Rethinking some roots of ecosystem approach in aquatic ecology: between the food cycle and lake metabolism

The present study provides new insight into the key aspects of the early formative period of the ecosystem concept in aquatic ecology. Raymond Lindeman's trophodynamics is known to be a starting point for the development of the modern concept of ecosystem. The trophodynamic approach in ecology was proposed by Lindeman in his widely cited paper of 1942. Lindeman's views are analyzed in comparison with the contemporary production studies in aquatic ecology. It is shown that a similar theoretical system has been proposed in the USSR at the end of the 1930s by Georgiy G. Vinberg. He introduced the concept of biotic balance based on the wide appraisal of the dark and light bottles method. The study shows that both Lindeman's trophodynamics and Vinberg's concept of biotic balance relied on an energy-based approach in considering the wholeness of a water body. The two scientists, however, differed in several important aspects concerning the interpretation of the role of living organisms. The holistic interpretation of ecosystem by Lindeman and Vinberg can be seen as part of the dilemma between physicalism and organicism. At the same time, the main emphasis in the concepts of both Vinberg and Lindemann was on the primary production component, a feature that was common to the first holistic systems in production hydrobiology (e.g., E. Naumann's regional limnology). It is clear that modern problems of aquatic ecology should be addressed from the perspective of the organismocentric understanding of the ecosystem, but undoubtedly at the new level of development of this view.

The Spemann-Mangold organizer discovery and society

This paper analyzes the influence of Hans Spemann and Hilde Mangold's discovery of the embryonic organizer on society outside the narrower confines of embryology. It begins by overviewing how in the 1920s-1930s, the organizer discovery fit well into the agenda of both right-wing and left-wing political camps, as it supported holistic theories of biological development that aligned with their ideological views. The paper then explores the organizer's influence on the formation and interdisciplinary discussions of the 1930s Cambridge Theoretical Biology Club. Club member C.H. Waddington's concept of the epigenetic landscape, inspired in part by Spemann and Mangold's work, went on to impact diverse fields including mathematics, psychology, anthropology, architecture, and art. Examples include mathematician René Thom's catastrophe landscapes and the field of ekistics (the science of human settlements). Spemann and Mangold's creation of an embryo chimera by combining tissues from different newt species also helped shape philosophers' and artists' understanding of the relationship between nature and technology as an integrated whole rather than separate entities. Additionally, Spemann's embryonic field concept helped influence field theories in other areas of science, and thinkers have pointed out metaphorical similarities between the organizer experiment and philosophical dialectics, film editing, or historical events. However, several factors likely limited the long-term societal impact of Spemann's holistic perspective, notably the rise of molecular biology and DNA-centric reductionist views of biology in the mid-late 20th century. While such reductionism still dominates public perceptions of biology, there seems to be a renewed openness to holistic perspectives reminiscent of Spemann's views.

The genotype-phenotype distinction: from Mendelian genetics to 21st century biology

The Genotype-Phenotype (G-P) distinction was proposed in the context of Mendelian genetics, in the wake of late nineteenth century studies about heredity. In this paper, we provide a conceptual analysis that highlights that the G-P distinction was grounded on three pillars: observability, transmissibility, and causality. Originally, the genotype is the non-observable and transmissible cause of its observable and non-transmissible effect, the phenotype. We argue that the current developments of biology have called the validity of such pillars into question. First, molecular biology has unveiled the putative material substrate of the genotype (qua DNA), making it an observable object. Second, numerous findings on non-genetic heredity suggest that some phenotypic traits can be directly transmitted. Third, recent organicist approaches to biological phenomena have emphasized the reciprocal causality between parts of a biological system, which notably applies to the relation between genotypes and phenotypes. As a consequence, we submit that the G-P distinction has lost its general validity, although it can still apply to specific situations. This calls for forging new frameworks and concepts to better describe heredity and development.

Evolution and ethics viewed from within two metaphors: machine and organism

How is moral thinking, ethics, related to evolutionary theorizing? There are two approaches, epitomized by Charles Darwin who works under the metaphor of the world as a machine, and by Herbert Spencer who works under the metaphor of the world as an organism. Although the author prefers the first approach, the aim of this paper is to give a disinterested account of both approaches.

