Development of a partnership between academia, community, and government in response to the 2022 mpox outbreak in Japan

Objectives　In response to the steady rise in the number of cases of mpox in nonendemic countries, starting with an outbreak in the United Kingdom in May 2022, the World Health Organization declared a public health emergency of international concern on July 23, 2022. As of November 13, 2022, seven cases of mpox have been reported in Japan.Methods　A community engagement approach was applied to prevent the spread of mpox in Japan.Results　A tripartite partnership between academia, community, and government (ACG) was established to promote multisectoral communication between vulnerable communities, medical personnel involved in diagnosis and treatment, public health specialists at public health centers, epidemiologists at the National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID), and government and public administration. Through information sharing, this ACG partnership can translate accurate information into effective infection control measures.Conclusion　By developing and maintaining the ACG partnership, an environment will be created that allows an immediate response to future public health crises affecting vulnerable communities. This Practice Report describes the process of establishing an ACG partnership.

A response playbook for early detection and population surveillance of new SARS-CoV-2 variants in a regional public health laboratory

BACKGROUND

Timely genomic surveillance is required to inform public health responses to new SARS-CoV-2 variants. However, the processes involved in local genomic surveillance introduce inherent time constraints. The Regional Innovative Public Health Laboratory in Chicago developed and employed a genomic surveillance response playbook for the early detection and surveillance of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants.

METHODS

The playbook outlines modifications to sampling strategies, laboratory workflows, and communication processes based on the emerging variant's predicted viral characteristics, observed public health impact in other jurisdictions and local community risk level. The playbook outlines procedures for implementing and reporting enhanced and accelerated genomic surveillance, including supplementing whole genome sequencing (WGS) with variant screening by quantitative PCR (qPCR).

RESULTS

The ability of the playbook to improve the response to an emerging variant was tested for SARS-CoV-2 Omicron BA.1. Increased submission of clinical remnant samples from local hospital laboratories enabled detection of a new variant at an average of 1.4% prevalence with 95% confidence rather than 3.5% at baseline. Genotyping qPCR concurred with WGS lineage assignments in 99.9% of 1541 samples with results by both methods, and was more sensitive, providing lineage results in 90.4% of 1833 samples rather than 85.1% for WGS, while significantly reducing the time to lineage result.

CONCLUSIONS

The genomic surveillance response playbook provides a structured, stepwise, and data-driven approach to responding to emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants. These pre-defined processes can serve as a template for other genomic surveillance programs to streamline workflows and expedite the detection and public health response to emerging variants. Based on the processes piloted during the Omicron BA.1 response, this method has been applied to subsequent Omicron subvariants and can be readily applied to future SARS-CoV-2 emerging variants and other public health surveillance activities.

Assessing public health preparedness and response in the European Union- a review of regional simulation exercises and after action reviews

BACKGROUND

Improving response capacities in the EU requires a good overview of capacities at both country and Union level. The International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring and Evaluation framework assesses capacities in countries. It includes semi-quantitative tools such as State Parties Annual Report (SPAR) and Joint External Evaluation (JEE). After Action Reviews (AAR) and Simulation Exercises (SimEx) were included to identify weaknesses in the functionality of capacities which are not addressed bySPAR and JEE. This study presents an analysis of the use of qualitative tools at regional level, in Europe. It aims to identify their added value by comparing them to standardised monitoring tools and lessons learned from COVID-19, and considers ways to improve their use in assessing capacities in the EU.

METHODS

We included 17 SimEx and 2 AAR organised by the European Commission between 2005 and 2018. We categorised a total of 357 recommendations according to the IHR (2005) core capacities and to the target audience of the recommendation. We analysed the data using language analysis software. Recommendations to countries were compared to SPAR and JEE indicators. Recommendations to EU agencies were compared to the current mandates of the EU agencies, and to lessons learnt during COVID-19.

RESULTS

Of all extracted recommendations from the exercises, 59% (211/357) targeted EU agencies, 18% (64/357) targeted countries, and 16% (57/357) targeted both. Recommendations mainly addressed areas of IHR coordination (C2), heath emergency management (C7) and risk communication (C10), and not low scoring areas. Recommendations complement SPAR indicators by identifying gaps in functionality. Eight out of ten early lessons learnt during the COVID-19 pandemic had been raised earlier as recommendations from exercises. Exercise reports did not include or result in action plans for implementation, but COVID-19 has accelerated implementation of some recommendations.

