Mu-ERD reflects action understanding, but the effect is small

Since the mid-2000's, many researchers have provided evidence that mu-ERD measured at the motor cortex may reflect the collective activation of upstream brain regions associated with the human mirror system during action observation paradigms; however, several recent papers have called these findings into question. Our study represents an effort to address these criticisms. In our study, participants watched videos in which the type of grip an actor used to grasp a coffee mug either conveyed the goal with 100 % certainty (unambiguous-goal trials), or offered no predictive information (ambiguous-goal trials). If mu-ERD indexes action understanding, then we predicted that mu-ERD should increase while participants watched the actor grasp the mug for unambiguous-goal trials, but not for ambiguous-goal trials. During the intervals where participants watched the actor execute the goal, mu-ERD for unambiguous-goal trials should remain steady, whereas mu-ERD for ambiguous-goal trials should now increase. Conversely, if mu-ERD does not index action understanding, and instead reflects general motor processes associated with action (such as the activation of population vectors in M1 or planning processes), then mu-ERD should show no difference across conditions. Across most comparisons, we found that mu-ERD mostly reflected general motor processes; however, there was a small effect when participants overserved unambiguous-goal trials while watching the actor execute the goal suggesting that mu-ERD does reflect mirroring, but the effect is small.

Task relevance alters the effect of emotion on congruency judgments during action understanding

The congruency judgments in action understanding helps individuals make timely adjustments to unexpected occurrence, and this process may be influenced by emotion. Previous research has showed contradictory effect of emotion on conflict processing, possibly due to the degree of relevance between emotion and task. However, to date, no study has systematically manipulated the relevance to explore how emotion affects congruency judgments in action understanding. We employed a cue-target paradigm and controlled the way emotional stimuli were presented on the target interface, setting up three experiments: emotion served as task-irrelevant distractor, task-irrelevant target and task-relevant target. The results showed that when emotion was irrelevant to the task, it impaired congruency judgements performance, regardless of a distractor or a target, while task-relevant emotion facilitated this process. These findings indicate that the impact of emotion on congruency judgements during action understanding depends on the degree of emotion-task relevance.

[Machine learning algorithms for identifying autism spectrum disorder through eye-tracking in different intention videos]

OBJECTIVES

To investigate the differences in visual perception between children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing (TD) children when watching different intention videos, and to explore the feasibility of machine learning algorithms in objectively distinguishing between ASD children and TD children.

METHODS

A total of 58 children with ASD and 50 TD children were enrolled and were asked to watch the videos containing joint intention and non-joint intention, and the gaze duration and frequency in different areas of interest were used as original indicators to construct classifier-based models. The models were evaluated in terms of the indicators such as accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity.

RESULTS

When using eight common classifiers, including support vector machine, linear discriminant analysis, decision tree, random forest, and K-nearest neighbors (with K values of 1, 3, 5, and 7), based on the original feature indicators, the highest classification accuracy achieved was 81.90%. A feature reconstruction approach with a decision tree classifier was used to further improve the accuracy of classification, and then the model showed the accuracy of 91.43%, the specificity of 89.80%, and the sensitivity of 92.86%, with an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.909 (P<0.001).

CONCLUSIONS

The machine learning model based on eye-tracking data can accurately distinguish ASD children from TD children, which provides a scientific basis for developing rapid and objective ASD screening tools.

Action planning and execution cues influence economic partner choice

Prudently choosing who to interact with and who to avoid is an important ability to ensure that we benefit from a cooperative interaction. While the role of others' preferences, attributes, and values in partner choice have been established (Rossetti, Hilbe & Hauser, 2022), much less is known about whether the manner in which a potential partner plans and implements a decision provides helpful cues for partner choice. We used a partner choice paradigm in which participants chose who to interact with in the Prisoners' Dilemma. Before choosing a cooperation partner, participants were presented with information about the potential partners' decision-related actions in another round of the Prisoners' Dilemma. They received either information about the potential partners' planning during decision making (i.e., decision-time; Experiment 1) or action execution during decision implementation (i.e., movement directness; Experiment 2). Across both games, participants preferred to interact with those who planned actions quickly or executed actions with direct and smooth movements, indicating that they were cooperating confidently and without deliberation. This demonstrates that action cues present in either the planning or implementation of economic decisions influence partner choice. We discuss implications of this finding for human decision-making and perception-action coupling in action understanding.

