How should we decide how to treat the child: harm versus best interests in cases of disagreement

Where parents seek treatment for their young child that healthcare professionals cannot agree to, the High Court can determine what is in the child's best interests. Some activists and academics seek change to impose threshold criteria that would bolster the decision-making rights of parents and reduce deference to clinicians and the courts. We defend the best interests standard against arguments that a higher threshold of 'significant harm' should apply. We do so from ethical, legal, and clinical perspectives. The matter is of significant moral and practical importance, especially in light of the divergence of academic opinion, the burgeoning number of cases coming before the courts and recent case law and statutory attempts to effect change. We begin by disputing ethical claims that a significant harm threshold is preferable to the best interests standard, and then we set out jurisprudential and practical arguments that demonstrate the imprudence of a significant harm threshold and defend the established yardstick of best interests.

Involving parents in paediatric clinical ethics committee deliberations: a current controversy

In cases where the best interests of the child are disputed or finely balanced, Clinical Ethics Committees (CECs) can provide a valuable source of advice to clinicians and trusts on the pertinent ethical dimensions. Recent judicial cases have criticised the lack of formalised guidance and inconsistency in the involvement of parents in CEC deliberations. In Manchester University NHS FT v Verden [2022], Arbuthnot J set out important procedural guidance as to how parental involvement in CEC deliberations might be managed. She also confirmed substantive guidance on the role of parental views in determining the child's best interests. We agree that it is good practice to ensure that the patient voice is heard in ethics processes, but how that is achieved is controversial. Surely it is best that what matters most to a patient and their family, whether facts or values, is conveyed directly to those considering the moral issues involved, rather than via a prism of another party. The approach suggested in the Verden case has much in common with the process used by our CEC. In this article, we commend Arbuthnot J's approach, provide an example of its effective operation and consider what it might mean for ethics processes.

Should states restrict recipient choice amongst relevant and available COVID-19 vaccines?

Several COVID-19 vaccinations have been authorised worldwide. Whilst some vaccines are contraindicated for certain age groups or health conditions, there are often multiple clinically suitable authorised vaccine brands available. Few states have allowed recipients to choose amongst them, though there are multiple reasons why choice would be valued. We consider the policy justifications for state controls on recipient choice amongst COVID-19 vaccine brands, focusing on European countries and drawing on the UK context as an example. We contrast justifications for not offering choice at the height of the early pandemic crisis, and as some states seek to de-escalate their response and transition towards living with COVID-19. We argue that in the latter context public expectations of choice between available vaccine brands and platforms may rise, but that several considerations may justify continued restrictions on choice. A key factor which states should continue to take into consideration is the global nature of the pandemic. Insofar as offering recipient choice at a national level might exacerbate global inequity in vaccine distribution, states retain a normative and legal justification for restricting choice amongst available and clinically suitable vaccine brands.

Nasogastric tube feeding under physical restraint on paediatric wards: ethical, legal and practical considerations regarding this lifesaving intervention

Eating disorders have the highest mortality rate of any psychiatric condition. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of patients who have required medical stabilisation on paediatric wards has increased significantly. Likewise, the number of patients who have required medical stabilisation against their will as a lifesaving intervention has increased. This paper highlights a fictional case study aiming to explore the legal, ethical and practical considerations a trainee should be aware of. By the end of this article, readers will be more aware of this complex issue and how it might be managed, as well as the impact it can have on the patient, their family and ward staff.

Ethical advice in paediatric care

The need for local ethics advice during the COVID-19 pandemic has put a spotlight on clinical ethics committees (CECs) and services. In this review, we focus on paediatric CECs that raise both generic questions and specific issues. In doing this, we acknowledge the broader roles of education, research and staff support some bioethics teams have developed but focus on the main areas of clinical ethics support to clinical teams. We raise 12 questions about the role, remit and responsibilities of CECs, provide preliminary answers to these and set out the next steps for the development of ethics support both in paediatric practice and more generally.

Clinical ethics support services during the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK: a cross-sectional survey

BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for clinical ethics support provision to ensure as far as possible fair decision making and to address healthcare workers' moral distress.

PURPOSE

To describe the availability, characteristics and role of clinical ethics support services (CESSs) in the UK during the COVID-19 pandemic.

METHOD

A descriptive cross-sectional online survey was developed by the research team. The survey included questions on CESSs characteristics (model, types of support, guidance development, membership, parent and patient involvement) and changes in response to the pandemic. Invitations to participate were widely circulated via National Health Service institutional emails and relevant clinical ethics groups known to the research team.

