Comparing the influence of intellectual humility, religiosity, and political conservatism on vaccine attitudes in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom

Three studies of US, Canada, and UK respondents examined pro-vaccine attitudes as predicted by intellectual humility, belief in science, religiosity, and political attitudes. Intellectual humility refers to the capacity to understand limits of one's own beliefs and showed strong relationship to pro-vaccine attitudes across samples. Pro-vaccine attitudes were correlated with intellectual humility and negatively correlated with political conservatism and religiosity. Regression models compared overlapping influences of belief predictors on vaccine attitudes. Across countries, intellectual humility was the most consistent predictor of pro-vaccine attitudes when controlling for other beliefs and thinking styles (political conservatism, belief in science, religiosity). In comparison, political conservatism was a significant predictor of vaccine attitudes in regression models on US and Canadian respondents, and religiosity only held as a predictor in regression models in the US sample. We conclude with a discussion of intellectual humility as a predictor of vaccine attitudes and implications for research and persuasion.

The genetic underpinnings of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation explain political attitudes beyond Big Five personality

OBJECTIVE

Political attitudes are predicted by the key ideological variables of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), as well as some of the Big Five personality traits. Past research indicates that personality and ideological traits are correlated for genetic reasons. A question that has yet to be tested concerns whether the genetic variation underlying the ideological traits of RWA and SDO has distinct contributions to political attitudes, or if genetic variation in political attitudes is subsumed under the genetic variation underlying standard Big Five personality traits.

METHOD

We use data from a sample of 1987 Norwegian twins to assess the genetic and environmental relationships between the Big Five personality traits, RWA, SDO, and their separate contributions to political policy attitudes.

RESULTS

RWA and SDO exhibit very high genetic correlation (r = 0.78) with each other and some genetic overlap with the personality traits of openness and agreeableness. Importantly, they share a larger genetic substrate with political attitudes (e.g., deporting an ethnic minority) than do Big Five personality traits, a relationship that persists even when controlling for the genetic foundations underlying personality traits.

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that the genetic foundations of ideological traits and political attitudes are largely non-overlapping with the genetic foundations of Big Five personality traits.

Attitude networks as intergroup realities: Using network-modelling to research attitude-identity relationships in polarized political contexts

We apply a newly developed attitude network-modelling technique (Response-Item Network, or ResIN) to study attitude-identity relationships in the context of hot-button issues that polarize the current US-American electorate. The properties of the network-method allow us to simultaneously depict differences in the structural organization of attitudes between groups and to explore the relevance of organized attitude-systems for group identity management. Individuals based on a sample of US-American crowd workers (N = 396) and the representative 2020 ANES data set (N = 8280), we model an attitude network with two conflictive partisan belief-systems. In the first step, we demonstrate that the structural properties of the attitude-network provide substantial information about latent partisan identities, thereby revealing which attitudes 'belong' to specific groups. In a second step, we evaluate the potential of attitudes to communicate identity-relevant information. Results from a vignette study suggest that people rely on their mental representations of attitude-identity links to structure and evaluate their social environment. By highlighting functional interdependences between (macro level) attitude structures and identity management, the presented findings help advancing the understanding of attitude-identity dynamics and socio-political cleavages.

People are less myopic about future than past collective outcomes

Myopia involves giving disproportionate weight to outcomes that occur close to the present. Myopia in people's evaluations of political outcomes and proposals threatens effective policymaking. It can lead to inefficient spending just before elections, cause inaction on important future policy challenges, and create incentives for government interventions aimed at boosting short-term performance at the expense of long-term welfare. But, are people generally myopic? Existing evidence comes mostly from studies that disregard either the future or collective outcomes. Political science characterizes people as myopic based on how they retrospectively evaluate collective outcomes, such as the state of the economy. Behavioral economics and psychology find that people make myopic choices involving future individual outcomes, such as money or personal health. To characterize myopia more generally, we offer two innovations: First, we adapt measurement approaches from behavioral economics and psychology to precisely gauge myopia over politically relevant collective outcomes. Second, we estimate myopia using the same approach for collective political outcomes in both past and future. We conduct two surveys on three different samples (including a large probability-based sample) asking respondents to evaluate national conditions randomly described as past or future while holding constant the domain, information about conditions, and the elicitation method. Results show that prospective evaluations are significantly less myopic than retrospective evaluations. People are often not myopic at all when looking to the future. This surprising pattern calls for more research to probe its robustness and spell out how low prospective myopia might lead to forward-looking policy.

The Onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic Made People Feel Threatened, but Had a Limited Impact on Political Attitudes in the United States

We investigated if the COVID-19 pandemic's onset caused changes in political attitudes. Influential theories predict that the pandemic's onset will cause people to adopt more conservative attitudes, more culturally conservative attitudes, or more extreme attitudes. We comprehensively tested the external validity of these predictions by estimating the causal effect of the pandemic's onset on 84 political attitudes and eight perceived threats using fine-grained repeated cross-sectional data (Study 1, N = 232,684) and panel data (Study 2, N = 552) collected in the United States. Although the pandemic's onset caused feelings of threat, the onset only caused limited attitude change (six conservative shifts, four extremity shifts, 12 liberal shifts, 62 no change). Prominent theories of threat and politics did not make accurate predictions for this major societal threat. Our results highlight the necessity of testing psychological theories' predictive powers in real-life circumstances.

Affective Polarization and Political Belief Systems: The Role of Political Identity and the Content and Structure of Political Beliefs

We investigate the extent that political identity, political belief content (i.e., attitude stances), and political belief system structure (i.e., relations among attitudes) differences are associated with affective polarization (i.e., viewing ingroup partisans positively and outgroup partisans negatively) in two multinational, cross-sectional studies (Study 1 N = 4,152, Study 2 N = 29,994). First, we found a large, positive association between political identity and group liking-participants liked their ingroup substantially more than their outgroup. Second, political belief system content and structure had opposite associations with group liking: Sharing similar belief system content with an outgroup was associated with more outgroup liking, but similarity with the ingroup was associated with less ingroup liking. The opposite pattern was found for political belief system structure. Thus, affective polarization was greatest when belief system content similarity was low and structure similarity was high.

