Participation in a public insurance program: subsidies, crowd-out, and adverse selection

Differences in price elasticities of demand for health insurance: a systematic review

Many health insurance systems apply managed competition principles to control costs and quality of health care. Besides other factors, managed competition relies on a sufficient price-elastic demand. This paper presents a systematic review of empirical studies on price elasticity of demand for health insurance. The objective was to identify the differing international ranges of price elasticity and to find socio-economic as well as setting-oriented factors that influence price elasticity. Relevant literature for the topic was identified through a two-step identification process including a systematic search in appropriate databases and further searches within the references of the results. A total of 45 studies from countries such as the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were found. Clear differences in price elasticity by countries were identified. While empirical studies showed a range between -0.2 and -1.0 for optional primary health insurance in the US, higher price elasticities between -0.6 and -4.2 for Germany and around -2 for Switzerland were calculated for mandatory primary health insurance. Dutch studies found price elasticities below -0.5. In consideration of all relevant studies, age and poorer health status were identified to decrease price elasticity. Other socio-economic factors had an unclear impact or too limited evidence. Premium level, range of premiums, homogeneity of benefits/coverage and degree of forced decision were found to have a major influence on price elasticity in their settings. Further influence was found from supplementary insurance and premium-dependent employer contribution.

Health insurance tax credits, the earned income tax credit, and health insurance coverage of single mothers

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 enacted a refundable tax credit for low-income working families who purchased health insurance coverage for their children. This health insurance tax credit (HITC) existed during tax years 1991, 1992, and 1993, and was then rescinded. A difference-in-differences estimator applied to Current Population Survey data suggests that adoption of the HITC, along with accompanying increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), was associated with a relative increase of about 4.7 percentage points in the private health insurance coverage of working single mothers with high school or less education. Also, a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator, which attempts to net out the possible influence of the EITC increases but which requires strong assumptions, suggests that the HITC was responsible for about three-quarters (3.6 percentage points) of the total increase. The latter estimate implies a price elasticity of health insurance take-up of -0.42.

Tax incentives as a solution to the uninsured: evidence from the self-employed

Between 1996 and 2003, a series of amendments were made to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that gradually increased the tax deduction for health insurance purchases by the self-employed (SE) from 25 to 100 percent. We study how these changes have influenced the likelihood that a SE person has health insurance coverage as the policyholder. The Current Population Survey is used to construct a data set corresponding to 1995-2005. Both the difference-in-differences and price elasticity of demand estimates suggest that the series of tax deductions did not provide sufficient incentives for the SE to obtain health insurance coverage.

Public and Private Health Insurance Premiums: How Do They Affect the Health Insurance Status of Low-Income Adults? Childless

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) will substantially increase public health insurance eligibility and alter the costs of insurance coverage. Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from the period 2000–2008, we examine the effects of public and private health insurance premiums on the insurance status of low-income childless adults, a population substantially affected by the ACA. Results show higher public premiums to be associated with a decrease in the probability of having public insurance and an increase in the probability of being uninsured, while increased private premiums decrease the probability of having private insurance. Eligibility for premium assistance programs and increased subsidy levels are associated with lower rates of uninsurance. The magnitudes of the effects are quite modest and provide important implications for insurance expansions for childless adults under the ACA.

Effects of a cost-sharing policy on disenrollment from a state health insurance program

Subsidized public health insurance programs face financial difficulties and are increasingly implementing policies to pass on greater costs to low-income enrollees. Results of a stratified, random sample of 1,153 enrollees and disenrollees of a state program after introduction of increased cost sharing revealed three main reasons for disenrollment, which varied by enrollee income: finding other coverage, becoming financially ineligible, or dropping coverage as too expensive. Seventeen percent of disenrollees cited cost sharing as a reason for disenrollment. Persons who disenrolled were more likely to be younger adults, male, and have fewer children. Persons who disenrolled reported greater subsequent out-of-pocket costs, more difficulty providing coverage for children, and less access to care than persons who stayed enrolled. Most enrollees stayed enrolled despite the cost sharing increases, and persons who did disenroll left for a variety of reasons, only one of which was cost. Implications for state health insurance policies are discussed.

