Bittersweet memories and somatic marker hypothesis: adaptive control in emotional recall facilitates long-term decision-making in the Iowa Gambling Task

The somatic marker hypothesis states that emotional recall and its somatic influence guide long-term decision-making. However, the mechanism through which decision-making benefits from emotional recall is unclear; whether emotional recall and the induced affect increase the regulatory demand or amplify the affect state that requires inhibition. It is unclear if controlling the automatic flow of emotion in recall improves adaptive decision-making. Two studies examine the hypothesis that affect control in emotional recall facilitates inhibitory control and benefits long-term decision-making. In Experiment 1 (n = 137), affect control was assessed in emotional recall to examine if switching of affect in recall of positive and negative valence (order: positive-negative memory recall vs. negative-positive memory recall) is linked with long-term decision-making. Results for long-term decision-making showed that negative-positive recall sequence was associated with higher long-term decision-making, whereas automatic frequency-based decision-making remained unaffected by the recall sequence. In experiment 2 (n = 71, all male), emotional recall (positive vs. negative), recall specificity (i.e., specific vs. overgeneralized recall), and post-recall mood regulation (post-recall positive mood regulation vs. no regulation) was expected to facilitate long-term decision-making. Results showed that emotional recall and post-recall mood regulation (i.e., negative recall - positive mood and positive recall - negative mood) were associated with higher long-term decision-making (decks C' and D'). Results of frequency decision-making showed that positive emotional recall, and poor recall specificity led to infrequent punishment deck choices (decks B' and D'). Hierarchical regression indicated that emotional recall increased infrequent deck choices and accounted for 10% of choices made, recall specificity increased the explanatory power to 19%, and higher recall specificity was associated with fewer infrequent punishment deck choices. Affect control engaged via negative emotional recall, post-recall mood regulation, and recall specificity might be a potential mechanism through which affect control in emotional recall might facilitate long-term decision-making.

How distinct functional insular subdivisions mediate interacting neurocognitive systems

Recent neurocognitive models propose that the insula serves as a hub of interoceptive awareness system, modulating 2 interplaying neurocognitive systems: The posterior insula (PI) receives and integrates various interoceptive signals; these signals are then transmitted to the anterior insula for processing higher-order representations into awareness, where the dorsal anterior insula (dAI) modulates the prefrontal self-control system and the ventral anterior insula (vAI) modulates the amygdala (AMG)-striatal reward-seeking circuit. We sought to test this view using a multimodal approach. We first used a resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) approach with a sample of 120 undergraduate students. Then, we unpacked the neuro-cognitive association between insular connectivity and cognitive performance during an Iowa gambling fMRI task. Lastly, an independent Open Southwest University Longitudinal Imaging Multimodal dataset was used to validate the results. Findings suggested that the dAI was predominantly connected to the prefrontal regions; the vAI was primarily connected to the AMG-ventral-striatum system; and the PI was mainly connected to the visceral-sensorimotor system. Moreover, cognitive scores were positively correlated with FC between dAI and the self-control process of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and were negatively correlated with FC between vAI and the reward-seeking process of orbitofrontal cortex and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. The findings highlight the roles of our theorized subinsular functionality in the overall operation of the neural cognitive systems.

The comparison of decision-making in ambiguous situations and galvanic skin responses as somatic markers in patients with posterior cortex epilepsy and mesial temporal lobe epilepsy with hippocampal sclerosis

INTRODUCTION

Decision-making behaviors of patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsy (MTLE) is a subject that has been studied frequently. However, determining the neuropsychological profiles of patients with different types of epilepsy is also important. Our main purpose was to examine the decision-making behaviors of patients with posterior cortex epilepsy (PCE) through the assumptions of somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) and to compare their performances with those of a MTLE group and a control group.

METHOD

Participants comprised of 13 patients with PCE (mean age 30.92 ± 9.99 years); 14 patients with MTLE with hippocampal sclerosis (MTLE-HS) (mean age 25.53 ± 7.40 years) and 15 controls (mean age 24.60 ± 8.45 years). Decision-making performances were assessed with the Iowa gambling test (IGT) and anticipatory skin responses before each choice were recorded. A comprehensive neuropsychological test battery was also given to all participants in order to examine the relationship of decision-making with other cognitive functions.

