RITL) is one of the most remarkable human abilities, when considered from both computational and evolutionary perspectives. A key feature of RITL is that it enables new goals to be immediately pursued (and shared) following formation of task representations. Although RITL is a form of cognitive control that engenders immense flexibility, it also seems to produce inflexible activation of action plans in inappropriate contexts. We argue that this "prepared reflex" effect arises because RITL is implemented in the brain via a "flexible hub" mechanism, in which top-down influences from the frontoparietal control network reroute pathways among procedure-implementing brain areas (e.g., perceptual and motor areas). Specifically, we suggest that RITL-based proactive control - the preparatory biasing of task-relevant functional network routes - results in inflexible associative processing, demanding compensation in the form of increased reactive (in-the-moment) control. Thus, RITL produces a computational trade-off, in which the top-down influences of flexible hubs increase overall cognitive flexibility, but at the cost of temporally localized inflexibility (the prepared reflex effect).

Neural Coding for Instruction-Based Task Sets in Human Frontoparietal and Visual Cortex

Task preparation has traditionally been thought to rely upon persistent representations of instructions that permit their execution after delays. Accumulating evidence suggests, however, that accurate retention of task knowledge can be insufficient for successful performance. Here, we hypothesized that instructed facts would be organized into a task set; a temporary coding scheme that proactively tunes sensorimotor pathways according to instructions to enable highly efficient "reflex-like" performance. We devised a paradigm requiring either implementation or memorization of novel stimulus-response mapping instructions, and used multivoxel pattern analysis of neuroimaging data to compare neural coding of instructions during the pretarget phase. Although participants could retain instructions under both demands, we observed striking differences in their representation. To-be-memorized instructions could only be decoded from mid-occipital and posterior parietal cortices, consistent with previous work on visual short-term memory storage. In contrast, to-be-implemented instructions could also be decoded from frontoparietal "multiple-demand" regions, and dedicated visual areas, implicated in processing instructed stimuli. Neural specificity in the latter moreover correlated with performance speed only when instructions were prepared, likely reflecting the preconfiguration of instructed decision circuits. Together, these data illuminate how the brain proactively optimizes performance, and help dissociate neural mechanisms supporting task control and short-term memory storage.

Toward a unified framework for research on instructions and other messages: An introduction to the special issue on the power of instructions

Instructions are known to have a profound impact on human behavior. Nevertheless, research on the effects of instructions is relatively scarce and scattered across different areas of research in psychology and neuroscience. The current issue of this journal contains six papers that review research on instructions in different research areas. In this introduction to the special issue, we provide the outline of a framework that focuses on five components that can be varied in research on this topic (sender, message, receiver, context, and outcome). The framework brings order to the boundless potential variability in research on the effects of messages (i.e., it has heuristic value) and highlights that past research explored only a tiny fraction of what is possible (i.e., it has predictive value). Moreover, it reveals that research in different areas tends to examine different instantiations of the five components. The latter observation implies that much can be gained from closer interactions between researchers from different areas.

Automatic Retrieval of Newly Instructed Cue-Task Associations Seen in Task-Conflict Effects in the First Trial after Cue-Task Instructions

Abstract. Novel stimulus-response associations are retrieved automatically even without prior practice. Is this true for novel cue-task associations? The experiment involved miniblocks comprising three phases and task switching. In the INSTRUCTION phase, two new stimuli (or familiar cues) were arbitrarily assigned as cues for up-down/right-left tasks performed on placeholder locations. In the UNIVALENT phase, there was no task cue since placeholder’s location afforded one task but the placeholders were the stimuli that we assigned as task cues for the following BIVALENT phase (involving target locations affording both tasks). Thus, participants held the novel cue-task associations in memory while executing the UNIVALENT phase. Results show poorer performance in the first univalent trial when the placeholder was associated with the opposite task (incompatible) than when it was compatible, an effect that was numerically larger with newly instructed cues than with familiar cues. These results indicate automatic retrieval of newly instructed cue-task associations.

