Transitions from child and adolescent to adult mental health services for eating disorders: an in-depth systematic review and development of a transition framework

BACKGROUND

Eating disorders (EDs) peak in mid-to-late adolescence and often persist into adulthood. Given their early onset and chronicity, many patients transition from child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS) to adult mental health services (AMHS) for ongoing, speciality ED care. This transition typically occurs at 18 years of age, when important biological, psychosocial, and vocational changes take place. Thus, smooth and effective transitions are paramount for ensuring service continuity, as well as reducing the risk of ED relapse and premature death. Here, we synthesized evidence on transitions from CAMHS to AMHS for young people with EDs, aiming to inform future research, clinical practice, and healthcare policy.

METHODS

A systematic review of the literature was conducted. This adhered to PRISMA guidelines. PubMed, Embase, and Scopus electronic databases were queried from inception to December 3, 2023. Leveraging the PICOS framework, study eligibility was evaluated in the qualitative synthesis. Data regarding methodology, analytic approach, and associated outcomes were then extracted. The quality of evidence was examined using critical appraisal tools. Finally, concept mapping was applied to organize findings into a transition framework.

RESULTS

The search returned 76 articles. Of these, 14 were included in the final review. Articles were grouped into 'qualitative' (n = 10), 'cross-sectional' (n = 2), and 'longitudinal cohort' (n = 2) studies based on research design. Overall, ED transitions were complex, multifaceted, and challenging for patients, caregivers, and providers alike. This resulted from an interplay of temporal- (e.g., timing of ED onset and transition), stakeholder- (e.g., patient ambivalence towards recovery) and systemic- (e.g., differences between services) related factors. Most studies were of moderate-to-high quality. Findings informed the development of five transition strategies designed to facilitate effective transfers across ED care: Timely talks, Readiness, Inclusion, Preparation, and Synergy (TRIPS).

CONCLUSIONS

Transitions from CAMHS to AMHS appear problematic for young people with EDs and other involved stakeholders. The field stands to benefit from TRIPS, an actionable, evidence-based framework that aims to alleviate challenges of transitioning and subsequently improve ED trajectories. As a logical next step, future work should empirically test the TRIPS framework, exploring its predictive utility and clinical value.

Keeping the promise: a critique of the current state of microdosing research

Introduction

The practice of taking small, sub-hallucinogenic doses of psychedelics, known as microdosing, has exploded in popularity over the last decade. Users claim benefits ranging from improved mood and enhanced creativity to an increased sense of meaning and connectedness in life. While research on microdosing is still lagging behind the shift in public opinion, several papers have been published in the last five years which attempted to assess the effects of microdosing.

Methods

This review paper aimed to critically analyze the research practices used in the recent wave of microdosing research: We reviewed 15 papers published before the closing date of this review in March 2022.

Results

Our review concludes that it is premature to draw any conclusions about the efficacy or safety of microdosing since the research quality cannot be considered confirmatory.

Discussion

We propose some potential causes for the current state of the literature and some suggestions for how these causes may be ameliorated.

5-MeO-DMT for post-traumatic stress disorder: a real-world longitudinal case study

Psychedelic therapy is, arguably, the next frontier in psychiatry. It offers a radical alternative to longstanding, mainstays of treatment, while exciting a paradigm shift in translational science and drug discovery. There is particular interest in 5-methoxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine (5-MeO-DMT)-a serotonergic psychedelic-as a novel, fast-acting therapeutic. Yet, few studies have directly examined 5-MeO-DMT for trauma- or stress-related psychopathology, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Herein, we present the first longitudinal case study on 5-MeO-DMT for chronic refractory PTSD, in a 23-year-old female. A single dose of vaporized bufotoxin of the Sonoran Desert Toad (Incilius alvarius), containing an estimated 10-15 mg of 5-MeO-DMT, led to clinically significant improvements in PTSD, with next-day effects. This was accompanied by marked reductions in hopelessness and related suicide risk. Improvements, across all constructs, were sustained at 1-, 3-, 6-, and 12-months follow-up, as monitored by a supporting clinician. The subject further endorsed a complete mystical experience, hypothesized to underly 5-MeO-DMT's therapeutic activity. No drug-related, serious adverse events occurred. Together, results showed that 5-MeO-DMT was generally tolerable, safe to administer, and effective for PTSD; however, this was not without risk. The subject reported acute nausea, overwhelming subjective effects, and late onset of night terrors. Further research is warranted to replicate and extend these findings, which are inherently limited, non-generalizable, and rely on methods not clinically accepted.