Sociotropic and Personal Threats and Authoritarian Reactions During COVID-19

The authoritarianism literature is divided over whether perceived threats to normative social order (sociotropic threats) or threats to the individual's well-being (personal threats) activate authoritarian predispositions. In addition, while some approaches claim that perceived threats primarily trigger those high in authoritarianism, others claim that those who are low in authoritarianism are more sensitive to threats. Given the centrality of authoritarianism and threat on support for extraordinary policies in the context of COVID-19, this article sought to test to what extent different types of threats moderated the effect of authoritarianism on support for tough law and order policies and harsh punishments to contain the spread of coronavirus. Data from two preregistered survey experiments indicates that those high in authoritarianism were more willing to support tough law and order policies when primed with sociotropic threats while those low in authoritarianism became more willing to support such policies when primed with personal threats.

Men's and women's endorsement of hegemonic masculinity and responses to COVID-19

Using a gendered psychology of health approach, we examine the effects of the culturally idealized form of masculinity-hegemonic masculinity-for both men and women's health attitudes and behaviors. Using data collected across four studies (N = 805) during the COVID-19 pandemic, we found that stronger endorsement of hegemonic masculinity related to health attitudes antithetical to mitigation strategies (e.g. more engagement in risky behaviors, less support for federal mandates) and evaluations of how political leaders have responded to COVID-19. These effects did not differ by gender suggesting that hegemonic masculinity has implications for both men and women's health.

Would I lie to you? Party affiliation is more important than Brexit in processing political misinformation

In recent years, the UK has become divided along two key dimensions: party affiliation and Brexit position. We explored how division along these two dimensions interacts with the correction of political misinformation. Participants saw accurate and inaccurate statements (either balanced or mostly inaccurate) from two politicians from opposing parties but the same Brexit position (Experiment 1), or the same party but opposing Brexit positions (Experiment 2). Replicating previous work, fact-checking statements led participants to update their beliefs, increasing belief after fact affirmations and decreasing belief for corrected misinformation, even for politically aligned material. After receiving fact-checks participants had reduced voting intentions and more negative feelings towards party-aligned politicians (likely due to low baseline support for opposing party politicians). For Brexit alignment, the opposite was found: participants reduced their voting intentions and feelings for opposing (but not aligned) politicians following the fact-checks. These changes occurred regardless of the proportion of inaccurate statements, potentially indicating participants expect politicians to be accurate more than half the time. Finally, although we found division based on both party and Brexit alignment, effects were much stronger for party alignment, highlighting that even though new divisions have emerged in UK politics, the old divides remain dominant.

"When the political becomes personal": evaluation of an elected president, election distress, and college students' psychological well-being

Objective: Although emerging adults' civic engagement is generally associated with positive outcomes, concerns about an elected candidate's leadership ability and the implications of administrative turnover may negatively impact youths' well-being. Using longitudinal data collected during the 2016 election cycle, the current study examined whether negative evaluation of a presidential candidate-who is eventually elected-may be indirectly associated with college students' psychological well-being due to increased election distress.Participants: 286 college-attending emerging adults (Mage= 20, SDage = 1.40) participated in the current study.Methods: Path models linking evaluation of Trump's leadership ability (pre-election) to psychological well-being (approx. 100 days in office) via election distress (presidential inauguration) were computed.Results: Reporting lower confidence in Trump's leadership ability prior to the election was associated with greater election distress 3 months post-election, and in turn, poorer psychological well-being 6 months post-election.Conclusion: Findings underscore the importance of centering college students' well-being within a broader sociopolitical context.

In sight, in mind: Spatial proximity to protest sites and changes in peoples' political attitudes

Occupying public spaces can be an effective tactic for conveying a semantic message of protest and gaining wider support; however, it may also severely disrupt the everyday lives of non-participants and causes a backfire. Therefore, it remains unclear whether and how the occupy movements have shifted political attitudes among the general public. Bringing a social-spatial perspective to the case of the Occupy Central Movement (OCM) in Hong Kong, this study investigates how the attitudinal impact of occupation has varied according to people's spatial proximity to the protest sites. Using two waves of individual-level panel data collected right before and after the OCM and detailed geo-information on the respondents' home addresses and the occupied areas, we apply a difference-in-differences (DIDs) design to identify the causal link between space and attitudes. In addition, propensity score matching (PSM) methods are used to ensure the comparability of nearby and faraway residents. The results show that after the OCM, residents living near the occupied areas not only maintained their support for the pro-democracy camp but also became more liberal as compared to faraway residents. This phenomenon can be explained by the "on-site" effect, which suggests that the direct exposure to protestors' solidarity and the repressive actions of authorities arouse bystanders' sympathy for the protestors and support for their political cause. Such influence appears to be long-lasting and can be evidenced by the local election results after the protest.

Political attitude change over time following COVID-19 lockdown: Rallying effects and differences between left and right voters

Restrictions to curb the spread of COVID-19 have required widespread compliance over long periods, but citizens' attitudes to these often change over time. Here, we examine the time course of political attitudes in New Zealand over the months before and after the announcement of the country's first nationwide COVID-19 lockdown in 2020 using a large-scale national survey (Ns = 41,831-42,663). Government satisfaction increased immediately following the lockdown announcement and remained elevated 5 months later. Trust in institutions and political efficacy also increased gradually over the same period. However, these trends varied by political party vote: Compared to center-left voters who supported the largest governing party, center-right voters who supported the opposition party returned to baseline levels of government satisfaction quicker and showed more pronounced dips in their satisfaction with the economy. These same attitudes also predicted compliance with COVID-19 guidelines. Results illustrate a rally-around-the-flag effect during the pandemic and suggest that support wanes faster among center-right (opposition party) voters.

