Preference Reversals in Decision Making Under Risk are Accompanied by Changes in Attention to Different Attributes

Attention biases the process of risky decision-making: Evidence from eye-tracking

Attention determines what kind of option information is processed during risky choices owing to the limitation of visual attention. This paper reviews research on the relationship between higher-complexity risky decision-making and attention as illustrated by eye-tracking to explain the process of risky decision-making by the effect of attention. We demonstrate this process from three stages: the pre-phase guidance of options on attention, the process of attention being biased, and the impact of attention on final risk preference. We conclude that exogenous information can capture attention directly to salient options, thereby altering evidence accumulation. In particular, for multi-attribute risky decision-making, attentional advantages increase the weight of specific attributes, thus biasing risk preference in different directions. We highlight the significance of understanding how people use available information to weigh risks from an information-processing perspective via process data.

Current research trends on cognition, integrative complexity, and decision-making: a systematic literature review using activity theory and neuroscience

Introduction

This article presents a systematic literature review that follows the PRISMA and PICOS guidelines to analyze current research trends on cognition, integrative complexity (IC) (a cognitive feature focusing on information processing in a person's response rather than its quantity or quality), and decision-making from the perspectives of activity theory and neuroscience.

Methods

The study examines 31 papers published between 2012 and 2022 and 19 articles specifically related to neuroscience. We performed a content analysis using six categories within activity theory: subjects, objects, rules, community, division of labor, and outcomes.

Results

The study investigates the relationship between decision-making outcomes and IC as a cognitive feature in various contexts. Additionally, content analysis on neuroscience and IC revealed significant research gaps, including understanding the nature of IC, challenges related to its measurement, and differentiation from other cognitive features. We also identify opportunities for investigating the brain's activity during decision-making in relation to IC.

Discussion

We address the need for a more precise categorization of IC in studies of cognition, IC, and decision-making. We discuss the implications of our analysis for understanding the cognitive nature of IC and the potential of neuroscience methods for studying this attribute.

The composition of the choice set modulates probability weighting in risky decisions

Probability distortion-the tendency to underweight larger probabilities and overweight smaller ones-is a robust empirical phenomenon and an important driver of suboptimal choices. We reveal a novel contextual effect on probability distortion that depends on the composition of the choice set. Probability distortion was larger in a magnitude-diverse choice set (in which participants encountered more unique magnitudes than probabilities) but declined, resulting in more veridical weighting, in a probability-diverse choice set (more unique probabilities than magnitudes). This effect was consistent in two, large, independent datasets (N = 481, N = 100) and held for a subset of lotteries that were identical in the two contexts. It also developed gradually as a function of exposure to the choice set, was independent of attentional biases to probability versus magnitude information, and was specific to probability weighting, leaving risk attitudes unaffected. The results highlight the importance of context when processing probabilistic information.

Evaluation Scale or Output Format: The Attentional Mechanism Underpinning Time Preference Reversal

Time preference reversals refers to systematic inconsistencies between preferences and valuations in intertemporal choice. When faced with a pair of intertemporal options, people preferred the smaller-sooner option but assign a higher price to the larger-later one. Different hypotheses postulate that the differences in evaluation scale or output format between the choice and the bid tasks cause the preference reversal. However, these hypotheses have not been distinguished. In the present study, we conducted a hybrid task, which shares the same evaluation scale with the bid task and shares the same output format with the choice task. By comparing these three tasks, we can figure out the key reason for time preference reversal. The eye-tracking measures reflecting attention allocation, cognitive effort and information search pattern were examined. Results showed that participants' time preference and eye-tracking measures in the hybrid task were similar to those in the choice task, but different from those in the bid task. Our findings suggest that the output format is the core reason for time preference reversal and may deepen our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie time preference reversal.

