Value-based attentional capture affects multi-alternative decision making

Dominant as Underdogs: Inefficient Search for Dominant-Looking Faces

Detecting dominant individuals within crowds is crucial for human survival, prompting investigation into the tension between quick detection and careful recognition of dominant faces. In our visual search tasks, participants located a target face with a specific identity, with dominance being task-irrelevant. Targets varied in dominance (high or low), and the dominance congruency between targets and distractors was manipulated. Results showed more efficient search when targets differed from distractors by dominance, suggesting leverage of latent dominance contrast. Surprisingly, searching for high-dominance faces exhibited lower efficiency. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and incorporated eye-tracking, revealing longer distractor inspection, more revisits to target faces, and prolonged identification times for high-dominance face searches. Experiment 3 showed search inefficiency even with only dominant faces' eye regions, underscoring the role of local features. Our findings offer a nuanced perspective on how perceived dominance influences cognition and behavior, challenging the assumed ease of dominance detection.

Decision makers consider all options in choice triplets

Most contemporary decision-making research focuses on choices between only two alternative options, in spite of the fact that most real-world decisions involve more than two options. Beyond this practical point, multi-option decisions are also important from a theoretical perspective. Experimental and computational studies have demonstrated that the composition of a set of choice options has predictable effects on choice outcomes. Specifically, with more options available to choose from, responses are slower and more stochastic. This effect is amplified when the values of the options (including the worst option in the set) are more similar to each other. In this study, we provide further evidence of these known effects. We also provide evidence that metacognitive factors such as feelings of confidence in the response or mental effort exertion during deliberation show similar effects as the cognitive factors (consistency between choices and value estimates, response speed). Finally, we provide novel evidence that value estimates are refined during deliberation for all options in choice triplets, similar to what has previously been show for choice pairs.

The timescale and direction of influence of a third inferior alternative in human value-learning

The way humans and other animals represent the values of alternatives is context-dependent, as it can be distorted by inferior alternatives that are immediately available for choice (immediate context); or that were encountered in previous episodes (temporal context). Yet, the extent to which the immediate and temporal context (co-) shape context-dependent valuation remains unclear. Here, we asked human participants (onsite: N = 30, online: N = 68) to learn the values associated with three alternatives and explicitly report these values before making binary and ternary choices among the alternatives. We show that context-dependent valuation is evident in the pre-choice value estimates and manifests equally in binary and ternary choices. Accordingly, we conclude that value representations are modulated by the temporal (and not the immediate) context. The direction and across-participants variability of this modulation cannot be captured by extant normalization theories but by a mechanism constructing values through sequential binary comparisons.

The leftmost digit change induces a decrease in brain activity related to visuospatial processing: An fMRI study of the price ending effect

Consumers perceive prices that have been slightly reduced from round price as irrationally cheap. This price ending effect is thought to be driven primarily by two factors: the left-digit effect which occurs when a small price drop changes the leftmost digit, and the image effect which stems from the symbolic association of a particular price ending with low prices or sales. Our study aimed to investigate the neural basis of these irrational effects on perceived cheapness using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We used five price values in Yen (197, 198, 201, 202, 206; Japanese consumers tend to perceive prices ending in the number 8 as cheap) for fMRI experiment. Participants were asked to rate the price value of a product. The "left-digit effect" was observed based on the deactivation in brain regions associated with visuospatial processing including the left lingual gyrus and posterior middle temporal gyrus, and the right dorsal posterior precuneus and anterior precuneus. From these regions, the degree of deactivation in the right dorsal posterior precuneus was negatively correlated with the irrational perception of cheapness. Furthermore, this region showed negative functional connectivity with the dorsal striatal regions. No regions were found with "the image effect". Our results suggested that a decrease in activity in the regions associated with visuospatial processing suggests that changes in the leftmost digits alter the level of visuospatial attention towards the price, leading to an underestimation of the payment amount. This reduced attention might activate the dorsal striatum driving unconscious purchasing.

Mutual inclusivity improves decision-making by smoothing out choice's competitive edge

Decisions form a central bottleneck to most tasks, one that people often experience as costly. Previous work proposes mitigating those costs by lowering one's threshold for deciding. Here we test an alternative solution, one that targets the basis of most choice costs: the idea that choosing one option sacrifices others (mutual exclusivity). Across 6 studies (N = 565), we test whether this tension can be relieved by framing choices as inclusive (allowing selection of more than 1 option, as in buffets). We find that inclusivity makes choices more efficient by selectively reducing competition between potential responses as participants accumulate information for each of their options. Inclusivity also made participants feel less conflicted, especially when they could not decide which good option to keep or which bad option to get rid of. These inclusivity benefits were also distinguishable from the effects of manipulating decision threshold (increased urgency), which improved choices but not experiences thereof.

