Molecular and virological characterization of the first poultry outbreaks of Genotype VII.2 velogenic avian orthoavulavirus type 1 (NDV) in North-West Europe, BeNeLux, 2018

After two decades free of Newcastle disease, Belgium encountered a velogenic avian orthoavulavirus type 1 epizootic in 2018. In Belgium, 20 cases were diagnosed, of which 15 occurred in hobby flocks, 2 in professional poultry flocks and 3 in poultry retailers. The disease also disseminated from Belgium towards the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by trade. Independently, the virus was detected once in the Netherlands, almost simultaneously to the first Belgian detection. As such Newcastle disease emerged in the entire BeNeLux region. Both the polybasic sequence of the fusion gene cleavage site and the intracerebral pathotyping assay demonstrated the high pathogenicity of the strain. This paper represents the first notification of this specific VII.2 subgenotype in the North-West of Europe. Time-calibrated full genome phylogenetic analysis indicated the silent or unreported circulation of the virus prior to the emergence of three genetic clusters in the BeNeLux region without clear geographical or other epidemiological correlation. The Dutch strain appeared as an outgroup to the Belgian and Luxembourgian strains in the time-correlated genetic analysis and no epidemiological link could be identified between the Belgian and Dutch outbreaks. In contrast, both genetic and epidemiological outbreak investigation data linked the G.D. Luxembourg case to the Belgian outbreak. The genetic links between Belgian viruses from retailers and hobby flocks only partially correlated with epidemiological data. Two independent introductions into the professional poultry sector were identified, although their origin could not be determined. Animal experiments using 6-week- old specific pathogen-free chickens indicated a systemic infection and efficient transmission of the virus. The implementation of re-vaccination in the professional sector, affected hobby and retailers, as well as the restriction on assembly and increased biosecurity measures, possibly limited the epizootic and resulted in the disappearance of the virus. These findings emphasize the constant need for awareness and monitoring of notifiable viruses in the field.

Chasing notifiable avian influenza in domestic poultry: a case report of low-pathogenic avian influenza h5 viruses in two Belgian holdings

In December 2008, bird species in two geographically distant holdings were found positive for H5 viruses following the annual Avian influenza serological screening in Belgium. The virological tests performed identified in one holding a low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus subtype H5N2, and a H5 LPAI virus was identified by real-time PCR and direct sequencing at the second holding. The first farm was an outdoor mixed holding housing ornamental birds and poultry (n = 6000) and the second a free-range geese breeding farm (n = 1500). No clinical signs or mortalities were reported. Control measures defined by Council Directive 2005/94/EC were followed, including notification to the European Commission via the Animal Disease Notification System and to the World Organization for Animal Health, and poultry were killed, while ornamental bird species were quarantined. Partial sequencing of the H5N2 virus haemagglutinin and neuraminidase N2 gene sequences revealed a close homology to some recent LPAI isolates identified from wild birds in Germany and Italy and from wild birds in Eurasia and Africa, respectively. It is noteworthy that, these two holdings were already H5 positive based on HI test results carried out during the previous serological screening; however, no virus was detected at that time. To have a better understanding of the potential 'silent' circulation of the H5N2 isolate in the field, experimental infections of chickens and turkeys were performed. The low excretion detected might in part explain viral persistence not associated with spread between gallinaceous birds in the same holding, indicating that the H5N2 LPAI isolate was not fully adapted to these two poultry species. Our results highlighted limitations to only using serological screening for the early detection of LPAI in an 'at-risk farm', suggesting that virological and serological monitoring tests be applied simultaneously as a means of testing animals in 'at-risk farms'.

Molecular epidemiological analysis of the transboundary transmission of 2003 highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N7 outbreaks between the Netherlands and Belgium

The 2003 outbreak of Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H7N7) in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany resulted in significant genetic diversification that proved informative for tracing transmission events. Building on previous investigations on the Dutch outbreak, we focused on the potential transnational transmissions between the Netherlands and Belgium. Although no clear epidemiological links could be identified from the tracing data, the transmission network based on concatenated HA-NA-PB2 sequences supports at least three independent introductions from the Netherlands to Belgium and suggests one possible introduction form Belgium back to the Netherlands. Two introductions in the Belgian province of Limburg occurred from nearby farms in the Dutch province of Limburg. One introduction resulted in three secondary infected farms, while a second introduction did not cause secondary infections. The third introduction into Belgium occurred in the north of the Antwerp province, very close to the national border, and originated from the North of the Dutch province Brabant (long distance transmission, >65 km). The virus spread to two additional Belgian farms, one of which may be the source of a secondarily infected farm in the Netherlands. One infected turkey farm in the province of Antwerp (Westmalle) was geographically close to the latter introduction, but genetically clustered with the first introduction event in the Limburg province. Epidemiological tracing data could neither confirm nor exclude whether this outbreak was a result from long distance contacts within Belgium or whether this farm presented a fourth independent transboundary introduction. These multiple transnational transmissions of HPAI in spite of reinforced biosecurity measures and trade restrictions illustrate the importance of international cooperation, legislation and standardization of tools to combat transboundary diseases.

