The hippocampus supports the representation of abstract concepts: Implications for the study of recognition memory

Words, unlike images, are symbolic representations. The associative details inherent within a word's meaning and the visual imagery it generates, are inextricably connected to the way words are processed and represented. It is well recognised that the hippocampus associatively binds components of a memory to form a lasting representation, and here we show that the hippocampus is especially sensitive to abstract word processing. Using fMRI during recognition, we found that the increased abstractness of words produced increased hippocampal activation regardless of memory outcome. Interestingly, word recollection produced hippocampal activation regardless of word content, while the parahippocampal cortex was sensitive to concreteness of word representations, regardless of memory outcome. We reason that the hippocampus has assumed a critical role in the representation of uncontextualized abstract word meaning, as its information-binding ability allows the retrieval of the semantic and visual associates that, when bound together, generate the abstract concept represented by word symbols. These insights have implications for research on word representation, memory, and hippocampal function, perhaps shedding light on how the human brain has adapted to encode and represent abstract concepts.

Grounded Cognition, Linguistic Relativity, and Abstract Concepts

Kemmerer's paper convincingly claims that the grounded cognition model (GCM) entails linguistic relativity. Here, we underline that tackling linguistic relativity and cultural differences is vital for GCM. First, it allows GCM to focus more on flexible rather than stable aspects of cognition. Second, it highlights the centrality of linguistic experience for human cognition. While GCM-inspired research underscored the similarity between linguistic and nonlinguistic concepts, it is now paramount to understand when and how language(s) influence knowledge. To this aim, we argue that linguistic variation might be particularly relevant for more abstract concepts-which are more debatable and open to revisions.

The neural correlates of abstract and concrete words

In this chapter, the literature concerning the dissociation between concrete and abstract words is reviewed, with a specific focus on the role of the temporal lobes. A number of studies have demonstrated the so-called "concreteness effect," that is, the superior processing of concrete versus abstract words. However, some neuropsychological patients have been described with a reversal of concreteness effect, namely, a better performance with abstract than concrete words. Available data suggest that the most frequent causes of this reversed effect are herpes simplex encephalitis and semantic dementia, which typically affect bilaterally anterior temporal regions. Direct electrical stimulation of the left temporal pole further supports this correlation, while the neuroimaging literature is more controversial. In fact, data from neuroimaging studies show either that abstract and concrete noun processing at least partly relies on the activation of a common left-lateralized network, or that abstract word processing is supported by the activation of networks within the left inferior frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus. In between abstract and concrete concepts are idioms, which are represented by concrete actions conveying abstract mental states and events. The involvement of the temporal lobes in processing this particular figure of language is discussed.

Concreteness of thoughts and images during suppression and expression of worry

The avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004) posits that the verbal-linguistic (versus imagery-based) nature of worry elicits abstract (versus concrete) processing, which inhibits affective responding and generates a host of negative consequences. Although suppression of worrisome thinking is maladaptive (Purdon, 1999), expression of worry using vivid imagery may increase concreteness of worrisome thinking and facilitate more adaptive emotional responding. The present study examined whether the valence, content, and expression of mentation impacts concreteness of thought. Participants (N = 62) were randomly assigned to verbalize their thoughts while engaging in either verbal-linguistic- or imagery-based mentation about both worrisome and neutral topics. Participants were also randomly assigned to engage in a 5-min period of suppressing or expressing the target stimuli before engaging in 5-min of freely expressing the targets. Verbalizations of mental content were coded for level of abstractness/concreteness. For neutral stimuli, imagery-based mentation led to greater concreteness than did verbal-linguistic mentation; however, for worrisome stimuli, imagery-based mentation did not enhance concreteness. In addition, for neutral (but not worrisome) stimuli, an initial period of suppression was associated with increased concreteness during subsequent expression. Imagery-based mentation about worrisome stimuli may not enhance concreteness; moreover, unlike suppression of neutral stimuli, suppression of worrisome stimuli may maintain, rather than ameliorate, abstractness of thought.

Imitation of counter-goal behavior: The role of psychological distance and level of construal

Previous research has demonstrated that individuals are more likely to engage in imitation of movements when the observed behavior is psychologically proximal. The present research tested whether movement imitation of proximal behavior is increased even when imitation is in conflict with own task goals. Participants completed a connect-the-dots task that was presented as either a speed task or an accuracy task. Additionally, participants watched a video of a person modeling the solution to the task in a way that contradicted the stated goal. Temporal distance to the model was manipulated in Experiment 1. Participants imitated the model's way to solve the task more when the model was proximal and followed the task goal comparably more when the model was distant. Experiment 2 replicated the effect with a direct mindset manipulation and additionally ruled out an alternative explanation (i.e., a stronger goal focus when thinking abstractly).

Preschoolers can form abstract rule representations regardless of cognitive flexibility

The abstractness of rule representations in the pre-switch phase of the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task was studied by letting 3- and 4-year-old children perform a standard DCCS task and a separate generalization task. In the generalization task, children were asked to generalize their sorting rules to novel stimuli in one of three conditions. In the relevant change condition, values of the relevant dimension changed; in the irrelevant change condition, values of the irrelevant dimension changed; and in the total change condition, values of both dimensions changed. All children showed high performance on the generalization task in the relevant change condition, implying an abstract rule representation at the level of dimensions ("same colors go together"). Performance in the relevant change condition was significantly better (and faster) than performance in the other two conditions. Children with high cognitive flexibility (switchers on the DCCS task) more often switched their attention to the irrelevant dimension in the generalization task only if values of the irrelevant dimension changed. Children with low cognitive flexibility (perseverators) were more often inconsistent in their sorting on the generalization task if values of both dimensions changed. The difference in performance on the DCCS task between switchers and perseverators seems to result from the processes that operate on the learned sorting rules and not from the abstractness of the rule representations children have.