Automatic processing of emotional images and psychopathic personality traits

Psychopathy is associated with a deficit in affective processes and might be reflected in the inability to extract the emotional content of a stimulus. Across two experiments, we measured the interference effect from emotional images that were irrelevant to the processing of simultaneous target stimuli and examined if this interference was moderated by psychometrically defined traits of psychopathy. In Experiment 1, we showed this emotional distraction effect was reduced as a function of psychopathic traits related to cold-heartedness and occurred for both positively- and negatively-valenced images. Experiment 2 attempted to test the automaticity of the effects by presenting the emotional stimuli briefly so that the emotion was difficult to report. Again, high visibility images produced strong effects that were moderated by the cold-heatedness/meanness traits of psychopathy, but the low-visibility images did not evoke the emotional distractor effect. Our results strongly support the notion that psychopathic traits related to cold-heartedness/meanness are associated with an inability to automatically process the emotional content of images.

A window of subliminal perception

Under labels such as unconscious processing and subliminal perception, identification of stimuli falling below the subjective threshold (whether truly unconscious or not) has been found remarkably accurate in some experiments while completely at chance in others. Here, we first identify that an apparent window of subliminal perception arises in humans under specific stimulus conditions using different experimental paradigms and analysis methods. We then show that the standard signal detection theory (SDT) model is unable to account for this window and extend it until it is. We finally compare a range of models on empirical data. The models performing best are notable for their absence of hierarchical levels, indicating that the window could be a base property of any phenomenally conscious system. The models explain previously incompatible findings in the literature, and they allow for estimations of peaks in subthreshold perception across the spectrum of stimulus saliency, which may be used in further studies of subliminal perception.

Subliminal perception is continuous with conscious vision and can be predicted from prestimulus electroencephalographic activity

Individuals are able to discriminate visual stimuli they report not consciously seeing. This phenomenon is known as "subliminal perception." Such capacity is often assumed to be relatively automatic in nature and rely on stimulus-driven activity in low-level cortical areas. Instead, here we asked to what extent neural activity before stimulus presentation influences subliminal perception. We asked participants to discriminate the location of a briefly presented low-contrast visual stimulus and then rate how well they saw the stimulus. Consistent with previous studies, participants correctly discriminated with slightly above chance-level accuracy the location of a stimulus they reported not seeing. Signal detection analyses indicated that while subjects categorized their percepts as "unconscious," their capacity to discriminate these stimuli lay on the same continuum as conscious vision. We show that the accuracy of discriminating the location of a subliminal stimulus could be predicted with relatively high accuracy (AUC = 0.70) based on lateralized electroencephalographic (EEG) activity before the stimulus, the hemifield where the stimulus was presented, and the accuracy of previous trial's discrimination response. Altogether, our results suggest that rather than being a separate unconscious capacity, subliminal perception is based on similar processes as conscious vision.

Unconscious preparation: Effects of prime visibility on semantic generalization of task priming

Studies found that subliminal primes can be associated with specific tasks to facilitate task performance, and such learning is highly adaptive and generalizable. Meanwhile, conditioning studies suggest that aversive/reward learning and generalization actually occur at the semantic level. The current study shows that prime-task associations can also be generalized to novel word/neighbour primes from the same semantic category, and this occurs without contingency awareness. Previous studies have counterintuitively suggested that both the learning of task priming and the semantic priming of word neighbours depend on the lack of visibility. Here, we show that semantic generalization indeed depends on reduced visibility, but cannot occur subliminally. The current study shows for the first time that semantic learning and generalization can occur without any emotional or motivational factors, and that semantic priming can occur for arbitrary-linked stimuli in a context completely devoid of semantics.

Subliminal Priming-State of the Art and Future Perspectives

The influence of subliminal priming (behavior outside of awareness) in humans is an interesting phenomenon and its understanding is crucial as it can impact behavior, choices, and actions. Given this, research about the impact of priming continues to be an area of investigative interest, and this paper provides a technical overview of research design strengths and issues in subliminal priming research. Efficient experiments and protocols, as well as associated electroencephalographic and eye movement data analyses, are discussed in detail. We highlight the strengths and weaknesses of different priming experiments that have measured affective (emotional) and cognitive responses. Finally, very recent approaches and findings are described to summarize and emphasize state-of-the-art methods and potential future directions in research marketing and other commercial applications.

