Differentiating busking from begging: A psychological approach

Despite the research support that street performance is generally a beneficial element to public space, the legitimacy of street performance remains controversial. One critical issue is that busking is often confused with begging. With a psychological perspective, the present research examines the distinction of busking from begging. Two studies approached the problem from the viewpoints of street performers and passersby, respectively. Study 1 (N = 188) surveyed street performers on their reasons for street performance and reasons for why donations to street performance should be acceptable. The respondents could articulate various features of street performance along which busking could be similar to and yet distinguishable from begging. Study 2 (N = 189) experimentally compared busking and begging in how they could affect people's perception of public space. Relative to public space with begging, public space with busking was perceived as significantly more comforting, more active, less prone to crimes, and overall more likeable. These descriptive (Study 1) and experimental (Study 2) findings help to clarify the difference between busking and begging: Street performance is not merely an act of soliciting donations in public space, but it also possesses artistic and entertaining qualities that can in turn make public space more favorable. The current findings can inform the policy making and regulations of street performance. Moreover, since the present research was conducted in Hong Kong, it contributes a cultural perspective to the literature on street performance.

Effect of Street Performance (Busking) on the Environmental Perception of Public Space

This is the first experimental study testing the effect of street performance (aka busking) on the subjective environmental perception of public space. It is generally believed that street performance can enhance people’s experience of public space, but studies advocating such a view have not used a control group to explicitly verify the effect of street performance. In response to this methodological limitation, we conducted two studies using experimental design. Study 1 (N = 748) was an online computer-based study where research participants evaluated the extent to which the presence vs. absence of street performance could change their perception of public space. Study 2 (N = 162) was a between-group quasi-experiment in an actual public space where people physically present in the space evaluated the perception of the space with vs. without street performance. Overall, we found converging results that street performance could make public space more visitable, more restorative, and more preferable. The current findings not only fill in a gap in the literature on street performance, but they also inform the policy making and regulations of street performance.

Scale Development for Environmental Perception of Public Space

We developed a psychometric scale for measuring the subjective environmental perception of public spaces. In the scale development process, we started with an initial pool of 85 items identified from the literature that were related to environmental perception. A total of 1,650 participants rated these items on animated images of 12 public spaces through an online survey. Using principal component analyses and confirmatory factor analyses, we identified two affective factors (comfort and activity) with 8 items and six cognitive factors (legibility, enclosure, complexity, crime potential, wildlife, and lighting) with 22 items. These eight factors represent the core attributes underlying environmental perception of public spaces. Practicality of the scale and limitations of the study are also discussed.

The effect of subgroup homogeneity of efficacy on contribution in public good dilemmas

This paper examines how to maximize contribution in public good dilemmas by arranging people into homogeneous or heterogeneous subgroups. Past studies on the effect of homogeneity of efficacy have exclusively manipulated group composition in their experimental designs, which might have imposed a limit on ecological validity because group membership may not be easily changed in reality. In this study, we maintained the same group composition but varied the subgroup composition. We developed a public good dilemmas paradigm in which participants were assigned to one of the four conditions (high- vs. low-efficacy; homogeneous vs. heterogeneous subgroup) to produce their endowments and then to decide how much to contribute. We found that individuals in homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups produced a similar amount and proportion of contribution, which was due to the two mediating effects that counteracted each other, namely (a) perceived efficacy relative to subgroup and (b) expectation of contribution of other subgroup members. This paper demonstrates both the pros and cons of arranging people into homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups of efficacy.

Order Effects in Individual and Group Policy Allocations

Although citizen panels have become quite popular for policy making, there is very little research on how the procedures these groups employ to manage consensus affect their decision making. We measured the effect of a simple procedural mechanism, agenda order, on individual and group allocations for an HIV policy. Allocations made in a large-small (state-region-city) order were substantially smaller, overall, than were allocations made in small-large (city-region-state) order, and group allocations were smaller, overall, than were individual judgments. The Social Judgment Scheme model (Davis, 1996) provided a good fit of the group allocation, and suggested a mechanism for this overall downward shift in judgment. Normative (i.e. calibration) analyses, as well as subjective impressions (e.g. confidence, repeat judgments) favored relatively smaller allocations so that judgments made in large-small order, and judgments made in groups were arguably more defensible than were individual or small-large judgments. We discuss these strong agenda influences and their implications both for citizen panels and for theoretical research on group consensus.

Effects of Group Size Uncertainty and Protocol of Play in a Common Pool Resource Dilemma

This study investigated the effect of group size uncertainty in a single-stage step-level common pool resource dilemma under a sequential (SEQ) and a Self-paced Sequential (SPS) protocol of play. In the uncertain group size condition, participants were told that their group was equally likely to be any size between three and seven persons. In the certain group size condition, the group size was always five. In the SEQ protocol, decisions were made in a pre-specified order such that each player knew his or her position in the sequence, as well as the combined requests of all the preceding players in the sequence. In the SPS protocol, participants could choose when to make their decisions. In both protocols, we replicated the position effects—individual requests are inversely related to the players' positions in the sequence with the first mover requesting most, and the last mover requesting the least. We also found that the position effect was stronger in SEQ than in SPS, and when group size was certain than when it was not. Relative to group size certainty, group size uncertainty decreased total requests and increased provision rates.