CONCLUSION

SimEx/AAR provide valuable insight into public health preparedness at EU level, as they assess functionality of preparedness and response mechanisms, point out gaps, and provide training and awareness on for participants, who often have key roles in public health emergencies. Better follow-up and implementation of recommendations is key to improve the regional preparedness for international public health incidents such as pandemics.

Does it matter that standard preparedness indices did not predict COVID-19 outcomes?

A number of scientific publications and commentaries have suggested that standard preparedness indices such as the Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and Joint External Evaluation (JEE) scores did not predict COVID-19 outcomes. To some, the failure of these metrics to be predictive demonstrates the need for a fundamental reassessment which better aligns preparedness measurement with operational capacities in real-world stress situations, including the points at which coordination structures and decision-making may fail. There are, however, several reasons why these instruments should not be so easily rejected as preparedness measures.From a methodological point of view, these studies use relatively simple outcome measures, mostly based on cumulative numbers of cases and deaths at a fixed point of time. A country's "success" in dealing with the pandemic is highly multidimensional - both in the health outcomes and type and timing of interventions and policies - is too complex to represent with a single number. In addition, the comparability of mortality data over time and among jurisdictions is questionable due to highly variable completeness and representativeness. Furthermore, the analyses use a cross-sectional design, which is poorly suited for evaluating the impact of interventions, especially for COVID-19.Conceptually, a major reason that current preparedness measures fail to predict pandemic outcomes is that they do not adequately capture variations in the presence of effective political leadership needed to activate and implement existing system, instill confidence in the government's response; or background levels of interpersonal trust and trust in government institutions and country ability needed to mount fast and adaptable responses. These factors are crucial; capacity alone is insufficient if that capacity is not effectively leveraged. However, preparedness metrics are intended to identify gaps that countries must fill. As important as effective political leadership and trust in institutions, countries cannot be held accountable to one another for having good political leadership or trust in institutions. Therefore, JEE scores, the GHSI, and similar metrics can be useful tools for identifying critical gaps in capacities and capabilities that are necessary but not sufficient for an effective pandemic response.

Public health infection prevention: An analysis of existing training during the COVID-19 pandemic

OBJECTIVES

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, agencies and organizations required trainings to support the needs of the public health workforce. To better understand the training resources available, this study identified, organized, and classified infection prevention and control (IPC) training and educational opportunities.

STUDY DESIGN

Environmental scan.

METHODS

A total of 306 IPC training resources were compiled between January and April 2021. Key themes and topics were identified and compared to the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee's (HICPAC) core IPC practices.

RESULTS

Three hundred and six training resources, including webinars, fact sheets, module-based learning activities, infographics, and professional practice guidance materials, were identified. Common themes included proper use of personal protective equipment (e.g., masks, gloves), community reopening guidance, and mass vaccination resources. A large proportion (74.9%) of trainings were under 60 min. Using the HICPAC framework, the most frequently addressed content included standard precautions (40%), leadership support (31.6%), and transmission-based precautions (25.8%). Few trainings addressed performance monitoring and feedback (17.1%).

CONCLUSIONS

A wide range of organizations developed IPC-specific content during the pandemic. However, these resources did not address the breadth of knowledge required to implement IPC concepts effectively. The creation of universally applicable IPC core competencies and the development of high-quality IPC education and trainings for public health and the overall responder workforces should be prioritized. Accessible high-quality online and just-in-time trainings are critical for future pandemic and disaster preparedness.

Making waves: Integrating wastewater surveillance with dynamic modeling to track and predict viral outbreaks

Wastewater surveillance has proved to be a valuable tool to track the COVID-19 pandemic. However, most studies using wastewater surveillance data revolve around establishing correlations and lead time relative to reported case data. In this perspective, we advocate for the integration of wastewater surveillance data with dynamic within-host and between-host models to better understand, monitor, and predict viral disease outbreaks. Dynamic models overcome emblematic difficulties of using wastewater surveillance data such as establishing the temporal viral shedding profile. Complementarily, wastewater surveillance data bypasses the issues of time lag and underreporting in clinical case report data, thus enhancing the utility and applicability of dynamic models. The integration of wastewater surveillance data with dynamic models can enhance real-time tracking and prevalence estimation, forecast viral transmission and intervention effectiveness, and most importantly, provide a mechanistic understanding of infectious disease dynamics and the driving factors. Dynamic modeling of wastewater surveillance data will advance the development of a predictive and responsive monitoring system to improve pandemic preparedness and population health.