Visual attention and time preference reversals

Time preference reversal refers to systematic inconsistencies between preferences and bids for intertemporal options. From the two eye-tracking studies (N1 = 60, N2 = 110), we examined the underlying mechanisms of time preference reversal. We replicated the reversal effect in which individuals facing a pair of intertemporal options choose the smaller-sooner option but assign a higher value to the larger-later one. Results revealed that the mean fixation duration and the proportion of gaze time on the outcome attribute varied across the choice and bid tasks. In addition, time preference reversals correlated with individual differences in maximizing tendencies. Findings support the contingent weighting hypothesis and strategy compatibility hypothesis and allow for improved theoretical understanding of the potential mechanisms and processes involved in time preference reversals.

Attentional shifts and preference reversals: An eye-tracking study

The classic preference reversal phenomenon, where monetary evaluations contradict risky choices, has been argued to arise due to a focus on outcomes during the evaluation of alternatives, leading to overpricing of long-shot options. Such an explanation makes the implicit assumption that attentional shifts drive the phenomenon. We conducted an eye-tracking study to causally test this hypothesis by comparing a treatment based on cardinal, monetary evaluations with a different treatment avoiding a monetary frame. We find a significant treatment effect in the form of a shift in attention toward outcomes (relative to probabilities) when evaluations are monetary. Our evidence suggests that attentional shifts resulting from the monetary frame of evaluations are a driver of preference reversals.

Attraction comes from many sources: Attentional and comparative processes in decoy effects

The attraction effect emerges when adding a seemingly irrelevant option (decoy) to a binary choice shifts preference towards a target option. This suggests that choice behaviour is dynamic, i.e., choice values are developed during deliberation, rather than manifesting some pre-existing preference set. Whereas several models of multialternative and multiattribute decision making consider dynamic choice processes as crucial to explain the attraction effect, empirically investigating the exact nature of such processes requires complementing choice output with other data. In this study, we focused on asymmetrically dominated decoys (i.e., decoys that are clearly dominated only by the target option) to examine the attentional and comparative processes responsible for the attraction effect. Through an eye-tracker paradigm, we showed that the decoy option can affect subjects’ preferences in two different and not mutually exclusive ways: by focusing the attention on the salient option and the dominance attribute, and by increasing comparisons with the choice dominant pattern. Although conceptually and procedurally distinct, both pathways for decoy effects produce an increase in preferences for the target option, in line with attentional and dynamic models of decision making. Eye-tracking data provide further details to the verification of such models, by highlighting the context-dependent nature of attention and the development of similarity-driven competitive decisional processes.

This way, please: Uncovering the directional effects of attribute translations on decision making

The translation of choice attributes into more meaningful information (e.g., from kWh to costs) is a form of choice architecture that is thought to facilitate decision making by providing decision signposts that activate personally relevant but latent objectives and guide decisions towards options that are most congruent with the activated objectives. Here, we investigated the psychological mechanisms that underlie and drive the directional effects of attribute translations on decision making. Across two choice experiments (total N = 973), we provide empirical support for our proposition that attribute translations operate via pre-decisional attention processes. Specifically, we demonstrate that attribute translations focus individuals’ attention on choice options that are most congruent with the concerns highlighted by translations, and that this attentional prioritization of alternatives predicts choice. In addition to the cognitive mechanisms underlying attribute translations, we highlight the choice architectural principles that moderate the effectiveness of translations. We show that the directional effects of attribute translations are driven by the information that translations provide rather than by contextual changes in the decision environment. In line with previous research on evaluability, we find the effectiveness of attribute translations to depend on information format, with translations conveying evaluative information having a larger impact on decision making than translations providing numerical information. The present study is among the first to investigate the decision making processes underlying a choice architectural intervention. It provides insights into the mechanisms that drive and facilitate the signpost effect and renders recommendations for the implementation of attribute translations in policy making.