Why Is 10 Past 10 the Default Setting for Clocks and Watches in Advertisements? A Psychological Experiment

Have you ever noticed that in watch advertisements the time is usually set at 10:10? The reasons and psychological effects of this default time setting are elusive. In Experiment 1, we hypothesized that watches showing a time setting resembling a smiling face (10:10) would enhance emotional valence and intention to buy compared to a neutral time setting (11:30), whereas a time setting resembling a sad face (8:20) would have the opposite effect. Moreover, we investigated a possible interaction effect with the gender of the participants. In Experiment 2, we directly tested the hypotheses that watches set at 10:10 resemble a smiling face, whereas watches set at 8:20 resemble a sad face. The data of the first experiment reveal that watches set at 10:10 showed a significant positive effect on the emotion of the observer and the intention to buy. However, watches set at 8:20 did not show any effect on the emotion or the intention to buy. Moreover, watches set at 10:10 induced in women significantly stronger ratings of pleasure than in men. The data of the second experiment show that participants consistently perceive high resemblance between watches set at 10:10 and a smiling face as well as high resemblance between watches set at 8:20 and a sad face. This study provides for the first time empirical evidence for the notion that using watches with a time setting resembling a smiling face (like 10:10) can positively affect the emotional response of the observers and their evaluation of a seen watch, even though they are not aware of the fact that the shown time setting is inducing this effect. Practical implications of the observed findings and alternative explanations are discussed.

Inhibition of Return Is Modulated by Negative Stimuli: Evidence from Subliminal Perception

Inhibition of return (IOR) is considered as a “blindness mechanism” that emotional stimuli have no impact on it. Most previous studies suggested that IOR was not modulated by emotional cues. However, one key question they ignored was that only supraliminal presentation of emotional stimuli was used in their experiments. The present experiment is aimed at exploring the possible interaction between the IOR effect and subliminal emotional process. We manipulated three different kinds of valence strength of negative stimuli (high negative, HN; moderate negative, MN; low negative, LN) which were presented under the subliminal perception level and an event-related potentials (ERPs) recording was adopted. The results showed that, compared to MN and HN, the IOR effect triggered by peripheral cues was more significant for LN with aspects of behavioral and electrophysiological data (a reduction P1 effect, more negative on cued trials than on uncued trials for both early posterior Nd and Nd components). This indicated that IOR can be modulated by emotionally relevant stimuli. The automatic processing that was triggered by subliminally negative stimuli of peripheral cues had an influence on the shifting of spatial attention that was triggered by IOR. These two mechanisms may occur in the perceptual stage simultaneously.

When Perception Trumps Reality

Is semantic priming driven by the objective or perceived meaning of the priming stimulus? This question is relevant given that many studies suggest that the objective meaning of invisible stimuli can influence cognitive processes and behavior. In an experiment involving 66 participants, we tested how the perceived meaning of misperceived stimuli influenced response times. Stroop priming (i.e., longer response times for incongruent than for congruent prime-target pairs) was observed in trials in which the prime was correctly identified. However, reversed Stroop priming was observed when the prime stimulus was incorrectly identified. Even in trials in which participants reported no perception of the prime and identified the primes at close to chance level (i.e., trials that meet both subjective and objective definitions of being subliminal), Stroop priming corresponded to perceived congruency, not objective congruency. This result suggests that occasional weak percepts and mispercepts are intermixed with no percepts in conditions traditionally claimed to be subliminal, casting doubt on claims of subliminal priming made in previous reports.