Syndromic surveillance system during mass gathering of Panchkroshi Yatra festival, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, India

Background

The health implications surrounding a mass gathering pose significant challenges to public health officials. The use of syndromic surveillance provides an ideal method for achieving the public health goals and objectives at such events. In the absence of published reports of systematic documentation of public health preparedness in mass gatherings in the local context, we describe the public health preparedness and demonstrate the operational feasibility of a tablet-based participatory syndromic surveillance among pilgrims during the annual ritual circumambulation- Panchkroshi Yatra.

Methods

A real-time surveillance system was established from 2017-2019 to capture all the health consultations done at the designated points (medical camps) in the Panchkroshi yatra area of the city Ujjain in Madhya Pradesh. We also surveyed a subset of pilgrims in 2017 to gauge satisfaction with the public health measures such as sanitation, water, safety, food, and cleanliness.

Results

In 2019, injuries were reported in the highest proportion (16.7%; 794/4744); most numbers of fever cases (10.6%; 598/5600) were reported in 2018, while 2017 saw the highest number of patient presentations of abdominal pain (7.73%; 498/6435).

Conclusion

Public health and safety measures were satisfactory except for the need for setting up urinals along the fixed route of the circumambulation. A systematic data collection of selected symptoms among yatris and their surveillance through tablet could be established during the panchkroshi yatra, which can complement the existing surveillance for detecting early warning signals. We recommend the implementation of such tablet-based surveillance during such mass gathering events.

Lessons learned from terror attacks: thematic priorities and development since 2001-results from a systematic review

Purpose

The threat of national and international terrorism remains high. Preparation is the key requirement for the resilience of hospitals and out-of-hospital rescue forces. The scientific evidence for defining medical and tactical strategies often feeds on the analysis of real incidents and the lessons learned derived from them. This systematic review of the literature aims to identify and systematically report lessons learned from terrorist attacks since 2001.

Methods

PubMed was used as a database using predefined search strategies and eligibility criteria. All countries that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) were included. The time frame was set between 2001 and 2018.

Results

Finally 68 articles were included in the review. From these, 616 lessons learned were extracted and summarized into 15 categories. The data shows that despite the difference in attacks, countries, and casualties involved, many of the lessons learned are similar. We also found that the pattern of lessons learned is repeated continuously over the time period studied.

Conclusions

The lessons from terrorist attacks since 2001 follow a certain pattern and remained constant over time. Therefore, it seems to be more accurate to talk about lessons identified rather than lessons learned. To save as many victims as possible, protect rescue forces from harm, and to prepare hospitals at the best possible level it is important to implement the lessons identified in training and preparation.

Public health preparedness and response synergies between institutional authorities and the community: a qualitative case study of emerging tick-borne diseases in Spain and the Netherlands

BACKGROUND

Communities affected by infectious disease outbreaks are increasingly recognised as partners with a significant role to play during public health emergencies. This paper reports on a qualitative case study of the interactions between affected communities and public health institutions prior to, during, and after two emerging tick-borne disease events in 2016: Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever in Spain, and Tick-Borne Encephalitis in the Netherlands. The aim of the paper is to identify pre-existing and emergent synergies between communities and authorities, and to highlight areas where synergies could be facilitated and enhanced in future outbreaks.

METHODS

Documentary material provided background for a set of semi-structured interviews with experts working in both health and relevant non-health official institutions (13 and 21 individuals respectively in Spain and the Netherlands), and focus group discussions with representatives of affected communities (15 and 10 individuals respectively). Data from all sources were combined and analysed thematically, initially independently for each country and then for both countries together.

RESULTS

Strong synergies were identified in tick surveillance activities in both countries, and the value of pre-existing networks of interest groups for preparedness and response activities was recognised. However, authorities also noted that there were hard-to-reach and potentially vulnerable groups, such as hikers, foreign tourists, and volunteers working in green areas. While the general population received preventive information about the two events, risk communication or other community engagement efforts were not seen as necessary specifically for these sub-groups. Post-event evaluations of community engagement activities during the two events were limited, so lessons learned were not well documented.

