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Lacalli T. Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1394669. [PMID: 38741757 PMCID: PMC11089241 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1394669] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2024] [Accepted: 04/16/2024] [Indexed: 05/16/2024] Open
Abstract
The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thurston Lacalli
- Department of Biology, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada
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Dominik T, Mele A, Schurger A, Maoz U. Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 157:105503. [PMID: 38072144 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105503] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2023] [Revised: 11/09/2023] [Accepted: 12/04/2023] [Indexed: 12/23/2023]
Abstract
The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Alfred Mele
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, FL, USA
| | | | - Uri Maoz
- Brain Institute, Chapman University, CA, USA
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Syrov N, Yakovlev L, Kaplan A, Lebedev M. Motor cortex activation during visuomotor transformations: evoked potentials during overt and imagined movements. Cereb Cortex 2024; 34:bhad440. [PMID: 37991276 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhad440] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2023] [Revised: 10/24/2023] [Accepted: 10/25/2023] [Indexed: 11/23/2023] Open
Abstract
Despite the prevalence of visuomotor transformations in our motor skills, their mechanisms remain incompletely understood, especially when imagery actions are considered such as mentally picking up a cup or pressing a button. Here, we used a stimulus-response task to directly compare the visuomotor transformation underlying overt and imagined button presses. Electroencephalographic activity was recorded while participants responded to highlights of the target button while ignoring the second, non-target button. Movement-related potentials (MRPs) and event-related desynchronization occurred for both overt movements and motor imagery (MI), with responses present even for non-target stimuli. Consistent with the activity accumulation model where visual stimuli are evaluated and transformed into the eventual motor response, the timing of MRPs matched the response time on individual trials. Activity-accumulation patterns were observed for MI, as well. Yet, unlike overt movements, MI-related MRPs were not lateralized, which appears to be a neural marker for the distinction between generating a mental image and transforming it into an overt action. Top-down response strategies governing this hemispheric specificity should be accounted for in future research on MI, including basic studies and medical practice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nikolay Syrov
- Vladimir Zelman Center for Neurobiology and Brain Rehabilitation, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, Bolshoy Boulevard 30, bld. 1. Moscow, 121205, Russia
| | - Lev Yakovlev
- Vladimir Zelman Center for Neurobiology and Brain Rehabilitation, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, Bolshoy Boulevard 30, bld. 1. Moscow, 121205, Russia
| | - Alexander Kaplan
- Vladimir Zelman Center for Neurobiology and Brain Rehabilitation, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, Bolshoy Boulevard 30, bld. 1. Moscow, 121205, Russia
- Faculty of Biology, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 1-12 Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991, Russia
| | - Mikhail Lebedev
- Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 1 Leninskiye Gory, Moscow, 119991, Russia
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Lawson L, Spivak S, Webber H, Yasin S, Goncalves B, Tarrio O, Ash S, Ferrol M, Ibragimov A, Olivares AG, Keenan JP. Alterations in Brain Activity Induced by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Their Relation to Decision Making. Biology (Basel) 2023; 12:1366. [PMID: 37997965 PMCID: PMC10669435 DOI: 10.3390/biology12111366] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2023] [Revised: 10/08/2023] [Accepted: 10/21/2023] [Indexed: 11/25/2023]
Abstract
Understanding the intricate dynamics between conscious choice and neural processes is crucial for unraveling the complexity of human decision-making. This study investigates the effects of inhibitory Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) on choice bias, shedding light on the malleability of cognitive-motor functions involved in decisions. While reaction times remained unaffected, inhibitory TMS to either the left or right motor cortex led to a significant bias in screen side preference during a choice task. These findings suggest that our cognitive-motor processes underlying decision-making can be unconsciously influenced by TMS. Furthermore, analysis of choice attribution categories revealed individual variability, emphasizing the complex nature of the decision-making process. These insights contribute to the ongoing exploration of the neural mechanisms governing human choice. As the neural basis of free will continues to captivate scientific inquiry, this research advances our understanding of the intricate relationship between neural circuits and conscious intention.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lexie Lawson
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
| | - Stephanie Spivak
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
| | - Heather Webber
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Houston, TX 77054, USA;
| | - Saeed Yasin
- New York Institute of Technology, New York, NY 10023, USA;
| | - Briana Goncalves
- School of Health and Medical Sciences, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ 07079, USA;
| | - Olivia Tarrio
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
| | - Sydney Ash
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
| | - Maria Ferrol
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
| | - Athenia Ibragimov
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
| | - Alejandro Gili Olivares
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
| | - Julian Paul Keenan
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Biology, Montclair State University, 320 Science Hall, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA; (L.L.); (S.S.); (O.T.); (S.A.); (M.F.); (A.I.); (A.G.O.)
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Delnatte C, Roze E, Pouget P, Galléa C, Welniarz Q. Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will? Neuropsychologia 2023; 188:108632. [PMID: 37385373 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108632] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2023] [Revised: 06/24/2023] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 07/01/2023]
Abstract
Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Emmanuel Roze
- Sorbonne Université, Faculté de Médecine, INSERM U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute Institut du Cerveau, F-75013, Paris, France; Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux de Paris, Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière, Département de Neurologie, Paris, France
| | - Pierre Pouget
- Sorbonne Université, Faculté de Médecine, INSERM U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute Institut du Cerveau, F-75013, Paris, France
| | - Cécile Galléa
- Sorbonne Université, Faculté de Médecine, INSERM U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute Institut du Cerveau, F-75013, Paris, France
| | - Quentin Welniarz
- Sorbonne Université, Faculté de Médecine, INSERM U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute Institut du Cerveau, F-75013, Paris, France.