Humans versus AI: whether and why we prefer human-created compared to AI-created artwork

With the recent proliferation of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models capable of mimicking human artworks, AI creations might soon replace products of human creativity, although skeptics argue that this outcome is unlikely. One possible reason this may be unlikely is that, independent of the physical properties of art, we place great value on the imbuement of the human experience in art. An interesting question, then, is whether and why people might prefer human-compared to AI-created artworks. To explore these questions, we manipulated the purported creator of pieces of art by randomly assigning a "Human-created" or "AI-created" label to paintings actually created by AI, and then assessed participants' judgements of the artworks across four rating criteria (Liking, Beauty, Profundity, and Worth). Study 1 found increased positive judgements for human- compared to AI-labelled art across all criteria. Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend Study 1 with additional ratings (Emotion, Story, Meaningful, Effort, and Time to create) intended to elucidate why people more-positively appraise Human-labelled artworks. The main findings from Study 1 were replicated, with narrativity (Story) and perceived effort behind artworks (Effort) moderating the label effects ("Human-created" vs. "AI-created"), but only for the sensory-level judgements (Liking, Beauty). Positive personal attitudes toward AI moderated label effects for more-communicative judgements (Profundity, Worth). These studies demonstrate that people tend to be negatively biased against AI-created artworks relative to purportedly human-created artwork, and suggest that knowledge of human engagement in the artistic process contributes positively to appraisals of art.

Registered clinical trials investigating ketamine and esketamine for treatment-resistant depression: A systematic review

Background and Aims

Ketamine and esketamine have garnered interest in both psychiatric research and clinical practice for treatment-resistant depression (TRD). In this review, we examined registered trials investigating the therapeutic use of ketamine or esketamine for TRD, with the aim of characterizing emerging trends and knowledge gaps.

Methods

The ClinicalTrials.gov electronic registry and results database was queried from inception to February 5, 2022, adhering to elements of the PRISMA guideline, we evaluated trial eligibility in the qualitative synthesis. Data regarding study design, drug regimens, and measures were subsequently abstracted and descriptively analyzed.

Results

The search returned 86 records, of which 56 trials were included in the final review. The number of trials investigating ketamine and esketamine for TRD increased since 2008, with higher peaks observed in 2015 (n = 9) and 2021 (n = 9). Most trials were Phase 2 (13, 23.2%) or Phase 3 (11, 19.6%), gathering preliminary data on efficacy and/or further data on safety and efficacy with variant dosing and pharmacological approaches. By and large, trials examined ketamine and esketamine as individual versus combination treatments (45% and 25%, respectively). The Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS) was most commonly used to assess clinical outcomes (75%).

Conclusions

There are increasingly large-scale and late-phase trials of esketamine over ketamine for TRD, coupled with efforts to centralize evidence on these medications. Yet several trials do not assess patient characteristics that may affect treatment response, such as age, sex, and race. By understanding these design limitations, scientists and clinicians can avoid research waste and funding bodies can judiciously direct support towards high priority research.

Cannabis-assisted psychotherapy for complex dissociative posttraumatic stress disorder: A case report

BACKGROUND

A dissociative subtype of posttraumatic stress disorder, known as "D-PTSD", has been included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition. In addition to meeting criteria for PTSD, patients endorse prominent dissociative symptoms, namely depersonalization and derealization, or detachment from one's self and surroundings. At present, this population is supported by a highly heterogeneous and undeveloped literature. Targeted interventions are therefore lacking, and those indicated for PTSD are limited by poor efficacy, delayed onset of action, and low patient engagement. Here, we introduce cannabis-assisted psychotherapy (CAP) as a novel treatment for D-PTSD, drawing parallels to psychedelic therapy.

CASE PRESENTATION

A 28-year-old female presented with complex D-PTSD. In a naturalistic setting, she underwent 10 sessions of CAP, scheduled twice monthly over 5 months, coupled with integrative cognitive behavioral therapy. An autonomic and relational approach to CAP was leveraged, specifically psychedelic somatic interactional psychotherapy. Acute effects included oceanic boundlessness, ego dissolution, and emotional breakthrough. From baseline to post-treatment, the patient showed a 98.5% reduction in pathological dissociation, as measured by the Multidimensional Inventory of Dissociation, no longer meeting criteria for D-PTSD. This was accompanied by decreased cognitive distractibility and emotional suffering, as well as increased psychosocial functioning. Anecdotally, the patient has sustained improvements for over 2 years to date.

CONCLUSIONS

There is urgency to identify treatments for D-PTSD. The present case, while inherently limited, underscores the potential of CAP as a therapeutic option, leading to robust and sustained improvement. Subjective effects were comparable to those produced by classic and non-classic psychedelics, such as psilocybin and ketamine. Further research is warranted to explore, establish, and optimize CAP in D-PTSD, and to characterize its role in the pharmacological landscape.