RESULTS

Between October 2020 and June 2021, a total of 53 responses were received. In response to the pandemic, new CESSs were established, and existing provision changed. Most took the form of clinical ethics committees, groups and advisory boards, which varied in size and membership and the body of clinicians and patient populations they served. Some services provided moral distress support and educational provision for clinical staff. During the pandemic, services became more responsive to clinicians' requests for ethics support and advice. More than half of respondents developed local guidance and around three quarters formed links with regional or other local services. Patient and/or family members' involvement in ethics discussions is infrequent.

CONCLUSIONS

The pandemic has resulted in an expansion in the number of CESSs. Though some may disband as the pandemic eases, the reliance on CESSs during the pandemic demonstrates the need for additional research to better understand the effectiveness of their various forms, connections, guidance, services and modes of working and for better support to enhance consistency, transparency, communication with patients and availability to clinical staff.

Challenging misconceptions about clinical ethics support during COVID-19 and beyond: a legal update and future considerations

The pace of change and, indeed, the sheer number of clinical ethics committees (not to be confused with research ethics committees) has accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Committees were formed to support healthcare professionals and to operationalise, interpret and compensate for gaps in national and professional guidance. But as the role of clinical ethics support becomes more prominent and visible, it becomes ever more important to address gaps in the support structure and misconceptions as to role and remit. The recent case of Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v MX, FX and X ([2020] EWHC 1958 (Fam), [21]-[23] and [58]) has highlighted the importance of patient/family representation at clinical ethics committee meetings. The court viewed these meetings as making decisions about such treatment. We argue that this misunderstands the role of ethics support, with treatment decisions remaining with the clinical team and those providing their consent. The considered review by clinical ethics committees of the moral issues surrounding complex treatment decisions is not a matter of determining a single ethical course of action. In this article, we consider current legal understandings of clinical ethics committees, explore current concepts of ethics support and suggest how they may evolve, considering the various mechanisms of the inclusion of patients and their representatives in ethics meetings which is not standard in the UK.

Healthcare Professional Standards in Pandemic Conditions: The Duty to Obtain Consent to Treatment

In the United Kingdom, the question of how much information is required to be given to patients about the benefits and risks of proposed treatment remains extant. Issues about whether healthcare resources can accommodate extended shared decision-making processes are yet to be resolved. COVID-19 has now stepped into this arena of uncertainty, adding more complexity. U.K. public health responses to the pandemic raise important questions about professional standards regarding how the obtaining and recording of consent might change or be maintained in such emergency conditions, particularly in settings where equipment, medicines, and appropriately trained or specialized staff are in short supply. Such conditions have important implications for the professional capacity and knowledge available to discuss the risks and benefits of and alternatives to proposed treatment with patients. The government's drive to expedite the recruitment to wards of medical students nearing the end of their studies, as well as inviting retired practitioners back into practice, raises questions about the ability of such healthcare providers to engage fully in shared decision-making.This article explores whether the legal duty on healthcare practitioners to disclose the material risks of a proposed medical treatment to a patient should be upheld during pandemic conditions or whether the pre-eminence of patient autonomy should be partly sacrificed in such exceptional circumstances. We argue that measures to protect public health and to respect autonomous decision-making are not mutually exclusive and that there are good reasons to maintain professional standards in obtaining consent to treatment even during acute pressures on public health systems.

Valid consent to medical treatment

When consent to medical treatment is described as 'valid', it might simply mean that it has a sound basis, or it could mean that it is legally valid. Where the two meanings are regularly interchanged, however, it can lead to aspects of the sound basis or the legal requirements being neglected. This article looks at how the term is used in a range of guidance on consent to treatment and argues for consistency.

Think of the Children: Liability for Non-Disclosure of Information Post-Montgomery

In 2015, the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board handed down a landmark decision on informed consent to medical treatment, heralding a legal shift to a more patient-centred approach. Montgomery, and the extensive commentary that has followed, focuses on 'adult persons of sound mind'. Cave and Purshouse consider the potential claims that may flow from a failure to adequately inform children. They argue that the relevance of the best interests test blurs the boundaries between negligence and battery. Limitations on children's rights to make treatment decisions for themselves impact on their potential to claim in negligence for non-disclosure and, conversely, enhance the potential relevance of the tort of battery. In paediatric cases, Montgomery raises expectations that the law is currently ill-equipped to satisfy. Tort law provides a legal incentive to disclose relevant information to children but limits the availability of a remedy.