State anxiety by itself does not change political attitudes: A threat of shock experiment

Previous research suggests that state anxiety may sway political attitudes. However, previous experimental procedures induced anxiety using political contexts (e.g., social or economic threat). In a pre-registered laboratory experiment, we set out to examine if anxiety that is unrelated to political contexts can influence political attitudes. We induced anxiety with a threat of shock paradigm, void of any political connotation. All participants were instructed that they might receive an electric stimulus during specified threat periods and none during safety periods. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Political attitudes (implicit and explicit) were assessed under safety in one condition and under threat in the other. Psychometric, as well as physiological data (skin conductance, heart rate), confirmed that anxiety was induced successfully. However, this emotional state did not alter political attitudes. In a Bayesian analytical approach, we confirmed the absence of an effect. Our results suggest that state anxiety by itself does not sway political attitudes. Previously observed effects that were attributed to anxiety may be conditional on a political context of threat.

Dimensions of class identification? On the roots and effects of class identity

Throughout the 20th century, objective class position was a strong predictor of both class identity, political preferences and party choice, but since the 1980s, the relationship between objective and subjective dimensions of class has supposedly vanished-according to some as the result of a fundamental blurring of class relations. However, others suggest that this result may be partly due to the use of outdated class schemes. Although still basically focused on inequality of life chances, class relations today are complex and include more than labor market position, such as different forms of cultural resources (e.g., education). As a result, class identity may also have become more complex, and possibly dependent upon the salience of different resources and types of group relations-both in itself and in its relationship with political preferences. Very few contributions, though, test such claims. Using two independent Danish surveys, this paper investigates to what extent class identification is multidimensional and how any such dimensionality is related to, on the one hand, different dimensions of objective class relations and, on the other hand, different dimensions of political conflict. The analyses show that despite changes at the overall, societal level, class identity remains a primarily unidimensional concept both in its structural origins and its relationship with politics.

Reality bites: An analysis of corona deniers in Germany over time

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in unprecedented government interventions in many people's lives. Opposition to these measures was not only based on policy disagreements but for some founded in an outright denial of basic facts surrounding the pandemic, challenging social cohesion. Conspiracy beliefs have been prolific within various protest groups and require attention, as such attitudes have been shown to be associated with lower rule compliance. Several studies have shown that the characteristics linked to holding COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs are complex and manifold; however, those insights usually rest on cross-sectional studies only. We have less knowledge on whether these cross-sectional correlates also reveal which parts of the population have been newly convinced by conspiracy theories or have dropped their support for them as the pandemic evolved. Using a unique panel data set from Germany, this paper explores a wide range of characteristics and compares the insights gained from cross-sectional associations on the one hand and links to the ways in which people change their views on the other hand. The findings show that cross-sectional analyses miss out on nuanced differences between different groups of temporary and more consistent conspiracy supporters. Specifically, this paper identifies major differences in the profiles of people who have been denying COVID-19 consistently compared to those who changed their minds on the question and those who assessed the reality correctly throughout. In doing so, socio-political and perception-based dimensions are differentiated and distinctions between respondents from East and West Germany explored.

COVID-19-related anxieties do not decrease support for liberal democracy

The COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer-term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID-19-specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID-19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania - two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear - a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID-19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right-wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID-19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand-side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.

Experimental and cross-cultural evidence that parenthood and parental care motives increase social conservatism

Differences in attitudes on social issues such as abortion, immigration and sex are hugely divisive, and understanding their origins is among the most important tasks facing human behavioural sciences. Despite the clear psychological importance of parenthood and the motivation to provide care for children, researchers have only recently begun investigating their influence on social and political attitudes. Because socially conservative values ostensibly prioritize safety, stability and family values, we hypothesized that being more invested in parental care might make socially conservative policies more appealing. Studies 1 (preregistered; n = 376) and 2 (n = 1924) find novel evidence of conditional experimental effects of a parenthood prime, such that people who engaged strongly with a childcare manipulation showed an increase in social conservatism. Studies 3 (n = 2610, novel data from 10 countries) and 4 (n = 426 444, World Values Survey data) find evidence that both parenthood and parental care motivation are associated with increased social conservatism around the globe. Further, most of the positive association globally between age and social conservatism is accounted for by parenthood. These findings support the hypothesis that parenthood and parental care motivation increase social conservatism.

Solar Panels and Political Attitudes

In the fight against climate change, renewable energy has been subsidised in many countries. With the costs passed onto consumers, governments are paying those, for example, who instal domestic solar panels on top of their homes and feed electricity back into the system at preferential rates. We know that substantial amounts of income flow into households with solar installations as a result, but we do not know much about the political consequences of these programmes. Similar government programmes are known to have resource and interpretative effects on participants, leading to changes in their attitudes. Drawing on three longitudinal surveys from Germany, United Kingdom, and Switzerland, this article analyses whether installation of these solar panels causes meaningful changes in households' various political attitudes. Using fixed-effect models as the identification strategy, the article reports null results - solar installations do not seem to generate political attitudes. This is good as well as bad news for actors looking to increase the amount of renewable energy produced through solar installations.

The Two Faces of Support for Redistribution in Colombia: Taxing the Wealthy or Assisting People in Need

Support for redistribution is crucial for reducing economic inequality. Despite people's desire for reducing extreme inequalities, they still have mixed opinions regarding how to do so. The aim of the article is to examine the underlying latent dimensions of support for redistribution and test its correlates to perceptions of and attitudes toward inequality. In two studies, we found that support for redistribution can be modeled as a latent construct depicting two different dimensions: one focused on taxing the wealthy and changing the income distribution schema, and other focused on assisting people in need and providing opportunities. We also found that the dimension related to taxing the wealthy (vs. assisting people in need) displayed higher internal reliability and correlated consistently with perceptions and attitudes toward inequality: the higher the support for taxing the wealthy, the higher the perceptions and concerns of inequality, and the lower the inequality-justifying ideologies. This research unveils distinct underlying dimensions of support for redistribution that shed light on different motivations that drive people's redistributive preferences.