Contributions of Attention to Learning in Multidimensional Reward Environments

Real-world choice options have many features or attributes, whereas the reward outcome from those options only depends on a few features or attributes. It has been shown that humans learn and combine feature-based with more complex conjunction-based learning to tackle challenges of learning in naturalistic reward environments. However, it remains unclear how different learning strategies interact to determine what features or conjunctions should be attended to and control choice behavior, and how subsequent attentional modulations influence future learning and choice. To address these questions, we examined the behavior of male and female human participants during a three-dimensional learning task in which reward outcomes for different stimuli could be predicted based on a combination of an informative feature and conjunction. Using multiple approaches, we found that both choice behavior and reward probabilities estimated by participants were most accurately described by attention-modulated models that learned the predictive values of both the informative feature and the informative conjunction. Specifically, in the reinforcement learning model that best fit choice data, attention was controlled by the difference in the integrated feature and conjunction values. The resulting attention weights modulated learning by increasing the learning rate on attended features and conjunctions. Critically, modulating decision-making by attention weights did not improve the fit of data, providing little evidence for direct attentional effects on choice. These results suggest that in multidimensional environments, humans direct their attention not only to selectively process reward-predictive attributes but also to find parsimonious representations of the reward contingencies for more efficient learning.

Influence of reinforcement learning on the inhibitory control of Internet gaming disorder

Reward processing dysfunction and inhibition control deficiency have been observed in Internet gaming disorder (IGD). However, it is still unclear whether the previous reinforcement learning depends on reward/punishment feedback influences on the cognitive inhibitory control of IGD. This study compared the differences between an IGD group and healthy people without game experiences in the probability selection task and the subsequent stop signal task by the method of behavioral experiments, in order to explore whether the reward learning ability is impaired in the IGD group. We also discuss the influence of previous reward learning on subsequent inhibition control. The results showed that (1) during the reward learning phase, the IGD group's accuracy was significantly lower than that of the control group; (2) compared with the control group, the IGD group's reaction times were longer in the transfer phase; (3) for no-go trials of the inhibitory control phase after reward learning, the accuracy of the reward-related stimulation in the IGD group was lower than that of punishment-related or neutral stimulation, but there was no significant difference among the three conditions in the control group. These findings indicated that the reinforcement learning ability of the IGD group was impaired, which further caused the abnormal response to reinforcement stimuli.

Common neural choice signals can emerge artefactually amid multiple distinct value signals

Previous work has identified characteristic neural signatures of value-based decision-making, including neural dynamics that closely resemble the ramping evidence accumulation process believed to underpin choice. Here we test whether these signatures of the choice process can be temporally dissociated from additional, choice-'independent' value signals. Indeed, EEG activity during value-based choice revealed distinct spatiotemporal clusters, with a stimulus-locked cluster reflecting affective reactions to choice sets and a response-locked cluster reflecting choice difficulty. Surprisingly, 'neither' of these clusters met the criteria for an evidence accumulation signal. Instead, we found that stimulus-locked activity can 'mimic' an evidence accumulation process when aligned to the response. Re-analysing four previous studies, including three perceptual decision-making studies, we show that response-locked signatures of evidence accumulation disappear when stimulus-locked and response-locked activity are modelled jointly. Collectively, our findings show that neural signatures of value can reflect choice-independent processes and look deceptively like evidence accumulation.

Individual and contextual effects of attention in risky choice

We investigate the role of visual attention in risky choice in a rich experimental dataset that includes eye-tracking data. We first show that attention is not reducible to individual and contextual variables, which explain only 20% of attentional variation. We then decompose attentional variation into individual average attention and trial-wise deviations of attention to capture different cognitive processes. Individual average attention varies by individual, and can proxy for individual preferences or goals (as in models of "rational inattention" or goal-directed attention). Trial-wise deviations of attention vary within subjects and depend on contextual factors (as in models of "salience" or stimulus-driven attention). We find that both types of attention predict behavior: average individual attention patterns are correlated with individual levels of loss aversion and capture part of this individual heterogeneity. Adding trial-wise deviations of attention further improves model fit. Our results show that a decomposition of attention into individual average attention and trial-wise deviations of attention can capture separable cognitive components of decision making and provides a useful tool for economists and researchers from related fields interested in decision-making and attention.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-024-09849-7.

Distractor effects in decision making are related to the individual's style of integrating choice attributes

Humans make irrational decisions in the presence of irrelevant distractor options. There is little consensus on whether decision making is facilitated or impaired by the presence of a highly rewarding distractor, or whether the distractor effect operates at the level of options' component attributes rather than at the level of their overall value. To reconcile different claims, we argue that it is important to consider the diversity of people's styles of decision making and whether choice attributes are combined in an additive or multiplicative way. Employing a multi-laboratory dataset investigating the same experimental paradigm, we demonstrated that people used a mix of both approaches and the extent to which approach was used varied across individuals. Critically, we identified that this variability was correlated with the distractor effect during decision making. Individuals who tended to use a multiplicative approach to compute value, showed a positive distractor effect. In contrast, a negative distractor effect (divisive normalisation) was prominent in individuals tending towards an additive approach. Findings suggest that the distractor effect is related to how value is constructed, which in turn may be influenced by task and subject specificities. This concurs with recent behavioural and neuroscience findings that multiple distractor effects co-exist.