Task relevance differentially shapes ventral visual stream sensitivity to visible and invisible faces

Top-down modulations of the visual cortex can be driven by task relevance. Yet, several accounts propose that the perceptual inferences underlying conscious recognition involve similar top-down modulations of sensory responses. Studying the pure impact of task relevance on sensory responses requires dissociating it from the top-down influences underlying conscious recognition. Here, using visual masking to abolish perceptual consciousness in humans, we report that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) responses to invisible faces in the fusiform gyrus are enhanced when they are task-relevant, but suppressed when they are task-irrelevant compared to other object categories. Under conscious perceptual conditions, task-related modulations were also present but drastically reduced, with visible faces always eliciting greater activity in the fusiform gyrus compared to other object categories. Thus, task relevance crucially shapes the sensitivity of fusiform regions to face stimuli, leading from enhancement to suppression of neural activity when the top-down influences accruing from conscious recognition are prevented.

Subliminal perception of complex visual stimuli

Rationale: Unconscious perception of various sensory modalities is an active subject of research though its function and effect on behavior is uncertain. Objective: The present study tried to assess if unconscious visual perception could occur with more complex visual stimuli than previously utilized. Methods and Results: Videos containing slideshows of indifferent complex images with interspersed frames of interest of various durations were presented to 24 healthy volunteers. The perception of the stimulus was evaluated with a forced-choice questionnaire while awareness was quantified by self-assessment with a modified awareness scale annexed to each question with 4 categories of awareness. At values of 16.66 ms of stimulus duration, conscious awareness was not possible and answers regarding the stimulus were random. At 50 ms, nonrandom answers were coupled with no self-reported awareness suggesting unconscious perception of the stimulus. At larger durations of stimulus presentation, significantly correct answers were coupled with a certain conscious awareness. Discussion: At values of 50 ms, unconscious perception is possible even with complex visual stimuli. Further studies are recommended with a focus on a range of interest of stimulus duration between 50 to 16.66 ms.

Unconscious semantic processing of polysemous words is not automatic

Semantic processing of visually presented words can be identified both on behavioral and neurophysiological evidence. One of the major discoveries of the last decades is the demonstration that these signatures of semantic processing, initially observed for consciously perceived words, can also be detected for masked words inaccessible to conscious reports. In this context, the distinction between conscious and unconscious verbal semantic processing constitutes a challenging scientific issue. A prominent view considered that while conscious representations are subject to executive control, unconscious ones would operate automatically in a modular way, independent from control and top-down influences. Recent findings challenged this view by revealing that endogenous attention and task-setting can have a strong influence on unconscious processing. However, one of the major arguments supporting the automaticity of unconscious semantic processing still stands, stemming from a seminal observation reported by Marcel in 1980 about polysemous words. In the present study we reexamined this evidence. We present a combination of behavioral and event-related-potentials (ERPs) results that refute this view by showing that the current conscious semantic context has a major and similar influence on the semantic processing of both visible and masked polysemous words. In a classical lexical decision task, a polysemous word was preceded by a word which defined the current semantic context. Crucially, this context was associated with only one of the two meanings of the polysemous word, and was followed by a word/pseudo-word target. Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence of semantic priming of target words by masked polysemous words was strongly dependent on the conscious context. Moreover, we describe a new type of influence related to the response-code used to answer for target words in the lexical decision task: unconscious semantic priming constrained by the conscious context was present both in behavior and ERPs exclusively when right-handed subjects were instructed to respond to words with their right hand. The strong and respective influences of conscious context and response-code on semantic processing of masked polysemous words demonstrate that unconscious verbal semantic representations are not automatic.

Human observers have optimal introspective access to perceptual processes even for visually masked stimuli

Many believe that humans can 'perceive unconsciously' - that for weak stimuli, briefly presented and masked, above-chance discrimination is possible without awareness. Interestingly, an online survey reveals that most experts in the field recognize the lack of convincing evidence for this phenomenon, and yet they persist in this belief. Using a recently developed bias-free experimental procedure for measuring subjective introspection (confidence), we found no evidence for unconscious perception; participants' behavior matched that of a Bayesian ideal observer, even though the stimuli were visually masked. This surprising finding suggests that the thresholds for subjective awareness and objective discrimination are effectively the same: if objective task performance is above chance, there is likely conscious experience. These findings shed new light on decades-old methodological issues regarding what it takes to consider a neurobiological or behavioral effect to be 'unconscious,' and provide a platform for rigorously investigating unconscious perception in future studies.