An active inference model of hierarchical action understanding, learning and imitation

We advance a novel active inference model of the cognitive processing that underlies the acquisition of a hierarchical action repertoire and its use for observation, understanding and imitation. We illustrate the model in four simulations of a tennis learner who observes a teacher performing tennis shots, forms hierarchical representations of the observed actions, and imitates them. Our simulations show that the agent's oculomotor activity implements an active information sampling strategy that permits inferring the kinematic aspects of the observed movement, which lie at the lowest level of the action hierarchy. In turn, this low-level kinematic inference supports higher-level inferences about deeper aspects of the observed actions: proximal goals and intentions. Finally, the inferred action representations can steer imitative responses, but interfere with the execution of different actions. Our simulations show that hierarchical active inference provides a unified account of action observation, understanding, learning and imitation and helps explain the neurobiological underpinnings of visuomotor cognition, including the multiple routes for action understanding in the dorsal and ventral streams and mirror mechanisms.

Commonsense psychology in human infants and machines

Human infants are fascinated by other people. They bring to this fascination a constellation of rich and flexible expectations about the intentions motivating people's actions. Here we test 11-month-old infants and state-of-the-art learning-driven neural-network models on the "Baby Intuitions Benchmark (BIB)," a suite of tasks challenging both infants and machines to make high-level predictions about the underlying causes of agents' actions. Infants expected agents' actions to be directed towards objects, not locations, and infants demonstrated default expectations about agents' rationally efficient actions towards goals. The neural-network models failed to capture infants' knowledge. Our work provides a comprehensive framework in which to characterize infants' commonsense psychology and takes the first step in testing whether human knowledge and human-like artificial intelligence can be built from the foundations cognitive and developmental theories postulate.

Is action understanding an automatic process? Both cognitive and perceptual processing are required for the identification of actions and intentions

The ability to identify others' actions and intentions, "action understanding," is crucial for successful social interaction. Under direct accounts, action understanding takes place without the involvement of inferential processes, a claim that has yet to be tested using behavioural measures. Using a dual-task paradigm, the present study aimed to establish whether the identification of others' actions and intentions depends on automatic or inferential processing, by manipulating working memory load during performance of a task designed to target the identification of actions and intentions. Experiment 1 tested a novel action understanding task targeting action identification and intention identification. This task was then combined with two working memory manipulations (cognitive: Experiment 2; perceptual: Experiment 3) to determine whether action identification and intention identification are disrupted by concurrent cognitive or perceptual load. Both action identification and intention identification were impaired by concurrent cognitive and perceptual processing, indicating that action understanding requires additional perceptual and cognitive resources. These findings contradict a direct account of action understanding.

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others' irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.

[Mirror neurons, neural substrate of action understanding?]

In 1992, the Laboratory of Human Physiology at the University of Parma (Italy) publish a study describing "mirror" neurons in the macaque that activate both when the monkey performs an action and when it observes an experimenter performing the same action. The research team behind this discovery postulates that the mirror neurons system is the neural basis of our ability to understand the actions of others, through the motor mapping of the observed action on the observer's motor repertory (direct-matching hypothesis). Nevertheless, this conception met serious criticism. These critics attempt to relativize their function by placing them within a network of neurocognitive and sensory interdependencies. In short, the essential characteristic of these neurons is to combine the processing of sensory information, especially visual, with that of motor information. Their elementary function would be to provide a motor simulation of the observed action, based on visual information from it. They can contribute, with other non-mirror areas, to the identification/prediction of the action goal and to the interpretation of the intention of the actor performing it. Studying the connectivity and high frequency synchronizations of the different brain areas involved in action observation would likely provide important information about the dynamic contribution of mirror neurons to "action understanding". The aim of this review is to provide an up-to-date analysis of the scientific evidence related to mirror neurons and their elementary functions, as well as to shed light on the contribution of these neurons to our ability to interpret and understand others' actions.

