Evolutionary analysis of stakeholder behavior in green retrofitting of traditional residential buildings based on dissemination and game models

To achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals in China, green retrofitting of traditional residential buildings is the one of the important ways. Therefore, the dynamics process of the change of the resident group intention to retrofit and its impact on the behavior of the tripartite game between the government, investment retrofitting enterprises and residents needs to be analyzed. Firstly, a dissemination model of green retrofitting intentions among resident groups is constructed, and it is coupled with the tripartite game model. Then, through numerical simulation, the dissemination laws of intention for green retrofitting among resident groups and its influence on the evolution process of the tripartite game are analyzed. The results show that: (1) The rate at which the triad of government, investment retrofitting enterprises and residents reaches steady state is influenced by the impact of changes in the level of social climate on the rate of conversion of potential and participating residents to immune residents. When the rate of enterprises investment and residents participation increases, the rate of government choice of incentive strategies decreases; (2) greater government regulation and subsidies will increase the intention of residents and retrofitting enterprises to participate. The ideal steady state without government incentives can be achieved when the group size of participating residents is increased by improving the level of government publicity and education and the technology level of the enterprises; (3) the intention of enterprises to invest is closely related to the cognitive benefits and the level of risk perception of residents. The conclusions of the study can be used as a reference for the government to make green retrofitting policies for traditional residential buildings.

Analysis on the stochastic evolution process of low-carbon transformation for supplier groups in construction supply chain

To achieve the goal of "emission peak and carbon neutrality", it is particularly important to accelerate the transformation of low-carbon production as the construction industry of China’s major carbon emission. Considering the national industrial management system, this paper constructs a stochastic game model of supplier group’s production strategy in construction supply chain based on Moran process, analyzes the conditions for low-carbon emission strategy to fixate in supplier populations and become an evolutionary stable strategy, then, carries out numerical analysis on fixation probability and fixation times, and the influence of various factors on the evolution process is discussed, such as the initial willingness of suppliers to choose low-carbon emission strategy, the cost subsidy coefficient of government to low carbon suppliers, the reward and punishment of government and the credibility of suppliers. The results show that on the basis of vigorously promoting environmental protection, the government should implement a differentiated treatment policy through the establishment of carbon emissions standards, cost subsidies, incentives and punishment measures, and information disclosure systems to guide supplier groups to transformation into low-carbon production.