Executive Control of Actions Across Time and Space

Many popular psychological accounts attribute adaptive human behavior to an "executive-control" system that regulates a lower-level "impulsive" or "associative" system. However, recent findings argue against this strictly hierarchical view. Instead, executive control of impulsive and inappropriate actions depends on an interplay between multiple basic cognitive processes. The outcome of these processes can be biased in advance. Executive-action control is also strongly influenced by personal experiences in the recent and distant past. Thus, executive control emerges from an interactive and competitive network. Main challenges for future research are to describe and understand these interactions and to put executive-action control in a wider sociocultural and evolutional context.

Proactive inhibitory control: A general biasing account

Flexible behavior requires a control system that can inhibit actions in response to changes in the environment. Recent studies suggest that people proactively adjust response parameters in anticipation of a stop signal. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that proactive inhibitory control involves adjusting both attentional and response settings, and we explored the relationship with other forms of proactive and anticipatory control. Subjects responded to the color of a stimulus. On some trials, an extra signal occurred. The response to this signal depended on the task context subjects were in: in the 'ignore' context, they ignored it; in the 'stop' context, they had to withhold their response; and in the 'double-response' context, they had to execute a secondary response. An analysis of event-related brain potentials for no-signal trials in the stop context revealed that proactive inhibitory control works by biasing the settings of lower-level systems that are involved in stimulus detection, action selection, and action execution. Furthermore, subjects made similar adjustments in the double-response and stop-signal contexts, indicating an overlap between various forms of proactive action control. The results of Experiment 1 also suggest an overlap between proactive inhibitory control and preparatory control in task-switching studies: both require reconfiguration of task-set parameters to bias or alter subordinate processes. We conclude that much of the top-down control in response inhibition tasks takes place before the inhibition signal is presented.

Learning through instructions vs. learning through practice: flanker congruency effects from instructed and applied S-R mappings

We compared flanker congruency effects (FCE) for flanker stimuli that were part of merely instructed S-R mappings or S-R mappings that had already been practiced. Four new S-R mappings were instructed before each block of trials. In applied flanker blocks, each instructed stimulus could appear as target and as flanker. In merely instructed flanker blocks, two stimuli only served as targets, whereas the other two exclusively appeared as flankers. Significant FCEs were observed for both flanker conditions even though the instruction-based FCE was (a) smaller than the FCE from applied mappings and (b) decreased with task practice. These results suggest that instructions alone can induce S-R associations that lead to automatic response activation when instructed stimuli appear as flankers. Execution of instructed rules seems to strengthen the instructed associations, leading to increased response conflict.

Evidence for capacity sharing when stopping

Research on multitasking indicates that central processing capacity is limited, resulting in a performance decrement when central processes overlap in time. A notable exception seems to be stopping responses. The main theoretical and computational accounts of stop performance assume that going and stopping do not share processing capacity. This independence assumption has been supported by many behavioral studies and by studies modeling the processes underlying going and stopping. However, almost all previous investigations of capacity sharing between stopping and going have manipulated the difficulty of the go task while keeping the stop task simple. In the present study, we held the difficulty of the go task constant and manipulated the difficulty of the stop task. We report the results of four experiments in which subjects performed a selective stop-change task, which required them to stop and change a go response if a valid signal occurred, but to execute the go response if invalid signals occurred. In the consistent-mapping condition, the valid signal stayed the same throughout the whole experiment; in the varied-mapping condition, the valid signal changed regularly, so the demands on the rule-based system remained high. We found strong dependence between stopping and going, especially in the varied-mapping condition. We propose that in selective stop tasks, the decision to stop or not will share processing capacity with the go task. This idea can account for performance differences between groups, subjects, and conditions. We discuss implications for the wider stop-signal and dual-task literature.