Reducing Explicit Blatant Dehumanization by Correcting Exaggerated Meta-Perceptions

If explicitly, blatantly dehumanizing a group of people—overtly characterizing them as less than human—facilitates harming them, then reversing this process is paramount. Addressing dehumanization among American political partisans appears especially crucial, given that it has been linked to their anti-democratic hostility. Perhaps because of its overt nature, partisans recognize—and greatly exaggerate—the extent to which out-partisans explicitly, blatantly dehumanize them. Past research has found that when people perceive they are dehumanized by an outgroup (i.e., meta-dehumanization), they respond with reciprocal dehumanization. Therefore, we reasoned that partisans’ dehumanization could be reduced by correcting their exaggerated meta-dehumanization. Indeed, across three preregistered studies ( N = 4,154), an intervention correcting American partisans’ exaggerated meta-dehumanization reduced their own dehumanization of out-partisans. This decreased dehumanization persisted at a 1-week follow-up and predicted downstream reductions in partisans’ anti-democratic hostility, suggesting that correcting exaggerated meta-dehumanization can durably mitigate the dark specter of dehumanization.

Fixation, flexibility, and creativity: The dynamics of mind wandering

The mind-wandering literature is long on results and short on theory. One notable exception is the Dynamic Framework, a theoretical framework that characterizes mind wandering as thoughts that are relatively unconstrained from deliberate and automatic sources, or "freely moving." Critically, this framework makes numerous testable predictions, including (a) a positive association between freely moving thought and ADHD, (b) negative associations between freely moving thought and depression, anxiety, and OCD, and (c) a positive association between freely moving thought and divergent thinking ability. In Study 1, to test these predictions, we measured participants' reports of freely moving thoughts during a cognitive task and assessed divergent thinking and various psychopathological symptoms. Results failed to support any of the Dynamic Framework's predictions. In Study 2, we assessed the predicted relations between freely moving thought and divergent-thinking performance by manipulating thought constraint during a creative-incubation interval that preceded a divergent-thinking task. Here, we found some evidence (albeit very weak) to support the Dynamic Framework's prediction. Finally, in Study 3, we examined the possibility that indexing freely moving thought during a divergent-thinking task would yield the predicted associations but failed to find support for these associations. These results, most of which are at odds with the predictions of the Dynamic Framework, suggest either the need to revise the framework and/or that current methods are inadequate to properly test these predictions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Ketamine as a Novel Psychopharmacotherapy for Eating Disorders: Evidence and Future Directions

Eating disorders (EDs) are serious, life-threatening psychiatric conditions associated with physical and psychosocial impairment, as well as high morbidity and mortality. Given the chronic refractory nature of EDs and the paucity of evidence-based treatments, there is a pressing need to identify novel approaches for this population. The noncompetitive N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDAr) antagonist, ketamine, has recently been approved for treatment-resistant depression, exerting rapid and robust antidepressant effects. It is now being investigated for several new indications, including obsessive–compulsive, post-traumatic, and substance use disorder, and shows transdiagnostic potential for EDs, particularly among clinical nonresponders. Hence, the aim of this review is to examine contemporary findings on the treatment of EDs with ketamine, whether used as a primary, adjunctive, or combination psychopharmacotherapy. Avenues for future research are also discussed. Overall, results are encouraging and point to therapeutic value; however, are limited to case series and reports on anorexia nervosa. Further empirical research is thus needed to explore ketamine efficacy across ED subgroups, establish safety profiles and optimize dosing, and develop theory-driven, targeted treatment strategies at the individual patient level.

Thought dynamics under task demands: Evaluating the influence of task difficulty on unconstrained thought

As research on mind wandering has accelerated, the construct's defining features have expanded and researchers have begun to examine different dimensions of mind wandering. Recently, Christoff and colleagues have argued for the importance of investigating a hitherto neglected variety of mind wandering: "unconstrained thought," or, thought that is relatively unguided by executive-control processes. To date, with only a few studies investigating unconstrained thought, little is known about this intriguing type of mind wandering. Across 2 experiments, we examined, for the first time, whether changes in task demand influence rates of constrained versus unconstrained thoughts. In both experiments, participants completed either an easy (0-back) or hard (2-back) task and responded to intermittently presented thought probes that gauged thought constraint throughout the task. In Experiment 1, we found that participants completing the easy task engaged in unconstrained thoughts more frequently than those completing the difficult task. In Experiment 2, we replicated this result and further demonstrated manipulations of unconstrained thought while also measuring task-relatedness (a common dimension of mind wandering). Finally, exploratory analyses showed associations between constrained thought and age, verbal intelligence, and an assessment of flow ('deep effortless concentration'), thereby adding further evidence to indicate a dissociation between task-relatedness and constraint. We discuss the methodological and theoretical applications of our findings to the burgeoning field of research on unconstrained thought. All data, analysis, article, and experiment code can be found at https://osf.io/wr2vk/ (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Mind-Wandering Across the Age Gap: Age-Related Differences in Mind-Wandering Are Partially Attributable to Age-Related Differences in Motivation

OBJECTIVES

A common finding in the mind-wandering literature is that older adults (OAs) tend to mind-wander less frequently than young adults (YAs). Here, we sought to determine whether this age-related difference in mind-wandering is attributable to age-related differences in motivation.