Selecting Treatment Options and Choosing Between them: Delineating Patient and Professional Autonomy in Shared Decision-Making

Professional control in the selection of treatment options for patients is changing. In light of social and legal developments emphasising patient choice and autonomy, and restricting medical paternalism and judicial deference, this article examines how far patients and families can demand NHS treatment in England and Wales. It considers situations where the patient is an adult with capacity, an adult lacking capacity and a child. In all three cases, there is judicial support for professional autonomy, but there are also inconsistencies that have potential to elevate the importance of patient and family preferences. In combination, they may be perceived by healthcare professionals as an obligation to follow patient preferences, even where doing so conflicts with other professional obligations. It is argued that a more nuanced approach to shared decision-making could help clarify the boundaries of decision-making responsibility.

Making Decisions for Children-Accommodating Parental Choice in Best Interests Determinations: Barts Health NHS Trust v Raqeeb [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam); Raqeeb and Barts Health NHS Trust [2019] EWHC 2531 (Admin)

Four-year-old Tafida Raqeeb suffered a sudden and catastrophic brain injury resulting from a rare condition. UK doctors would not agree to a transfer of Tafida to a hospital in Italy in circumstances that they considered to be contrary to her best interests. Her parents applied for judicial review of the hospital decision and the hospital Trust applied for a determination of Tafida's best interests. The cases were heard together. The High Court ruled that Tafida could be taken to Italy for treatment. Applying the best interests test, Mr Justice MacDonald found that Tafida was not in pain and ongoing treatment would not be a burden to her. Further treatment would comply with the religious beliefs of her parents. The case is specific to its facts, but MacDonald J's interpretation of the best interests test is likely to have implications. In particular, we explore the separation of medical and overall best interests; the recognition of the relevance of international laws and frameworks to best interests determinations; and reliance not on what Tafida could understand and express but on what she might in future have come to believe had she followed her parents' religious beliefs.

Bridging disciplines to advance elasmobranch conservation: applications of physiological ecology

A strength of physiological ecology is its incorporation of aspects of both species' ecology and physiology; this holistic approach is needed to address current and future anthropogenic stressors affecting elasmobranch fishes that range from overexploitation to the effects of climate change. For example, physiology is one of several key determinants of an organism's ecological niche (along with evolutionary constraints and ecological interactions). The fundamental role of physiology in niche determination led to the development of the field of physiological ecology. This approach considers physiological mechanisms in the context of the environment to understand mechanistic variations that beget ecological trends. Physiological ecology, as an integrative discipline, has recently experienced a resurgence with respect to conservation applications, largely in conjunction with technological advances that extended physiological work from the lab into the natural world. This is of critical importance for species such as elasmobranchs (sharks, skates and rays), which are an especially understudied and threatened group of vertebrates. In 2017, at the American Elasmobranch Society meeting in Austin, Texas, the symposium entitled `Applications of Physiological Ecology in Elasmobranch Research' provided a platform for researchers to showcase work in which ecological questions were examined through a physiological lens. Here, we highlight the research presented at this symposium, which emphasized the strength of linking physiological tools with ecological questions. We also demonstrate the applicability of using physiological ecology research as a method to approach conservation issues, and advocate for a more available framework whereby results are more easily accessible for their implementation into management practices.

EU Clinical Trials Regulation 2014: Fetter or facilitator?

European Union (EU) Clinical Trials Regulation 536/2014, expected to come into force in 2019, provides for a streamlined single EU application for cross-border clinical trials and enhanced transparency of results. The status of the Regulation in post-Brexit UK is uncertain. Matters of regulatory alignment will be covered by agreements on the future EU-UK relationship. In the short term, implementation of the Regulation in the United Kingdom depends on the Brexit model and timing of the Regulation’s implementation. The EU (Withdrawal) Act will convert EU law into UK law, including the vast array of EU life sciences regulation. However, the Regulation is likely to be implemented after the United Kingdom leaves the EU, but within the transition period. If the United Kingdom is not part of the legal framework governing clinical trials in the EU, then the United Kingdom will still need to comply with the global framework set out in the International Council on Harmonisation if it wants to be part of trials of medicinal products for which marketing authorization will be sought for licensing in the European Economic Area. This article extols the virtues of harmonization with the EU and attempts to counter some of the media focus on the advantages of a deregulated bespoke approach.