What modulates the Mirror Neuron System during action observation?: Multiple factors involving the action, the actor, the observer, the relationship between actor and observer, and the context

Seeing an agent perform an action typically triggers a motor simulation of that action in the observer's Mirror Neuron System (MNS). Over the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that during action observation the patterns and strengths of responses in the MNS are modulated by multiple factors. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide the most comprehensive survey to date of these factors. To that end, 22 distinct factors are described, broken down into the following sets: six involving the action; two involving the actor; nine involving the observer; four involving the relationship between actor and observer; and one involving the context. The second aim is to consider the implications of these findings for four prominent theoretical models of the MNS: the Direct Matching Model; the Predictive Coding Model; the Value-Driven Model; and the Associative Model. These assessments suggest that although each model is supported by a wide range of findings, each one is also challenged by other findings and relatively unaffected by still others. Hence, there is now a pressing need for a richer, more inclusive model that is better able to account for all of the modulatory factors that have been identified so far.

Infant perception of causal motion produced by humans and inanimate objects

Both the movements of people and inanimate objects are intimately bound up with physical causality. Furthermore, in contrast to object movements, causal relationships between limb movements controlled by humans and their body displacements uniquely reflect agency and goal-directed actions in support of social causality. To investigate the development of sensitivity to causal movements, we examined the looking behavior of infants between 9 and 18 months of age when viewing movements of humans and objects. We also investigated whether individual differences in gender and gross motor functions may impact the development of the visual preferences for causal movements. In Experiment 1, infants were presented with walking stimuli showing either normal body translation or a "moonwalk" that reversed the horizontal motion of body translations. In Experiment 2, infants were presented with unperformable actions beyond infants' gross motor functions (i.e., long jump) either with or without ecologically valid body displacement. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with rolling movements of inanimate objects that either complied with or violated physical causality. We found that female infants showed longer looking times to normal walking stimuli than to moonwalk stimuli, but did not differ in their looking time to movements of inanimate objects and unperformable actions. In contrast, male infants did not show sensitivity to causal movement for either category. Additionally, female infants looked longer at social stimuli of human actions than male infants. Under the tested circumstances, our findings indicate that female infants have developed a sensitivity to causal consistency between limb movements and body translations of biological motion, only for actions with previous visual and motor exposures, and demonstrate a preference toward social information.

The Naïve Utility Calculus as a unified, quantitative framework for action understanding

The human ability to reason about the causes behind other people' behavior is critical for navigating the social world. Recent empirical research with both children and adults suggests that this ability is structured around an assumption that other agents act to maximize some notion of subjective utility. In this paper, we present a formal theory of this Naïve Utility Calculus as a probabilistic generative model, which highlights the role of cost and reward tradeoffs in a Bayesian framework for action-understanding. Our model predicts with quantitative accuracy how people infer agents' subjective costs and rewards based on their observable actions. By distinguishing between desires, goals, and intentions, the model extends to complex action scenarios unfolding over space and time in scenes with multiple objects and multiple action episodes. We contrast our account with simpler model variants and a set of special-case heuristics across a wide range of action-understanding tasks: inferring costs and rewards, making confidence judgments about relative costs and rewards, combining inferences from multiple events, predicting future behavior, inferring knowledge or ignorance, and reasoning about social goals. Our work sheds light on the basic representations and computations that structure our everyday ability to make sense of and navigate the social world.