Submillisecond unmasked subliminal visual stimuli evoke electrical brain responses

Subliminal perception is strongly associated to the processing of meaningful or emotional information and has mostly been studied using visual masking. In this study, we used high density 256-channel EEG coupled with an liquid crystal display (LCD) tachistoscope to characterize the spatio-temporal dynamics of the brain response to visual checkerboard stimuli (Experiment 1) or blank stimuli (Experiment 2) presented without a mask for 1 ms (visible), 500 µs (partially visible), and 250 µs (subliminal) by applying time-wise, assumption-free nonparametric randomization statistics on the strength and on the topography of high-density scalp-recorded electric field. Stimulus visibility was assessed in a third separate behavioral experiment. Results revealed that unmasked checkerboards presented subliminally for 250 µs evoked weak but detectable visual evoked potential (VEP) responses. When the checkerboards were replaced by blank stimuli, there was no evidence for the presence of an evoked response anymore. Furthermore, the checkerboard VEPs were modulated topographically between 243 and 296 ms post-stimulus onset as a function of stimulus duration, indicative of the engagement of distinct configuration of active brain networks. A distributed electrical source analysis localized this modulation within the right superior parietal lobule near the precuneus. These results show the presence of a brain response to submillisecond unmasked subliminal visual stimuli independently of their emotional saliency or meaningfulness and opens an avenue for new investigations of subliminal stimulation without using visual masking.

A Neural Mechanism for Nonconscious Activation of Conditioned Placebo and Nocebo Responses

Fundamental aspects of human behavior operate outside of conscious awareness. Yet, theories of conditioned responses in humans, such as placebo and nocebo effects on pain, have a strong emphasis on conscious recognition of contextual cues that trigger the response. Here, we investigated the neural pathways involved in nonconscious activation of conditioned pain responses, using functional magnetic resonance imaging in healthy participants. Nonconscious compared with conscious activation of conditioned placebo analgesia was associated with increased activation of the orbitofrontal cortex, a structure with direct connections to affective brain regions and basic reward processing. During nonconscious nocebo, there was increased activation of the thalamus, amygdala, and hippocampus. In contrast to previous assumptions about conditioning in humans, our results show that conditioned pain responses can be elicited independently of conscious awareness and our results suggest a hierarchical activation of neural pathways for nonconscious and conscious conditioned responses. Demonstrating that the human brain has a nonconscious mechanism for responding to conditioned cues has major implications for the role of associative learning in behavioral medicine and psychiatry. Our results may also open up for novel approaches to translational animal-to-human research since human consciousness and animal cognition is an inherent paradox in all behavioral science.

Evidence of weak conscious experiences in the exclusion task

Exclusion tasks have been proposed as objective measures of unconscious perception as they do not depend upon subjective ratings. In exclusion tasks, participants have to complete a task without using a previously presented prime. Use of the prime is taken as evidence for unconscious processing in the absence of awareness, yet it may also simply indicate that participants have weak experiences but fail to realize that these affect the response or fail to counter the effect on the response. Here, we tested this claim by allowing participants to rate their experience of a masked prime on the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) after the exclusion task. Results showed that the prime was used almost as often when participants reported having seen a “weak glimpse” of the prime as when they claimed to have “no experience” of the prime, thus suggesting participants frequently have weak (possibly contentless) experiences of the stimulus when failing to exclude. This indicates that the criteria for report of awareness is lower (i.e., more liberal) than that for exclusion and that failure to exclude should not be taken as evidence of complete absence of awareness.