Do increased premium subsidies affect how much health insurance is purchased? Evidence from the self-employed

This paper estimates the effect of recent federal and state level increases in the deductibility of health insurance premiums for self-employed individuals, which reduced the after-tax price of health insurance, on both the take-up of coverage and the amount of insurance purchased. Using a panel of tax returns filed by self-employed taxpayers from 1999 to 2004, we estimate a take-up elasticity of -0.316 overall, with significantly higher elasticities for single taxpayers. On the intensive margin, we find an elasticity of -0.733 overall.

Crowd-in: the effect of private health insurance markets on the demand for Medicaid

OBJECTIVE

To investigate the effects of local labor market conditions and the availability of employer-sponsored health insurance on exits from the Medicaid program.

DATA SOURCE

Data for this project come from a unique administrative database containing a 2 percent sample of all cases on California's Medicaid program in 1987 and a 2 percent sample of all new cases starting each year between 1987 and 1995.

STUDY DESIGN

The results are estimated using a discrete duration model where the monthly exit probability is a function of demographic characteristics, local labor market variables, the probability of having employer-sponsored insurance, and fixed year and county effects.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Improvements in labor market opportunities (i.e., employment growth, wage growth, and increases in the availability of employer-sponsored health insurance) promote exits off the Medicaid program. A 2.5 percentage point increase in the availability of employer-sponsored insurance leads to a 6 percent increase in the probability that a completed spell lasts no more than 2 years. It would take a 2 percentage point decrease in unemployment rates or a 10 percent increase in average quarterly earnings to yield an equivalent increase in the likelihood of exiting Medicaid within 2 years. These effects are robust to the inclusion of county-level fixed effects and time effects.

CONCLUSIONS

Medicaid expenditures and caseloads are sensitive to local economic fluctuations and secular trends in the availability of health insurance. Continued decreases in employer-based health insurance coverage will greatly increase the demand for public insurance coverage and the financial pressures on state governments.

The effects of recent employment changes and premium increases on adults' insurance coverage

This study uses national survey data from 1997, 1999, and 2002 to estimate a statistical model of the relationships between employment loss, insurance costs, and insurance coverage of nonelderly adults. Simulations based on the model suggest that the large increase in private insurance premiums (about 33 percent in constant dollars) was responsible for 3.1 of the 3.4 percentage-point drop in private insurance coverage between 2000 and 2003. Employment loss has a substantial impact on the coverage of people who lose employment, but its impact on aggregate coverage is relatively small. Expanded public coverage absorbed only about one quarter of the loss of private coverage. Controlling insurance (and medical) cost inflation is critical to expanding insurance coverage, even after the employment rate recovers.

The Role Of The Individual Health Insurance Market And Prospects For Change

The individual market is the only source of health insurance for the more than 20 percent of Americans not eligible for group or public health insurance; yet participation rates are low and shrinking. This paper examines this market's structural features and assesses the likelihood that it will play an expanded role in the future. We describe how pressures such as cost growth, new technologies, and changes in the nature of the workplace are shaping the individual market. We conclude that the future of the market will depend largely on whether there are policy interventions that balance the problems of affordability, risk sharing, and adverse selection.

Subsidies and the demand for individual health insurance in California

OBJECTIVE

To estimate the effect of changes in premiums for individual insurance on decisions to purchase individual insurance and how this price response varies among subgroups of the population.

DATA SOURCE

Survey responses from the Current Population Survey (http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp), the National Health Interview Survey (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis.htm), and data about premiums and plans offered in the individual insurance market in California, 1996-2001.

STUDY DESIGN

A logit model was used to estimate the decisions to purchase individual insurance by families without access to group insurance. This was modeled as a function of premiums, controlling for family characteristics and other characteristics of the market. A multinomial model was used to estimate the choice between group coverage, individual coverage, and remaining uninsured for workers offered group coverage as a function of premiums for individual insurance and out-of-pocket costs of group coverage.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The elasticity of demand for individual insurance by those without access to group insurance is about -.2 to -.4, as has been found in earlier studies. However, there are substantial differences in price responses among subgroups with low-income, young, and self-employed families showing the greatest response. Among workers offered group insurance, a decrease in individual premiums has very small effects on the choice to purchase individual coverage versus group coverage.

CONCLUSIONS

Subsidy programs may make insurance more affordable for some families, but even sizeable subsidies are unlikely to solve the problem of the uninsured. We do not find evidence that subsidies to individual insurance will produce an unraveling of the employer-based health insurance system.