RESULTS

Anticipatory responses before choosing from disadvantageous decks were significantly larger than choosing from advantageous decks in the PCE group (p = 0.00). No significant difference was found between the PCE and control group's total net scores. IGT total net scores was significantly correlated with Stroop test interference time (p = 0.03).

CONCLUSION

The study reveals that cognitive impairments of patients with PCE are not limited to brain's posterior areas' functions, and provides evidence for the current paradigm which understands epilepsy as a network disorder.

Reanalyzing the Maia and McClelland (2004) Empirical Data: How Do Participants Really Behave in the Iowa Gambling Task?

Background

Since 2007, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been a standardized clinical assessment tool for assessing decision behavior in 13 psychiatric/neurological conditions. After the publication of Maia and McClelland's (1) article, there were two responses in 2005 from Bechara et al. and Maia and McClelland, respectively, discussing whether implicit emotion or explicit knowledge influences the development of foresighted decision strategies under uncertain circumstances (e.g., as simulated in the IGT).

Methods and Results

We reanalyze and verify the data obtained by Maia and McClelland (1) in their study "What participants really know in the Iowa Gambling Task" and find that decision-makers were lured into shortsighted decisions by the prospect of immediate gains and losses.

Conclusion

Although the findings of this reanalysis cannot support any arguments concerning the effect of either implicit emotion or explicit knowledge, we find evidence that, based on the gain-loss frequency in the IGT, participants behave myopically. This is consistent with most IGT-related articles (58 out of 86) in Lee et al.'s (2) cross-cultural review. Alternatively, under uncertain circumstances, there is probably no such thing as foresighted decision strategy irrespective of the proposed mechanisms of implicit emotion or explicit knowledge.

Normatively Irrelevant Affective Cues Affect Risk-Taking under Uncertainty: Insights from the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Skin Conductance Response, and Heart Rate Variability

Being able to distinguish between safe and risky options is paramount in making functional choices. However, deliberate manipulation of decision-makers emotions can lead to risky behaviors. This study aims at understanding how affective reactions driven by normatively irrelevant affective cues can interfere with risk-taking. Good and Bad decks of the Iowa Gambling Task have been manipulated to make them unpleasant through a negative auditory manipulation. Anticipatory skin conductance response (SCR) and heart rate variability (HRV) have been investigated in line with the somatic marker hypothesis. Results showed fewer selections from Good decks when they were negatively manipulated (i.e., Incongruent condition). No effect of the manipulation was detected when Bad decks were negatively manipulated (i.e., Congruent condition). Higher anticipatory SCR was associated with Bad decks in Congruent condition. Slower heart rate was found before selections from Good decks in Control and Congruent condition and from Bad decks in Incongruent condition. Differences in heart rate between Bad and Good decks were also detected in Congruent condition. Results shed light on how normatively irrelevant affective cues can interfere with risk-taking.

The Agony of Choice? Preserved Affective Decision Making in Early Multiple Sclerosis

Background: Cognitive impairment (CI) is an early and frequent symptom of multiple sclerosis (MS). Likewise, affective symptoms (e.g., depression and anxiety) and alterations in the processing of emotional stimuli have been frequently reported. Thus, abilities that integrate affective and cognitive processes such as decision making (DM) based on affective feedback are potentially valuable early diagnostic markers for MS. The available research on this topic, however, is still inconclusive and suffers from methodological issues. Methods: We compared DM ability in a clinically homogeneous cohort of 24 patients with early relapsing-remitting MS (RRMS) and 59 age-matched healthy controls (HCs). A modified version of the Iowa gambling task (IGT) allowed us to control for individual differences in search strategies during the risk exploration phase. Besides standard IGT measures (netscore, obtained play money, and learning index), we also examined reaction times and post-error slowing (PES) patterns as a proxy for abnormalities in the processing of affective feedback. Results: The performance of patients did not significantly deviate from HCs in any standard parameter of the modified IGT. Furthermore, although RRMS patients reacted significantly slower than HCs overall, we found similar patterns of PES in both groups, suggesting similarly efficient processing of affective feedback. Conclusion: We conclude that there is no specific deficit in affective feedback processing in early RRMS. Previous findings of IGT impairments in this patient group may thus not represent a genuine deficit in affective DM but rather be related to sample characteristics, general CI, and/or differences in individual search strategies. Future research should explore the potential influence of lesion volumes and locations on DM ability by employing brain imaging techniques.

