An evolutionary analysis of the applicability and utility of the clinico-pathological method in psychiatry

Unlike other medical specialties, psychiatry has not been involved in the theoretical shift that replaced the syndromal approach with the clinico-pathological method, which consists in explaining clinical manifestations by reference to morbid anatomical and physiological changes. Past and present discussions on the applicability of the clinico-pathological method in psychiatry are based on a pre-Darwinian concept of biology as the study of proximate causation. Distinguishing between mediating mechanisms and evolved functions, an evolutionary perspective offers an original contribution to the debate by overcoming the opposite views of dualism (i.e., the clinico-pathological method is not applicable to disorders of the mind) and neuroessentialism (i.e., the definitive way of explaining psychiatric disorders is by reference to the brain and its activity). An evolutionary perspective offers original insights on the utility of the clinico-pathological method to solve critical questions of psychiatric research and clinical practice, including the distinction between mental health and illness, a better understanding of the etiology and pathophysiology, the classification and differential diagnosis of psychiatric disorders, and the development of more efficacious psychiatric treatments.

The concept of disease in the Norwegian National Insurance Court

AIMS

The National Insurance Act administrates an important part of the welfare system in Norway by entitlements to benefits. Disease is an absolute requirement for many benefits, but the Act does not provide any definition of disease. The National Insurance Court is the normative body in management of the Act. In 1994, a consensus report was written on the concept of disease on behalf of the National Insurance Court, which subsequently became a guideline in the management of decisions. This study examined how the concept of disease has been interpretated in recent decisions in the National Insurance Court compared to the interpretation in the consensus report.

METHODS

The material consisted of anonymous decisions from the National Insurance Court in the period from September 2018 to August 2019. It was analysed by systematic text condensation and compared to the consensus report by a theory-driven content analysis.

RESULTS

The consensus report described disease as a value-laden condition with personal resources and external environment as decisive context, while the decisions express disease as a process with causal relationship to personal resources and external environment.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of recent decisions showed that the interpretation of the concept of disease has moved in a value-neutral direction compared to the consensus report.

The concept of disease in the time of COVID-19

Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease (disease judgements) and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick (sickness judgements). In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection with respect to four groups of people-positive and asymptomatic; positive and symptomatic; negative; and untested-and show how different concepts of disease impact on the disease and sickness judgements for these groups. The suggestion is that sickness judgements and social measures akin to those experienced during the current COVID-19 outbreak presuppose a concept of disease containing social (risk of) harm as a component. We indicate the problems that arise when adopting this kind of disease concept beyond a state of emergency.

Expanding disease and undermining the ethos of medicine

The expansion of the concept of disease poses problems for epidemiology. Certainly, new diseases are discovered and more people are treated earlier and better. However, the historically unprecedented expansion is criticised for going too far. Overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and medicalization are some of the challenges heatedly debated in medicine, media, and in health policy making. How are we to analyse and handle the vast expansion of disease? Where can we draw the line between warranted and unwarranted expansion? To address this issue, which has wide implications for epidemiology, we need to understand how disease is expanded. This article identifies six ways that our conception of disease is expanded: by increased knowledge (epistemic), making more phenomena count as disease (ontological), doing more (pragmatic), defining more (conceptual), and by encompassing the bad (ethic) and the ugly (aesthetic). Expanding the subject matter of medicine extends its realm and power, but also its responsibility. It makes medicine accountable for ever more of human potential dis-eases. At the same time it blurs the borders and undermines the demarcation of medicine. Six specific advices can guide our action clarifying the subject matter of medicine in general and epidemiology in particular. To avoid unlimited responsibility and to keep medicine on par with its end, we need to direct the expansion of disease to what effectively identifies or reduces human suffering. Otherwise we will deplete medicine and undermine the greatest asset in health care: trust.

Illness and disease: an empirical-ethical viewpoint

Background

The concepts of disease, illness and sickness capture fundamentally different aspects of phenomena related to human ailments and healthcare. The philosophy and theory of medicine are making manifold efforts to capture the essence and normative implications of these concepts. In parallel, socio-empirical studies on patients’ understanding of their situation have yielded a comprehensive body of knowledge regarding subjective perspectives on health-related statuses. Although both scientific fields provide varied valuable insights, they have not been strongly linked to each other. Therefore, the article aims to scrutinise the normative-ethical implications of patient perspectives in building a bridge to the empirical ethics debates.

Main text

Three potential fields of tension between the illness and the disease perspective are presented. Consequently, findings from empirical research examining patient perspectives on illness are displayed and the practical implications and associated ethical issues which arise are discussed. This leads to the conclusion that an explicit and elaborate empirical-ethical methodology is needed to deal appropriately with the complex interaction between patients’ views and the medico-professional view of disease. Kon’s four-stage model of normative-empirical collaboration is then applied against the background of empirical data on patient perceptions. Starting from this exemplary approach, the article suggests employing empirical-ethical frameworks for further research on the conceptual and normative issues, as they help to integrate perspectives from the philosophy of medicine with socio-empirical research.

Conclusion

The combination of theoretical and empirical perspectives suggested contributes to a more nuanced discussion of the normative impact of patients’ actual understanding of illness. Further empirical research in this area would profit from explicitly considering potential ethical issues to avoid naturalistic fallacies or crypto-normative conclusions that may compromise healthcare practice. Vice versa, medico-theoretical debates could be enriched by integrating subjective views of those people who are immediately affected.