CONCLUSIONS

A set of good practices emerged from this study, that could be applied in these and other settings. They included the potential value of conducting stakeholder analyses of community actors with a stake in tick-borne or other zoonotic diseases; of utilising pre-existing stakeholder networks for information dissemination; and of monitoring community perceptions of any public health incident, including through social media. Efforts in the two countries to build on the community engagement activities that are already in place could contribute to better preparedness planning and more efficient and timely responses in future outbreaks.

Public Health Student Response to COVID-19

To understand the role public health students play in response to COVID-19 despite cuts in funding for graduate student emergency response programs (GSERPs), we reviewed the websites of the Association of Schools and Programs of Public Health, Council on Education in Public Health, and individual schools and programs to identify student participation in COVID-19 response activities. Thirty schools and programs of public health are supporting public health agencies in response to COVID-19, primarily through the provision of surge capacity (n = 20, 66.7%), contact tracing (n = 19, 63.3%), and training (n = 11, 36.7%). The opportunity to participate in formal and informal applied public health experiences like practica, service-learning, and field placements can benefit both public health students and agency partners. Although recent publications have identified gaps in academic public health response to COVID-19, in part due to the cessation of funding for workforce development and other university-based programs in public health preparedness, schools and programs of public health continue to support public health agencies. Future funding should explicitly link public health students to applied public health activities in ways that can be measured to document impacts on public health emergency response and the future public health workforce.

Military Participation in Health Security: Analysis of Joint External Evaluation Reports and National Action Plans for Health Security

Militaries around the world play an important but at times poorly defined and underappreciated role in global health security. They are often called upon to support civilian authorities in humanitarian crises and to provide routine healthcare for civilians. Military personnel are a unique population in a health security context, as they are highly mobile and often deploy to austere settings domestically and internationally, which may increase exposure to endemic and emerging infectious diseases. Despite the role of militaries, few studies have systematically evaluated their involvement in global health security activities including the Global Health Security Agenda. We analyzed Joint External Evaluation (JEE) mission reports (n = 94) and National Action Plan for Health Security plans (n = 12), published as of July 2020, to determine the extent to which military organizations were involved in the evaluation process, military involvement in health security activities were described, and specific recommendations were provided for the country's military. For JEE reports, descriptions of military involvement were highest in 3 of the 4 core areas: Respond (76%), Prevent (39%), and Detect (32%). Similarly, National Action Plan for Health Security plans mentioned military involvement in the same 3 core areas: Respond (58%), Prevent (33%), and Detect (33%). Only 28% of JEE reports provided recommendations for the military in any of the core areas. Our results indicate that military roles and contributions are incorporated into some aspects of country-level health security activities, but that more extensive involvement may be warranted to improve national capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats.

Best practices for after-action review: turning lessons observed into lessons learned for preparedness policy

All-hazards preparedness and response planning requires ongoing individual, organisational and multi-jurisdictional learning. Disaster after-action reviews are an established emergency management practice to acquire knowledge through a process of analysing what happened and why, to improve the emergency response before the next crisis. After-action reviews help individuals and organisations learn, and are an essential step in the preparedness cycle. Human and animal health authorities have begun to employ after-action reviews for disaster preparedness and response among public health and Veterinary Services. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) encourages Members to establish after-action reviews and share best practice. The adoption of afteraction review is an essential step for all provincial, national and multinational emergency management authorities to mitigate the impact of disasters on human and animal health. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases with pandemic potential pose unique preparedness challenges, requiring high-level policy attention to close long-standing gaps. A review of after-action reports from the 2001 anthrax bioterror attacks and of naturally occurring infectious disease crises, from the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) to the 2014 Ebola epidemic, reveal a similar pattern of repeated weakness and failures. These phenomena are described as 'lessons observed but not lessons learned'. Most infectious disease outbreaks with pandemic potential are zoonotic and require a One Health approach to prevent, prepare for and respond to global health security crises. After-action reviews in a One Health security context are essential to improve the pandemic preparedness of public health and Veterinary Services. After-action reviews can also provide the evidence-based 'feedback loop' needed to galvanise public policy and political will to translate lessons observed into sustained and applied lessons learned.

Getting the most from after action reviews to improve global health security

Background

After Action Reviews (AARs) provide a means to observe how well preparedness systems perform in real world conditions and can help to identify – and address – gaps in national and global public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) systems. WHO has recently published guidance for voluntary AARs. This analysis builds on this guidance by reviewing evidence on the effectiveness of AARs as tools for system improvement and by summarizing some key lessons about ensuring that AARs result in meaningful learning from experience.