Bridging Ecological Rationality, Embodied Emotion, and Neuroeconomics: Insights From the Somatic Marker Hypothesis

The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) has been utilized to demonstrate the role of emotion and somatic state in decision-making under uncertainty over the past two decades. Despite some debate, the SMH has provided not only a neurobiological framework for understanding emotion and decision-making but also a good empirical support for ecological rationality and embodied emotion. Unlike the traditional maximizing rationality and bounded satisficing rationality, the ecological rationality stresses that emotions should be brought to the decision-making process. The embodied emotion furthermore emphasizes that emotions are embodied in the body and the brain. On the other hand, behavioral decision-making has spawned many new interdisciplines, including neuroeconomics. In this case, the SMH could act as a bridge to translate the ecological rationality and the embodied emotion into emerging neuroeconomics. Thus, this mini-review article aims to propose an integrated framework for introducing ecological rationality and embodied emotion into the field of neuroeconomics by virtue of insights from the SMH.

Electrophysiological Measurement of Emotion and Somatic State Affecting Ambiguity Decision: Evidences From SCRs, ERPs, and HR

Twenty-three years ago, the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) proposed by Damasio was introduced to explain the role of emotion in decision-making, and provided a unique neuroanatomical framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. The core idea of the SMH is that decision-making is a process that is affected by somatic state signals, including those that express themselves in emotion and feeling. In order to verify the SMH, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was originally designed by Bechara et al. and the skin conductance responses (SCRs) was recorded during the IGT. The initial confirmatory results showed that normal subjects would generate anticipatory SCRs when they received reward or punishment, but patients of the VMPFC lesion entirely failed to generate anticipatory SCRs prior to their selection of a card. With the further development of the SMH–related researches, other electrophysiological methods of measuring somatic state was gradually used to test the SMH, including event-related potentials (ERPs), and heart rate (HR). In this mini review article, we summarize the extant electrophysiological research on the SMH and decision-making under ambiguity, propose an integrative perspective for employing different electrophysiological measurement methods, and indicate the application of electrophysiological measurement based on the SMH in daily social decision-making.

Somatic Marker Production Deficits do not Explain the Relationship between Psychopathic Traits and Utilitarian Moral Decision Making

In moral dilemma tasks, high levels of psychopathic traits often predict increased utilitarian responding-specifically, endorsing sacrificing one person to save many. Research suggests that increased arousal (i.e., somatic marker production) underlies lower rates of utilitarian responding during moral dilemmas. Though deficient somatic marker production is characteristic of psychopathy, how this deficit affects the psychopathy-utilitarian connection remains unknown. We assessed psychopathic traits in undergraduates, as well as behavioral performance and skin conductance level reactivity (SCL-R; a measure of somatic marker production) during a moral dilemma task. High psychopathic traits and low SCL-R were associated with increased utilitarian decisions in dilemmas involving direct personal harm. Psychopathic traits were unrelated to SCL-R, nor did SCL-R mediate the relationship between psychopathy and utilitarianism. The present study did not find evidence that somatic marker production explains the connection between utilitarianism and psychopathy in a college population. Further research is necessary to identify the neural mechanisms relating psychopathy and moral decision-making in nonclinical samples.

Cerebellum, Basal Ganglia, and Cortex Mediate Performance of an Aerial Pursuit Task

The affordance competition hypothesis is an ethologically inspired theory from cognitive neuroscience that provides an integrative neural account of continuous, real-time behavior, and will likely become increasingly relevant to the growing field of neuroergonomics. In the spirit of neuroergonomics in aviation, we designed a three-dimensional, first-person, continuous, and real-time fMRI task during which human subjects maneuvered a simulated airplane in pursuit of a target airplane along constantly changing headings. We introduce a pseudo-event-related, parametric fMRI analysis approach to begin testing the affordance competition hypothesis in neuroergonomic contexts, and attempt to identify regions of the brain that exhibit a linear metabolic relationship with the continuous variables of task performance and distance-from-target. In line with the affordance competition hypothesis, our results implicate the cooperation of the cerebellum, basal ganglia, and cortex in such a task, with greater involvement of the basal ganglia during good performance, and greater involvement of cortex and cerebellum during poor performance and when distance-from-target closes. We briefly review the somatic marker and dysmetria of thought hypotheses, in addition to the affordance competition hypothesis, to speculate on the intricacies of the cooperation of these brain regions in a task such as ours. In doing so, we demonstrate how the affordance competition hypothesis and other cognitive neuroscience theories are ready for testing in continuous, real-time tasks such as ours, and in other neuroergonomic settings more generally.