Multiattribute Decision-making in Macaques Relies on Direct Attribute Comparisons

In value-based decisions, there are frequently multiple attributes, such as cost, quality, or quantity, that contribute to the overall goodness of an option. Because one option may not be better in all attributes at once, the decision process should include a means of weighing relevant attributes. Most decision-making models solve this problem by computing an integrated value, or utility, for each option from a weighted combination of attributes. However, behavioral anomalies in decision-making, such as context effects, indicate that other attribute-specific computations might be taking place. Here, we tested whether rhesus macaques show evidence of attribute-specific processing in a value-based decision-making task. Monkeys made a series of decisions involving choice options comprising a sweetness and probability attribute. Each attribute was represented by a separate bar with one of two mappings between bar size and the magnitude of the attribute (i.e., bigger = better or bigger = worse). We found that translating across different mappings produced selective impairments in decision-making. Choices were less accurate and preferences were more variable when like attributes differed in mapping, suggesting that preventing monkeys from easily making direct attribute comparisons resulted in less accurate choice behavior. This was not the case when mappings of unalike attributes within the same option were different. Likewise, gaze patterns favored transitions between like attributes over transitions between unalike attributes of the same option, so that like attributes were sampled sequentially to support within-attribute comparisons. Together, these data demonstrate that value-based decisions rely, at least in part, on directly comparing like attributes of multiattribute options.

Mutual inclusivity improves decision-making by smoothing out choice's competitive edge

Decisions form a central bottleneck to most tasks, one that people often experience as costly. Past work proposes mitigating those costs by lowering one's threshold for deciding. Here, we test an alternative solution, one that targets the basis for most choice costs: that choosing one option sacrifices others (mutual exclusivity). Across 5 studies (N = 462), we test whether this tension can be relieved by framing choices as inclusive (allowing selection of more than one option, as in buffets). We find that inclusivity makes choices more efficient, by selectively reducing competition between potential responses as participants accumulate information for each of their options. Inclusivity also made participants feel less conflicted, especially when they couldn't decide which good option to keep or which bad option to get rid of. These inclusivity benefits were also distinguishable from the effects of manipulating decision threshold (increased urgency), which improved choices but not experiences thereof.

Value-modulated attentional capture is augmented by win-related sensory cues

Attentional prioritisation of stimuli in the environment plays an important role in overt choice. Previous research shows that prioritisation is influenced by the magnitude of paired rewards, in that stimuli signalling high-value rewards are more likely to capture attention than stimuli signalling low-value rewards; and this attentional bias has been proposed to play a role in addictive and compulsive behaviours. A separate line of research has shown that win-related sensory cues can bias overt choices. However, the role that these cues play in attentional selection is yet to be investigated. Participants in this study completed a visual search task in which they responded to a target shape in order to earn reward. The colour of a distractor signalled the magnitude of reward and type of feedback on each trial. Participants were slower to respond to the target when the distractor signalled high reward compared to when the distractor signalled low reward, suggesting that the high-reward distractors had increased attentional priority. Critically, the magnitude of this reward-related attentional bias was further increased for a high-reward distractor with post-trial feedback accompanied by win-related sensory cues. Participants also demonstrated an overt choice preference for the distractor that was associated with win-related sensory cues. These findings demonstrate that stimuli paired with win-related sensory cues are prioritised by the attention system over stimuli with equivalent physical salience and learned value. This attentional prioritisation may have downstream implications for overt choices, especially in gambling contexts where win-related sensory cues are common.

Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference

It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions - such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices - are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes - possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.

Multi-attribute decision-making in macaques relies on direct attribute comparisons

In value-based decisions, there are frequently multiple attributes, such as cost, quality, or quantity, that contribute to the overall goodness of an option. Since one option may not be better in all attributes at once, the decision process should include a means of weighing relevant attributes. Most decision-making models solve this problem by computing an integrated value, or utility, for each option from a weighted combination of attributes. However, behavioral anomalies in decision-making, such as context effects, indicate that other attribute-specific computations might be taking place. Here, we tested whether rhesus macaques show evidence of attribute-specific processing in a value-based decision-making task. Monkeys made a series of decisions involving choice options comprising a sweetness and probability attribute. Each attribute was represented by a separate bar with one of two mappings between bar size and the magnitude of the attribute (i.e., bigger=better or bigger=worse). We found that translating across different mappings produced selective impairments in decision-making. When like attributes differed, monkeys were prevented from easily making direct attribute comparisons, and choices were less accurate and preferences were more variable. This was not the case when mappings of unalike attributes within the same option were different. Likewise, gaze patterns favored transitions between like attributes over transitions between unalike attributes of the same option, so that like attributes were sampled sequentially to support within-attribute comparisons. Together, these data demonstrate that value-based decisions rely, at least in part, on directly comparing like attributes of multi-attribute options.