Results

Empirical evidence from a variety of fields suggests that AARs hold considerable promise as tools of system improvement for PHEP. Our review of the literature and practical experience demonstrates that AARs are most likely to result in meaningful learning if they focus on incidents that are selected for their learning value, involve an appropriately broad range of perspectives, are conducted with appropriate time for reflection, employ systems frameworks and rigorous tools such as facilitated lookbacks and root cause analysis, and strike a balance between attention to incident specifics vs. generalizable capacities and capabilities.

Conclusions

Employing these practices requires a PHEP system that facilitates the preparation of insightful AARs, and more generally rewards learning. The barriers to AARs fall into two categories: concerns about the cultural sensitivity and context, liability, the political response, and national security; and constraints on staff time and the lack of experience and the requisite analytical skills. Ensuring that AARs fulfill their promise as tools of system improvement will require ongoing investment and a change in mindset. The first step should be to clarify that the goal of AARs is organizational learning, not placing blame or punishing poor performance. Based on experience in other fields, the buy-in of agency and political leadership is critical in this regard. National public health systems also need support in the form of toolkits, guides, and training, as well as research on AAR methods. An AAR registry could support organizational improvement through careful post-event analysis of systems’ own events, facilitate identification and sharing of best practices across jurisdictions, and enable cross-case analyses.

A Public Health Preparedness Logic Model: Assessing Preparedness for Cross-border Threats in the European Region

Improving preparedness in the European region requires a clear understanding of what European Union (EU) member states should be able to do, whether acting internally or in cooperation with each other or the EU and other multilateral organizations. We have developed a preparedness logic model that specifies the aims and objectives of public health preparedness, as well as the response capabilities and preparedness capacities needed to achieve them. The capabilities, which describe the ability to effectively use capacities to identify, characterize, and respond to emergencies, are organized into 5 categories. The first 3 categories—(1) assessment; (2) policy development, adaptation, and implementation; and (3) prevention and treatment services in the health sector—represent what the public health system must accomplish to respond effectively. The fourth and fifth categories represent a series of interrelated functions needed to ensure that the system fulfills its assessment, policy development, and prevention and treatment roles: (4) coordination and communication regards information sharing within the public health system, incident management, and leadership, and (5) emergency risk communication focuses on communication with the public. This model provides a framework for identifying what to measure in capacity inventories, exercises, critical incident analyses, and other approaches to assessing public health emergency preparedness, not how to measure them. Focusing on a common set of capacities and capabilities to measure allows for comparisons both over time and between member states, which can enhance learning and sharing results and help identify both strengths and areas for improvement of public health emergency preparedness in the EU.

Improving preparedness in Europe requires a clear understanding of what EU member states should be able to do, whether acting internally or in cooperation with each other. The authors developed a preparedness logic model that specifies the aims and objectives of public health preparedness, as well as the response capabilities and preparedness capacities needed to achieve them.

Ebola Virus Training: A Needs Assessment and Gap Analysis

In response to the 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak, the Worker Training Program embarked on an assessment of existing training for those at risk for exposure to the virus. Searches of the recent peer-reviewed literature were conducted for descriptions of relevant training. Federal guidance issued during 2015 was also reviewed. Four stakeholder meetings were conducted with representatives from health care, academia, private industry, and public health to discuss issues associated with ongoing training. Our results revealed few articles about training that provided sufficient detail to serve as models. Training programs struggled to adjust to frequently updated federal guidance. Stakeholders commented that most healthcare training focused solely on infection control, and there was an absence of employee health-related training for non-healthcare providers. Challenges to ongoing training included funding and organizational complacency. Best practices were noted where management and employees planned training cooperatively and where infection control, employee health, and hospital emergency managers worked together on the development of protective guidance. We conclude that sustainable training for infectious disease outbreaks requires annual funding, full support from organizational management, input from all stakeholders, and integration of infection control, emergency management, and employee health when implementing guidance and training.