The Altered Somatic Brain Network in State Anxiety

Highly anxious individuals often show excessive emotional arousal, somatic arousal, and characteristics of mental illness. Previous researches have extensively investigated the emotional and cognitive biases of individuals with high anxiety, but overlooked the spontaneous brain activity and functional connections associated with somatic arousal. In this study, we investigated the relationship between state anxiety and the spontaneous brain activity of the somatosensory cortex in a non-clinical healthy population with state anxiety. Furthermore, we also explored the functional connections of the somatosensory cortex. We found that state anxiety was positively correlated with the amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations (ALFFs) of somatic related brain regions, including the right postcentral gyrus (somatosensory cortex) and the right precentral gyrus (somatic motor cortex). Furthermore, we found that state anxiety was positively correlated with the connections between the postcentral gyrus and the left cerebellum gyrus, whereas state anxiety was negatively correlated with the connectivity between the postcentral gyrus and brain regions including the left inferior frontal cortex and left medial superior frontal cortex. These results revealed the association between the anxious individuals' body-loop and state anxiety in a healthy population, which revealed the importance of somatic brain regions in anxiety symptoms and provided a new perspective on anxiety for further study.

Performance Under Stress: An Eye-Tracking Investigation of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)

Stress pervades everyday life and impedes risky decision making. The following experiment is the first to examine effects of stress on risky decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), while measuring inspection time and conscious awareness of deck contingencies. This was original as it allowed a fine grained rigorous analysis of the way that stress impedes awareness of, and attention to maladaptive financial choices. The extended Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) further afforded examination of the impact of impaired reflective thinking on risky decision making. Stressed participants were slower to avoid the disadvantageous decks and performed worse overall. They inspected disadvantageous decks for longer than the control condition and were slower in developing awareness of their poor deck quality compared to the control condition. Conversely, in the control condition greater inspection times for advantageous decks were observed earlier in the task, and better awareness of the deck contingencies was shown as early as the second block of trials than the stress condition. Path analysis suggested that stress reduced IGT performance by impeding reflective thinking and conscious awareness. Explicit cognitive processes, moreover, were important during the preliminary phase of IGT performance-a finding that has significant implications for the use of the IGT as a clinical diagnostic tool. It was concluded that stress impedes reflective thinking, attentional disengagement from poorer decks, and the development of conscious knowledge about choice quality that interferes with performance on the IGT. These data demonstrate that stress impairs risky decision making performance, by impeding attention to, and awareness of task characteristics in risky decision making.

Pathological Gambling in Parkinson's disease: Autonomic measures supporting impaired decision-making

According to the somatic marker hypothesis, autonomic measures and arousal modulation can reveal a difference in subgroups of patients developing impaired decision-making because of addictions. Previously, pathological gambling (PG) and Parkinson's disease (PD) have been associated with differential arousal levels during gambling behavior. However, no research considered the specific autonomic responses of Parkinson's disease patients with pathological gambling and with a previous history of gambling. Thus, this study investigated skin conductance responses (SCRs), skin conductance level (SCL) and heart rate (HR) during the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in two groups of PD patients with gambling disorder, active (PD Gamblers; n = 14) or remitted (PD Non-Gamblers; n = 13) and a control group of patients with Parkinson's disease only (n = 13). Anticipatory autonomic responses to disadvantageous decks and advantageous decks during the Iowa Gambling Task were measured for each participant. The PD Gamblers group performed worse than the PD Non-Gamblers and the control groups at the IGT task and exhibited lower SCRs, SCL, and HR during the decision-making processing of cards belonging to disadvantageous decks. The role of autonomic and behavioral measures was considered.