METHOD

YAs and OAs completed an attention task during which they responded to thought probes that assessed rates of mind-wandering, and they provided self-reports of task-based motivation before and after completion of the attention task.

RESULTS

Age-related differences in mind-wandering are partially explained by differences in motivation, and motivating YAs via incentive diminishes mind-wandering differences across these groups.

DISCUSSION

We consider these results in the context of theories on age-related differences in mind wandering, with a specific focus on their relevance to the recently proposed motivational account of such age-related differences.

Boredom proneness, political orientation and adherence to social-distancing in the pandemic

Research recently showed that boredom proneness was associated with increased social distancing rule-breaking in a sample collected early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we explore data collected early in the pandemic to examine what factors might drive this relation. We focus on political affiliation. Given the functional account of boredom as a call to action, we hypothesized that this urge to act may drive individuals towards outlets replete with symbolic value (e.g., ideology, identity). In addition, given the politicization of some social distancing rules (e.g., mask wearing), we explored whether those who adhere to strong political ideologies—particularly conservative ideologies—would be more likely to rule-break. Moderation analyses indicated that boredom proneness and social (but not fiscal) conservatism were indeed predictive of rule-breaking. These results highlight the need for both clear messaging emphasizing the strength of communal identity and action (i.e., that “We are all in this together”) and for interventions that emphasize shared collective values in contexts that appeal directly to social conservatives.

The neural correlates of ongoing conscious thought

A core goal in cognitive neuroscience is identifying the physical substrates of the patterns of thought that occupy our daily lives. Contemporary views suggest that the landscape of ongoing experience is heterogeneous and can be influenced by features of both the person and the context. This perspective piece considers recent work that explicitly accounts for both the heterogeneity of the experience and context dependence of patterns of ongoing thought. These studies reveal that systems linked to attention and control are important for organizing experience in response to changing environmental demands. These studies also establish a role of the default mode network beyond task-negative or purely episodic content, for example, implicating it in the level of vivid detail in experience in both task contexts and in spontaneous self-generated experiential states. Together, this work demonstrates that the landscape of ongoing thought is reflected in the activity of multiple neural systems, and it is important to distinguish between processes contributing to how the experience unfolds from those linked to how these experiences are regulated.

Boredom in the COVID-19 pandemic: Trait boredom proneness, the desire to act, and rule-breaking

The state of boredom presents a conundrum: When bored, we want to engage with an activity, but we don't want to engage with whatever is currently available. This conflict is exacerbated when external factors impose restrictions on the range of behaviors we can engage in, which is precisely the scenario we are currently facing, at a global level, during this period of social isolation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We collected data from 924 North American participants (530 Male, Mean age = 37.7 years) using the internet-based Mturk platform to examine the relation between self-reports of boredom proneness (using the Short Boredom-Proneness Scale) and individual responses to questions about compliance with social-distancing requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our sample replicated recent findings in boredom research, including a negative correlation between boredom proneness and self-control. We also provide novel evidence that highly boredom prone people have been more likely to break the rules of social isolation in a variety of ways (e.g., fewer hours spent in social isolation, poor adherence to social distancing as evidenced by increased likelihood of holding a social gathering and coming into proximity with more people than recommended). We further demonstrated that boredom proneness substantially mediates the association between self-control and rule-breaking. These results indicate that boredom proneness is a critical factor to consider when encouraging adherence to social isolation.

Attention need not always apply: Mind wandering impedes explicit but not implicit sequence learning

According to the attentional resources account, mind wandering (or "task-unrelated thought") is thought to compete with a focal task for attentional resources. Here, we tested two key predictions of this account: First, that mind wandering should not interfere with performance on a task that does not require attentional resources; second, that as task requirements become automatized, performance should improve and depth of mind wandering should increase. Here, we used a serial reaction time task with implicit- and explicit-learning groups to test these predictions. Providing novel evidence for the attentional resource account's first prediction, results indicated that depth of mind wandering was negatively associated with learning in the explicit, but not the implicit, group, indicating that mind wandering is associated with impaired explicit, but not implicit, learning. Corroborating the attention resource account's second prediction, we also found that, overall, performance improved while at the same time depth of mind wandering increased. From an implicit-learning perspective, these results are consistent with the claim that explicit learning is impaired under attentional load, but implicit learning is not. Data, analysis code, manuscript preparation code, and pre-print available at osf.io/qzry7/.