Bluetongue sentinel surveillance program and cross-sectional serological survey in cattle in Belgium in 2010-2011

Bluetongue virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) emerged in Central Western Europe in 2006 causing a large scale epidemic in 2007 that involved several European Union (EU) countries including Belgium. As in several other EU member states, vaccination against BTV-8 with inactivated vaccines was initiated in Belgium in spring 2008 and appeared to be successful. Since 2009, no clinical cases of Bluetongue (BT) have been reported in Belgium and BTV-8 circulation seemed to have completely disappeared by spring 2010. Therefore, a series of repeated cross-sectional surveys, the BT sentinel surveillance program, based on virus detection in blood samples by means of real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR) were carried out in dairy cattle from the end of 2010 onwards with the aim to demonstrate the absence of BTV circulation in Belgium. This paper describes the results of the first two sampling rounds of this BT sentinel surveillance program carried out in October-November 2010 and January-February 2011. In addition, the level of BTV-specific maternal antibodies in young non-vaccinated animals was monitored and the level of herd immunity against BTV-8 after 3 consecutive years of compulsory BTV-8 vaccination was measured by ELISA. During the 1st sampling round of the BT sentinel surveillance program, 15 animals tested positive and 2 animals tested doubtful for BTV RNA by RT-qPCR. During the 2nd round, 17 animals tested positive and 5 animals tested doubtful. The positive/doubtful animals in both rounds were re-sampled 2-4 weeks after the original sampling and then all tested negative by RT-qPCR. These results demonstrate the absence of BTV circulation in Belgium in 2010 at a minimum expected prevalence of 2% and 95% confidence level. The study of the maternal antibodies in non-vaccinated animals showed that by the age of 7 months maternal antibodies against BTV had disappeared in most animals. The BTV seroprevalence at herd level after 3 years of compulsory BTV-8 vaccination was very high (97.4% [95% CI: 96.2-98.2]). The overall true within-herd BTV seroprevalence in 6-24 month old Belgian cattle in early 2011 was estimated at 73.4% (95% CI: 71.3-75.4).

Emergence of bluetongue serotypes in Europe, part 2: the occurrence of a BTV-11 strain in Belgium

An EDTA-blood sample from a cow without clinical signs, which gave early birth to a newborn calf that died soon after delivery, was shown to be positive for bluetongue virus (BTV)-RNA using a group-specific real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR). In-house serotype-specific RT-qPCR assays for bluetongue virus serotype 1 (BTV-1), -6 and -8 all gave negative results. Subsequent assays were carried out using conventional (gel-based) RT-PCR primers for all 25 BTV serotypes and only two primer sets, both specific for BTV-11, gave bands of the expected size. The cDNAs generated were sequenced and comparisons of the genome segment 2 sequence with that of the modified 'live' vaccine strain of BTV-11 from South Africa showed 100% identity. A survey of all ruminants in a 1-km area around the first positive farm using a BTV-11 serotype-specific RT-qPCR revealed five other holdings with in total nine BTV-11 positive animals. A cross-sectional monitoring of dairy cattle in Belgium showed an overall prevalence of 3.8% on herd level and 0.2% on animal level. A BTV-11 has been introduced into the Belgian cattle herd during the 2008 vector season. The source of the infection and the way by which the virus was introduced are unknown.

Bluetongue in Belgium: episode II

Bluetongue (BT) is an arthropod-borne viral disease of ruminants. In August 2006, domestic ruminant populations in Northern Europe became infected with BT virus serotype 8 (BTV-8). The first BTV-8-case of the year 2007 in Belgium was notified in July. This case was the starting point of a second wave of BT outbreaks. The main objective of this study was to describe the evolution and the clinical impact of the second episode of BT in Belgium. In addition, the main differences with the previous episode (August-December 2006) are reported. Both outbreak and rendering plant data were analysed. Overall cumulative incidence at herd level was estimated at 11.5 (11.2-11.8) and 7.5 (7.3-7.8) per cent in cattle and sheep populations respectively. The findings went in favour of a negative association between within-herd prevalence in 2006 and the risk of showing clinical signs of BT in 2007 (via protective immunity). A high level of correlation was demonstrated between BT incidence and small ruminant mortality data when shifting the latter of 1-week backwards. This result supports the hypothesis that the high increase in small ruminant mortality observed in 2007 was the consequence of the presence of BT. For cattle, the correlation was not as high. An increase in cattle foetal mortality was also observed during the year 2007 and a fair correlation was found between BT incidence and foetal mortality.