Mapping Political Trust and Involvement in the Personality Space - A Meta-Analysis and New Evidence

OBJECTIVE

Relations between the Big Five personality dispositions and individual differences in political trust and involvement in politics have been investigated in many studies. We aimed to systematically integrate these findings and further explore the correlations at different hierarchical levels of the Big Five and political trust and involvement.

METHOD

We conducted a meta-analysis of 43 publications (N₁ = 207,360 participants) and estimated latent correlations at different hierarchical levels using two additional samples (N₂ = 988 and N₃ = 795).

RESULTS

The meta-analysis revealed substantial correlations between involvement and openness (+), extraversion (+), and neuroticism (-), but only small correlations between trust and the Big Five. We also found a substantial amount of inconsistency in findings across studies. Our additional analyses showed that (a) correlations with the Big Five were larger for higher-order factors of general political trust (as opposed to subdimensions such as trust in politicians) and general political involvement (as opposed to subdimensions such as political interest) and (b) correlational patterns within each Big Five domain differed across facets.

CONCLUSION

Our analyses indicate that political involvement is more strongly linked to the Big Five than political trust. We discuss the theoretical and empirical relevance of hierarchical constructs.

The Effects of Source Cues and Issue Frames During COVID-19

The health and economic outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic will in part be determined by how effectively experts can communicate information to the public and the degree to which people follow expert recommendation. Using a survey experiment conducted in May 2020 with almost 5,000 respondents, this paper examines the effect of source cues and message frames on perceptions of information credibility in the context of COVID-19. Each health recommendation was framed by expert or nonexpert sources, was fact- or experience-based, and suggested potential gain or loss to test if either the source cue or framing of issues affected responses to the pandemic. We find no evidence that either source cue or message framing influence people’s responses – instead, respondents’ ideological predispositions, media consumption, and age explain much of the variation in survey responses, suggesting that public health messaging may face challenges from growing ideological cleavages in American politics.

Parent Contributions to the Development of Political Attitudes in Adoptive and Biological Families

Where do our political attitudes originate? Although early research attributed the formation of such beliefs to parent and peer socialization, genetically sensitive designs later clarified the substantial role of genes in the development of sociopolitical attitudes. However, it has remained unclear whether parental influence on offspring attitudes persists beyond adolescence. In a unique sample of 394 adoptive and biological families with offspring more than 30 years old, biometric modeling revealed significant evidence for genetic and nongenetic transmission from both parents for the majority of seven political-attitude phenotypes. We found the largest genetic effects for religiousness and social liberalism, whereas the largest influence of parental environment was seen for political orientation and egalitarianism. Together, these findings indicate that genes, environment, and the gene-environment correlation all contribute significantly to sociopolitical attitudes held in adulthood, and the etiology and development of those attitudes may be more important than ever in today's rapidly changing sociopolitical landscape.

Measuring attitudes as a complex system: Structured thinking and support for the Canadian carbon tax

We test a method for applying a network-based approach to the study of political attitudes. We use cognitive-affective mapping, an approach that visually represents attitudes as networks of concepts that an individual associates with a given issue. Using a software tool called Valence, we asked a sample of Canadians (n = 111) to draw a cognitive-affective map (CAM) of their views on the carbon tax. We treat these networks as a series of undirected graphs and examine the extent to which support for the tax can be predicted based on each graph's emotional and structural properties. We find evidence that the emotional but not the structural properties significantly predict individuals' attitudes toward the carbon tax. We also find associations between CAMs' structural properties (density and centrality) and several measures of political interest. Our results provide preliminary evidence for the efficacy of CAMs as a tool for studying political attitudes. The study data are available at https://osf.io/qwpvd/?view_only=6834a1c442224e72bf45e7641880a17f.

Were Americans' Political Attitudes Linked to Objective Threats From COVID-19? An Examination of Data From Project Implicit During Initial Months of the Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has created objectively threatening situations in everyday life (e.g., unemployment, risk of infection), and researchers have begun to ask whether threats from the pandemic are linked to people's political attitudes. However, scholars currently lack a systematic answer to this question. Here, we examined whether objective COVID-19 threats (cases, deaths, and government restrictions) occurring over the initial months of the pandemic (February-June 2020) were associated with seven different assessments of political attitudes among Project Implicit users in the United States (N = 34,581). We did not consistently observe meaningful associations between COVID-19 threats and political attitudes. The lack of consistent meaningful associations emerged regardless of the level of analysis (country, state, and county) or participant's self-identified ideology. Collectively, these findings failed to find evidence that political attitudes were tied to COVID-19 threats in a meaningful way during the initial months of the pandemic.

Male descendant kin promote conservative views on gender issues and conformity to traditional norms

Political and social attitudes have been shown to differ by sex in a way that tracks individual self-interest. We propose that these attitudes also change strategically to serve the best interests of either male or female kin. To test this hypothesis, we developed a measure of gendered fitness interests (GFI) - an index which reflects the sex, relatedness and residual reproductive value of close kin. We predicted that people with male-biased GFI (i.e. people with more male kin of a reproductive age) would have more conservative attitudes towards gender-related issues (e.g. gender roles, women's rights, abortion rights). An online study using an American sample (N = 560) found support for this hypothesis. Further analyses revealed that this relationship was driven not only by people's own sex and reproductive value but also by those of their descendant kin. Exploratory analyses also found a positive association between male-biased GFI and a measure of conformity, as well as a smaller association between male-biased GFI and having voted Republican in the last election. Both of these associations were statistically mediated by gender-related conservatism. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that GFI influences sociopolitical attitudes.