Emotion, rationality, and decision-making: how to link affective and social neuroscience with social theory

In this paper, we argue for a stronger engagement between concepts in affective and social neuroscience on the one hand, and theories from the fields of anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology on the other. Affective and social neuroscience could provide an additional assessment of social theories. We argue that some of the most influential social theories of the last four decades-rational choice theory, behavioral economics, and post-structuralism-contain assumptions that are inconsistent with key findings in affective and social neuroscience. We also show that another approach from the social sciences-plural rationality theory-shows greater compatibility with these findings. We further claim that, in their turn, social theories can strengthen affective and social neuroscience. The former can provide more precise formulations of the social phenomena that neuroscientific models have targeted, can help neuroscientists who build these models become more aware of their social and cultural biases, and can even improve the models themselves. To illustrate, we show how plural rationality theory can be used to further specify and test the somatic marker hypothesis. Thus, we aim to accelerate the much-needed merger of social theories with affective and social neuroscience.

The somatic marker theory in the context of addiction: contributions to understanding development and maintenance

Recent theoretical accounts of addiction have acknowledged that addiction to substances and behaviors share inherent similarities (eg, insensitivity to future consequences and self-regulatory deficits). This recognition is corroborated by inquiries into the neurobiological correlates of addiction, which has indicated that different manifestations of addictive pathology share common neural mechanisms. This review of the literature will explore the feasibility of the somatic marker hypothesis as a unifying explanatory framework of the decision-making deficits that are believed to be involved in addiction development and maintenance. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a neuroanatomical and cognitive framework of decision making, which posits that decisional processes are biased toward long-term prospects by emotional marker signals engendered by a neuronal architecture comprising both cortical and subcortical circuits. Addicts display markedly impulsive and compulsive behavioral patterns that might be understood as manifestations of decision-making processes that fail to take into account the long-term consequences of actions. Evidence demonstrates that substance dependence, pathological gambling, and Internet addiction are characterized by structural and functional abnormalities in neural regions, as outlined by the somatic marker hypothesis. Furthermore, both substance dependents and behavioral addicts show similar impairments on a measure of decision making that is sensitive to somatic marker functioning. The decision-making deficits that characterize addiction might exist a priori to addiction development; however, they may be worsened by ingestion of substances with neurotoxic properties. It is concluded that the somatic marker model of addiction contributes a plausible account of the underlying neurobiology of decision-making deficits in addictive disorders that is supported by the current neuroimaging and behavioral evidence. Implications for future research are outlined.

Effects of working memory load on uncertain decision-making: evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) simulates uncertain gains and losses in real life situations and thus is a good measure of uncertain decision-making. The role of working memory (WM) in IGT performance still remains unclear. The present study aimed to examine the effect of WM on IGT performance. Three groups of participants matched on gender ratio were randomly assigned to no WM load, low WM load, and high WM load conditions. Initially the three groups did not show significant difference in WM capacity. They finished a modified version of IGT and then their implicit learning effect and explicit cognition on IGT were assessed. Results indicated a linear increasing trend of IGT performance among high WM load, low WM load and no WM load groups; participants in the no WM load and low WM load groups revealed implicit learning effect, while participants in the high WM load group did not; all participants showed explicit cognition on IGT to the same level. These results suggested that participants in the high WM load group showed good explicit cognition to IGT but showed poor performance. This pattern is similar to frontal patients. Further studies should be conducted to explore this issue.

Fear and decision-making in narcissistic personality disorder-a link between psychoanalysis and neuroscience

Linking psychoanalytic studies with neuroscience has proven increasingly productive for identifying and understanding personality functioning. This article focuses on pathological narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), with the aim of exploring two clinically relevant aspects of narcissistic functioning also recognized in psychoanalysis: fear and decision-making. Evidence from neuroscientific studies of related conditions, such as psychopathy, suggests links between affective and cognitive functioning that can influence the sense of self-agency and narcissistic self-regulation. Attention can play a crucial role in moderating fear and self-regulatory deficits, and the interaction between experience and emotion can be central for decision-making. In this review we will explore fear as a motivating factor in narcissistic personality functioning, and the impact fear may have on decision-making in people with pathological narcissism and NPD. Understanding the processes and neurological underpinnings of fear and decision-making can potentially influence both the diagnosis and treatment of NPD.

Enhanced cardiac perception predicts impaired performance in the Iowa Gambling Task in patients with panic disorder

OBJECTIVE

Somatic marker theory predicts that somatic cues serve intuitive decision making; however, cardiovascular symptoms are threat cues for patients with panic disorder (PD). Therefore, enhanced cardiac perception may aid intuitive decision making only in healthy individuals, but impair intuitive decision making in PD patients.