The formation of preference in risky choice

A key question in decision-making is how people integrate amounts and probabilities to form preferences between risky alternatives. Here we rely on the general principle of integration-to-boundary to develop several biologically plausible process models of risky-choice, which account for both choices and response-times. These models allowed us to contrast two influential competing theories: i) within-alternative evaluations, based on multiplicative interaction between amounts and probabilities, ii) within-attribute comparisons across alternatives. To constrain the preference formation process, we monitored eye-fixations during decisions between pairs of simple lotteries, designed to systematically span the decision-space. The behavioral results indicate that the participants' eye-scanning patterns were associated with risk-preferences and expected-value maximization. Crucially, model comparisons showed that within-alternative process models decisively outperformed within-attribute ones, in accounting for choices and response-times. These findings elucidate the psychological processes underlying preference formation when making risky-choices, and suggest that compensatory, within-alternative integration is an adaptive mechanism employed in human decision-making.

Predictably intransitive preferences

The transitivity axiom is common to nearly all descriptive and normative utility theories of choice under risk. Contrary to both intuition and common assumption, the little-known ’Steinhaus-Trybula paradox’ shows the relation ’stochastically greater than’ will not always be transitive, in contradiction of Weak Stochastic Transitivity. We bespoke-design pairs of lotteries inspired by the paradox, over which individual preferences might cycle. We run an experiment to look for evidence of cycles, and violations of expansion/contraction consistency between choice sets. Even after considering possible stochastic but transitive explanations, we show that cycles can be the modal preference pattern over these simple lotteries, and we find systematic violations of expansion/contraction consistency.

Implications of Visual Attention Phenomena for Models of Preferential Choice

We use computational modeling to examine the ability of evidence accumulation models to produce the reaction time (RT) distributions and attentional biases found in behavioral and eye-tracking research. We focus on simulating RTs and attention in binary choice with particular emphasis on whether different models can predict the late onset bias (LOB), commonly found in eye movements during choice (sometimes called the gaze cascade). The first finding is that this bias is predicted by models even when attention is entirely random and independent of the choice process. This shows that the LOB is not evidence of a feedback loop between evidence accumulation and attention. Second, we examine models with a relative evidence decision rule and an absolute evidence rule. In the relative models a decision is made once the difference in evidence accumulated for 2 items reaches a threshold. In the absolute models, a decision is made once 1 item accumulates a certain amount of evidence, independently of how much is accumulated for a competitor. Our core result is simple-the existence of the late onset gaze bias to the option ultimately chosen, together with a positively skewed RT distribution means that the stopping rule must be relative not absolute. A large scale grid search of parameter space shows that absolute threshold models struggle to predict these phenomena even when incorporating evidence decay and assumptions of either mutual inhibition or feedforward inhibition.

Preference reversal in quantum decision theory

We consider the psychological effect of preference reversal and show that it finds a natural explanation in the frame of quantum decision theory. When people choose between lotteries with non-negative payoffs, they prefer a more certain lottery because of uncertainty aversion. But when people evaluate lottery prices, e.g., for selling to others the right to play them, they do this more rationally, being less subject to behavioral biases. This difference can be explained by the presence of the attraction factors entering the expression of quantum probabilities. Only the existence of attraction factors can explain why, considering two lotteries with close utility factors, a decision maker prefers one of them when choosing, but evaluates higher the other one when pricing. We derive a general quantitative criterion for the preference reversal to occur that relates the utilities of the two lotteries to the attraction factors under choosing vs. pricing and test successfully its application on experiments by Tversky et al. We also show that the planning paradox can be treated as a kind of preference reversal.

The effect of consumer ratings and attentional allocation on product valuations

Online marketplaces allow consumers to leave reviews about the products they purchase, which are visible to potential customers and competitors. While the impact of reviews on valuations of worth and purchasing decisions has been intensively studied, little is known about how the reviews themselves are attended to, and the relation between attention and valuations. In three studies we use eye-tracking methodologies to investigate attention in subjective monetary valuations of consumer goods. We find that, when evaluating consumer goods, individuals’ attention to ratings are related to their frequencies, attention to positive or negative information is related to subjective valuations, and that perspective (owner vs. non-owner) influences the type of information attended to. These findings extend previous research regarding the valuations of risky prospects as implemented in abstract monetary gambles and suggest that similar cognitive processes might underlie both types of tasks.