Why People Hate Congress but Love Their Own Congressperson: An Information Processing Explanation

Citizens in Western democracies often have negative attitudes toward political bodies, yet consistently re-elect their own representatives to these same political bodies. They hate Congress, but love their own congressperson. In contrast to resource-based explanations, we propose that this Paradox of Congressional Support is partly due to the wide availability of negative information about politicians in open societies combined with basic processes of information processing. Five studies found that unrelated negative political information decreases attitudes toward political categories such as U.S. governors but has no effect on attitudes of familiar, individual politicians (e.g., one's own governor); additional studies further identify familiarity as the critical process. Importantly, we demonstrate that this effect generalizes to all U.S. regions and remains when controlling for and is not moderated by political ideology. These results place a presumed macrolevel political paradox within the domain of cognitive mechanisms of basic information processing.

Different Populations Agree on Which Moral Arguments Underlie Which Opinions

People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.

Social penumbras predict political attitudes

To explain the political clout of different social groups, traditional accounts typically focus on the group's size, resources, or commonality and intensity of its members' interests. We contend that a group's penumbra-the set of individuals who are personally familiar with people in that group-is another important explanatory factor that merits systematic analysis. To this end, we designed a panel study that allows us to learn about the characteristics of the penumbras of politically relevant groups such as gay people, the unemployed, or recent immigrants. Our study reveals major and systematic differences in the penumbras of various social groups, even ones of similar size. Moreover, we find evidence that entering a group's penumbra is associated with a change in attitude on group-related policy questions. Taken together, our findings suggest that penumbras are pertinent for understanding variation in the political standing of different groups in society.

Hegemonic masculinity predicts 2016 and 2020 voting and candidate evaluations

Donald J. Trump’s history-making ascension from nonpolitician to president of the United States has been attributed to the antiestablishment, antielitist, and nativist populism of Trump voters, as well as to sexism, racism, homophobia, and xenophobia. Based on the findings of seven studies involving 2,007 people, men’s and women’s endorsement of hegemonic masculinity predicted support for Trump over and beyond the aforementioned factors, even when controlling for political party affiliation. Results highlight the importance of looking beyond social identity–based conceptualizations of masculinity to fully consider how men’s and women’s endorsement of cultural ideologies about masculinity legitimate patriarchal forms of dominance and reify gender-, race-, and class-based hierarchies.

This work examined whether the endorsement of the culturally idealized form of masculinity—hegemonic masculinity (HM)—accounted for unique variance in men’s and women’s support for Donald Trump across seven studies (n = 2,007). Consistent with our theoretical backdrop, in the days (Studies 1 and 2) and months (Studies 3 through 6) following the 2016 American presidential election, women’s and men’s endorsement of HM predicted voting for and evaluations of Trump, over and above political party affiliation, gender, race, and education. These effects held when controlling for respondents’ trust in the government, in contrast to a populist explanation of support for Trump. In addition, as conceptualized, HM was associated with less trust in the government (Study 3), more sexism (Study 4), more racism (Study 5), and more xenophobia (Study 6) but continued to predict unique variance in evaluations of Trump when controlling for each of these factors. Whereas HM predicted evaluations of Trump, across studies, social and prejudiced attitudes predicted evaluations of his democratic challengers: Clinton in 2016 and Biden in 2020. We replicate the findings of Studies 1 through 6 using a nationally representative sample of the United States (Study 7) 50 days prior to the 2020 presidential election. The findings highlight the importance of psychological examinations of masculinity as a cultural ideology to understand how men’s and women’s endorsement of HM legitimizes patriarchal dominance and reinforces gender, race, and class-based hierarchies via candidate support.

Exploring the Effect of Cooperation in Reducing Implicit Racial Bias and Its Relationship With Dispositional Empathy and Political Attitudes

Previous research using immersive virtual reality (VR) has shown that after a short period of embodiment by White people in a Black virtual body, their implicit racial bias against Black people diminishes. Here we tested the effects of some socio-cognitive variables that could contribute to enhancing or reducing the implicit racial bias. The first aim of the study was to assess the beneficial effects of cooperation within a VR scenario, the second aim was to provide preliminary testing of the hypothesis that empathy and political attitudes could contribute to implicit bias about race, while the third aim was to explore the relationship between political attitudes and empathy. We had (Caucasian) participants embodied in a Black virtual body and engaged either in a cooperative (Coop group) or in a non-cooperative (Neutral group) activity with a confederate experimenter embodying another Black avatar. Before and after VR, we measured participants’ implicit racial bias by means of Implicit Association Test (IAT) and their perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter. Before VR we also assessed participants’ political attitudes and empathy traits. Results revealed that, as compared to the Neutral group, the Coop group showed lower IAT scores after the social interaction. Interestingly, in the Neutral but not the Coop group the perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter was associated with the initial racial bias: the more the participants reduced their distance, the more they reduced their IAT score. Moreover, reported traits of empathy and political attitudes significantly explained the variance observed in the initial implicit bias, with perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress being significant predictors of the IAT scores. Finally, there was a relationship between political attitudes and empathy: the more participants considered themselves as left-wing voters, the higher their perspective-taking and empathic concern scores. We discuss these findings within the neuroscientific and social cognition field and encourage scholars from different domains to further explore whether and under which conditions a given manipulation for reducing racial bias could be efficiently transposed in VR.

Precarious Manhood Predicts Support for Aggressive Policies and Politicians

Precarious manhood (PM) theory posits that males are expected to actively maintain their reputations as "real men." We propose that men's concern about failing to meet masculine standards leads them to embrace policies and politicians that signal strength and toughness-or what we term political aggression. Three correlational studies support this claim. In Study 1, men's fear of failing to meet masculine expectations predicted their support for aggressive policies (e.g., the death penalty), but not policies lacking aggressive features (e.g., affirmative action). Studies 2 and 3 utilized Google searches to assess the relationship between regional levels of PM and real-world electoral behavior. The use of search terms related to masculine anxieties correlated with Donald Trump's vote share in the 2016 general election (Study 2) and, confirming preregistered predictions, with Republican candidates' vote shares in 2018 congressional elections (Study 3). We close by discussing potential sources of variation in PM.