METHODS

PD patients and age-and sex-matched volunteers without a psychiatric diagnosis (n = 17, respectively) completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) as a measure of intuitive decision making. Interindividual differences in cardiac perception were assessed with a common mental-tracking task.

RESULTS

In line with our hypothesis, we found a pattern of opposing associations (Fisher's Z = 1.78, P = 0.04) of high cardiac perception with improved IGT-performance in matched control-participants (r = 0.36, n = 14) but impaired IGT-performance in PD patients (r = -0.38, n = 13).

CONCLUSION

Interoceptive skills, typically assumed to aid intuitive decision making, can have the opposite effect in PD patients who experience interoceptive cues as threatening, and tend to avoid them. This may explain why PD patients frequently have problems with decision making in everyday life. Screening of cardiac perception may help identifying patients who benefit from specifically tailored interventions.

Neural correlates of uncertain decision making: ERP evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

In our daily life, it is very common to make decisions in uncertain situations. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been widely used in laboratory studies because of its good simulation of uncertainty in real life activities. The present study aimed to examine the neural correlates of uncertain decision making with the IGT. Twenty-six university students completed this study. An adapted IGT was administered to them, and the EEG data were recorded. The adapted IGT we used allowed us to analyze the choice evaluation, response selection, and feedback evaluation stages of uncertain decision making within the same paradigm. In the choice evaluation stage, the advantageous decks evoked larger P3 amplitude in the left hemisphere, while the disadvantageous decks evoked larger P3 in the right hemisphere. In the response selection stage, the response of “pass” (the card was not turned over; the participants neither won nor lost money) evoked larger negativity preceding the response compared to that of “play” (the card was turned over; the participant either won or lost money). In the feedback evaluation stage, feedback-related negativity (FRN) was only sensitive to the valence (win/loss) but not the magnitude (large/small) of the outcome, and P3 was sensitive to both the valence and the magnitude of the outcome. These results were consistent with the notion that a positive somatic state was represented in the left hemisphere and a negative somatic state was represented in the right hemisphere. There were also anticipatory ERP effects that guided the participants' responses and provided evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis with more precise timing.

Learning on the IGT follows emergence of knowledge but not differential somatic activity

The importance of unconscious autonomic activity vs. knowledge in influencing behavior on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been the subject of debate. The task's developers, Bechara and colleagues, have claimed that behavior on the IGT is influenced by somatic activity and that this activity precedes the emergence of knowledge about the task contingencies sufficient to guide behavior. Since then others have claimed that this knowledge emerges much earlier on the task. However, it has yet to be established whether somatic activity which differentiates between advantageous and disadvantageous choices on the IGT is found before this point. This study describes an experiment to determine whether knowledge sufficient to guide behavior precedes differential autonomic activity or vice versa. This experiment used a computerized version of the IGT, knowledge probes after every 10 trials and skin conductance recording to measure somatic activity. Whereas in previous reports the majority of participants end the task with full conceptual knowledge of the IGT contingencies we found little evidence in support of this conclusion. However, full conceptual knowledge was not critical for advantageous deck selection to occur and most participants had knowledge sufficient to guide behavior after approximately 40 trials. We did not find anticipatory physiological activity sufficient to differentiate between deck types in the period prior to acquiring this knowledge. However, post-punishment physiological activity was found to be larger for the disadvantageous decks in the pre-knowledge period, but only for participants who displayed knowledge. Post-reward physiological activity distinguished between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks across the whole experiment but, again, only in participants who displayed knowledge and then only in later trials following their display of knowledge.

Learning on the IGT follows emergence of knowledge but not differential somatic activity

The importance of unconscious autonomic activity vs. knowledge in influencing behavior on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been the subject of debate. The task's developers, Bechara and colleagues, have claimed that behavior on the IGT is influenced by somatic activity and that this activity precedes the emergence of knowledge about the task contingencies sufficient to guide behavior. Since then others have claimed that this knowledge emerges much earlier on the task. However, it has yet to be established whether somatic activity which differentiates between advantageous and disadvantageous choices on the IGT is found before this point. This study describes an experiment to determine whether knowledge sufficient to guide behavior precedes differential autonomic activity or vice versa. This experiment used a computerized version of the IGT, knowledge probes after every 10 trials and skin conductance recording to measure somatic activity. Whereas in previous reports the majority of participants end the task with full conceptual knowledge of the IGT contingencies we found little evidence in support of this conclusion. However, full conceptual knowledge was not critical for advantageous deck selection to occur and most participants had knowledge sufficient to guide behavior after approximately 40 trials. We did not find anticipatory physiological activity sufficient to differentiate between deck types in the period prior to acquiring this knowledge. However, post-punishment physiological activity was found to be larger for the disadvantageous decks in the pre-knowledge period, but only for participants who displayed knowledge. Post-reward physiological activity distinguished between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks across the whole experiment but, again, only in participants who displayed knowledge and then only in later trials following their display of knowledge.