Congruency effects on the basis of instructed response-effect contingencies

Previous research indicated that stimulus-response congruency effects can be obtained in one task (the diagnostic task) on the basis of the instructed stimulus-response mappings of another task (the inducer task) and this without having executed the instructions of the inducer task once. A common interpretation of such finding is that instructed stimulus-response mappings are implemented into functional associations, which automatically trigger responses when being irrelevant and this without any practice. The present study investigated whether instruction-based congruency effects are also observed for a different type of instructions than instructed S-R mappings, namely instructed response-effect contingencies. In three experiments, instruction-based congruency effects were observed in the diagnostic task when the instructions of the inducer task specified response-effect contingencies. On the one hand, our results indicate that instruction-based congruency effects are not restricted to instructed S-R mappings. On the other hand, our results suggest that the representations that mediate these effects do not specify the nature of the relation between response and effect even though this relation was explicitly specified by the instructions.

Eliminating mirror responses by instructions

The observation of an action leads to the activation of the corresponding motor plan in the observer. This phenomenon of motor resonance has an important role in social interaction, promoting imitation, learning and action understanding. However, mirror responses not always have a positive impact on our behavior. An automatic tendency to imitate others can introduce interference in action execution and non-imitative or opposite responses have an advantage in some contexts. Previous studies suggest that mirror tendencies can be suppressed after extensive practice or in complementary joint action situations revealing that mirror responses are more flexible than previously thought. The aim of the present study was to gain insight into the mechanisms that allow response flexibility of motor mirroring. Here we show that the mere instruction of a counter-imitative mapping changes mirror responses as indexed by motor evoked potentials (MEPs) enhancement induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Importantly, mirror activation was measured while participants were passively watching finger movements, without having the opportunity to execute the task. This result suggests that the implementation of task instructions activates stimulus-response association that can overwrite the mirror representations. Our outcome reveals one of the crucial mechanisms that might allow flexible adjustments of mirror responses in different contexts. The implications of this outcome are discussed.

Proportion congruency effects: instructions may be enough

Learning takes time, namely, one needs to be exposed to contingency relations between stimulus dimensions in order to learn, whereas intentional control can be recruited through task demands. Therefore showing that control can be recruited as a function of experimental instructions alone, that is, adapting the processing according to the instructions before the exposure to the task, can be taken as evidence for existence of control recruitment in the absence of learning. This was done by manipulating the information given at the outset of the experiment. In the first experiment, we manipulated list-level congruency proportion. Half of the participants were informed that most of the stimuli would be congruent, whereas the other half were informed that most of the stimuli would be incongruent. This held true for the stimuli in the second part of each experiment. In the first part, however, the proportion of the two stimulus types was equal. A proportion congruent (PC) effect was found in both parts of the experiment, but it was larger in the second part. In our second experiment, we manipulated the proportion of the stimuli within participants by applying an item-specific design. This was done by presenting some color words most often in their congruent color, and other color words in incongruent colors. Participants were informed about the exact word-color pairings in advance. Similar to Experiment 1, this held true only for the second experimental part. In contrast to our first experiment, informing participants in advance did not result in an item-specific proportion effect, which was observed only in the second part. Thus our results support the hypothesis that instructions may be enough to trigger list-level control, yet learning does contribute to the PC effect under such conditions. The item-level proportion effect is apparently caused by learning or at least it is moderated by it.

Banishing the Control Homunculi in Studies of Action Control and Behavior Change

For centuries, human self-control has fascinated scientists and nonscientists alike. Current theories often attribute it to an executive control system. But even though executive control receives a great deal of attention across disciplines, most aspects of it are still poorly understood. Many theories rely on an ill-defined set of "homunculi" doing jobs like "response inhibition" or "updating" without explaining how they do so. Furthermore, it is not always appreciated that control takes place across different timescales. These two issues hamper major advances. Here we focus on the mechanistic basis for the executive control of actions. We propose that at the most basic level, action control depends on three cognitive processes: signal detection, action selection, and action execution. These processes are modulated via error-correction or outcome-evaluation mechanisms, preparation, and task rules maintained in working and long-term memory. We also consider how executive control of actions becomes automatized with practice and how people develop a control network. Finally, we discuss how the application of this unified framework in clinical domains can increase our understanding of control deficits and provide a theoretical basis for the development of novel behavioral change interventions.