Elucidating unconscious processing with instrumental hypnosis

Most researchers leverage bottom-up suppression to unlock the underlying mechanisms of unconscious processing. However, a top-down approach - for example via hypnotic suggestion - paves the road to experimental innovation and complementary data that afford new scientific insights concerning attention and the unconscious. Drawing from a reliable taxonomy that differentiates subliminal and preconscious processing, we outline how an experimental trajectory that champions top-down suppression techniques, such as those practiced in hypnosis, is uniquely poised to further contextualize and refine our scientific understanding of unconscious processing. Examining subliminal and preconscious methods, we demonstrate how instrumental hypnosis provides a reliable adjunct that supplements contemporary approaches. Specifically, we provide an integrative synthesis of the advantages and shortcomings that accompany a top-down approach to probe the unconscious mind. Our account provides a larger framework for complementing the results from core studies involving prevailing subliminal and preconscious techniques.

Flexible establishment of functional brain networks supports attentional modulation of unconscious cognition

In classical theories of attention, unconscious automatic processes are thought to be independent of higher-level attentional influences. Here, we propose that unconscious processing depends on attentional enhancement of task-congruent processing pathways implemented by a dynamic modulation of the functional communication between brain regions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we tested our model with a subliminally primed lexical decision task preceded by an induction task preparing either a semantic or a perceptual task set. Subliminal semantic priming was significantly greater after semantic compared to perceptual induction in ventral occipito-temporal (vOT) and inferior frontal cortex, brain areas known to be involved in semantic processing. The functional connectivity pattern of vOT varied depending on the induction task and successfully predicted the magnitude of behavioral and neural priming. Together, these findings support the proposal that dynamic establishment of functional networks by task sets is an important mechanism in the attentional control of unconscious processing.

Nonconscious emotional activation colors first impressions: a regulatory role for conscious awareness

Emotions can color people's attitudes toward unrelated objects in the environment. Existing evidence suggests that such emotional coloring is particularly strong when emotion-triggering information escapes conscious awareness. But is emotional reactivity stronger after nonconscious emotional provocation than after conscious emotional provocation, or does conscious processing specifically change the association between emotional reactivity and evaluations of unrelated objects? In this study, we independently indexed emotional reactivity and coloring as a function of emotional-stimulus awareness to disentangle these accounts. Specifically, we recorded skin-conductance responses to spiders and fearful faces, along with subsequent preferences for novel neutral faces during visually aware and unaware states. Fearful faces increased skin-conductance responses comparably in both stimulus-aware and stimulus-unaware conditions. Yet only when visual awareness was precluded did skin-conductance responses to fearful faces predict decreased likability of neutral faces. These findings suggest a regulatory role for conscious awareness in breaking otherwise automatic associations between physiological reactivity and evaluative emotional responses.

Nonconscious learning from crowded sequences

Can people learn complex information without conscious awareness? Implicit learning-learning without awareness of what has been learned-has been the focus of intense investigation over the last 50 years. However, it remains controversial whether complex knowledge can be learned implicitly. In the research reported here, we addressed this challenge by asking participants to differentiate between sequences of symbols they could not perceive consciously. Using an operant-conditioning task, we showed that participants learned to associate distinct sequences of crowded (nondiscriminable) symbols with their respective monetary outcomes (reward or punishment). Overall, our study demonstrates that sensitivity to sequential regularities can arise through the nonconscious temporal integration of perceptual information.

Invisible emotional expressions influence social judgments and pupillary responses of both depressed and non-depressed individuals

We used filtered low spatial frequency images of facial emotional expressions (angry, fearful, happy, sad, or neutral faces) that were blended with a high-frequency image of the same face but with a neutral facial expression, so as to obtain a “hybrid” face image that “masked” the subjective perception of its emotional expression. Participants were categorized in three groups of participants: healthy control participants (N = 49), recovered previously depressed (N = 79), and currently depressed individuals (N = 36), All participants were asked to rate how friendly the person in the picture looked. Simultaneously we recorded, by use of an infrared eye-tracker, their pupillary responses. We expected that depressed individuals (either currently or previously depressed) would show a negative bias and therefore rate the negative emotional faces, albeit the emotions being invisible, as more negative (i.e., less friendly) than the healthy controls would. Similarly, we expected that depressed individuals would overreact to the negative emotions and that this would result in greater dilations of the pupil's diameter than those shown by controls for the same emotions. Although we observed the expected pattern of effects of the hidden emotions on both ratings and pupillary changes, both responses did not differ significantly among the three groups of participants. The implications of this finding are discussed.