Ideology before party: Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism temporally precede political party support

Although an extensive literature on political ideology and party support has developed, studies examining the temporal ordering of these variables remain lacking. We address this oversight and argue that because ideologies provide a framework for understanding the world, they should forecast changes in party support over time. Accordingly, a random intercepts cross-lagged panel model estimated the annual within-person associations between social dominance orientation (SDO), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and party support in nine waves of a New Zealand representative longitudinal panel sample from 2009 to 2017 (N = 31,537). As hypothesized, SDO and RWA predicted within-person increases in support for the centre-right National Party, but decreases in support for the centre-left Labour Party. Reciprocal associations from party support to ideology were approximately half the magnitude. These results provide some of the most robust evidence to date of the oft-assumed, but largely untested, premise that SDO and RWA predict change in party support.

Correlations between social dominance orientation and political attitudes reflect common genetic underpinnings

Deciphering the underlying psychology of societal attitudes and prejudices is important in times of political unpredictability. We focus on the foundational construct of preference for (or against) hierarchies between groups, as reflected in the 2 subdimensions of social dominance orientation (SDO). Studying SDO with a large-sample twin design, we show that both its sub-dimensions are heritable, share common genetic influences, and overlap genetically with 6 political attitudes that serve to enhance versus attenuate societal hierarchy. This suggests that desire for versus opposition to intergroup hierarchy, in abstract and concrete forms, constitutes a genetically-grounded behavioral syndrome, thus explaining an important part of the long-observed association among political views of various kinds.

A foundational question in the social sciences concerns the interplay of underlying causes in the formation of people’s political beliefs and prejudices. What role, if any, do genes, environmental influences, or personality dispositions play? Social dominance orientation (SDO), an influential index of people’s general attitudes toward intergroup hierarchy, correlates robustly with political beliefs. SDO consists of the subdimensions SDO-dominance (SDO-D), which is the desire people have for some groups to be actively oppressed by others, and SDO-egalitarianism (SDO-E), a preference for intergroup inequality. Using a twin design (n = 1,987), we investigate whether the desire for intergroup dominance and inequality makes up a genetically grounded behavioral syndrome. Specifically, we investigate the heritability of SDO, in addition to whether it genetically correlates with support for political policies concerning the distribution of power and resources to different social groups. In addition to moderate heritability estimates for SDO-D and SDO-E (37% and 24%, respectively), we find that the genetic correlation between these subdimensions and political attitudes was overall high (mean genetic correlation 0.51), while the environmental correlation was very low (mean environmental correlation 0.08). This suggests that the relationship between political attitudes and SDO-D and SDO-E is grounded in common genetics, such that the desire for (versus opposition to) intergroup inequality and support for political attitudes that serve to enhance (versus attenuate) societal disparities form convergent strategies for navigating group-based dominance hierarchies.

Economic Attitudes, Social Attitudes and Their Psychological Underpinnings - A Study of the Finnish Political Elite

We investigated the relation between economic and social attitudes and the psychological underpinnings of these attitudes in candidates (N = 9515) in the Finnish 2017 municipal elections. In this politically elite sample, right-wing economic attitudes and social conservatism were positively correlated (r = 0.41), and this correlation was predominantly driven by those on the economic left being socially liberal, and vice versa. In terms of underlying psychological processes, consistent with dual process models of political ideology, the anti-egalitarian aspect of social dominance orientation was more strongly associated with right-wing economic attitudes, and the conventionalism and aggression aspects of right-wing authoritarianism with social conservatism. Our results show that even in a non-United States context in which the masses organize their political attitudes on two independent dimensions, these dimensions are moderately aligned among certain parts of the political elite, and that the political attitudes of the political elite can be traced to underlying psychological motivations. We argue that equality concerns could play a role in explaining why the left-right and liberal-conservative dimensions are more strongly aligned among those on the left and those more liberal.

Attitudes Toward Abortion After Receiving vs. Being Denied an Abortion in the USA

U.S. public attitudes toward abortion have been studied extensively, but little is known about these attitudes among women who seek abortion. This mixed-methods study explores women's attitudes about abortion after receiving or being denied an abortion. Data are from the Turnaway Study, a prospective, longitudinal study of women seeking abortions at 30 U.S. facilities. Participants presented just before a facility's gestational limit and received abortions, or just beyond the limit and were denied abortions. Using mixed effects logistic regression, we assessed 812 participants' attitudes about abortion over four years. At five years after abortion-seeking, we conducted in-depth interviews with 31 participants; this analysis includes the comments of 19 participants who discussed their abortion attitudes in those interviews. We find that six months after abortion-seeking, nearly all women supported abortion legality in all (80%) or some (18%) situations, yet 20% also believed abortion is morally wrong. Women denied an abortion were significantly less likely to support the legal right to abortion at six months (62%) and 4.5 years (77%) after abortion-seeking than women who had received a near-limit abortion (78% and 88%, respectively). In open-ended interviews, women expressed nuanced views, including reporting increased empathy for others facing an unwanted pregnancy. Women's own reproductive experiences impact their views on abortion. Distinguishing between morality and legality of abortion is critical in understanding abortion attitudes.

Does truth matter to voters? The effects of correcting political misinformation in an Australian sample

In the 'post-truth era', political fact-checking has become an issue of considerable significance. A recent study in the context of the 2016 US election found that fact-checks of statements by Donald Trump changed participants' beliefs about those statements-regardless of whether participants supported Trump-but not their feelings towards Trump or voting intentions. However, the study balanced corrections of inaccurate statements with an equal number of affirmations of accurate statements. Therefore, the null effect of fact-checks on participants' voting intentions and feelings may have arisen because of this artificially created balance. Moreover, Trump's statements were not contrasted with statements from an opposing politician, and Trump's perceived veracity was not measured. The present study (N = 370) examined the issue further, manipulating the ratio of corrections to affirmations, and using Australian politicians (and Australian participants) from both sides of the political spectrum. We hypothesized that fact-checks would correct beliefs and that fact-checks would affect voters' support (i.e. voting intentions, feelings and perceptions of veracity), but only when corrections outnumbered affirmations. Both hypotheses were supported, suggesting that a politician's veracity does sometimes matter to voters. The effects of fact-checking were similar on both sides of the political spectrum, suggesting little motivated reasoning in the processing of fact-checks.