Avian influenza outbreak management: action at time of confirmation, depopulation and disposal methods; the 'Belgian experience' during the H7N7 highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic in 2003

Eradication of H5 and H7 influenza in a positive flock will include mass depopulation of birds, containment and inactivation of the virus in the carcasses and litter, and decontamination of the facility. A quick response is desired in the event of a disease outbreak. Ideally, birds should be depopulated within 24 h after detecting the virus. Mass depopulation of birds must be performed in a humane manner while minimizing human health and biosecurity risks. In the framework of the European legislation, a number of methods are authorized for the killing of poultry for processing prior to marketing. However, during emergencies such as a disease outbreak, there are fewer options. The current most commonly used procedures for large-scale emergency depopulation of birds consist of exposing poultry to CO or CO(2) gas. Both gasses have been used in Belgium during the H7N7 crisis in 2003. The gassing procedures include whole house gassing, portable panel enclosures, cage cabinets, containers and polyethylene tent method. Whole house gassing requires sealing the house to prevent gas leakage and, using specialized equipment, introducing large volumes of gas evenly over the birds. All procedures are very labour intensive, create a biosecurity risk and require a large number of personnel. There are considerable region-to-region differences in emergency depopulation techniques and disposal of carcasses and infected material. Because of the differences in bird type and species, management, housing and stocking density, it is difficult to propose a depopulation technique that will be suitable for all circumstances. Safety of the human operators is an increasing concern with all H5 and H7 strains and in particular with the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain. Researchers and commercial poultry companies in the United States recently established that non-toxic water-based foam with a certain bubble size presents a practicable, effective and humane method for mass depopulation. Foam of the right bubble size creates an occlusion in the trachea of birds, causing a rapid onset of hypoxia. The foam that blankets the broiler house induces physical hypoxia - the same cause of death as the approved method using carbon dioxide gas (CO(2)). The article illustrates the different culling and disposal methods with a focus on the methods used during the 2003 H7N7 crisis in Belgium.

Evaluation of antibody-ELISA and real-time RT-PCR for the diagnosis and profiling of bluetongue virus serotype 8 during the epidemic in Belgium in 2006

In 2006 bluetongue (BT) emerged for the first time in North-Western Europe. Reliable diagnostic tools are essential in controlling BT but data on the diagnostic sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp) are often missing. This paper aims to describe and analyse the results obtained with the diagnostics used in Belgium during the 2006 BT crisis. The diagnosis was based on a combination of antibody detection (competitive ELISA, cELISA) and viral RNA detection by real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR). The performance of the cELISA as a diagnostic tool was assessed on field results obtained during the epidemic and previous surveillance campaigns. As the infectious status of the animals is unknown during an epidemic, a Bayesian analysis was performed. Both assays were found to be equally specific (RT-qPCR: 98.5%; cELISA: 98.2%) while the diagnostic sensitivity of the RT-qPCR (99.5%) was superior to that of the cELISA (87.8%). The assumption of RT-qPCR as standard of comparison during the bluetongue virus (BTV) epidemic proved valid based on the results of the Bayesian analysis. A ROC analysis of the cELISA, using RT-qPCR as standard of comparison, showed that the cut-off point with the highest accuracy occurred at a percentage negativity of 66, which is markedly higher than the cut-off proposed by the manufacturer. The analysis of the results was further extended to serological and molecular profiling and the possible use of profiling as a rapid epidemiological marker of the BTV in-field situation was assessed. A comparison of the serological profiles obtained before, during and at the end of the Belgian epidemic clearly showed the existence of an intermediate zone which appears soon after BTV (re)enters the population. The appearance or disappearance of this intermediate zone is correlated with virus circulation and provides valuable information, which would be entirely overlooked if only positive and negative results were considered.

Bluetongue in Belgium, 2006

Bluetongue has emerged recently in Belgium. A bluetongue virus strain was isolated and characterized as serotype 8. Two new real-time reverse transcription–quantitative PCRs (RT-qPCRs) that amplified 2 different segments of bluetongue virus detected this exotic strain. These 2 RT-qPCRs detected infection earlier than a competitive ELISA for antibody detection.

Tomographic measurements of regional cerebral blood flow in progressive supranuclear palsy and Parkinson's disease

Intellectual changes observed in progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) are sometimes seen with lesser intensity in Parkinson's disease (PD). Cognitive impairment of PSP has been attributed to a frontal lobe dysfunction explaining the frontal cortex hypometabolism detected by PET. To establish whether this frontal hypometabolism is more pronounced in PSP than in PD, we compared frontal and temporo-parietal cerebral blood flow (CBF) indexes studied by SPECT using Tc99m HmPAO in 18 PSP, 18 PD and 8 control subjects. For each patient neuropsychological performances were also assessed. A significant left frontal hypoperfusion was observed in PSP (mean index value: 0.78 +/- 0.03, p < 0.01) and PD (0.78 +/- 0.04, p < 0.05) as compared to controls (0.84 +/- 0.03), whereas there was no difference between PSP and PD. No correlation was discovered between neuropsychological performances and frontal cortical index changes. This frontal uptake reduction of Tc99m HmPAO in PSP and PD could result from a disconnection phenomenon secondary to subcortical lesions. In both groups mean frontal indexes showed only a left frontal hypoperfusion suggesting that subcortical structures might be asymmetrically involved in early stages of the diseases. The lack of difference for indexe values between PSP and PD might be explained by the difference between the mean disease duration: 4.3 years for the PSP and 7.8 years for the PD. It might also suggest that frontal CBF reduction exists in the same proportions in PD and PSP, but at a later stage in the former case.