Significance Statement

Value-based decision-making is a cognitive function impacted by a number of clinical conditions, including substance use disorder and mood disorders. Understanding the neural mechanisms, including online processing steps involved in decision formation, will provide critical insights into decision-making deficits characteristic of human psychiatric disorders. Using rhesus monkeys as a model species capable of complex decision-making, this study shows that decisions involve a process of comparing like features, or attributes, of multi-attribute options. This is contrary to popular models of decision-making in which attributes are first combined into an overall value, or utility, to make a choice. Therefore, these results serve as an important foundation for establishing a more complete understanding of the neural mechanisms involved in forming complex decisions.

Peripheral Visual Information Halves Attentional Choice Biases

A growing body of research has shown that simple choices involve the construction and comparison of values at the time of decision. These processes are modulated by attention in a way that leaves decision makers susceptible to attentional biases. Here, we studied the role of peripheral visual information on the choice process and on attentional choice biases. We used an eye-tracking experiment in which participants (N = 50 adults) made binary choices between food items that were displayed in marked screen "shelves" in two conditions: (a) where both items were displayed, and (b) where items were displayed only when participants fixated within their shelves. We found that removing the nonfixated option approximately doubled the size of the attentional biases. The results show that peripheral visual information is crucial in facilitating good decisions and suggest that individuals might be influenceable by settings in which only one item is shown at a time, such as e-commerce.

Intraparietal stimulation disrupts negative distractor effects in human multi-alternative decision-making

There has been debate about whether addition of an irrelevant distractor option to an otherwise binary decision influences which of the two choices is taken. We show that disparate views on this question are reconciled if distractors exert two opposing but not mutually exclusive effects. Each effect predominates in a different part of decision space: (1) a positive distractor effect predicts high-value distractors improve decision-making; (2) a negative distractor effect, of the type associated with divisive normalisation models, entails decreased accuracy with increased distractor values. Here, we demonstrate both distractor effects coexist in human decision making but in different parts of a decision space defined by the choice values. We show disruption of the medial intraparietal area (MIP) by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) increases positive distractor effects at the expense of negative distractor effects. Furthermore, individuals with larger MIP volumes are also less susceptible to the disruption induced by TMS. These findings also demonstrate a causal link between MIP and the impact of distractors on decision-making via divisive normalisation.

Toward an attentional turn in research on risky choice

For a long time, the dominant approach to studying decision making under risk has been to use psychoeconomic functions to account for how behavior deviates from the normative prescriptions of expected value maximization. While this neo-Bernoullian tradition has advanced the field in various ways—such as identifying seminal phenomena of risky choice (e.g., Allais paradox, fourfold pattern)—it contains a major shortcoming: Psychoeconomic curves are mute with regard to the cognitive mechanisms underlying risky choice. This neglect of the mechanisms both limits the explanatory value of neo-Bernoullian models and fails to provide guidance for designing effective interventions to improve decision making. Here we showcase a recent “attentional turn” in research on risk choice that elaborates how deviations from normative prescriptions can result from imbalances in attention allocation (rather than distortions in the representation or processing of probability and outcome information) and that thus promises to overcome the challenges of the neo-Bernoullian tradition. We argue that a comprehensive understanding of preference formation in risky choice must provide an account on a mechanistic level, and we delineate directions in which existing theories that rely on attentional processes may be extended to achieve this objective.

Degenerate boundaries for multiple-alternative decisions

Integration-to-threshold models of two-choice perceptual decision making have guided our understanding of human and animal behavior and neural processing. Although such models seem to extend naturally to multiple-choice decision making, consensus on a normative framework has yet to emerge, and hence the implications of threshold characteristics for multiple choices have only been partially explored. Here we consider sequential Bayesian inference and a conceptualisation of decision making as a particle diffusing in n-dimensions. We show by simulation that, within a parameterised subset of time-independent boundaries, the optimal decision boundaries comprise a degenerate family of nonlinear structures that jointly depend on the state of multiple accumulators and speed-accuracy trade-offs. This degeneracy is contrary to current 2-choice results where there is a single optimal threshold. Such boundaries support both stationary and collapsing thresholds as optimal strategies for decision-making, both of which result from stationary representations of nonlinear boundaries. Our findings point towards a normative theory of multiple-choice decision making, provide a characterisation of optimal decision thresholds under this framework, and inform the debate between stationary and dynamic decision boundaries for optimal decision making.

Gaze-dependent evidence accumulation predicts multi-alternative risky choice behaviour

Choices are influenced by gaze allocation during deliberation, so that fixating an alternative longer leads to increased probability of choosing it. Gaze-dependent evidence accumulation provides a parsimonious account of choices, response times and gaze-behaviour in many simple decision scenarios. Here, we test whether this framework can also predict more complex context-dependent patterns of choice in a three-alternative risky choice task, where choices and eye movements were subject to attraction and compromise effects. Choices were best described by a gaze-dependent evidence accumulation model, where subjective values of alternatives are discounted while not fixated. Finally, we performed a systematic search over a large model space, allowing us to evaluate the relative contribution of different forms of gaze-dependence and additional mechanisms previously not considered by gaze-dependent accumulation models. Gaze-dependence remained the most important mechanism, but participants with strong attraction effects employed an additional similarity-dependent inhibition mechanism found in other models of multi-alternative multi-attribute choice.