Exploring the brains of Baduk (Go) experts: gray matter morphometry, resting-state functional connectivity, and graph theoretical analysis

One major characteristic of experts is intuitive judgment, which is an automatic process whereby patterns stored in memory through long-term training are recognized. Indeed, long-term training may influence brain structure and function. A recent study revealed that chess experts at rest showed differences in structure and functional connectivity (FC) in the head of caudate, which is associated with rapid best next-move generation. However, less is known about the structure and function of the brains of Baduk experts (BEs) compared with those of experts in other strategy games. Therefore, we performed voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and FC analyses in BEs to investigate structural brain differences and to clarify the influence of these differences on functional interactions. We also conducted graph theoretical analysis (GTA) to explore the topological organization of whole-brain functional networks. Compared to novices, BEs exhibited decreased and increased gray matter volume (GMV) in the amygdala and nucleus accumbens (NA), respectively. We also found increased FC between the amygdala and medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and decreased FC between the NA and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Further GTA revealed differences in measures of the integration of the network and in the regional nodal characteristics of various brain regions activated during Baduk. This study provides evidence for structural and functional differences as well as altered topological organization of the whole-brain functional networks in BEs. Our findings also offer novel suggestions about the cognitive mechanisms behind Baduk expertise, which involves intuitive decision-making mediated by somatic marker circuitry and visuospatial processing.

Fear and decision-making in narcissistic personality disorder-a link between psychoanalysis and neuroscience

Linking psychoanalytic studies with neuroscience has proven increasingly productive for identifying and understanding personality functioning. This article focuses on pathological narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), with the aim of exploring two clinically relevant aspects of narcissistic functioning also recognized in psychoanalysis: fear and decision-making. Evidence from neuroscientific studies of related conditions, such as psychopathy, suggests links between affective and cognitive functioning that can influence the sense of self-agency and narcissistic self-regulation. Attention can play a crucial role in moderating fear and self-regulatory deficits, and the interaction between experience and emotion can be central for decision-making. In this review we will explore fear as a motivating factor in narcissistic personality functioning, and the impact fear may have on decision-making in people with pathological narcissism and NPD. Understanding the processes and neurological underpinnings of fear and decision-making can potentially influence both the diagnosis and treatment of NPD.

Conscious knowledge influences decision-making differently in substance abusers with and without co-morbid antisocial personality disorder

Decision-making impairment, as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), is a consistent finding among individuals with substance use disorder (SUD). We studied how this impairment is influenced by co-morbid antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and conscious knowledge of the task. Three groups were investigated: SUD individuals without co-morbid ASPD (n = 30), SUD individuals with co-morbid ASPD (n = 16), and healthy controls (n = 17). Both SUD and SUD+ASPD participants had poor overall IGT performance. A block-by-block analysis revealed that SUD participants exhibited slow but steady improvement across the IGT, whereas SUD+ASPD participants exhibited initial normal improvement, but dropped off during the last 40 trials. Conscious knowledge of the task was significantly correlated to performance for controls and SUD participants, but not for SUD+ASPD participants. Our findings suggest that decision-making proceeds differently in SUD and SUD+ASPD individuals due to differences in acquisition and application of conscious knowledge.