Hyperconnectivity of social brain networks in autism during action-intention judgment

Deficits in social communication in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have been documented using neuroimaging techniques such as functional MRI over the past decade. More recently, functional connectivity MRI has revealed altered connectivity in face processing, mentalizing, and mirroring brain networks, networks involved in the social brain in ASD. However, to our knowledge, previous studies have not examined these three networks concurrently. The purpose of the current study was to investigate the functional connectivity of the face processing, mentalizing, and mirroring networks (within each network and across networks) in ASD during an action-intention task in which participants were asked to determine the means and intention of a model's actions. We examined: a) within-network connectivity of each network using an ROI-to-ROI analysis; b) connectivity of each network hub to the rest of the brain using a seed-to-voxel analysis; c) the between-network connectivity of each network hub using ROI-to-ROI analysis; and d) brain-behavior relationships by correlating autism symptoms with brain connectivity. Task-fMRI data were used from 21 participants with ASD and 20 typically developing participants. The ASD group consistently showed significantly greater connectivity between networks and between hub regions to the rest of the brain. Hyperconnectivity in ASD may entail more and widespread resource utilization for accomplishing action-intention judgment.

The role of context in "over-imitation": Evidence of movement-based goal inference in young children

Children, as well as adults, often imitate causally unnecessary actions. Three experiments investigated whether such "over-imitation" occurs because these actions are interpreted as performed for the movement's sake (i.e., having a "movement-based" goal). Experiment 1 (N = 30, 2-5-year-olds) replicated previous findings; children imitated actions with no goal more precisely than actions with external goals. Experiment 2 (N = 58, 2-5-year-olds) confirmed that the difference between these conditions was not due to the absence/presence of external goals but rather was also found when actions brought about external goals in a clearly inefficient way. Experiment 3 (N = 36, 3-5-year-olds) controlled for the possibility that imitation fidelity was affected by the number of actions and objects present during the demonstration and confirmed that identical actions were imitated more precisely when they appeared to be more inefficient toward an external goal. Our findings suggest that movement-based goal inference encourages over-imitation.

What Are You Doing With That Object? Comparing the Neural Responses of Action Understanding in Adolescents With and Without Autism

Understanding another's actions, including what they are doing and why they are doing it, can be difficult for individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This understanding is supported by the action observation (AON) and mentalizing (MZN) networks, as well as the superior temporal sulcus. We examined these areas in children with ASD and typically developing controls by having participants view eating and placing actions performed in conventional and unconventional ways while functional magnetic resonance images were collected. We found an effect of action-type, but not conventionality, in both groups, and a between groups difference only when viewing conventional eating actions. Findings suggest there are not global AON/MZN deficits in ASD, and observing unconventional actions may not spontaneously activate the MZN.

Understanding approach and avoidance in verbal descriptions of everyday actions: An ERP study

Understanding verbal descriptions of everyday actions could involve the neural representation of action direction (avoidance and approach) toward persons and things. We recorded the electrophysiological activity of participants while they were reading approach/avoidance action sentences that were directed toward a target: a thing/a person (i.e., "Petra accepted/rejected Ramón in her group"/ "Petra accepted/rejected the receipt of the bank"). We measured brain potentials time locked to the target word. In the case of things, we found a N400-like component with right frontal distribution modulated by approach/avoidance action. This component was more negative in avoidance than in approach sentences. In the case of persons, a later negative event-related potential (545-750 ms) with left frontal distribution was sensitive to verb direction, showing more negative amplitude for approach than avoidance actions. In addition, more negativity in approach-person sentences was associated with fear avoidance trait, whereas less negativity in avoidance-person sentences was associated with a greater approach trait. Our results support that verbal descriptions of approach/avoidance actions are encoded differently depending on whether the target is a thing or a person. Implications of these results for a social, emotional and motivational understanding of action language are discussed.