Epidemiology of ebolavirus disease (EVD) and occupational EVD in health care workers in Sub-Saharan Africa: Need for strengthened public health preparedness

Ebolavirus disease (EVD) is a severe contagious disease in humans, and health care workers (HCW) are at risk of infection when caring for EVD patients. This paper highlights the epidemiologic profile of EVD and its impact on the health care workforce in Africa. A documentary study was conducted which consisted of a review of available literature regarding the epidemiology of EVD, occupational EVD (OEVD), and work safety issues in Sub-Saharan Africa; the literature findings are enriched by field experiences from the authors. EVD outbreaks have already caused 30,500 cases in humans of whom 12,933 died (as of September 9, 2015), and the number of infected HCW has dramatically increased. All eight HCW infected during the 2014 outbreak in Democratic Republic of the Congo died, whereas during the recent West African EVD epidemic more than 890 HCW were infected, with a case fatality rate of 57%. Occupational exposure to blood and other body fluids due to inadequate use of personal protective equipment and needle stick or sharp injuries are among factors that contribute to the occurrence of OEVD. Prevention of OEVD should be one of the top priorities in EVD outbreak preparedness and management, and research should be conducted to elucidate occupational and other factors that expose HCW to EVD. In addition to regularly training HCW to be adequately prepared to care for patients with EVD, it is critical to strengthen the general health care system and improve occupational safety in medical settings of countries at risk.

Implementation of the IHR Joint External Evaluation: Taiwan's Experiences

In February 2016, the World Health Organization developed the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool to independently assess country capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats as part of the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) monitoring and evaluation framework. In light of this, the Taiwan government actively engaged at least 19 government agencies or institutions and voluntarily implemented the JEE. An External Assessment Team consisting of 6 US subject matter experts conducted the external evaluation, including site visits, from June 21 to July 1, 2016. The results, published on October 18, 2016, are useful and will be translated into actions and change in the system. Based on Taiwan's experiences, early stakeholder engagement and an experts' pre-JEE pilot visit would contribute to a successful JEE process.

Biological Risks to Public Health: Lessons from an International Conference to Inform the Development of National Risk Communication Strategies

Biological risk management in public health focuses on the impact of outbreaks on health, the economy, and other systems and on ensuring biosafety and biosecurity. To address this broad range of risks, the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) request that all member states build defined core capacities, risk communication being one of them. While there is existing guidance on the communication process and on what health authorities need to consider to design risk communication strategies that meet the requirements on a governance level, little has been done on implementation because of a number of factors, including lack of resources (human, financial, and others) and systems to support effective and consistent capacity for risk communication. The international conference on “Risk communication strategies before, during and after public health emergencies” provided a platform to present current strategies, facilitate learning from recent outbreaks of infectious diseases, and discuss recommendations to inform risk communication strategy development. The discussion concluded with 4 key areas for improvement in risk communication: consider communication as a multidimensional process in risk communication, broaden the biomedical paradigm by integrating social science intelligence into epidemiologic risk assessments, strengthen multisectoral collaboration including with local organizations, and spearhead changes in organizations for better risk communication governance. National strategies should design risk communication to be proactive, participatory, and multisectoral, facilitating the connection between sectors and strengthening collaboration.

Mass Vaccinations at the United States Naval Academy

We analyzed the mass influenza vaccination clinic process at the United States Naval Academy to identify gaps and implement changes for improvement. The Lean Six Sigma methodology was employed. Total number of staff members working the clinic and total hours worked were measured at baseline in August 2013 and after implementation in August 2014 to determine improvement. The clinic was moved from a hallway to an auditorium, and a linear patient flow was established. Staff members wore vests for easy identification, and the supply box was reorganized. Training was standardized and given to all staff members before working in the clinic. These changes decreased the number of staff members required to work in the clinic from 62 to 40 (-35.5%) and decreased the total number of hours worked from 558 to 360 (-35.5%). The changes successfully improved the mass vaccination clinic by decreasing staffing and hours required. These changes can be adopted in other settings to increase community capacity and readiness.

"Skip the infection, get the injection": a case study in emergency preparedness education

The frequency of natural and manmade disasters along with increasing potential for public health emergencies emphasizes the need for emergency preparedness education. Because nurses are the largest group of health professionals to meet the needs of those affected by disasters and public health emergencies, schools of nursing need to prepare graduates who are knowledgeable about disaster and public health emergency management. The use of core competencies may be a means to ensure consistent application of best practices in disaster health care. The next step in competency development involves validation through evidence. Through documentation and dissemination of their experiences with emergency preparedness education, schools of nursing can provide supportive evidence to aid in competency development. The purpose of this paper is present a case study of an ongoing and evolving public health nursing education project consistent with disaster health care and emergency preparedness competencies.