Subjective Beliefs About Trust and Reciprocity Activate an Expected Reward Signal in the Ventral Striatum

Neural bases of loss aversion when choosing for oneself versus known or unknown others

Despite the ubiquitous interdependence between one's own decisions and others' welfare, and the controversial evidence on the behavioral effect of choosing for others, the neural bases of making decisions for another versus oneself remain unexplored. We investigated whether loss aversion (LA; the tendency to avoid losses over approaching equivalent gains) is modulated by (i) choosing for oneself, other individuals, or both; (ii) knowing or not knowing the other recipients; or (iii) an interaction between these factors. We used fMRI to assess the brain activations associated with choosing whether to accept or reject mixed gambles, either for oneself, for another player, or both, in 2 groups of 28 participants who had or had not briefly interacted with the other players before scanning. Participants displayed higher LA for choices involving their payoff compared with those affecting only the payoff of other, known, players. This "social" modulation of decision-making was found to engage the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and its inhibitory connectivity to the middle cingulate cortex. This pattern might underpin decision-making for known others via self-other distinction processes associated with dorsomedial prefrontal areas, with this in turn promoting the inhibition of socially oriented responses through the downregulation of the midcingulate node of the empathy network.

Beyond lottery-evoked ambiguity aversion: the neural signature of the types and the sources of uncertainty

Studies on decision-making under uncertainty have mainly focused on understanding preferences for either risk or ambiguity using standard lottery designs. However, people often face uncertainty that directly stems from interacting with other people, which may be processed differently from lottery-based uncertainty. Here, we substantially extend the investigation of uncertainty by examining a fourfold pattern of the sources and the types of uncertainty, assessing behavioral and neural responses to both risk and ambiguity across both social and non-social contexts. A key element in our research design was to control for participants' naturally occurring social beliefs, and taking these a priori beliefs into account allow us to elicit individual preferences in accordance with economic approaches that stress the dynamics of ambiguity preference as a function of underlying likelihoods. Using this design, we find a behavioral main effect of ambiguity aversion, with increasing ambiguity aversion as a function of higher beliefs regarding the likelihood of reciprocity, and related neural activity in the right IPS. This brain region was primarily involved when participants experienced lottery-based uncertainty as opposed to social uncertainty. However, we found that the right IFG was more involved when participants made decisions under social, as compared to non-social, uncertainty. Overall, therefore, the IPS may activate an analytic mindset, which might resonate more with a lottery than a social context, whereas the IFG is engaged when the context requires players to resolve uncertainty, such as unravelling the intentions behind the choice of another person.

Understanding identification-based trust in the light of affiliative bonding: Meta-analytic neuroimaging evidence

Trust is vital for establishing social relationships and is a crucial precursor for affiliative bonds. Investigations explored the neuropsychological bases of trust separately (e.g., measured by the trust game) and affiliative bonding (e.g., measured by parental care, pair-bonding, or friendship). However, direct empirical support for the shared neural mechanisms between trust and affiliative bonding is missing. Here, we conducted a coordinate-based meta-analysis on functional magnetic resonance imaging studies on interpersonal trust and affiliative bonding using the activation likelihood estimation method. Our results demonstrated that decisions to trust strangers in repeated interactions (i.e., identification-based trust) engaged the ventral striatum (vSTR, part of the mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway), likely signaling the reward anticipation. Further, both feedbacks in repeated interactions and affiliative bonding engaged the dorsal striatum (dSTR, part of the nigrostriatal dopaminergic pathway), likely encoding learning dynamics. Our findings suggest that identification-based trust can be understood in the light of affiliative bonding, involving the mesocorticolimbic "reward" pathway (vSTR) and nigrostriatal "habit formation" pathway (dSTR) in building and sustaining social relationships.

Beliefs: A challenge in neuropsychological disorders

INTRODUCTION

Beliefs have recently been defined as the neural product of perception of objects and events in the external world and of an affirmative internal affective state reflecting personal meaning. It is, however, undetermined in which way diseases of the brain affect these integrative processes.

METHODS

Here, the formation and updating of abnormal beliefs in cerebral disorders are described.

RESULTS

It will be shown that well-defined neuropsychological syndromes resulting from brain lesions also interfere with the neural processes that enable the formation, up-dating and communication of beliefs. Similarly, in neuropsychiatric disorders abnormal and delusional beliefs appear to be caused by altered perception and/or misattribution of aversive meaning.

CONCLUSION

Given the importance of beliefs for ordinary social behaviour, abnormal beliefs are a challenge in neuropsychological disorders.

Belief formation - A driving force for brain evolution

The topic of belief has been neglected in the natural sciences for a long period of time. Recent neuroscience research in non-human primates and humans, however, has shown that beliefs are the neuropsychic product of fundamental brain processes that attribute affective meaning to concrete objects and events, enabling individual goal setting, decision making and maneuvering in the environment. With regard to the involved neural processes they can be categorized as empirical, relational, and conceptual beliefs. Empirical beliefs are about objects and relational beliefs are about events as in tool use and in interactions between subjects that develop below the level of awareness and are up-dated dynamically. Conceptual beliefs are more complex being based on narratives and participation in ritual acts. As neural processes are known to require computational space in the brain, the formation of inceasingly complex beliefs demands extra neural resources. Here, we argue that the evolution of human beliefs is related to the phylogenetic enlargement of the brain including the parietal and medial frontal cortex in humans.