The third-way third wave and the enduring appeal of bioexceptionalism

We may induce from a longue durée examination of Anglo-American History of Biology that the impulse to reject reduc - tionism persists and will continue to percolate cyclically. This impulse I deem "bioexceptionalism": an intuition, stance, attitude, or activating metaphor that the study of living beings requires explanations in addition to exclusively bottom-up causal explanations and the research programs constructed upon that bottom-up philosophical foundation by non-organismal biologists, biochemists, and biophysicists - the explanations, in other words, that Wadding - ton (1977) humorously termed the "Conventional Wisdom of the Dominant Group, or cowdung." Bioexceptionalism might indicate an ontological assertion, like vitalism. Yet most often in the last century, it has been defined by a variety of methodological or even sociological positions. On three occasions in the interval from the late nineteenth century to the present, a small but significant group of practicing biologists and allies in other research disciplines in the UK and US adopted a species of bioexceptionalism, rejecting the dominant explanatory philosophy of reductionistic mechanism. Yet they also rejected the vitalist alternative. We can refer to their subset of bioexceptionalism as a "Third-Way" approach, though participants at the time called it by a variety of names, including "organicism." Today's appeals to a Third-Way are but the latest eruption of this older dissensus and retain at least heuristic value apart from any explanatory success.

The cancer puzzle: Welcome to organicism

During the fifty years since President Nixon declared the "War on Cancer", those inside and outside the cancer community have witnessed the systematic moving of the goalposts attitude to accommodate evidence into an inadequate theory, that is, the Somatic Mutation Theory (SMT). This sorry state promoted a renewable yearly promise that at the end of the next 10-year period the promises uttered in 1971 would become reality. Each failure triggered calls to do more of the same research under the same theory, routinely using more and more sophisticated technology. Meanwhile, in the last few years, an unambiguous general consensus has emerged acknowledging that this overall long, intensive effort has failed, and that it is likely that the solution to the cancer problem resides elsewhere, namely, in alternative theoretical principles of biology. In this essay we concentrate, first, on the big picture, from the philosophical stance (reductionism versus organicism) to the need to adopt rigorous theories. From this novel perspective we conceptualize cancer as a disease of tissue organization akin to development gone awry. Finally, having identified both a promising stance and a useful theory, i.e., the tissue organization field theory (TOFT), we call for abandoning the SMT and for adopting the more promising TOFT.

Neither superorganisms nor mere species aggregates: Charles Elton's sociological analogies and his moderate holism about ecological communities

This paper analyzes community ecologist Charles Elton's ideas on animal communities, and situates them with respect to the classical opposition between organicist-holistic and individualistic-reductionist ecological views drawn by many historians of ecology. It is argued that Elton espoused a moderate ecological holism, which drew a middle way between the stricter ecological holism advocated by organicist ecologists and the merely aggregationist views advocated by some of their opponents. It is also argued that Elton's moderate ecological holism resonated with his preference for analogies between ecological communities and human societies over more common ones between communities and individual organisms. I discuss, on the one hand, how the functionalist-interactionist approach to community ecology introduced by Elton entailed a view of ecological communities as more or less self-maintaining functionally organized wholes, and how his ideas on this matter were incorporated into their views by organicist ecologists Frederic Clements, Victor Shelford, and Warder C. Allee et al. On the other hand, I identify some important divergences between Elton's ecological ideas and those of organicist ecologists. Specifically, I show (1) how Elton's ideas on species distribution, animal migrations, and ecological succession entailed a view of animal communities as exhibiting a weaker degree of part-whole integration than that attributed to them by Clements and Shelford; and (2) how Elton's mixed stance on the balance of nature idea and his associated views on community stability attributed to communities a weaker form of self-regulation than that attributed to them by Allee et al.

Challenging the Adaptationist Paradigm: Morphogenesis, Constraints, and Constructions

In this paper, I argue that the German morphological tradition made a major contribution to twentieth-century study of form. Several scientists paved the way for this research: paleontologist Adolf Seilacher (1925-2014), entomologist Hermann Weber (1899-1956), and biologist Johann-Gerhard Helmcke (1908-1993) together with architect Frei Otto (1925-2015). All of them sought to examine morphogenetic processes to illustrate their inherent structural properties, thus challenging the neo-Darwinian framework of evolutionary theory. I point out that the German theoretical challenge to adaptationist thinking was possible through an exchange and transfer of practices, data, technologies, and knowledge between biologically oriented students of form and architects, designers, and engineers. This exchange of practices and knowledge was facilitated by the establishment of two collaborative research centers at the beginning of the 1970s. Hence, by showing the richness of topics, methods, and technologies discussed in German-speaking morphology between 1950 and the 1970s, this paper paves the way to a much broader comprehension of the shifts that have shaped twentieth-century evolutionary biology.