Experience matters: Dogs (Canis familiaris) infer physical properties of objects from movement clues

Reasoning about physical properties of objects such as heaviness by observing others' actions toward them is important and useful for adapting to the environment. In this study, we asked whether domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) can use a human's action to infer a physical property of target objects. In Experiment 1, dogs watched an experimenter opening two differently loaded swinging doors with different corresponding degrees of effort, and then were allowed to open one of the doors. Dogs chose randomly between the two doors. In Experiment 2, we gave new dogs the same test as in Experiment 1, but only after giving them experience of opening the doors by themselves, so that they already knew that the doors could be either light or heavy. In this test the dogs reliably chose the light door. These results indicate that dogs are able to infer physical characteristics of objects from the latters' movement caused by human action, but that this inferential reasoning requires direct own experience of the objects.

1- and 2-year-olds' expectations about third-party communicative actions

Infants expect people to direct actions toward objects, and they respond to actions directed to themselves, but do they have expectations about actions directed to third parties? In two experiments, we used eye tracking to investigate 1- and 2-year-olds' expectations about communicative actions addressed to a third party. Experiment 1 presented infants with videos where an adult (the Emitter) either uttered a sentence or produced non-speech sounds. The Emitter was either face-to-face with another adult (the Recipient) or the two were back-to-back. The Recipient did not respond to any of the sounds. We found that 2-, but not 1-year-olds looked quicker and longer at the Recipient following speech than non-speech, suggesting that they expected her to respond to speech. These effects were specific to the face-to-face context. Experiment 2 presented 1-year-olds with similar face-to-face exchanges but modified to engage infants and minimize task demands. The infants looked quicker to the Recipient following speech than non-speech, suggesting that they expected a response to speech. The study suggests that by 1 year of age infants expect communicative actions to be directed at a third-party listener.

Motor resonance meets motor performance

The aim of the present work is to explore which of two different models better explains facilitation/interference effects when participants have to conditionally react to an observed action with a movement. The Dimensional Overlap model assumes two parallel routes, an automatic route and a rule-based one, that interact only when the stimulus-set and the response-set share some dimensions. In the alternative model, a motor resonance for rule-based reaction, the automatic visuo-motor transformation is always an obligatory step that provides the correct categorization of the observed action as the input for the rule-based route, thus linking the two routes in a serial fashion. We explicitly tested which of the hypotheses fits better the data by asking participants to perform one of two different actions in a two-choice reaction paradigm. In one condition participants were required to perform the opposite action compared to the one they saw (COUNTER task: see A→do B, see B→do A), while in the other they were required to perform two actions that did not share any dimension with the stimulus-set (NEUTRAL task: see A→do C, see B→do D). We predicted an advantage for the NEUTRAL task if the Dimensional Overlap model was correct, while a similar performance was foreseen if the motor resonance-based model was correct. Since the interpretation of these results was not straightforward, we conducted a distributional analysis of participants' response accuracies in order to understand whether a serial or a general parallel model explained better the data. We found clear evidence that participants responded above chance before the motor representation of the action observed was activated. We conclude that two separate systems in the human brain can transform observed actions in own motor representations. One is stimulus-driven, while the second is rule-driven. Likely, their activity is mutually independent along parallel pathways.

Responses to irrational actions in action observation and mentalising networks of the human brain

By observing other people, we can often infer goals and motivations behind their actions. This study examines the role of the action observation network (AON) and the mentalising network (MZN) in the perception of rational and irrational actions. Past studies in this area report mixed results, so the present paper uses new stimuli which precisely control motion path, the social form of the actor and the rationality of the action. A cluster in medial prefrontal cortex and a large cluster in the right inferior parietal lobule extending to the temporoparietal junction distinguished observation of irrational from rational actions. Activity within the temporoparietal region also correlated on a trial-by-trial basis with each participant's judgement of action rationality. These findings demonstrate that observation of another person performing an irrational action engages both action observation and mentalising networks. Our results advance current theories of action comprehension and the roles of action observation and mentalising networks in this process.