Political attitudes as predictors of the multiple dimensions of mental health stigma

BACKGROUND

Mental health (MH) stigma is multidimensional and remains common in the United States and throughout the world. While sociopolitical attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) have emerged as strong predictors of some aspects of MH stigma, no study has assessed the relationship between RWA and multidimensional components of MH stigma, or linked this relationship to a theory of stigma.

AIMS

The association between RWA and multiple stigma outcomes, including stereotypes, attributions/negative affect, social distance, microaggressions and help-seeking self-stigma was assessed controlling for covariates, including education, age, social desirability, race/ethnicity, gender, geographic location and prior contact with mental illness.

METHOD

A total of 518 US residents (from all geographic regions; convenience sample) completed an online survey.

RESULTS

Findings indicated that RWA was significantly associated with all MH stigma dimensions analyzed, even after controlling for covariates. A hypothesized mediator for this relationship, dangerous world beliefs, was not supported as a theoretical explanation.

CONCLUSION

Right-wing authoritarianism predicts various dimensions of mental health stigma, but more research is needed to determine the theoretical underpinnings. These current findings may guide research in this area and be used to target a variety of conservative audiences for stigma reduction.

Sociodemographic Predictors of Sex Offender Stigma: How Politics Impact Attitudes, Social Distance, and Perceptions of Sex Offender Recidivism

Stigma toward general criminal offenders has been found to be particularly salient among community members who identify as politically conservative; however, less is known about how political identification relates to stigma toward sex offenders. This is a particularly important area of inquiry, given that criminal jurisprudence and politics legitimatize stigmatizing labels attributed to sex offenders through laws and policies that apply specifically to this group. A nonrandom sample ( N = 518) of participants living in the United States was recruited for this survey study. Findings indicated that a specific aspect of conservative political ideology-right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)-significantly predicts negative attitudes and intended social distancing behavior toward sex offenders, even when controlling for other important predictors, such as education and prior contact. RWA was found to be the strongest predictor of negative attitudes and estimations of sex offender recidivism, and also significantly predicted intended social distancing behavior. Implications for addressing stigma toward sex offenders are discussed.

Genetic and environmental influences on sociopolitical attitudes

A new paradigm has emerged in which both genetic and environmental factors are cited as possible influences on sociopolitical attitudes. Despite the increasing acceptance of this paradigm, several aspects of the approach remain underdeveloped. Specifically, limitations arise from a reliance on a twins-only design, and all previous studies have used self-reports only. There are also questions about the extent to which existing findings generalize cross-culturally. To address those issues, this study examined individual differences in liberalism/conservatism in a German sample that included twins, their parents, and their spouses and incorporated both self- and peer reports. The self-report findings from this extended twin family design were largely consistent with previous research that used that rater perspective, but they provided higher estimates of heritability, shared parental environmental influences, assortative mating, and genotype-environment correlation than the results from peer reports. The implications of these findings for the measurement and understanding of sociopolitical attitudes are explored.

How Is Existential Threat Related to Intergroup Conflict? Introducing the Multidimensional Existential Threat (MET) Model

Existential threat lies at the heart of intergroup conflict, but the literature on existential concerns lacks clear conceptualization and integration. To address this problem, we offer a new conceptualization and measurement of existential threat. We establish the reliability and validity of our measure, and to illustrate its utility, we examine whether different existential threats underlie the association between political ideology and support for specific political policies. Study 1 (N = 798) established the construct validity of the scale, and revealed four distinct existential threats: personal death (PD), physical collective annihilation (PA), symbolic collective annihilation (SA), and past victimization (PV). Study 2 (N = 424) confirmed the 4-factor structure, and the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale. Study 3 (N = 170) revealed that the association between a hawkish political ideology and support for hardline policies was mediated by PV, whereas the association between a dovish political ideology and conciliatory policies was mediated by concerns over collective symbolic annihilation. Study 4 (N = 503) conceptually replicated the pattern of findings found in Study 3, and showed that at times of conflict, PA concerns also mediate the relationship between hawkish ideologies and support for hardline policies. In both Studies 3 and 4, when controlling for other threats, PD did not play a significant role. These results underscore the need to consider the multidimensional nature of existential threat, especially in the context of political conflict.

Attitudes toward Regulations of Reproductive Care in the European Union: A Comparison between Travellers for Cross-Border Reproductive Care and Citizens of the Local Country

This paper compares two populations with respect to attitudes toward the regulation of reproductive care by the European Union. The two populations are 252 individuals who crossed a national border to receive treatment at an independent clinic in Spain and 45 Spanish citizens who received treatment in their home country. Online surveys were sent to former patients (from many different countries) of a private Spanish clinic. By comparing those who engaged in cross-border reproductive care (CBRC) with those who did not, we examined attitudes toward whether or not the EU should extend to all clients in all countries the type of services the clinic provided. These services included access to anonymous donors and conception via egg or embryo donation. We found that those who travelled abroad were less in favor of EU expanding regulation for the type of services they received than were those in Spain. This study is unusual in focusing on political attitudes rather than the nature of the experience and consequences of cross-border reproductive care. We suggest that individuals who engage in CBRC might be reluctant to see the EU extend reproductive care broadly because debates within both the EU and their home countries could result in the elimination of options that are now available through travel. We suggest that individuals from countries that are popular destinations for CBRC like Spain might want to extend EU reproductive care more broadly so as to reduce the pressure on the medical services in their own country. We suggest directions for further research.