The repulsion effect in preferential choice and its relation to perceptual choice

People rely on the choice context to guide their decisions, violating fundamental principles of rational choice theory and exhibiting phenomena called context effects. Recent research has uncovered that dominance relationships can both increase or decrease the choice share of the dominating option, marking the two ends of an attraction-repulsion continuum. However, empirical links between the two opposing effects are scarce and theoretical accounts are missing altogether. The present study (N = 55) used eye tracking alongside a within-subject design that contrasts a perceptual task and a preferential-choice analog in order to bridge this gap and uncover the underlying information-search processes. Although individuals differed in their perceptual and preferential choices, they generally engaged in alternative-wise comparisons and a repulsion effect was present in both conditions that became weaker the more predominant the attribute-wise comparisons were. Altogether, our study corroborates the notion that repulsion effects are a robust and general phenomenon that theoretical accounts need to take seriously.

Violations of economic rationality due to irrelevant information during learning in decision from experience

According to normative decision-making theories, the composition of a choice set should not affect people’s preferences regarding the different options. This assumption contrasts with decades of research that have identified multiple situations in which this principle is violated, leading to context effects. Recently, research on context effects has been extended to the domain of experience-based choices, where it has been shown that forgone outcomes from irrelevant alternatives affect preferences — an accentuation effect. More specifically, it has been shown that an option presented in a situation in which its outcomes are salient across several trials is evaluated more positively than in a context in which its outcomes are less salient. In the present study, we investigated whether irrelevant information affects preferences as much as relevant information. In two experiments, individuals completed a learning task with partial feedback. We found that past outcomes from non-chosen options, which contain no relevant information at all, led to the same accentuation effect as did counterfactual outcomes that provided new and relevant information. However, if the information is entirely irrelevant (from options that could not have been chosen), individuals ignored it, thus ruling out a purely perceptual account of the accentuation effect. These results provide further support for the influence of salience on learning and highlight the necessity of mechanistic accounts in decision-making research.

Setting the space for deliberation in decision-making

Decision-making models in the behavioral, cognitive, and neural sciences typically consist of forced-choice paradigms with two alternatives. While theoretically it is feasible to translate any decision situation to a sequence of binary choices, real-life decision-making is typically more complex and nonlinear, involving choices among multiple items, graded judgments, and deferments of decision-making. Here, we discuss how the complexity of real-life decision-making can be addressed using conventional decision-making models by focusing on the interactive dynamics between criteria settings and the collection of evidence. Decision-makers can engage in multi-stage, parallel decision-making by exploiting the space for deliberation, with non-binary readings of evidence available at any point in time. The interactive dynamics principally adhere to the speed-accuracy tradeoff, such that increasing the space for deliberation enables extended data collection. The setting of space for deliberation reflects a form of meta-decision-making that can, and should be, studied empirically as a value-based exercise that weighs the prior propensities, the economics of information seeking, and the potential outcomes. Importantly, the control of the space for deliberation raises a question of agency. Decision-makers may actively and explicitly set their own decision parameters, but these parameters may also be set by environmental pressures. Thus, decision-makers may be influenced-or nudged in a particular direction-by how decision problems are framed, with a sense of urgency or a binary definition of choice options. We argue that a proper understanding of these mechanisms has important practical implications toward the optimal usage of space for deliberation.

A rational model of people's inferences about others' preferences based on response times

There's a difference between someone instantaneously saying "Yes!" when you ask them on a date compared to "…yes." Psychologists and economists have long studied how people can infer preferences from others' choices. However, these models have tended to focus on what people choose and not how long it takes them to make a choice. We present a rational model for inferring preferences from response times, using a drift diffusion model to characterize how preferences influence response time, and Bayesian inference to invert this relationship. We test our model's predictions for three experimental questions. Matching model predictions, participants inferred that a decision-maker preferred a chosen item more if the decision-maker spent less time deliberating (Experiment 1), participants predicted a decision-maker's choice in a novel comparison based on inferring the decision-maker's relative preferences from previous response times and choices (Experiment 2), and participants could incorporate information about a decision-maker's mental state of cautious or careless (Experiments 3, 4A, and 4B).

The elusiveness of context effects in decision making

Contextual features influence human and non-human decision making, giving rise to preference reversals. Decades of research have documented the species and situations in which these effects are observed. More recently, however, researchers have focused on boundary conditions, that is, settings in which established effects disappear or reverse. This work is scattered across academic disciplines and some results appear to contradict each other. We synthesize recent findings and resolve apparent contradictions by considering them in terms of three core categories of decision context: spatial arrangement, attribute concreteness, and deliberation time. We suggest that these categories could be understood using theories of choice representation, which specify how context shapes the information over which deliberation processes operate.