Motor system evolution and the emergence of high cognitive functions

In human and nonhuman primates, the cortical motor system comprises a collection of brain areas primarily related to motor control. Existing evidence suggests that no other mammalian group has the number, extension, and complexity of motor-related areas observed in the frontal lobe of primates. Such diversity is probably related to the wide behavioral flexibility that primates display. Indeed, recent comparative anatomical, psychophysical, and neurophysiological studies suggest that the evolution of the motor cortical areas closely correlates with the emergence of high cognitive abilities. Advances in understanding the cortical motor system have shown that these areas are also related to functions previously linked to higher-order associative areas. In addition, experimental observations have shown that the classical distinction between perceptual and motor functions is not strictly followed across cortical areas. In this paper, we review evidence suggesting that evolution of the motor system had a role in the shaping of different cognitive functions in primates. We argue that the increase in the complexity of the motor system has contributed to the emergence of new abilities observed in human and nonhuman primates, including the recognition and imitation of the actions of others, speech perception and production, and the execution and appreciation of the rhythmic structure of music.

Inferring learners' knowledge from their actions

Watching another person take actions to complete a goal and making inferences about that person's knowledge is a relatively natural task for people. This ability can be especially important in educational settings, where the inferences can be used for assessment, diagnosing misconceptions, and providing informative feedback. In this paper, we develop a general framework for automatically making such inferences based on observed actions; this framework is particularly relevant for inferring student knowledge in educational games and other interactive virtual environments. Our approach relies on modeling action planning: We formalize the problem as a Markov decision process in which one must choose what actions to take to complete a goal, where choices will be dependent on one's beliefs about how actions affect the environment. We use a variation of inverse reinforcement learning to infer these beliefs. Through two lab experiments, we show that this model can recover people's beliefs in a simple environment, with accuracy comparable to that of human observers. We then demonstrate that the model can be used to provide real-time feedback and to model data from an existing educational game.

Young children's agent-neutral representations of action roles

Recent developmental research has shown that young children coordinate complementary action roles with others. But what do they understand about the logical structure of such roles? Do they have an agent-neutral conception of complementary action roles, grasping that such roles can be variably filled by any two agents or even by one agent over time? Accordingly, can they make use of such representations for planning both their own and others' actions? To address these questions, 3- and 4-year-olds were introduced to an activity comprising two action roles, A and B, by seeing either two agents performing A and B collaboratively or one agent performing A and B individually. Children's flexible inferences from these demonstrations were then tested by asking them later on to plan ahead for the fulfillment of one of the roles either by themselves or by someone else. The 4-year-olds competently drew inferences in all directions, from past individual and collaborative demonstrations, when planning how they or someone else would need to fulfill the roles in the future. The 3-year-olds, in contrast, showed more restricted competence; they were capable of such inferences only when planning in the immediate present. Taken together, these results suggest that children form and use agent-neutral representations of action roles by 3 years of age and flexibly use such representations for episodic memory and future deliberation in planning their own and others' actions by 4 years of age. The findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of understanding self-other equivalence and agent-neutral frames of references.

Using action understanding to understand the left inferior parietal cortex in the human brain

Humans have a sophisticated knowledge of the actions that can be performed with objects. In an fMRI study we tried to establish whether this depends on areas that are homologous with the inferior parietal cortex (area PFG) in macaque monkeys. Cells have been described in area PFG that discharge differentially depending upon whether the observer sees an object being brought to the mouth or put in a container. In our study the observers saw videos in which the use of different objects was demonstrated in pantomime; and after viewing the videos, the subject had to pick the object that was appropriate to the pantomime. We found a cluster of activated voxels in parietal areas PFop and PFt and this cluster was greater in the left hemisphere than in the right. We suggest a mechanism that could account for this asymmetry, relate our results to handedness and suggest that they shed light on the human syndrome of apraxia. Finally, we suggest that during the evolution of the hominids, this same pantomime mechanism could have been used to 'name' or request objects.