Comparing the phenomenological qualities of stimulus-independent thought, stimulus-dependent thought and dreams using experience sampling

Humans spend a considerable portion of their lives engaged in 'stimulus-independent thoughts' (SIT), or mental activity that occurs independently of input from the immediate external environment. Although such SITs are, by definition, different from thoughts that are driven by stimuli in one's external environment (i.e. stimulus-dependent thoughts; SDTs), at times, the phenomenology of these two types of thought appears to be deceptively similar. But how similar are they? We address this question by comparing the content of two types of SIT (dreaming and waking SITs) with the content of SDTs. In this 7 day, smartphone-based experience-sampling procedure, participants were intermittently probed during the day and night to indicate whether their current thoughts were stimulus dependent or stimulus independent. They then responded to content-based items indexing the qualitative aspects of their experience (e.g. My thoughts were jumping from topic to topic). Results indicate substantial distinctiveness between these three types of thought: significant differences between at least two of the three mental states were found across every measured variable. Implications are discussed. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Missing the forest because of the trees: slower alternations during binocular rivalry are associated with lower levels of visual detail during ongoing thought

Conscious awareness of the world fluctuates, either through variation in how vividly we perceive the environment, or when our attentional focus shifts away from information in the external environment towards information that we generate via imagination. Our study combined individual differences in experience sampling, psychophysical reports of perception and neuroimaging descriptions of structural connectivity to better understand these changes in conscious awareness. In particular, we examined (i) whether aspects of ongoing thought—indexed via multi-dimensional experience sampling during a sustained attention task—are associated with the white matter fibre organization of the cortex as reflected by their relative degree of anisotropic diffusion and (ii) whether these neurocognitive descriptions of ongoing experience are related to a more constrained measure of visual consciousness through analysis of bistable perception during binocular rivalry. Individuals with greater fractional anisotropy in right hemisphere white matter regions involving the inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus, the superior longitudinal fasciculus and the cortico-spinal tract, described their ongoing thoughts as lacking external details. Subsequent analysis indicated that the combination of low fractional anisotropy in these right hemisphere regions, with reports of thoughts with high levels of external details, was associated with the shortest periods of dominance during binocular rivalry. Since variation in binocular rivalry reflects differences between bottom-up and top-down influences on vision, our study suggests that reports of ongoing thoughts with vivid external details may occur when conscious precedence is given to bottom-up representation of perceptual information.

Dissociating the freely-moving thought dimension of mind-wandering from the intentionality and task-unrelated thought dimensions

The recently forwarded family-resemblances framework of mind-wandering argues that mind-wandering is a multidimensional construct consisting of a variety of exemplars. On this view, membership in the mind-wandering family is graded along various dimensions that define more or less prototypical instances of mind-wandering. In recent work, three dimensions that have played a prominent role in defining prototypicality within the mind-wandering family include: (a) task-relatedness (i.e., how related the content of a thought is to an ongoing task), (b) intentionality (i.e., whether thought is deliberately or spontaneously engaged), and (c) thought constraint (i.e., how much attention constrains thought dynamics). One concern, however, is that these dimensions may be redundant with each other. The utility of distinguishing among these different dimensions of mind-wandering rests upon a demonstration that they are dissociable. To shed light on this issue, we indexed the task-relatedness, intentionality, and constraint dimensions of thought during the completion of a laboratory task to evaluate how these dimensions relate to each other. We found that 56% of unconstrained thoughts were "on-task" and that 23% of constrained thoughts were "off-task." Moreover, we found that rates of off-task thought, but not "freely-moving" (i.e., unconstrained) thought, varied as a function of expected changes in task demands, confirming that task-relatedness and thought constraint are separable dimensions. Participants also reported 21% of intentional off-task thoughts that were freely moving and 9% of unintentional off-task thoughts that were constrained. Finally, off-task thoughts were more likely to be freely-moving than unintentional. Taken together, the results suggest that these three dimensions of mind-wandering are not redundant with one another.

Intellectual humility and perceptions of political opponents

OBJECTIVE

Intellectual humility (IH) refers to the recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. We investigate possible interpersonal implications of IH for how people perceive the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their sociopolitical opponents and for their willingness to associate with those opponents.

METHOD

In four initial studies (N = 1,926, M_age  = 38, 880 females, 1,035 males), we measured IH, intellectual and moral derogation of opponents, and willingness to befriend opponents. In two additional studies (N = 568, M_age  = 40, 252 females, 314 males), we presented participants with a specific opponent on certain sociopolitical issues and several social media posts from that opponent in which he expressed his views on the issue. We then measured IH, intellectual, and moral derogation of the opponent, participants' willingness to befriend the opponent, participants' willingness to "friend" the opponent on social media, and participants' willingness to "follow" the opponent on social media.

RESULTS

Low-IH relative to high-IH participants were more likely to derogate the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their opponents, less willing to befriend their opponents, and less willing to "friend" and "follow" an opponent on social media.