The influence of visual attention on memory-based preferential choice

Many decisions rely on past experiences. Recent research indicates that people's choices are biased towards choosing better-remembered options, even if these options are comparatively unattractive (i.e., a memory bias). In the current study, we used eye tracking to compare the influence of visual attention on preferential choice between memory-based and non-memory-based decisions. Participants completed the remember-and-decide task. In this task, they first learned associations between screen locations and snack items. Then, they made binary choices between snack items. These snacks were either hidden and required recall (memory-based decisions), or they were visible (non-memory-based decisions). Remarkably, choices were more strongly influenced by attention in memory-based compared to non-memory-based decisions. However, visual attention did not mediate the memory bias on preferential choices. Finally, we adopt and expand a recently proposed computational model to provide a comprehensive description of the role of attention in memory-based decisions. In sum, the present work elucidates how visual attention interacts with episodic memory and preference formation in memory-based decisions.

Influence of divided attention on the attraction effect in multialternative choice

The attraction effect in multialternative decision making reflects the context-dependent violation of rational choice axioms. This study examined the effect of concurrent divided attention in three-alternative visual choice tasks. The concurrent divided attention task is considered to consume the mental resources available for the choice task. There were three conditions: (a) the task-relevant condition, in which the auditory task should consume resources across multiple levels; (b) the task-irrelevant condition, in which the auditory stimuli should consume perceptual resources; (c) and the control condition, in which the resources should not be consumed by auditory stimuli. Thirty-three participants solved 24 hypothetical purchase problems with three alternatives that differed in terms of two attributes. The results indicated that the choice proportion of the target was significantly higher in the task-relevant condition than in the task-irrelevant and control conditions, thereby suggesting that a reduction in cognitive (and/or response) resources is critical for the attraction effect.

Uncovering the computational mechanisms underlying many-alternative choice

How do we choose when confronted with many alternatives? There is surprisingly little decision modelling work with large choice sets, despite their prevalence in everyday life. Even further, there is an apparent disconnect between research in small choice sets, supporting a process of gaze-driven evidence accumulation, and research in larger choice sets, arguing for models of optimal choice, satisficing, and hybrids of the two. Here, we bridge this divide by developing and comparing different versions of these models in a many-alternative value-based choice experiment with 9, 16, 25, or 36 alternatives. We find that human choices are best explained by models incorporating an active effect of gaze on subjective value. A gaze-driven, probabilistic version of satisficing generally provides slightly better fits to choices and response times, while the gaze-driven evidence accumulation and comparison model provides the best overall account of the data when also considering the empirical relation between gaze allocation and choice.

Fixation patterns in simple choice reflect optimal information sampling

Simple choices (e.g., eating an apple vs. an orange) are made by integrating noisy evidence that is sampled over time and influenced by visual attention; as a result, fluctuations in visual attention can affect choices. But what determines what is fixated and when? To address this question, we model the decision process for simple choice as an information sampling problem, and approximate the optimal sampling policy. We find that it is optimal to sample from options whose value estimates are both high and uncertain. Furthermore, the optimal policy provides a reasonable account of fixations and choices in binary and trinary simple choice, as well as the differences between the two cases. Overall, the results show that the fixation process during simple choice is influenced dynamically by the value estimates computed during the decision process, in a manner consistent with optimal information sampling.

The influence of associative reward learning on motor inhibition

Stimuli that predict a rewarding outcome can cause difficulties to inhibit unfavourable behaviour. Research suggests that this is also the case for stimuli with a history of reward extending these effects on action control to situations, where reward is no longer accessible. We expand this line of research by investigating if previously reward-predictive stimuli promote behavioural activation and impair motor inhibition in a second unrelated task. In two experiments participants were trained to associate colours with a monetary reward or neutral feedback. Afterwards participants performed a cued go/no-go task, where cues appeared in the colours previously associated with feedback during training. In both experiments training resulted in faster responses in rewarded trials providing evidence of a value-driven response bias as long as reward was accessible. However, stimuli with a history of reward did not interfere with goal-directed action and inhibition in a subsequent task after removal of the reward incentives. While the first experiment was not conclusive regarding an impact of reward-associated cues on response inhibition, the second experiment, validated by Bayesian statistics, clearly questioned an effect of reward history on inhibitory control. This stands in contrast to earlier findings suggesting that the effect of reward history on subsequent action control is not as consistent as previously assumed. Our results show that participants are able to overcome influences from Pavlovian learning in a simple inhibition task. We discuss our findings with respect to features of the experimental design which may help or complicate overcoming behavioural biases induced by reward history.

Does Attention Increase the Value of Choice Alternatives?

A growing recognition of the role of attention in decision-making has been driven by both the technology of eye tracking and the development of models that explicitly incorporate attention. One result of this convergence is the arresting claim that attention, by itself, can increase the perceived value of a decision alternative. In this review, we cover the origins of that claim, its empirical foundation, and the reasoning that supports it. The conclusion is that, to date, there is not sufficient evidence to support the claim. Alternative explanations for the extant evidentiary base are discussed, as is the balance between the bottom-up influence of empirical evidence and the top-down commitment to a conceptual framework.