The far-reaching implications of Montgomery for risk disclosure in practice

The UK Supreme Court held in Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB (2015) that practitioners must take reasonable care to ensure patients are aware of any material risks involved in treatment. We reviewed all court decisions since Montgomery which deal with the case, to establish how this judgment is being interpreted by the courts and the implications of this for risk disclosure in practice. We found that Montgomery’s application has been expanded in a number of ways: information about reasonable alternatives includes the provision of information about their risks and benefits; Montgomery applies to post- as well as pre-operative disclosure; and the timing of discussion with patients about risks is important. Conversely, there is evidence that the parameters of Montgomery are being curtailed, giving rise to questions about judicial commitment to patient autonomy. In some cases there is focus on the objective risks of procedures as opposed to patients’ subjective concerns; in others, causation of injury is sometimes a factor that will defeat claims. There are also further questions about whether patients now should accept more responsibility for the outcome of decisions they make. We conclude that practitioners engaged in discussions about the risks of proposed treatments and their alternatives have been left in a position of uncertainty by the courts in relation to the obtaining of informed consent in practice. It is now critical that updated guidance is provided by the UK General Medical Council to give practitioners and service providers confidence that they are adhering to the law.

Who Knows Best (Interests)? The Case of Charlie Gard

When baby Charlie Gard was diagnosed with a rare mitochondrial disease, his parents located a Professor of Neurology in the USA willing to provide nucleoside therapy which offered a theoretical chance of improvement and successfully raised £1.3 million through crowd funding. The decision that unproven therapy was contrary to Charlie Gard's best interests and that life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn was devastating for his parents and difficult for their supporters to comprehend. The decision was upheld at three levels of appeal and Charlie died in July 2017 aged 11 months. This commentary provides a critical analysis of the legal principles surrounding unproven treatment and application of the best interests test in the different contexts of hospital and court. It draws attention to conflicting guidance and explores differences in approach in relation to unproven treatment for adults lacking capacity and children.

Protecting Patients from their Bad Decisions: Rebalancing Rights, Relationships, and Risk

Patients have a right to autonomy that encompasses making medical decisions that others consider 'bad'. The ambits of this right in law and clinical practice are explored in this article, which describes an expansion of welfare protections across different aspects of medical law and explores their justifications and implications. In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out protections for those who fall within its definition of incapacity. Those who retain capacity are ostensibly free to make decisions others consider unwise. But the decisions of those with borderline capacity; those whose decisions conflict with the public interest in protecting the patient from harm; and those considered 'vulnerable' are, in circumstances explored in this article, susceptible to override. The article explores the effects of these developments on the relationship between patients' autonomy rights and clinicians' responsibilities.

The ill-informed

Affirming the doctrine of informed consent, the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB belatedly followed the Australian decision of Rogers v Whitaker, decoupling the duty to inform patients about the material risks of medical treatment from Bolam. The underlying commitment to patient autonomy coincides with a wider body of medical law that protects the right of capacitous adult patients to make treatment decisions, even if others consider those decisions bizarre and even if they will cause the patient serious harm. It is seemingly anomalous, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Montgomery referred to a ‘therapeutic exception’ (TE), as this suggests an underlying paternalistic approach. Contrary to this view, international examples suggest that a TE does not necessarily conflict with commitment to patient autonomy. In some countries, the exception mitigates the effects of a broadly objective test of materiality by enabling clinicians in exceptional circumstances to protect the autonomy interests of the particular patient. In others, it protects those incapable of an autonomous decision from harm. In England and Wales, however, alternative mechanisms can be interpreted to protect such patients from harm. On this basis, it is argued that the TE is obfuscatory, unnecessary and unjustified.

Voluntary vaccination: the pandemic effect

Justification of a voluntary vaccination policy in England and Wales rests on tenuous foundations. Two arguments against voluntary vaccination are gaining ground. The first is that globalisation necessitates preparedness strategies for pandemics. Assuming sufficient supply, compulsory vaccination of adults and children constitutes a potential policy option in the context of a severe, vaccine-preventable pandemic outbreak. The second argument is that children have a right to preventive medicine and thus to vaccination. The influence of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its emphasis on parents as the trustees of their children's best interests, and the increasingly global nature of our collective and individual responsibilities with respect to the transmission of vaccine-preventable disease present challenges to the right to refuse vaccination on our own behalf and on behalf of our children. Exploring methods of compulsion and persuasion utilised across Europe, the USA and Australia, this paper argues that necessity and proportionality must be reassessed, and national public health law and policy setting out a graduated and proportionate approach to compulsory vaccination developed as a matter of priority.

