Defining "recklessness" in research misconduct proceedings

To find research misconduct in research that has been supported by federal funds, an institution must determine that the misconduct was committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. "Intentional" and "knowing" are straightforward standards. Yet "reckless" often mystifies institutions, which struggle to assess whether a respondent's conduct should be deemed "reckless," or merely negligent. This difficulty is most pronounced when allegations are lodged against the author under whose supervision the primary research was conducted - most often, the senior and/or corresponding author of a published paper who may not have been directly involved in performing the experiments or preparing the data under scrutiny. In these situations, investigation committees and the institutional "deciding official" must assess whether the supervising scientist is guilty of research misconduct - based on the theory that their supervision of the research and development of the publication containing falsified, fabricated, or plagiarized information was reckless - even if that person did not perform the experiment or assemble the research records in question. This paper seeks to provide a framework for evaluating the circumstances in which past supervisory conduct should be deemed "reckless" and thus a basis on which a finding of research misconduct may be made.

The Doctrine of Double Effect and Potential Criminal Liability of Medical Practitioners in Australia

Recent parliamentary inquiries into end-of-life choices identify the need to provide legal certainty for health practitioners working in end-of-life care. A concern identified is the lack of clarity surrounding the operation, status and application of the doctrine of double effect. This discussion clarifies these concerns. Although the doctrine is judicially recognised in several overseas jurisdictions, in Australia the doctrine of precedent means that it does not form part of the common law. In most jurisdictions, the fault element for murder includes recklessness, and application of the doctrine does not avoid criminal liability being established against orthodox criminal law principles. Although the prosecution of a medical practitioner who incidentally causes death in the proper course of medical treatment is a rare event, it remains a live issue. Legislative protection of medical practitioners, as has occurred in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia, is the means to achieve the certainty sought.

Predicting the knowledge-recklessness distinction in the human brain

Criminal convictions require proof that a prohibited act was performed in a statutorily specified mental state. Different legal consequences, including greater punishments, are mandated for those who act in a state of knowledge, compared with a state of recklessness. Existing research, however, suggests people have trouble classifying defendants as knowing, rather than reckless, even when instructed on the relevant legal criteria. We used a machine-learning technique on brain imaging data to predict, with high accuracy, which mental state our participants were in. This predictive ability depended on both the magnitude of the risks and the amount of information about those risks possessed by the participants. Our results provide neural evidence of a detectable difference in the mental state of knowledge in contrast to recklessness and suggest, as a proof of principle, the possibility of inferring from brain data in which legally relevant category a person belongs. Some potential legal implications of this result are discussed.