Long-Term Effects of Financial Incentives for General Practitioners on Quality Indicators in the Treatment of Patients With Diabetes Mellitus in Primary Care-A Follow-Up Analysis of a Cluster Randomized Parallel Controlled Trial

Background: The effect of financial incentives on the quality of primary care is of high interest, and so is its sustainability after financial incentives are withdrawn.

Objective: To assess both long-term effects and sustainability of financial incentives for general practitioners (GPs) in the treatment of patients with diabetes mellitus based on quality indicators (QIs) calculated from routine data from electronic medical records.

Design/Participants: Randomized controlled trial using routine data from electronic medical records of patients with diabetes mellitus of Swiss GPs.

Intervention: During the study period of 24 months, all GPs received bimonthly feedback reports with information on their actual treatment as reflected in QIs. In the intervention group, the reports were combined with financial incentives for quality improvement. The incentive was stopped after 12 months.

Measurements: Proportion of patients meeting the process QI of annual HbA1c measurements and the clinical QI of blood pressure levels below 140/85 mmHg.

Results: A total of 71 GPs from 43 different practices were included along with 3,854 of their patients with diabetes mellitus. Throughout the study, the proportion of patients with annual HbA1c measurements was stable in the intervention group (78.8–78.9%) and decreased slightly in the control group (81.5–80.2%) [odds ratio (OR): 1.21; 95% CI: 1.04–1.42, p < 0.05]. The proportion of patients achieving blood pressure levels below 140/85 mmHg decreased in the control group (51.2–47.2%) and increased in the intervention group (49.7–51.9%) (OR: 1.18; 95% CI: 1.04–1.35, p < 0.05) where it peaked at 54.9% after 18 months and decreased steadily over the last 6 months.

Conclusion: After the withdrawal of financial incentives for the GPs after 12 months, some QIs still improved, indicating that 1 year might be too short to observe the full effect of such interventions. The decrease in QI achievement rates after 18 months suggests that the positive effects of time-limited financial incentives eventually wane.

[Pay for performance in dental care: A systematic narrative review of quality P4P models in dental care]

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) links reimbursement to the achievement of quality objectives. Experiences with P4P instruments and studies on their effects are available for the inpatient sector. A systematic narrative review brings together findings concerning the use and the effects of P4P, especially in dental care.

METHODS

A systematic literature search in PubMed and the Cochrane Library for reimbursement models using quality indicators provided 77 publications. Inclusion criteria were: year of publication not older than 2007, dental sector, models of quality-oriented remuneration, quality of care, quality indicators. 27 publications met the inclusion criteria and were evaluated with regard to the instruments and effects of P4P. The database search was supplemented by a free search on the Internet as well as a search in indicator databases and portals. The results of the included studies were extracted and summarized narratively.

RESULTS

27 studies were included in the review. Performance-oriented remuneration is an instrument of quality competition. In principle, P4P is embedded in an existing remuneration system, i.e., it does not occur in isolation. In the United States, England and Scandinavia, models are currently being tested for quality-oriented remuneration in dental care, based on quality indicators. The studies identified by the literature search are very heterogeneous and do not yield comparable endpoints. Difficulties are seen in the reproducibility of the quality of dental care with regard to certain characteristics which still have to be defined as quality-promoting properties. Risk selection cannot be ruled out, which may have an impact on structural quality (access to care, coordination).

CONCLUSION

There were no long-term effects of P4P on the quality of care. In the short and medium term, adverse effects on the participants' motivation as well as shifting effects towards the private sector are described. A prerequisite for the functioning of P4P is the definition of clear targets and measuring parameters. Furthermore, evidence-based quality indicators have to be developed that validly depict quality differences. It is yet unknown whether P4P will have long-term effects or whether the quality of dental care will increase.

Hemodialysis Hospitalizations and Readmissions: The Effects of Payment Reform

BACKGROUND

In 2004, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services changed reimbursement for physicians and advanced practitioners caring for patients receiving hemodialysis from a capitated to a tiered fee-for-service system, encouraging increased face-to-face visits. This early version of a pay-for-performance initiative targeted a care process: more frequent provider visits in hemodialysis. Although more frequent provider visits in hemodialysis are associated with fewer hospitalizations and rehospitalizations, it is unknown whether encouraging more frequent visits through reimbursement policy also yielded these benefits.

STUDY DESIGN

We used a retrospective cohort interrupted time-series study design to examine whether the 2004 nephrologist reimbursement reform led to reduced hospitalizations and rehospitalizations. We also used published data to estimate a range of annual economic costs associated with more frequent visits.

SETTING & PARTICIPANTS

Medicare beneficiaries in the United States receiving hemodialysis in the 2 years prior to and following reimbursement reform.

PREDICTOR

The 2 years following nephrologist reimbursement reform.

OUTCOMES

Odds of hospitalization and 30-day hospital readmission for all causes and fluid overload; US dollars.

RESULTS

We found no significant change in all-cause hospitalization or rehospitalization and slight reductions in fluid overload hospitalization and rehospitalization following reimbursement reform; the estimated economic cost associated with additional visits ranged from $13 to $87 million per year, depending on who (physicians or advanced practitioners) spent additional time visiting patients and how much additional effort was involved.

LIMITATIONS

Due to limited information about how much additional time providers spent seeing patients after reimbursement reform, we could only examine a range of potential economic costs associated with the reform.

CONCLUSIONS

A Medicare reimbursement policy designed to encourage more frequent visits during outpatient hemodialysis may have been costly. The policy was associated with fewer hospitalizations and rehospitalizations for fluid overload, but had no effect on all-cause hospitalizations or rehospitalizations.