Visual attention modulates the integration of goal-relevant evidence and not value

When choosing between options, such as food items presented in plain view, people tend to choose the option they spend longer looking at. The prevailing interpretation is that visual attention increases value. However, in previous studies, 'value' was coupled to a behavioural goal, since subjects had to choose the item they preferred. This makes it impossible to discern if visual attention has an effect on value, or, instead, if attention modulates the information most relevant for the goal of the decision-maker. Here, we present the results of two independent studies-a perceptual and a value-based task-that allow us to decouple value from goal-relevant information using specific task-framing. Combining psychophysics with computational modelling, we show that, contrary to the current interpretation, attention does not boost value, but instead it modulates goal-relevant information. This work provides a novel and more general mechanism by which attention interacts with choice.

Urgency Promotes Affective Disengagement: Effects From Bivalent Cues on Preference Formation for Abstract Images

Although previous research has characterized the important role for spatial and affective pre-cues in the control of visual attention, less is known about the impact of pre-cues on preference formation. In preference formation, the gaze cascade phenomenon suggests that the gaze serves both to enhance and express “liking” during value-based decision-making. This phenomenon has been interpreted as a type of Pavlovian approach toward preferred objects. Decision-making here reflects a process of gradual commitment in which the gaze functions as a precursor to choice; by this account, overt attention produces a necessarily positive, additive effect on the value of the attended object. The implication is that drawing attention to an object should initiate, and therefore promote, preference formation for that object. Alternatively, information-integration models of attention propose that attention produces a multiplicative effect on the value of the attended object, implying that negative information can impede preference formation. To pitch the gradual-commitment hypothesis against the information-integration hypothesis, we conducted four experiments that combined the spatial-cueing paradigm with a value-based choice paradigm. In each trial in all experiments, subjects were presented with an irrelevant, peripheral pre-cue for a duration of 500 ms, followed by a 500 ms blank, and then a pair of abstract images (one at the pre-cued position; one in the opposite hemifield). The subjects were asked to choose their preferred abstract image by pressing the corresponding button. We manipulated the type of pre-cues (images of faces versus foods; with varying affective associations) and the time constraints (a deadline of 1,500 ms versus self-paced). Overall, the choice data showed a clear pattern of influence from the pre-cues, such that, given a deadline, abstract images were chosen less often if they had been preceded by a pre-cue with a negative affective association (both for face and food images). Analyses of the gaze data showed the emergence of significant gaze biases in line with the subjects’ choices. Taken together, the data pattern provided support for the information-integration hypothesis, particularly under urgency. When tasked with a speeded preference choice, subjects showed affective disengagement following pre-cues that carried a negative association.

Consistent patterns of distractor effects during decision making

The value of a third potential option or distractor can alter the way in which decisions are made between two other options. Two hypotheses have received empirical support: that a high value distractor improves the accuracy with which decisions between two other options are made and that it impairs accuracy. Recently, however, it has been argued that neither observation is replicable. Inspired by neuroimaging data showing that high value distractors have different impacts on prefrontal and parietal regions, we designed a dual route decision-making model that mimics the neural signals of these regions. Here we show in the dual route model and empirical data that both enhancement and impairment effects are robust phenomena but predominate in different parts of the decision space defined by the options' and the distractor's values. However, beyond these constraints, both effects co-exist under similar conditions. Moreover, both effects are robust and observable in six experiments.

Selective Integration during Sequential Sampling in Posterior Neural Signals

Decisions are typically made after integrating information about multiple attributes of alternatives in a choice set. Where observers are obliged to consider attributes in turn, a computational framework known as "selective integration" can capture salient biases in human choices. The model proposes that successive attributes compete for processing resources and integration is biased towards the alternative with the locally preferred attribute. Quantitative analysis shows that this model, although it discards choice-relevant information, is optimal when the observers' decisions are corrupted by noise that occurs beyond the sensory stage. Here, we used electroencephalography (EEG) to test a neural prediction of the model: that locally preferred attributes should be encoded with higher gain in neural signals over the posterior cortex. Over two sessions, human observers judged which of the two simultaneous streams of bars had the higher (or lower) average height. The selective integration model fits the data better than a rival model without bias. Single-trial analysis showed that neural signals contralateral to the preferred attribute covaried more steeply with the decision information conferred by locally preferred attributes. These findings provide neural evidence in support of selective integration, complementing existing behavioral work.

Value-based attention but not divisive normalization influences decisions with multiple alternatives

Violations of economic rationality principles in choices between three or more options are critical for understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms of decision-making. A recent study reported that the relative choice accuracy between two options decreases as the value of a third (distractor) option increases and attributed this effect to divisive normalization of neural value representations. In two preregistered experiments, a direct replication and an eye-tracking experiment, we assessed the replicability of this effect and tested an alternative account that assumes value-based attention to mediate the distractor effect. Surprisingly, we could not replicate the distractor effect in our experiments. However, we found a dynamic influence of distractor value on fixations to distractors as predicted by the value-based attention theory. Computationally, we show that extending an established sequential sampling decision-making model by a value-based attention mechanism offers a comprehensive account of the interplay between value, attention, response times and decisions.

