Safe Food Supply Chain as Health Network: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Behavior Strategy for Quality Investment

There is a natural relation between human health and the quality of their food and drinks, and elevating the quality input level of food production for all enterprises within the food supply chain system forms the foundation for preventing various potential food safety risks that may be encountered. Unlike the previous research on quality investment of food production by enterprises, this paper probes into the evolutionary routes of the behavior strategy selection of subjects in the food supply chain and the preconditions for the equilibrium points of the social co-governance system. It takes the approach of establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model of food suppliers, food manufacturers and consumers on the basis of the social co-governance framework, in view of the above, this paper focuses on the influence of the reputation mechanism and the market contracts among supply chain subjects on the selection of a behavior strategy for quality investment by enterprises under the condition of lawful regulation by government. The results show that every subject selects their own behavior strategy on the basis of the balance of their respective interests. The net disbursement incurred by enterprises for quality investment and the costs of participation in governance by consumers constitute the dominant factors that influence both enterprises' selection of a behavior strategy and the level of social co-governance. Compared with the increase in economic punishment imposed on suppliers for production of risky food raw materials, it is more efficient to control food safety risks by lowering the costs of quality investment by suppliers. Accordingly, this paper proposes advice on policy in an attempt to provide inspiration for preventing and controlling food safety risks.

Evolutionary game analysis of FinTech transformation: A social co-governance pattern of peer-to-peer lending market in China

Benign exit has become the main theme of the transformation in China's peer-to-peer (P2P) lending industry. To protect the interests of investors in the benign exit process, this paper proposes a social co-governance pattern using a tripartite evolutionary game model to capture the behavior strategies of P2P lending platforms, investors, and financial regulators. The results demonstrate that there are four evolutionary stable strategies for the game model, among which the positive disposal of P2P lending platforms, the participation of the investors, and the co-governance policy of financial regulators is the optimal strategy in the benign exit process. The results also show that the initial proportion of P2P lending platforms, investors, and financial regulators would significantly affect the convergence speed of the evolutionary stable strategy. The proposed social co-governance pattern would effectively safeguard the interests of investors if incentive, penalty, and reputation mechanisms are well-designed. This paper provides in-depth implications for protecting investors' interests in the transformation of the P2P lending industry and enhancing the sustainable development of the FinTech industry.

Enterprise Food Fraud in China: Key Factors Identification From Social Co-governance Perspective

Food fraud not only exacerbates human public health risks but also threatens the business development of food and related industries. Therefore, how to curb food fraud effectively becomes a crucial issue for governments, industries, and consumers. Previous studies have demonstrated that enterprise food fraud is subject to joint influences of factor at various hierarchical levels within a complex system of stakeholders. To address enterprise food fraud, it is necessary to identify the key such factors and elucidate the functional mechanisms, as well as systematic analysis of the interrelationships among clusters and factors. Hence, we grounded on a social co-governance perspective and investigated the food fraud key influencing factors and their interrelationships in an emerging food market – China, by using the DEMATEL-based analytic network process (DANP). Results showed that the identified key cluster was government regulation, social governance, and detection techniques. Four other key factors were also identified, including government regulatory capability and penalty intensity, expected economic benefits, maturity of market reputation mechanism, and transparency of supply chain. Policy implications from the social co-governance perspective for China and similar economies are discussed finally.

Psychological Capital in Food Safety Social Co-governance

Social co-governance of food safety is an advocacy model to deal with current global food safety risks. Food safety co-governance involves the collaboration and partnership of government, industry, and society. The success of this collaboration is dependent on the construct of positive psychological capital. This paper discusses the concept of psychological capital and its four elements of self-efficacy, optimism, hope, and resiliency in line with co-governance in food safety. Accordingly, the paper proposes that great success in food safety co-governance would be realized if the government, industry, and society nurture positive psychological capital. Psychological capital can help corporates to instill organizational commitment on employees, thus promote food safety. Furthermore, positive psychological capital can help the government to appeal to the emotions of food companies and social actors to ensure self-efficacy toward food safety. The government can inspire hope by setting food safety goals and plans to achieve them, and a reward program will motivate food companies and promote self-efficacy in co-governance efforts. The government can also reinforce the efforts of companies in leveraging the elements of PsyCap in food safety, since the production of high-quality food is also dependent on the behaviors and attitudes of the workforce. Furthermore, the government can utilize social persuasion to improve the engagement of social actors in food safety regulations.