O Organism, Where Art Thou? Old and New Challenges for Organism-Centered Biology

This paper addresses theoretical challenges, still relevant today, that arose in the first decades of the twentieth century related to the concept of the organism. During this period, new insights into the plasticity and robustness of organisms as well as their complex interactions fueled calls, especially in the UK and in the German-speaking world, for grounding biological theory on the concept of the organism. This new organism-centered biology (OCB) understood organisms as the most important explanatory and methodological unit in biological investigations. At least three theoretical strands can be distinguished in this movement: Organicism, dialectical materialism, and (German) holistic biology. This paper shows that a major challenge of OCB was to describe the individual organism as a causally autonomous and discrete unit with consistent boundaries and, at the same time, as inextricably interwoven with its environment. In other words, OCB had to conciliate individualistic with anti-individualistic perspectives. This challenge was addressed by developing a concept of life that included functionalist and metabolic elements, as well as biochemical and physical ones. It allowed for specifying organisms as life forms that actively delimit themselves from the environment. Finally, this paper shows that the recent return to the concept of the organism, especially in the so-called "Extended Evolutionary Synthesis," is challenged by similar anti-individualistic tendencies. However, in contrast to its early-twentieth-century forerunner, today's organism-centered approaches have not yet offered a solution to this problem.

The schism in chiropractic through the eyes of a 1st year chiropractic student

Since its inception, the chiropractic profession has been divided along ideological fault lines. These divisions have led to a profession wide schism, which has limited mainstream acceptance, utilisation, social authority and integration. The authors explore the historical origins of this schism, taking time to consider historical context, religiosity, perpetuating factors, logical fallacies and siege mentality. Evidence is then provided for a way forward, based on the positioning of chiropractors as mainstream partners in health care.

Epigenesis by experience: Romantic empiricism and non-Kantian biology

Reconstructions of Romantic-era life science in general, and epigenesis in particular, frequently take the Kantian logic of autotelic "self-organization" as their primary reference point. I argue in this essay that the Kantian conceptual rubric hinders our historical and theoretical understanding of epigenesis, Romantic and otherwise. Neither a neutral gloss on epigenesis, nor separable from the epistemological deflation of biological knowledge that has received intensive scrutiny in the history and philosophy of science, Kant's heuristics of autonomous "self-organization" in the third Critique amount to the strategic capture of epigenesis from nature, for thought, in thought's critical transcendence of nature. This essay looks to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and his English contemporary Erasmus Darwin to begin to reconstruct the rigorously materialist, naturalist, and empiricist theories of epigenesis (still) marginalized by Kantian argumentation. As theorists of environmental and social collaboration in the ontogeny of viable forms, Lamarck and Darwin illuminate features of our own epigenetic turn obscured by the rhetoric of "self-organization," allowing us to glimpse an alternative Romantic genealogy of the biological present.

Modeling mammary organogenesis from biological first principles: Cells and their physical constraints

In multicellular organisms, relations among parts and between parts and the whole are contextual and interdependent. These organisms and their cells are ontogenetically linked: an organism starts as a cell that divides producing non-identical cells, which organize in tri-dimensional patterns. These association patterns and cells types change as tissues and organs are formed. This contextuality and circularity makes it difficult to establish detailed cause and effect relationships. Here we propose an approach to overcome these intrinsic difficulties by combining the use of two models; 1) an experimental one that employs 3D culture technology to obtain the structures of the mammary gland, namely, ducts and acini, and 2) a mathematical model based on biological principles. The typical approach for mathematical modeling in biology is to apply mathematical tools and concepts developed originally in physics or computer sciences. Instead, we propose to construct a mathematical model based on proper biological principles. Specifically, we use principles identified as fundamental for the elaboration of a theory of organisms, namely i) the default state of cell proliferation with variation and motility and ii) the principle of organization by closure of constraints. This model has a biological component, the cells, and a physical component, a matrix which contains collagen fibers. Cells display agency and move and proliferate unless constrained; they exert mechanical forces that i) act on collagen fibers and ii) on other cells. As fibers organize, they constrain the cells on their ability to move and to proliferate. The model exhibits a circularity that can be interpreted in terms of closure of constraints. Implementing the mathematical model shows that constraints to the default state are sufficient to explain ductal and acinar formation, and points to a target of future research, namely, to inhibitors of cell proliferation and motility generated by the epithelial cells. The success of this model suggests a step-wise approach whereby additional constraints imposed by the tissue and the organism could be examined in silico and rigorously tested by in vitro and in vivo experiments, in accordance with the organicist perspective we embrace.

Theoretical principles for biology: Organization

In the search of a theory of biological organisms, we propose to adopt organization as a theoretical principle. Organization constitutes an overarching hypothesis that frames the intelligibility of biological objects, by characterizing their relevant aspects. After a succinct historical survey on the understanding of organization in the organicist tradition, we offer a specific characterization in terms of closure of constraints. We then discuss some implications of the adoption of organization as a principle and, in particular, we focus on how it fosters an original approach to biological stability, as well as and its interplay with variation.