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Lacalli T. Consciousness and its hard problems: separating the ontological from the evolutionary. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1196576. [PMID: 37484112 PMCID: PMC10362341 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1196576] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2023] [Accepted: 06/21/2023] [Indexed: 07/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant. This is a problem for biological realists trying to assess the applicability of competing theories of consciousness to taxa other than our own, and across evolutionary time. Here, as an aid to investigating such questions, a consciousness "machine" is employed as conceptual device for thinking about the different ways ontology and evolution contribute to the emergence of a consciousness composed of distinguishable contents. A key issue is the nature of the evolutionary innovations required for any kind of consciousness to exist, specifically whether this is due to the underappreciated properties of electromagnetic (EM) field effects, as in neurophysical theories, or, for theories where there is no such requirement, including computational and some higher-order theories (here, as a class, algorithmic theories), neural connectivity and the pattern of information flow that connectivity encodes are considered a sufficient explanation for consciousness. In addition, for consciousness to evolve in a non-random way, there must be a link between emerging consciousness and behavior. For the neurophysical case, an EM field-based scenario shows that distinct contents can be produced in the absence of an ability to consciously control action, i.e., without agency. This begs the question of how agency is acquired, which from this analysis would appear to be less of an evolutionary question than a developmental one. Recasting the problem in developmental terms highlights the importance of real-time feedback mechanisms for transferring agency from evolution to the individual, the implication being, for a significant subset of theories, that agency requires a learning process repeated once in each generation. For that subset of theories the question of how an evolved consciousness can exist will then have two components, of accounting for conscious experience as a phenomenon on the one hand, and agency on the other. This reduces one large problem to two, simplifying the task of investigation and providing what may prove an easier route toward their solution.
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Abstract
Motor awareness is a complex, multifaceted construct involving the awareness of both (i) one's motor state while executing a movement or remaining still and (ii) one's motor abilities. The analysis of neurological syndromes associated with motor disorders suggests the existence of various different components which are, however, integrated into a model of motor awareness. These components are: (i) motor intention, namely, a conscious desire to perform an action; (ii) motor monitoring and error recognition, that is, the capacity to check the execution of the action and identify motor errors; and (iii) a general awareness of one's own motor abilities and deficits, that is, the capacity to recognize the general state of one's motor abilities about the performance of specific actions and the potential consequences of motor impairment. Neuroanatomical correlates involving the parietal and insular cortices, the medial and lateral frontal regions, and subcortical structures (basal ganglia and limbic system) support this multi-component model. Specific damage (or disconnections) to these structures results in a number of different disorders in motor awareness, such as anosognosia for hemiplegia and apraxia, and a number of symptoms which are specific to motor intention disorders (e.g., the Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Tourette's Syndrome) or motor monitoring (e.g., Parkinson's and Huntington's diseases). All of these clinical conditions are discussed in the light of a motor awareness model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Valentina Pacella
- Groupe d'Imagerie Neurofonctionnelle, Institut des Maladies Neurodégénératives-UMR 5293, CNRS, CEA University of Bordeaux, 33076, Bordeaux, CS, France. .,Brain Connectivity and Behaviour Laboratory, Sorbonne Universities, Paris, France.
| | - Valentina Moro
- NPSY.Lab-VR, Department of Human Sciences, University of Verona, Lungadige Porta Vittoria 17, 37129, Verona, Italy.
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Sannita WG. Time, Consciousness, and the Readiness Potential. J PSYCHOPHYSIOL 2022. [DOI: 10.1027/0269-8803/a000304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Walter G. Sannita
- Department of Neuroscience, Rehabilitation, Ophthalmology, Genetics and Mother/child sciences (DINOGMI), University of Genova, Italy
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Armstrong SR, Bland NS, Sale MV, Cunnington R. Unconscious Influences on "Free Will" Movement Initiation: Slow-wave Brain Stimulation and the Readiness Potential. J Cogn Neurosci 2022; 34:1038-1052. [PMID: 35195727 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_01840] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
Abstract
A central objective in the study of volition has been to identify how changes in neural activity relate to voluntary-"free will"-movement. The readiness potential (RP) is observed in the EEG as a slow-building signal that precedes action onset. Many consider the RP as a marker of an underlying preparatory process for initiating voluntary movement. However, the RP may emerge from ongoing slow-wave brain oscillations that influence the timing of movement initiation in a phase-dependent manner. Transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) enables brain oscillations to be entrained at the frequency of stimulation. We delivered tACS at a slow-wave frequency over frontocentral motor areas while participants (n = 30) performed a simple, self-paced button press task. During the active tACS condition, participants showed a tendency to initiate actions in the phase of the tACS cycle that corresponded to increased negative potentials across the frontocentral motor region. Comparisons of premovement EEG activity observed over frontocentral and central scalp electrodes showed earlier onset and increased amplitude of RPs from active stimulation compared with sham stimulation. This suggests that movement-related activity in the brain can be modulated by the delivery of weak, nonconsciously perceptible alternating currents over frontocentral motor regions. We present novel findings that support existing theories, which suggest the timing of voluntary movement is influenced by the phase of slow-changing oscillating brain states.
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