Minors' capacity to refuse treatment: a reply to Gilmore and Herring

Re R and Re W allow a parent to consent to treatment a competent minor refuses, but the cases have not been tested post-Human Rights Act 1998. Gilmore and Herring offer a means by which they might be distinguished or sidelined. They interpret Gillick to say that in order to consent a minor need only have a full understanding of the particular treatment. They argue that the minors in Re R and Re W were refusing all treatment which requires a separate assessment of capacity-an assessment which was not made. We fear that this distinction would not be workable in clinical practice and argue that their interpretation of Gillick is flawed. From a clinician's point of view, competence cannot always be judged in relation to a specific treatment, but instead must relate to the decision. We show that a decision can incorporate more than one treatment, and more than one decision might be made about one treatment. A minor's understanding of a specific treatment is not always sufficient to demonstrate competence to make a decision. The result is that whilst there might be situations when a parent and a minor both have the power to consent to a particular treatment, they will not share concurrent powers in relation to the same decision. Consequently, a challenge to Re R and Re W, if forthcoming, would need to take a different form. We emphasise the necessity to minimise the dichotomy between legal consent and how consent works in medical practice.

Adolescent consent and confidentiality in the U.K

In R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health the Gillick competence test was confirmed. Commitment to childhood autonomy and privacy rights caused renewed academic criticism of the 'refusal' cases. This paper considers the form any changes to the law may take, and the potential consequences for the rights of parents and young people. Silber J.'s contention that parental Article 8 rights cease when the child makes a competent decision is potentially problematic if applied to refusal cases, especially in the context of the distinction between competence to consent to treatment and to the disclosure of information.

Clinical audit and reform of the UK research ethics review system

There is an international consensus that medical research involving humans should only be undertaken in accordance with ethical principles. Paradoxically though, there is no consensus over the kinds of activities that constitute research and should be subject to review. In the UK and elsewhere, research requiring review is distinguished from clinical audit. Unfortunately the two activities are not always easy to differentiate from one another. Moreover, as the volume of audit increases and becomes more formal in response to the demand for evidence-based practice in medicine, the overlap between research and audit grows more acute. Arguably, similar ethical standards and systems for ensuring that those standards are met should be applied regardless of whether or not a project is classified as research or audit. At a time when the research ethics review system in the UK is undergoing significant reform it is important that the opportunity is not missed to address the longstanding research-audit problem. We discuss suggestions for further reform that addresses this issue.

Milgram and Tuskegee--paradigm research projects in bioethics

This paper discusses the use of the Milgram obedience experiments and the Tuskegee syphilis study in the bioethical literature. The two studies are presented and a variety of uses of them identified and discussed. It is argued that the use of these studies as paradigms of problematic research relies on a reduction of their complexity. What is discussed is thus often constructions of these studies that are closer to hypothetical examples than to the real studies.

New governance arrangements for research ethics committees: is facilitating research achieved at the cost of participants' interest

This paper examines the UK's response to a recent European Clinical Trials Directive, namely the Department of Health, Central Office for Research Ethics Committee guidance, Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees. The revisions have been long awaited by researchers and research ethics committee members alike. They substantially reform the ethical review system in the UK. We examine the new arrangements and argue that though they go a long way toward addressing the uncertainty surrounding ethics committee function, the system favours the facilitation of research over the protection of the dignity and welfare of research participants.

Enteric fistulas and necrotizing enterocolitis

The incidence, presentation, significance, and outcome of infants with internal enteric fistula formation secondary to necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) were examined. Of 130 infants with NEC treated during a 7-year period, an enteric fistula developed in five (4%). The gestational age of these patients (3 boys, 2 girls) ranged from 25 to 40 weeks and their birth weight ranged from 800 to 3,460 g. Two had Down's syndrome. Plain abdominal radiographs showed widespread intramural gas in all, and portal vein gas in two. Four patients required early laparotomy, which confirmed extensive intestinal necrosis; a diverting jejunostomy or ileostomy was constructed in three, and the abdomen was closed with drainage in one. Fistulas were diagnosed by contrast radiology between 16 and 51 days after the onset of NEC, and were jejunocolic (2), ileocolic (2), and colocolic (1). They were associated with enteric stricture(s), an inflammatory mass, and clinical signs of intermittent sepsis. One infant with an ileocolic fistula died of sepsis before definitive surgical treatment. Of the four who underwent surgery, two survived after limited intestinal resection, but one of the two with short bowel syndrome died. Enteric fistula formation is a rare complication of NEC. Typically it occurs with colonic stricture(s) and is associated with signs of incomplete bowel obstruction and intermittent sepsis. Resectional surgery is successful, but there appears to be a significant risk of short bowel syndrome.