Infections and Elections: Did an Ebola Outbreak Influence the 2014 U.S. Federal Elections (and if so, How)?

In the studies reported here, we conducted longitudinal analyses of preelection polling data to test whether an Ebola outbreak predicted voting intentions preceding the 2014 U.S. federal elections. Analyses were conducted on nationwide polls pertaining to 435 House of Representatives elections and on state-specific polls pertaining to 34 Senate elections. Analyses compared voting intentions before and after the initial Ebola outbreak and assessed correlations between Internet search activity for the term "Ebola" and voting intentions. Results revealed that (a) the psychological salience of Ebola was associated with increased intention to vote for Republican candidates and (b) this effect occurred primarily in states characterized by norms favoring Republican Party candidates (the effect did not occur in states with norms favoring Democratic Party candidates). Ancillary analyses addressed several interpretational issues. Overall, these results suggest that disease outbreaks may influence voter behavior in two psychologically distinct ways: increased inclination to vote for politically conservative candidates and increased inclination to conform to popular opinion.

Managing the terror of a dangerous world: Political attitudes as predictors of mental health stigma

BACKGROUND

Previous research has associated self-reported political conservatism to mental health stigma. Although the limitations of self-reported political attitudes are well documented, no study has evaluated this relationship from a more nuanced perspective of sociopolitical identity.

AIMS

To assess the relationship between political attitudes and mental health stigma (i.e. negative stereotypes and intended social distance), particularly from a standpoint of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)--a more specific measure of political conservatism.

METHOD

A sample of 505 New York State residents completed an online survey.

RESULTS

The results of this study indicated significant relationships between endorsements of self-reported conservatism and RWA to negative stereotypes and social distance in relation to mental illness. Individuals with 'High RWA' were more likely to see individuals with mental illness as dangerous and unpredictable, and less willing to want to socially associate with individuals with mental illness. These results remained statistically significant even when controlling for other factors that consistently predict mental health stigma. Negative stereotypes also partially mediated individuals with RWA's significant relationship to social distance.

CONCLUSION

Characteristics of political conservatives and right-wing authoritarians (e.g. threat-aversion, personal responsibility) are predictive of mental health stigma. Terror Management Theory may also help to explain this phenomenon.

Life at Both Ends of the Ladder: Education-Based Identification and Its Association With Well-Being and Social Attitudes

Level of formal education is an important divide in contemporary societies; it is positively related to health, well-being, and social attitudes such as tolerance for minorities and interest in politics. We investigated whether education-based identification is a common underlying factor of these education effects. Indeed, education-based identification was stronger among the higher educated, especially for identification aspects that encompass education-based group esteem (i.e., the belief that one’s educational group is worthy and that others think so, too). Furthermore, while group esteem had beneficial effects across educational levels, aspects of identification that were unrelated to group esteem had positive effects for the higher educated but not for the less educated. Thus, the less educated do not benefit from the psychologically nourishing effect of identification that exists for other groups. The stigma and responsibility related to low education could be a common explanation for a wide range of outcomes.

Is the political animal politically ignorant? Applying evolutionary psychology to the study of political attitudes

As evidenced by research in evolutionary psychology, humans have evolved sophisticated psychological mechanisms tailored to solve enduring adaptive problems of social life. Many of these social problems are political in nature and relate to the distribution of costs and benefits within and between groups. In that sense, evolutionary psychology suggests that humans are, by nature, political animals. By implication, a straightforward application of evolutionary psychology to the study of public opinion seems to entail that modern individuals find politics intrinsically interesting. Yet, as documented by more than fifty years of research in political science, people lack knowledge of basic features of the political process and the ability to form consistent political attitudes. By reviewing and integrating research in evolutionary psychology and public opinion, we describe (1) why modern mass politics often fail to activate evolved mechanisms and (2) the conditions in which these mechanisms are in fact triggered.

A step into the anarchist's mind: examining political attitudes and ideology through event-related brain potentials

The present study investigates patterns of event-related brain potentials following the presentation of attitudinal stimuli among political moderates (N=12) and anarchists (N=11). We used a modified oddball paradigm to investigate the evaluative inconsistency effect elicited by stimuli embedded in a sequence of contextual stimuli with an opposite valence. Increased late positive potentials (LPPs) of extreme political attitudes were observed. Moreover, this LPP enhancement was larger among anarchists than among moderates, indicating that an extreme political attitude of a moderate differs from an extreme political attitude of an anarchist. The discussion elaborates on the meaning of attitude extremity for moderates and extremists.

Protestant Clergy and the Culture Wats: An Empirical Test of Hunter's Thesis

This study instead focuses on culture wars among religious elites-clergy-and tests three aspects of the culture wars thesis: (1) whether cultural wars exist at all among religious elites, (2) whether clergy attitudes are polarized on these issues, and (3) whether religious authority or religious affiliation is more salient in creating culture wars cleavages. Using data from a large random sample of Protestant clergy, we find a substantial amount of engagement in culture wars by all types of Protestant clergy. The amount of polarization is more attributable to views of religious authority (i.e., biblical inerrancy) than to religious tradition. Moreover, polarization among clergy is somewhat more evident on culture wars issues than on other social and political issues. These findings are generally supportive of the culture wars thesis and should help return examinations of culture wars back to where they were originally theorized to be waged: among elites.

Extending the the behavioral immune system to political psychology: are political conservatism and disgust sensitivity really related?

Previous research suggests that several individual and cultural level attitudes, cognitions, and societal structures may have evolved to mitigate the pathogen threats posed by intergroup interactions. It has been suggested that these anti-pathogen defenses are at the root of conservative political ideology. Here, we test a hypothesis that political conservatism functions as a pathogen-avoidance strategy. Across three studies, we consistently find no relationship between sensitivity to pathogen disgust and multiple measures of political conservatism. These results are contrasted with theoretical perspectives suggesting a relationship between conservatism and pathogen avoidance, and with previous findings of a relationship between conservatism and disgust sensitivity.