Effect of risk orientation on cooperation and decision process in public goods dilemma

This paper investigates the effects of risk orientation (RO) and social value orientation (SVO) on cooperation and the process of making the decision in a public goods dilemma (PGD). We found in Study 1 that risk-seeking prosocials were more cooperative than risk-averse prosocials in a simultaneous PGD. In Study 2, we found the same effect of RO on cooperation in a real-time PGD. Moreover, we found that risk-seeking prosocials, compared with their risk-averse counterparts, took less time to make decisions and observed fewer preceding cooperation choices before making their decisions. Mediation analysis confirms our model based on the change of K’ index in real-time PGD: The number of preceding cooperation choices being observed by a player mediated the effect of RO on cooperation among prosocials that risk-seekers were more cooperative than risk-averse participants. Our studies illustrate that individual differences such as RO and SVO play an important role in decision processes in PGD that subsequently affects cooperation decisions.

The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction

In two studies we found that feelings of guilt provoke individuals to cooperate in repeated social bargaining games (a prisoner's dilemma in Study 1 and an ultimatum game in Study 2). Feelings of guilt were either experimentally manipulated (Study 1) or assessed via self-report (Study 2) after participants had played one round of a social bargaining game. As predicted, individuals who experienced feelings of guilt (compared to individuals who felt no guilt) after pursuing a non-cooperative strategy in the first round of play, displayed higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of play (even one week later). Results are discussed in terms of an "affect-as-information" model, which suggests that non-cooperating individuals who experience the negative affective state associated with guilt in a social bargaining game may be using this feeling state as "information" about the future costs of pursuing an uncooperative strategy. Because in guilt the focus is on the specific, individuals are capable of ridding themselves of this emotional state through action (Lewis, 1993, p. 570).

Bonus and Penalty in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty

Common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas constitute a class of social dilemmas in which equilibrium behavior results in Pareto deficient outcomes that are not at all desirable by the group. We focus on a class of CPR dilemmas that, in addition to strategic uncertainty about the harvesting behavior of the other group members, include environmental uncertainty about the size of the CPR. In an attempt to decrease the rate of requests from the common pool, and thereby increase individual payoffs, we extend previous research-both theoretically and experimentally-in two different directions. In the bonus treatment, a reward is given to the agent(s) who requests the least, and in the penalty treatment, a charge is imposed on the agent(s) who requests the most. We show that under equilibrium play the bonus treatment decreases total group request, whereas the penalty treatment increases it. Our experimental results do not support this prediction. Rather, both treatments considerably decrease the rate of request and, therefore, increase the rate of provision. The penalty treatment is shown to be more effective in reducing individual requests and enhancing provision rates than the bonus treatment. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.

The effects of averaging subjective probability estimates between and within judges

The average probability estimate of J > 1 judges is generally better than its components. Two studies test 3 predictions regarding averaging that follow from theorems based on a cognitive model of the judges and idealizations of the judgment situation. Prediction 1 is that the average of conditionally pairwise independent estimates will be highly diagnostic, and Prediction 2 is that the average of dependent estimates (differing only by independent error terms) may be well calibrated. Prediction 3 contrasts between- and within-subject averaging. Results demonstrate the predictions' robustness by showing the extent to which they hold as the information conditions depart from the ideal and as J increases. Practical consequences are that (a) substantial improvement can be obtained with as few as 2-6 judges and (b) the decision maker can estimate the nature of the expected improvement by considering the information conditions.

The effects of averaging subjective probability estimates between and within judges

The average probability estimate of J > 1 judges is generally better than its components. Two studies test 3 predictions regarding averaging that follow from theorems based on a cognitive model of the judges and idealizations of the judgment situation. Prediction 1 is that the average of conditionally pairwise independent estimates will be highly diagnostic, and Prediction 2 is that the average of dependent estimates (differing only by independent error terms) may be well calibrated. Prediction 3 contrasts between- and within-subject averaging. Results demonstrate the predictions' robustness by showing the extent to which they hold as the information conditions depart from the ideal and as J increases. Practical consequences are that (a) substantial improvement can be obtained with as few as 2-6 judges and (b) the decision maker can estimate the nature of the expected improvement by considering the information conditions.

A Probabilistic Model of Criticality in a Sequential Public Good Dilemma

A public good (PG) is a commodity or service made available to all members of a group: its provision depends on the voluntary contribution of its members. Once provided, all members can enjoy the benefits of the PG, regardless of whether they contributed or not; hence, there is a temptation to "free-ride" in the hope that others will contribute. Rapoport (1987) showed that an important factor that affects cooperation (contribution) in a PG dilemma is the extent to which a group member is critical in providing it. Erev and Rapoport (1990) tested a game-theoretic model that yields deterministic predictions about the effects of criticality on cooperation in public good dilemmas. Based on research by Chen, Au, and Komorita (1996), we propose a probabilistic model of criticality. The model is tested and found to fit empirical data. Extensions of the model to situations with uncertain group size or provision point are discussed. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.