Carcinogenesis explained within the context of a theory of organisms

For a century, the somatic mutation theory (SMT) has been the prevalent theory to explain carcinogenesis. According to the SMT, cancer is a cellular problem, and thus, the level of organization where it should be studied is the cellular level. Additionally, the SMT proposes that cancer is a problem of the control of cell proliferation and assumes that proliferative quiescence is the default state of cells in metazoa. In 1999, a competing theory, the tissue organization field theory (TOFT), was proposed. In contraposition to the SMT, the TOFT posits that cancer is a tissue-based disease whereby carcinogens (directly) and mutations in the germ-line (indirectly) alter the normal interactions between the diverse components of an organ, such as the stroma and its adjacent epithelium. The TOFT explicitly acknowledges that the default state of all cells is proliferation with variation and motility. When taking into consideration the principle of organization, we posit that carcinogenesis can be explained as a relational problem whereby release of the constraints created by cell interactions and the physical forces generated by cellular agency lead cells within a tissue to regain their default state of proliferation with variation and motility. Within this perspective, what matters both in morphogenesis and carcinogenesis is not only molecules, but also biophysical forces generated by cells and tissues. Herein, we describe how the principles for a theory of organisms apply to the TOFT and thus to the study of carcinogenesis.

The biological default state of cell proliferation with variation and motility, a fundamental principle for a theory of organisms

The principle of inertia is central to the modern scientific revolution. By postulating this principle Galileo at once identified a pertinent physical observable (momentum) and a conservation law (momentum conservation). He then could scientifically analyze what modifies inertial movement: gravitation and friction. Inertia, the default state in mechanics, represented a major theoretical commitment: there is no need to explain uniform rectilinear motion, rather, there is a need to explain departures from it. By analogy, we propose a biological default state of proliferation with variation and motility. From this theoretical commitment, what requires explanation is proliferative quiescence, lack of variation, lack of movement. That proliferation is the default state is axiomatic for biologists studying unicellular organisms. Moreover, it is implied in Darwin's "descent with modification". Although a "default state" is a theoretical construct and a limit case that does not need to be instantiated, conditions that closely resemble unrestrained cell proliferation are readily obtained experimentally. We will illustrate theoretical and experimental consequences of applying and of ignoring this principle.

Neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but organicism: what the philosophy of biology was

Philosophy of biology is often said to have emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, it has been alleged that the only authors who engaged philosophically with the life sciences were either logical empiricists who sought to impose the explanatory ideals of the physical sciences onto biology, or vitalists who invoked mystical agencies in an attempt to ward off the threat of physicochemical reduction. These schools paid little attention to actual biological science, and as a result philosophy of biology languished in a state of futility for much of the twentieth century. The situation, we are told, only began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a new generation of researchers began to focus on problems internal to biology, leading to the consolidation of the discipline. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted narrative of the history of philosophy of biology. We do so by arguing that the most important tradition within early twentieth-century philosophy of biology was neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but the organicist movement that flourished between the First and Second World Wars. We show that the organicist corpus is thematically and methodologically continuous with the contemporary literature in order to discredit the view that early work in the philosophy of biology was unproductive, and we emphasize the desirability of integrating the historical and contemporary conversations into a single, unified discourse.

The organism as ontological go-between: hybridity, boundaries and degrees of reality in its conceptual history

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles--sometimes overt, sometimes masked--throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the 'theorization' of Life, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated 'vitalism'. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the 'body' than to the 'molecule', is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious 'vitalist' ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, 'go-between' concept-invoked as 'natural' by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of 'nomadic concepts'. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts--as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc.--despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any 'metaphysics of organism', or organismic biology.

Neither metaphysical dichotomy nor pure identity: clarifying the emergentist creed

Emergentism is often misleadingly described as a monolithic "third way" between radical monism and pluralism. In the particular case of biology, for example, emergentism is perceived as a middle course between mechanicism and vitalism. In the present paper I propose to show that the conceptual landscape between monism and pluralism is more complex than this classical picture suggests. On the basis of two successive analyses-distinguishing three forms of tension between monism and pluralism and a distinction between derivational and functional reduction-I define three different versions of emergentism that can be considered as consistent middle courses between monism and pluralism (respectively theoretical, explanatory and causal emergence). I then emphasise the advantage of this taxonomy of the concepts of emergence by applying the results of my analysis to the historical controversy that pertains to the relationship between life and matter.