CONCLUSIONS

IH may have important interpersonal implications for person perception, and for understanding social extremism and polarization.

Rich environments, dull experiences: how environment can exacerbate the effect of constraint on the experience of boredom

We examined the hypothesis that boredom is likely to occur when opportunity costs are high; that is, when there is a high potential value of engaging in activities other than the researcher-assigned activity. To this end, participants were either placed in a room with many possible affordances (e.g. a laptop, puzzle, etc.; affordances condition; n = 121), or they were ushered into an empty room (control condition; n = 107). In both conditions participants were instructed to entertain themselves with only their thoughts (hence, participants in the affordances condition were to refrain from engaging with the available options). As predicted, participants in the affordances condition reported higher levels of boredom compared with those in the control condition. Results suggest that under some conditions, environments that afford alternative activities may be more boring than those that are void of such activities.

What's in a Task? Complications in the Study of the Task-Unrelated-Thought Variety of Mind Wandering

In recent years, the number of studies examining mind wandering has increased considerably, and research on the topic has spread widely across various domains of psychological research. Athough the term mind wandering has been used to refer to various cognitive states, researchers typically operationalize mind wandering in terms of task-unrelated thought (TUT). Research on TUT has shed light on the various task features that require people's attention and on the consequences of task inattention. Important methodological and conceptual complications do persist, however, in current investigations of TUT. We argue that these complications may be dampening the development of a more nuanced scientific account of TUT. In this article, we outline three of the more prominent methodological and conceptual complications in the literature on TUT and discuss potential directions for researchers to take as they move forward in their investigations of TUT.

The relation between task-unrelated media multitasking and task-related motivation

In two experiments, we explored the relation between participants' (a) levels of motivation to complete a task and (b) task-unrelated media multitasking. In Experiment 1, we examined the extent to which participants' levels of motivation to complete a task influenced their tendency to engage in task-unrelated media multitasking. Participants completed a 1-back task, while having the opportunity to turn on and off an unrelated, optional video. Results showed that participants who were told they would finish the experiment early if they achieved a sufficient level of performance (the motivated group) were significantly less likely to play the optional video during the 1-back task than those who were not given the opportunity to finish early (control condition). In Experiment 2, we examined the extent to which engaging in task-unrelated media multitasking affected task-related motivation. Three groups of participants completed a 1-back task, while (a) no video was presented, (b) a video was continuously played, or (c) participants could turn on and off a video at their leisure (as in Experiment 1). At both the beginning and the end of Experiment 2, participants were asked to indicate their level of motivation to complete the task. Interestingly, results revealed that continuously having the video playing helped sustain task-related motivation. Thus, although greater motivation to perform a task reduces the likelihood of engaging in task-unrelated media multitasking, such media multitasking also appears to increase levels of motivation.

Yearning for distraction: Evidence for a trade-off between media multitasking and mind wandering

We examined whether providing participants with the opportunity to media multitask influenced their tendency to be 'off-task.' More specifically, we were interested in whether providing participants with the opportunity to engage with an external media stream during a required (researcher-imposed) cognitive task might lead to a trade-off between mind wandering and engagement with external distractions (such as the media). We also examined the extent to which intentionality plays a role in these associations. Participants completed 2 phases of a cognitive task (1-back). During 1 phase, participants were provided the opportunity to concurrently watch a video while they performed the cognitive task; during the other, no such opportunity was provided. Throughout both phases, thought probes asked participants if they were (a) focused on the task, (b) attending to external distractions, or (c) mind wandering. If options 2 or 3 were selected, participants were further asked to report whether these forms of distraction were engaged intentionally or unintentionally. Our findings indicated that, although the opportunity to media multitask increased overall reports of being off-task, the tendency to mind-wander was significantly reduced in favour of attending to external distractions (such as the video). Of interest to the authors, overall reports of being unintentionally off-task were equivalent, irrespective of whether participants had the opportunity to media multitask or not, which suggests that the increased tendency to have an off-task locus of attention was because of intentionally shifting attention away from the primary task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Mind-Wandering as a Natural Kind: A Family-Resemblances View

As empirical research on mind-wandering accelerates, we draw attention to an emerging trend in how mind-wandering is conceptualized. Previously articulated definitions of mind-wandering differ from each other in important ways, yet they also maintain overlapping characteristics. This conceptual structure suggests that mind-wandering is best considered from a family-resemblances perspective, which entails treating it as a graded, heterogeneous construct and clearly measuring and describing the specific aspect(s) of mind-wandering that researchers are investigating. We believe that adopting this family-resemblances approach will increase conceptual and methodological connections among related phenomena in the mind-wandering family and encourage a more nuanced and precise understanding of the many varieties of mind-wandering.