Validating the Why/How contrast for functional MRI studies of Theory of Mind

The ability to impute mental states to others, or Theory of Mind (ToM), has been the subject of hundreds of neuroimaging studies. Although reviews and meta-analyses of these studies have concluded that ToM recruits a coherent brain network, mounting evidence suggests that this network is an abstraction based on pooling data from numerous studies, most of which use different behavioral tasks to investigate ToM. Problematically, this means that no single behavioral task can be used to reliably measure ToM Network function as currently conceived. To make ToM Network function scientifically tractable, we need standardized tasks capable of reliably measuring specific aspects of its functioning. Here, our goal is to validate the Why/How Task for this purpose. Several prior studies have found that when compared to answering how-questions about another person's behavior, answering why-questions about that same behavior activates a network that is anatomically consistent with meta-analytic definitions of the ToM Network. In the version of the Why/How Task presented here, participants answer yes/no Why (e.g., Is the person helping someone?) and How (e.g., Is the person lifting something?) questions about pretested photographs of naturalistic human behaviors. Across three fMRI studies, we show that the task elicits reliable performance measurements and modulates a left-lateralized network that is consistently localized across studies. While this network is convergent with meta-analyses of ToM studies, it is largely distinct from the network identified by the widely used False-Belief Localizer, the most common ToM task. Our new task is publicly available, and can be used as an efficient functional localizer to provide reliable identification of single-subject responses in most regions of the network. Our results validate the Why/How Task, both as a standardized protocol capable of producing maximally comparable data across studies, and as a flexible foundation for programmatic research on the neurobiological foundations of a basic manifestation of human ToM.

The joint role of trained, untrained, and observed actions at the origins of goal recognition

Recent findings across a variety of domains reveal the benefits of self-produced experience on object exploration, object knowledge, attention, and action perception. The influence of active experience may be particularly important in infancy, when motor development is undergoing great changes. Despite the importance of self-produced experience, we know that infants and young children are eventually able to gain knowledge through purely observational experience. In the current work, three-month-old infants were given experience with object-directed actions in one of three forms and their recognition of the goal of grasping actions was then assessed in a habituation paradigm. All infants were given the chance to manually interact with the toys without assistance (a difficult task for most three-month-olds). Two of the three groups were then given additional experience with object-directed actions, either through active training (in which Velcro mittens helped infants act more efficiently) or observational training. Findings support the conclusion that self-produced experience is uniquely informative for action perception and suggest that individual differences in spontaneous motor activity may interact with observational experience to inform action perception early in life.

Goal representation in the infant brain

It is well established that, from an early age, human infants interpret the movements of others as actions directed towards goals. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms which underlie this ability are hotly debated. The current study was designed to identify brain regions involved in the representation of others' goals early in development. Studies with adults have demonstrated that the anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) exhibits repetition suppression for repeated goals and a release from suppression for new goals, implicating this specific region in goal representation in adults. In the current study, we used a modified paired repetition suppression design with 9-month-old infants to identify which cortical regions are suppressed when the infant observes a repeated goal versus a new goal. We find a strikingly similar response pattern and location of activity as had been reported in adults; the only brain region displaying significant repetition suppression for repeated goals and a release from suppression for new goals was the left anterior parietal region. Not only does our data suggest that the left anterior parietal region is specialized for representing the goals of others' actions from early in life, this demonstration presents an opportunity to use this method and design to elucidate the debate over the mechanisms and cues which contribute to early action understanding.

Predicting others' intention involves motor resonance: EMG evidence from 6- and 9-month-old infants

The study explores infants' ability to generate on-line predictions about others' action goals through the recruitment of motor resonance mechanisms. To this aim, electromyography was recorded from mouth-opening suprahyoid muscles (SM) of 9-month-old infants while watching a video of an adult agent reaching-to-grasp an object and bringing it either to mouth or head. The results demonstrated, for the first time, that at the age of 9 months there is a dynamic mirror modulation of SM activity by action observation, with the infant's muscles responsible for the action final goal being recruited from the action outset. The comparison with the responses of 6-month-olds tested on the same task showed that in younger and older infants there is a different chronometry of the SM activation with respect to the different phases of the observed action (i.e., bringing vs. grasping, respectively). Results suggest that motor resonance mechanisms triggered within the infants' motor system by action observation undergo gradual development during the first year of life. They also indicate that motor resonance may reflect anticipation of the agent's intention based on the goal of the action.