Dynamic resource allocation during reinforcement learning accounts for ramping and phasic dopamine activity

For an animal to learn about its environment with limited motor and cognitive resources, it should focus its resources on potentially important stimuli. However, too narrow focus is disadvantageous for adaptation to environmental changes. Midbrain dopamine neurons are excited by potentially important stimuli, such as reward-predicting or novel stimuli, and allocate resources to these stimuli by modulating how an animal approaches, exploits, explores, and attends. The current study examined the theoretical possibility that dopamine activity reflects the dynamic allocation of resources for learning. Dopamine activity may transition between two patterns: (1) phasic responses to cues and rewards, and (2) ramping activity arising as the agent approaches the reward. Phasic excitation has been explained by prediction errors generated by experimentally inserted cues. However, when and why dopamine activity transitions between the two patterns remain unknown. By parsimoniously modifying a standard temporal difference (TD) learning model to accommodate a mixed presentation of both experimental and environmental stimuli, we simulated dopamine transitions and compared them with experimental data from four different studies. The results suggested that dopamine transitions from ramping to phasic patterns as the agent focuses its resources on a small number of reward-predicting stimuli, thus leading to task dimensionality reduction. The opposite occurs when the agent re-distributes its resources to adapt to environmental changes, resulting in task dimensionality expansion. This research elucidates the role of dopamine in a broader context, providing a potential explanation for the diverse repertoire of dopamine activity that cannot be explained solely by prediction error.

Selective Integration: An Attentional Theory of Choice Biases and Adaptive Choice

Human choice behavior shows a range of puzzling anomalies. Even simple binary choices are modified by accept/reject framing and by the presence of decoy options, and they can exhibit circular (i.e., intransitive) patterns of preferences. Each of these phenomena is incompatible with many standard models of choice but may provide crucial clues concerning the elementary mental processes underpinning our choices. One promising theoretical account proposes that choice-related information is selectively gathered through an attentionally limited window favoring goal-consistent information. We review research showing attentional-mediated choice biases and present a computationally explicit model—selective integration—that accounts for these biases.

Optimal policy for multi-alternative decisions

Everyday decisions frequently require choosing among multiple alternatives. Yet the optimal policy for such decisions is unknown. Here we derive the normative policy for general multi-alternative decisions. This strategy requires evidence accumulation to nonlinear, time-dependent bounds that trigger choices. A geometric symmetry in those boundaries allows the optimal strategy to be implemented by a simple neural circuit involving normalization with fixed decision bounds and an urgency signal. The model captures several key features of the response of decision-making neurons as well as the increase in reaction time as a function of the number of alternatives, known as Hick's law. In addition, we show that in the presence of divisive normalization and internal variability, our model can account for several so-called 'irrational' behaviors, such as the similarity effect as well as the violation of both the independence of irrelevant alternatives principle and the regularity principle.

Value-driven attentional capture enhances distractor representations in early visual cortex

When a behaviorally relevant stimulus has been previously associated with reward, behavioral responses are faster and more accurate compared to equally relevant but less valuable stimuli. Conversely, task-irrelevant stimuli that were previously associated with a high reward can capture attention and distract processing away from relevant stimuli (e.g., seeing a chocolate bar in the pantry when you are looking for a nice, healthy apple). Although increasing the value of task-relevant stimuli systematically up-regulates neural responses in early visual cortex to facilitate information processing, it is not clear whether the value of task-irrelevant distractors influences behavior via competition in early visual cortex or via competition at later stages of decision-making and response selection. Here, we measured functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in human visual cortex while subjects performed a value-based learning task, and we applied a multivariate inverted encoding model (IEM) to assess the fidelity of distractor representations in early visual cortex. We found that the fidelity of neural representations related to task-irrelevant distractors increased when the distractors were previously associated with a high reward. This finding suggests that value-driven attentional capture begins with sensory modulations of distractor representations in early areas of visual cortex.

Gaze bias differences capture individual choice behaviour

How do we make simple choices such as deciding between an apple and an orange? Recent empirical evidence suggests that choice behaviour and gaze allocation are closely linked at the group level, whereby items looked at longer during the decision-making process are more likely to be chosen. However, it is unclear how variable this gaze bias effect is between individuals. Here we investigate this question across four different simple choice experiments and using a computational model that can be easily applied to individuals. We show that an association between gaze and choice is present for most individuals, but differs considerably in strength. Generally, individuals with a strong association between gaze and choice behaviour are worse at choosing the best item from a choice set compared with individuals with a weak association. Accounting for individuals' variability in gaze bias in the model can explain and accurately predict individual differences in choice behaviour.

Value-based attentional capture affects multi-alternative decision making

Humans and other animals often violate economic principles when choosing between multiple alternatives, but the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms remain elusive. A robust finding is that adding a third option can alter the relative preference for the original alternatives, but studies disagree on whether the third option's value decreases or increases accuracy. To shed light on this controversy, we used and extended the paradigm of one study reporting a positive effect. However, our four experiments with 147 human participants and a reanalysis of the original data revealed that the positive effect is neither replicable nor reproducible. In contrast, our behavioral and eye-tracking results are best explained by assuming that the third option's value captures attention and thereby impedes accuracy. We propose a computational model that accounts for the complex interplay of value, attention, and choice. Our theory explains how choice sets and environments influence the neurocognitive processes of multi-alternative decision making.