Network Neuroscience of Creative Cognition: Mapping Cognitive Mechanisms and Individual Differences in the Creative Brain

Network neuroscience research is providing increasing specificity on the contribution of large-scale brain networks to creative cognition. Here, we summarize recent experimental work examining cognitive mechanisms of network interactions and correlational studies assessing network dynamics associated with individual creative abilities. Our review identifies three cognitive processes related to network interactions during creative performance: goal-directed memory retrieval, prepotent-response inhibition, and internally-focused attention. Correlational work using prediction modeling indicates that functional connectivity between networks-particularly the executive control and default networks-can reliably predict an individual's creative thinking ability. We discuss potential directions for future network neuroscience, including assessing creative performance in specific domains and using brain stimulation to test causal hypotheses regarding network interactions and cognitive mechanisms of creative thought.

Thinking about the past and future in daily life: an experience sampling study of individual differences in mental time travel

Remembering the past and imagining the future are hallmarks of mental time travel. We provide evidence that such experiences are influenced by individual differences in temporal and affective biases in cognitive style, particularly brooding rumination (a negative past-oriented bias) and optimism (a positive future-oriented bias). Participants completed a 7-day, cellphone-based experience-sampling study of temporal orientation and mental imagery. Multilevel models showed that individual differences in brooding rumination predicted less vivid and positive past- and future-oriented thoughts, even after controlling for depressed mood. People high in brooding rumination were also more likely to report thinking about a past experience when probed at random during the day. Conversely, optimists were more likely to report more vivid and positive future-oriented, but not past-oriented thoughts, although they did not report thinking more or less often about the past and future. The results suggest that temporal and affective biases in cognitive style influence how people think about the past and future in daily life.

Volitional media multitasking: awareness of performance costs and modulation of media multitasking as a function of task demand

In two experiments, we sought to determine whether (a) people are aware of the frequently observed performance costs associated with engaging in media multitasking (Experiment 1), and (b) if so, whether they modulate the extent to which they engage in multitasking as a function of task demand (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants completed a high-demand task (2-back) both independently and while a video was simultaneously presented. To determine whether people were sensitive to the impact that the concurrent video had on primary-task performance, subjective estimates of performance were collected following both trial types (No-Video vs. Video trials), as were explicit beliefs about the influence of the video on performance. In Experiment 2, we modified our paradigm by allowing participants to turn the video on and off at their discretion, and had them complete either a high-demand task (2-back) or a low-demand task (0-back). Findings from Experiment 1 indicated that people are sensitive to the magnitude of the decrement that media multitasking has on primary-task performance. In addition, findings from Experiment 2 indicated that people modulate the extent to which they engage in media multitasking in accordance with the demands of their primary task. In particular, participants completing the high-demand task were more likely to turn off the optional video stream compared to those completing the low-demand task. The results suggest that people media multitask in a strategic manner by balancing considerations of task performance with other potential concerns.

On the Clock: Evidence for the Rapid and Strategic Modulation of Mind Wandering

We examined the hypothesis that people can modulate their mind wandering on the basis of their expectations of upcoming challenges in a task. To this end, we developed a novel paradigm in which participants were presented with an analog clock, via a computer monitor, and asked to push a button every time the clock's hand was pointed at 12:00. Importantly, the time at which the clock's hand was pointed at 12:00 was completely predictable and occurred at 20-s intervals. During some of the 20-s intervals, we presented thought probes to index participants' rates of mind wandering. Results indicated that participants decreased their levels of mind wandering as they approached the predictable upcoming target. Critically, these results suggest that people can and do modulate their mind wandering in anticipation of changes in task demands.

The awakening of the attention: Evidence for a link between the monitoring of mind wandering and prospective goals

Across 2 independent samples, we examined the relation between individual differences in rates of self-caught mind wandering and individual differences in temporal monitoring of an unrelated response goal. Rates of self-caught mind wandering were assessed during a commonly used sustained-attention task, and temporal goal monitoring was indexed during a well-established prospective-memory task. The results from both samples showed a positive relation between rates of self-caught mind wandering during the sustained-attention task and rates of checking a clock to monitor the amount of time remaining before a response was required in the prospective-memory task. This relation held even when controlling for overall propensity to mind-wander (indexed by intermittent thought probes) and levels of motivation (indexed by subjective reports). These results suggest the possibility that there is a common monitoring system that monitors the contents of consciousness and the progress of ongoing goals and tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record

Cognitive aging and the distinction between intentional and unintentional mind wandering