Effects of anger and sadness on attentional patterns in decision making: an eye-tracking study

Past research examining the effect of anger and sadness on decision making has associated anger with a relatively more heuristic decision-making approach. However, it is unclear whether angry and sad individuals differ while attending to decision-relevant information. An eye-tracking experiment (N=87) was conducted to examine the role of attention in links between emotion and decision making. Angry individuals looked more and earlier toward heuristic cues while making decisions, whereas sad individuals did not show such bias. Implications for designing persuasive messages and studying motivated visual processing were discussed.

Attention as foraging for information and value

What is the purpose of attention? One avenue of research has led to the proposal that attention might be crucial for gathering information about the environment, while other lines of study have demonstrated how attention may play a role in guiding behavior to rewarded options. Many experiments that study attention require participants to make a decision based on information acquired discretely at one point in time. In real-world situations, however, we are usually not presented with information about which option to select in such a manner. Rather we must initially search for information, weighing up reward values of options before we commit to a decision. Here, we propose that attention plays a role in both foraging for information and foraging for value. When foraging for information, attention is guided toward the unknown. When foraging for reward, attention is guided toward high reward values, allowing decision-making to proceed by accept-or-reject decisions on the currently attended option. According to this account, attention can be regarded as a low-cost alternative to moving around and physically interacting with the environment—“teleforaging”—before a decision is made to interact physically with the world. To track the timecourse of attention, we asked participants to seek out and acquire information about two gambles by directing their gaze, before choosing one of them. Participants often made multiple refixations on items before making a decision. Their eye movements revealed that early in the trial, attention was guided toward information, i.e., toward locations that reduced uncertainty about value. In contrast, late in the trial, attention was guided by expected value of the options. At the end of the decision period, participants were generally attending to the item they eventually chose. We suggest that attentional foraging shifts from an uncertainty-driven to a reward-driven mode during the evolution of a decision, permitting decisions to be made by an engage-or-search strategy.

Attention and choice: a review on eye movements in decision making

This paper reviews studies on eye movements in decision making, and compares their observations to theoretical predictions concerning the role of attention in decision making. Four decision theories are examined: rational models, bounded rationality, evidence accumulation, and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Although most theories were confirmed with regard to certain predictions, none of the theories adequately accounted for the role of attention during decision making. Several observations emerged concerning the drivers and down-stream effects of attention on choice, suggesting that attention processes plays an active role in constructing decisions. So far, decision theories have largely ignored the constructive role of attention by assuming that it is entirely determined by heuristics, or that it consists of stochastic information sampling. The empirical observations reveal that these assumptions are implausible, and that more accurate assumptions could have been made based on prior attention and eye movement research. Future decision making research would benefit from greater integration with attention research.

Rational temporal predictions can underlie apparent failures to delay gratification

An important category of seemingly maladaptive decisions involves failure to postpone gratification. A person pursuing a desirable long-run outcome may abandon it in favor of a short-run alternative that has been available all along. Here we present a theoretical framework in which this seemingly irrational behavior emerges from stable preferences and veridical judgments. Our account recognizes that decision makers generally face uncertainty regarding the time at which future outcomes will materialize. When timing is uncertain, the value of persistence depends crucially on the nature of a decision maker's prior temporal beliefs. Certain forms of temporal beliefs imply that a delay's predicted remaining length increases as a function of time already waited. In this type of situation, the rational, utility-maximizing strategy is to persist for a limited amount of time and then give up. We show empirically that people's explicit predictions of remaining delay lengths indeed increase as a function of elapsed time in several relevant domains, implying that temporal judgments offer a rational basis for limiting persistence. We then develop our framework into a simple working model and show how it accounts for individual differences in a laboratory task (the well-known "marshmallow test"). We conclude that delay-of-gratification failure, generally viewed as a manifestation of limited self-control capacity, can instead arise as an adaptive response to the perceived statistics of one's environment.