Do infants provide evidence that the mirror system is involved in action understanding?

The mirror neuron theory of action understanding makes predictions concerning how the limited motor repertoire of young infants should impact on their ability to interpret others' actions. In line with this theory, an increasing body of research has identified a correlation between infants' abilities to perform an action, and their ability to interpret that action as goal-directed when performed by others. In this paper, I will argue that the infant data does by no means unequivocally support the mirror neuron theory of action understanding and that alternative interpretations of the data should be considered. Furthermore, some of this data can be better interpreted in terms of an alternative view, which holds that the role of the motor system in action perception is more likely to be one of enabling the observer to predict, after a goal has been identified, how that goal will be attained.

The contribution of brain sub-cortical loops in the expression and acquisition of action understanding abilities

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Focusing on cortical areas is too restrictive to explain action understanding ability.

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We propose that sub-cortical areas support action understanding ability.

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Cortical and sub-cortical processes allow acquisition of action understanding ability.

Research on action understanding in cognitive neuroscience has led to the identification of a wide “action understanding network” mainly encompassing parietal and premotor cortical areas. Within this cortical network mirror neurons are critically involved implementing a neural mechanism according to which, during action understanding, observed actions are reflected in the motor patterns for the same actions of the observer. We suggest that focusing only on cortical areas and processes could be too restrictive to explain important facets of action understanding regarding, for example, the influence of the observer's motor experience, the multiple levels at which an observed action can be understood, and the acquisition of action understanding ability. In this respect, we propose that aside from the cortical action understanding network, sub-cortical processes pivoting on cerebellar and basal ganglia cortical loops could crucially support both the expression and the acquisition of action understanding abilities. Within the paper we will discuss how this extended view can overcome some limitations of the “pure” cortical perspective, supporting new theoretical predictions on the brain mechanisms underlying action understanding that could be tested by future empirical investigations.

Early rationality in action perception and production? A theoretical exposition

Within recent years, the question of early rationality in action perception and production has become a topic of great interest in developmental psychology. On the one hand, studies have provided evidence for rational action perception and action imitation even in very young infants. On the other hand, scholars have recently questioned these interpretations and proposed that the ability to rationally evaluate actions is not yet in place in infancy. Others have examined the development of the ability to make rational action choices and have indicated limitations of young children's ability to act rationally. This editorial to the special issue on Early Rationality in Action Perception and Production? introduces the reader to the current debate. It elucidates the underlying theoretical assumptions that drive the debate on whether or not young children's action perception and production is rational. Finally, it summarizes the papers and their contributions to the theoretical debate.

Event-related potentials to intact and disrupted actions in children and adults

The current research used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate neurophysiological responses to intact and disrupted actions embedded within an event in children and adults. Responses were recorded as children (24-month-olds) and adults observed a relatively novel event composed of three actions. In one condition pauses were inserted at intact boundaries (i.e., at the endpoint of each action), whereas in the other condition they were inserted at breakpoints that disrupted the action (i.e., in the middle of each action). Evoked responses revealed differences across conditions in both groups; disrupted actions elicited a prolonged negative slow wave from 100 to 700 ms in children, whereas adults demonstrated two distinct negative peaks between 50-150 and 250-350 ms. These findings contribute the first electrophysiological evidence that children readily detect disruptions to ongoing events by the end of the second year, even with limited exposure to the event itself. Furthermore, they suggest that adults rely on two distinct mechanisms when processing novel events. Results are discussed in relation to the role of perceptual and conceptual levels of analysis in the development of action processing.