Unreliable gut feelings can lead to correct decisions: the somatic marker hypothesis in non-linear decision chains

Dual-process approaches of decision-making examine the interaction between affective/intuitive and deliberative processes underlying value judgment. From this perspective, decisions are supported by a combination of relatively explicit capabilities for abstract reasoning and relatively implicit evolved domain-general as well as learned domain-specific affective responses. One such approach, the somatic markers hypothesis (SMH), expresses these implicit processes as a system of evolved primary emotions supplemented by associations between affect and experience that accrue over lifetime, or somatic markers. In this view, somatic markers are useful only if their local capability to predict the value of an action is above a baseline equal to the predictive capability of the combined rational and primary emotional subsystems. We argue that decision-making has often been conceived of as a linear process: the effect of decision sequences is additive, local utility is cumulative, and there is no strong environmental feedback. This widespread assumption can have consequences for answering questions regarding the relative weight between the systems and their interaction within a cognitive architecture. We introduce a mathematical formalization of the SMH and study it in situations of dynamic, non-linear decision chains using a discrete-time stochastic model. We find, contrary to expectations, that decision-making events can interact non-additively with the environment in apparently paradoxical ways. We find that in non-lethal situations, primary emotions are represented globally over and above their local weight, showing a tendency for overcautiousness in situated decision chains. We also show that because they tend to counteract this trend, poorly attuned somatic markers that by themselves do not locally enhance decision-making, can still produce an overall positive effect. This result has developmental and evolutionary implications since, by promoting exploratory behavior, somatic markers would seem to be beneficial even at early stages when experiential attunement is poor. Although the model is formulated in terms of the SMH, the implications apply to dual systems theories in general since it makes minimal assumptions about the nature of the processes involved.

Somatic aphasia: mismatch of body sensations with autonomic stress reactivity in psychopathy

BACKGROUND

Although one of the main characteristics of psychopaths is a deficit in emotion, it is unknown whether they show a fundamental impairment in appropriately recognizing their own body sensations during an emotion-inducing task.

METHOD

Skin conductance and heart rate were recorded in 138 males during a social stressor together with subjective reports of body sensations. Psychopathic traits were assessed using the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) 2nd edition (Hare, 2003).

RESULTS

Nonpsychopathic controls who reported higher body sensations showed higher heart rate reactivity, but this verbal-autonomic consistency was not found in psychopathic individuals. This mind-body disconnection is particularly associated with the interpersonal-affective factor of psychopathy.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings are the first to document this body sensation-autonomic mismatch in psychopaths, and suggest that somatic aphasia - the inaccurate identification and recognition of one's own somatic states - may partly underlie the interpersonal-affective features of psychopathy.

The Iowa Gambling Task in fMRI images

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a sensitive test for the detection of decision-making impairments in several neurological and psychiatric populations. Very few studies have employed the IGT in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations, in part, because the task is cognitively complex. Here we report a method for exploring brain activity using fMRI during performance of the IGT. Decision-making during the IGT was associated with activity in several brain regions in a group of healthy individuals. The activated regions were consistent with the neural circuitry hypothesized to underlie somatic marker activation and decision-making. Specifically, a neural circuitry involving the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (for working memory), the insula and posterior cingulate cortex (for representations of emotional states), the mesial orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (for coupling the two previous processes), the ventral striatum and anterior cingulate/SMA (supplementary motor area) for implementing behavioral decisions was engaged. These results have implications for using the IGT to study abnormal mechanisms of decision making in a variety of clinical populations.

Neural activity relating to generation and representation of galvanic skin conductance responses: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study

Central feedback of peripheral states of arousal influences motivational behavior and decision making. The sympathetic skin conductance response (SCR) is one index of autonomic arousal. The precise functional neuroanatomy underlying generation and representation of SCR during motivational behavior is undetermined, although it is impaired by discrete brain lesions to ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and parietal lobe. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study brain activity associated with spontaneous fluctuations in amplitude of SCR, and activity corresponding to generation and afferent representation of discrete SCR events. Regions that covaried with increased SCR included right orbitofrontal cortex, right anterior insula, left lingual gyrus, right fusiform gyrus, and left cerebellum. At a less stringent level of significance, predicted areas in bilateral medial prefrontal cortex and right inferior parietal lobule covaried with SCR. Generation of discrete SCR events was associated with significant activity in left medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral extrastriate visual cortices, and cerebellum. Activity in right medial prefrontal cortex related to afferent representation of SCR events. Activity in bilateral medial prefrontal lobe, right orbitofrontal cortex, and bilateral extrastriate visual cortices was common to both generation and afferent representation of discrete SCR events identified in a conjunction analysis. Our results suggest that areas implicated in emotion and attention are differentially involved in generation and representation of peripheral SCR responses. We propose that this functional arrangement enables integration of adaptive bodily responses with ongoing emotional and attentional states of the organism.