Problems in using d' measures to assess subjective awareness

An accurate method of assessing the awareness to primes is crucial to investigations of subliminal perception. In a recent paper, Vermeiren and Cleeremans (2012) contend that traditional measures of prime detection potentially overestimate awareness to the prime. This can lead to wrongly classifying effects as subliminal, since even when primes are detected at chance level, it could be due to factors other than visibility. Here, I address this and point to another fundamental issue that is inherent to d′ calculations, and has to be considered when using signal detection methods to assess awareness. In subliminal perception studies, unconscious processing of the stimuli is assumed when d′ is not significantly different from zero. However, this is a null finding that leaves open the possibility of there being differences that the statistical test was not sensitive enough to detect. Hence, reported subliminal effects, especially small effects, could have occurred as a consequence of visible trials even when d′ did not significantly differ from chance. Therefore, additional measures such as bootstrapping, which could complement d′ in ensuring that the effects were not a consequence of a small number of trials, should be utilized in future studies.

Executive control over unconscious cognition: attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing

Unconscious priming is a prototypical example of an automatic process, which is initiated without deliberate intention. Classical theories of automaticity assume that such unconscious automatic processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent of executive control mechanisms. In contrast to these classical theories, our attentional sensitization model of unconscious information processing proposes that unconscious processing is susceptible to executive control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. It is assumed that unconscious processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways as a function of task sets. This article provides an overview of the latest research on executive control influences on unconscious information processing. I introduce refined theories of automaticity with a particular focus on the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition which is specifically developed to account for various attentional influences on different types of unconscious information processing. In support of the attentional sensitization model, empirical evidence is reviewed demonstrating executive control influences on unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing: subliminal priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and is influenced by action intentions and task sets. This suggests that even unconscious processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of higher-level executive control settings. I discuss that the assumption of attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing can accommodate conflicting findings regarding the automaticity of processes in many areas of cognition and emotion. This theoretical view has the potential to stimulate future research on executive control of unconscious processing in healthy and clinical populations.

Attentional sensitization of unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.

Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of conscious and unconscious visual perception: From a plethora of phenomena to general principles

Psychological and neuroscience approaches have promoted much progress in elucidating the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie phenomenal visual awareness during the last decades. In this article, we provide an overview of the latest research investigating important phenomena in conscious and unconscious vision. We identify general principles to characterize conscious and unconscious visual perception, which may serve as important building blocks for a unified model to explain the plethora of findings. We argue that in particular the integration of principles from both conscious and unconscious vision is advantageous and provides critical constraints for developing adequate theoretical models. Based on the principles identified in our review, we outline essential components of a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception. We propose that awareness refers to consolidated visual representations, which are accessible to the entire brain and therefore globally available. However, visual awareness not only depends on consolidation within the visual system, but is additionally the result of a post-sensory gating process, which is mediated by higher-level cognitive control mechanisms. We further propose that amplification of visual representations by attentional sensitization is not exclusive to the domain of conscious perception, but also applies to visual stimuli, which remain unconscious. Conscious and unconscious processing modes are highly interdependent with influences in both directions. We therefore argue that exactly this interdependence renders a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception valuable. Computational modeling jointly with focused experimental research could lead to a better understanding of the plethora of empirical phenomena in consciousness research.

Specifying attentional top-down influences on subsequent unconscious semantic processing

Classical theories assume that unconscious automatic processes are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast, we propose that automatic processing depends on a specific configuration of the cognitive system by top-down control. In 2 experiments, we tested the influence of available attentional resources and previously activated task sets on masked semantic priming in a lexical decision task. In Experiment 1, before masked prime presentation, participants were engaged in an easy or hard primary task that differentially afforded attentional resources. Semantic priming was attenuated when the primary task was hard, that is, when only little attentional resources were available. In Experiment 2, a semantic or perceptual induction task differentially modulated subsequent masked semantic priming. Hence, unconscious automatic processing depends on the availability of attentional resources and is susceptible to top-down control.