The inhibitory control reflex

Response inhibition is typically considered a hallmark of deliberate executive control. In this article, we review work showing that response inhibition can also become a 'prepared reflex', readily triggered by information in the environment, or after sufficient training, or a 'learned reflex' triggered by the retrieval of previously acquired associations between stimuli and stopping. We present new results indicating that people can learn various associations, which influence performance in different ways. To account for previous findings and our new results, we present a novel architecture that integrates theories of associative learning, Pavlovian conditioning, and executive response inhibition. Finally, we discuss why this work is also relevant for the study of 'intentional inhibition'.

Instruction-based response activation depends on task preparation

An increasing number of studies have demonstrated that a response in one task can be activated automatically on the basis merely of instructed stimulus-response (S-R) mappings belonging to another task. Such instruction-based response activations are considered to be evidence for the formation of S-R associations on the basis of the S-R mappings for an upcoming, but not yet executed, task. A crucial but somewhat neglected assumption is that instructed S-R associations are formed only under conditions that impose a sufficient degree of task preparation. Accordingly, in the present study we investigated the relation between task preparation and the instruction-based task-rule congruency effect, which is an index of response activation on the basis of instructions. The results from two experiments demonstrated that merely instructed S-R mappings of a particular task only elicit instruction-based response activations when that task is prepared for to a sufficient degree. Implications are discussed for the representation of instructed S-R mappings in working memory.

What Is Learned, and When?

In the musical Stroop task, which has recently been introduced by Grégoire, Perruchet, and Poulin-Charronat (2013), participants respond to note names that are placed inside musical notes. Musicians respond more slowly to note names that are incongruent with the note than to note names that are congruent with the note. Grégoire et al. propose to use this task to study the acquisition of automaticity by relating musical Stroop effects to the amount of musical experience. I discuss some caveats that have to be considered for these types of analyses. Specifically, I focus on how different contingencies in the learning situation relate to the Stroop effect and on the question whether a long-term perspective is suitable for studying the acquisition of automaticity.

Rapid instructed task learning: a new window into the human brain's unique capacity for flexible cognitive control

The human ability to flexibly adapt to novel circumstances is extraordinary. Perhaps the most illustrative, yet underappreciated, form of this cognitive flexibility is rapid instructed task learning (RITL)--the ability to rapidly reconfigure our minds to perform new tasks from instructions. This ability is important for everyday life (e.g., learning to use new technologies) and is used to instruct participants in nearly every study of human cognition. We review the development of RITL as a circumscribed domain of cognitive neuroscience investigation, culminating in recent demonstrations that RITL is implemented via brain circuits centered on lateral prefrontal cortex. We then build on this and the recent discovery of compositional representations within lateral prefrontal cortex to develop an integrative theory of cognitive flexibility and cognitive control that identifies mechanisms that may enable RITL within the human brain. The insights gained from this new theoretical account have important implications for further developments and applications of RITL research.

Task-Switching Methodology

In this paper, the authors review studies involving switching between an evaluative task and a nonevaluative task as a means to indirectly assess evaluative processes in the context of research of attitudes, psychopathology, and personality traits. Two task-switching indices, Switching Cost and Task Rule Congruency Effect, which represent two distinct sets of processes, have been used so far and can be assessed simultaneously. The authors suggest that using task-switching methodology as a platform provides significant methodological as well as theoretical advantages, which they attribute to the heightened involvement of the individual’s goal system, characterizing the task-switching paradigm.