A growing number of studies have reported age-related reductions in the frequency of mind wandering. Here, at both the trait (Study 1) and state (Study 2) levels, we reexamined this association while distinguishing between intentional (deliberate) and unintentional (spontaneous) mind wandering. Based on research demonstrating age-accompanied deficits in executive functioning, we expected to observe increases in unintentional mind wandering with increasing age. Moreover, because aging is associated with increased task motivation, we reasoned that older adults might be more engaged in their tasks, and hence, show a more pronounced decline in intentional mind wandering relative to young adults. In both studies, we found that older adults did indeed report lower rates of intentional mind wandering compared with young adults. However, contrary to our expectations, we also found that older adults reported lower rates of unintentional mind wandering (Studies 1 and 2). We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of age-related declines in mind wandering. (PsycINFO Database Record

Mind-wandering and task stimuli: Stimulus-dependent thoughts influence performance on memory tasks and are more often past- versus future-oriented

Although many studies have indicated that participants frequently mind-wander during experimental tasks, relatively little research has examined the extent to which such thoughts are triggered by task stimuli (stimulus-dependent thoughts; SDTs) versus internally triggered (stimulus-independent thoughts; SITs). In the current experiment, we assessed differences in the frequency and characteristics of SDTs and SITs, as well as their associations with subsequent memory in young adults. Whereas frequency of SDTs (but not SITs) increased in a task with more meaningful stimuli, frequency of SITs (but not SDTs) increased in an easier task. Furthermore, only SDTs were more likely to be past- versus future-oriented. Finally, frequency and vividness of SDTs during a shallow, but not a deep, incidental encoding task both correlated with later memory performance for word stimuli. These results suggest that SDTs differ from SITs in several important ways.

What did you have in mind? Examining the content of intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering

It has recently been argued that researchers should distinguish between mind wandering (MW) that is engaged with and without intention. Supporting this argument, studies have found that intentional and unintentional MW have behavioral/neural differences, and that they are differentially associated with certain variables of theoretical interest. Although there have been considerable inroads made into the distinction between intentional/unintentional MW, possible differences in their content remain unexplored. To determine whether these two types of MW differ in content, we had participants complete a task during which they categorized their MW as intentional or unintentional, and then provided responses to questions about the content of their MW. Results indicated that intentional MW was more frequently rated as being future-oriented and less vague than unintentional MW. These findings shed light on the nature of intentional and unintentional MW and provide support for the argument that researchers should distinguish between intentional and unintentional types.

Forget all that nonsense: The role of meaning during the forgetting of recollective and familiarity-based memories

Memory can be divided into recollection and familiarity. Recollection is characterized as the ability to vividly re-experience past events, and is believed to be supported by the hippocampus, whereas familiarity is defined as an undifferentiated feeling of knowing or acquaintance, and is believed to be supported by extra-hippocampal regions, such as the perirhinal cortex. Recent evidence suggests that the neural architectures of the hippocampus and neocortex lead information in these regions being susceptible to different forgetting processes. We expand on these accounts and propose that the neocortex may be sensitive to the semantic content of a trace, with more meaningful traces being more easily retained. The hippocampus, in contrast, is not hypothesized to be influenced by semantics in the same way. To test this new account, we use a continuous-recognition paradigm to examine the forgetting rates words and nonwords that are either recollected or familiar. We find that words and nonwords that are recollected are equally likely to be forgotten over time. However, nonwords that are familiar are more likely to be forgotten over time than are words that are familiar. Our results support recent neuropsychologically-based forgetting theories of recollection and familiarity and provide new insight into how and why representations are forgotten over time.

On the Necessity of Distinguishing Between Unintentional and Intentional Mind Wandering

In recent years, there has been an enormous increase in the number of studies examining mind wandering. Although participants’ reports of mind wandering are often assumed to largely reflect spontaneous, unintentional thoughts, many researchers’ conceptualizations of mind wandering have left open the possibility that at least some of these reports reflect deliberate, intentional thought. Critically, however, in most investigations on the topic, researchers have not separately assessed each type of mind wandering; instead, they have measured mind wandering as a unitary construct, thereby conflating intentional and unintentional types. We report the first compelling evidence that an experimental manipulation can have qualitatively different effects on intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering. This result provides clear evidence that researchers interested in understanding mind wandering need to consider the distinction between unintentional and intentional occurrences of this phenomenon.

Intrusive thoughts: linking spontaneous mind wandering and OCD symptomatology

One recent line of research in the literature on mind wandering has been concerned with examining rates of mind wandering in special populations, such as those characterized by attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, dysphoria, and schizophrenia. To best conceptualize mind wandering in studies examining special populations, it has recently been suggested that researchers distinguish between deliberate and spontaneous subtypes of this experience. Extending this line of research on mind wandering in special populations, in a large non-clinical sample (N = 2636), we examined how rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering vary with symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Results indicate that, whereas deliberate mind wandering is not associated with OCD symptomatology, spontaneous mind wandering is, with higher reports of spontaneous mind wandering being associated with higher reports of OCD symptoms. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding both mind wandering and OCD.