[An ethical evaluation of presumed consent for organ donation in Switzerland]

Following a current trend in European countries, Switzerland is about to decide to adopt (or reject) a presumed consent legislation for organ donation. In such a system, every citizen is considered as a potential organ donor except in case of expressed refusal during lifetime. The presumed consent system raises ethical and practical issues that need to be carefully understood and weighed before deciding on its fate. This article reviews the most pressing ethical issues and provides the empirical data necessary for assessing the presumed consent legislation in Switzerland. At the end of the analysis, the reader will be able to form her own informed opinion on the issue.

The side effects of deemed consent: changing defaults in organ donation

In this Current Controversy article, I describe and analyse the imminent move to a system of deemed consent for deceased organ donation in England and similar planned changes in Scotland, in light of evidence from Wales, where the system changed in 2015. Although the media has tended to focus on the potential benefits and ethical issues relating to the main change from an opt-in default to an opt-out one, other defaults will also change, while some will remain the same. Interaction of these other defaults with the principal one raise several ethical issues that may complicate efforts to use deemed consent to increase donation rates. Most significantly, changing the main default will have the effect of changing the default for patients' families, who play a vital role in the consent process.

Ethical understandings of proxy decision making for research involving adults lacking capacity: A systematic review (framework synthesis) of empirical research

BACKGROUND

Research involving adults lacking mental capacity relies on the involvement of a proxy or surrogate, although this raises a number of ethical concerns. Empirical studies have examined attitudes towards proxy decision-making, proxies' authority as decision-makers, decision accuracy, and other relevant factors. However, a comprehensive evidence-based account of proxy decision-making is lacking. This systematic review provides a synthesis of the empirical data reporting the ethical issues surrounding decisions made by research proxies, and the development of a conceptual framework of proxy decision-making for research.

METHODS

A systematic review was conducted according to PRISMA guidelines. Databases including MEDLINE, EMBASE, and CINAHL were searched using a combination of search terms, and empirical data from eligible studies were retrieved. The review followed the framework synthesis approach to refine and develop a conceptual framework.

RESULTS

Thirty-four studies were included in the review. Two dimensions of proxy decision-making emerged. The ethical framing criteria of decision-making used by proxies: use of a substituted judgement, use of a best interests approach, combination of substituted judgement and best interests, and 'something else', and the active elements of proxy decision-making: 'knowing the person', patient-proxy relationship, accuracy of the decision, and balancing risks, benefits and burdens, and attitudes towards proxy decision-making. Interactions between the framing criteria and the elements of decision-making are complex and contextually-situated.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings from this systematic review challenge the accepted reductionist account of proxy decision-making. Decision-making by research proxies is highly contextualized and multifactorial in nature. The choice of proxy and the relational features of decision-making play a fundamental role: both in providing the proxy's authority as decision-maker, and guiding the decision-making process. The conceptual framework describes the relationship between the framing criteria used by the proxy, and the active elements of decision-making. Further work to develop, and empirically test the proposed framework is needed.

Deemed consent: assessing the new opt-out approach to organ procurement in Wales

In December 2015, Wales became the first country in the UK to move away from an opt-in system in organ procurement. The new legislation introduces the concept of deemed consent whereby a person who neither opt in nor opt out is deemed to have consented to donation. The data released by the National Health Service (NHS) in July 2017 provide an excellent opportunity to assess this legislation in light of concerns that it would decrease procurement rates for living and deceased donation, as well as sparking an increase in family refusals. None of these concerns have come to pass, with Wales experiencing more registered donors, fewer family refusals and more living donations. However, as the number of actual donors has dropped slightly from a high level, the situation must be monitored closely in the years to come.

Presumed consent: licenses and limits inferred from the case of geriatric hip fractures

BACKGROUND

Hip fractures are common and serious injuries in the geriatric population. Obtaining informed consent for surgery in geriatric patients can be difficult due to the high prevalence of comorbid cognitive impairment. Given that virtually all patients with hip fractures eventually undergo surgery, and given that delays in surgery are associated with increased mortality, we argue that there are select instances in which it may be ethically permissible, and indeed clinically preferable, to initiate surgical treatment in cognitively impaired patients under the doctrine of presumed consent. In this paper, we examine the boundaries of the license granted by presumed consent and use the example of geriatric hip fracture to build an ethical framework for understanding the doctrine of presumed consent.

DISCUSSION

The license to act under presumed consent requires three factors: patient incapacity, clinical urgency and clarity on the correct course of action. All three can apply to geriatric hip fracture. The typical patient frequently lacks capacity. Delays in initiating surgical treatment are associated with markedly increased mortality rates. Last, there appears to be consensus that surgery is the preferred treatment. Nonetheless, because there is a window of safe delay during which treating physicians can stabilize the patient, address reversible causes of cognitive impairment and identify surrogate decision makers, presumed consent should be invoked only as a method of last resort.

CONCLUSIONS

A medical situation need not be characterized by risk of imminent and certain death for presumed consent to be relevant. Rather, there are two distinct windows that must be considered: the time interval in which action may be delayed without danger, and the time interval needed to obtain a better form of consent. Presumed consent is appropriate only when the latter exceeds the former.

Vaccination and other Altruistic Medical Treatments: Should Autonomy or Communitarianism Prevail?

The publication of a report into a case where an organ donor's constraints on the race of potential recipients raises questions about whether respect for autonomy or communitarianism should prevail in altruistic medical procedures.

This article briefly reviews how autonomy and communitarianism are balanced in cadaveric and live organ donation, bone marrow donation, gamete donation, blood donation and vaccination. It criticises vaccination policy for ostensibly respecting patient autonomy yet in practice compromising that autonomy in various ways. Vaccination is properly viewed as an altruistic medical procedure because some vaccines are of more good to society than to the vaccinee, who runs associated health risks.

The conclusion is that there is a spectrum of attitudes to the value of autonomy, depending principally upon the invasiveness of the procedure. In most cases the autonomy-communitarianism balance is satisfactory, but this is not so in respect of cadaveric organ donation and vaccination. The article proposes that cadaveric organ donation should be governed by the communitarian law of well-publicised presumed consent. It proposes two alternatives for vaccination: that vaccination should be compulsory or, preferably, that procedures be modified so that parents have real autonomy in their decisions whether to vaccinate their children.

Is an opt-out organ donation system desirable? Comments on a new law

A law that introduces an opt-out system for organ donation has recently come into force in Wales. The debate surrounding the effectiveness and ethical acceptability of an opt-out system continues, though the available data have still not provided definitive proof that an opt-out system is more efficient than an opt-in system. Systems based on implied consent but with specific safeguards would appear more suitable and more respectful of ethical principles than those based on a more aggressive form of presumed consent.

Opt-out and consent

A chief objection to opt-out organ donor registration policies is that they do not secure people's actual consent to donation, and so fail to respect their autonomy rights to decide what happens to their organs after they die. However, scholars have recently offered two powerful responses to this objection. First, Michael B Gill argues that opt-out policies do not fail to respect people's autonomy simply because they do not secure people's actual consent to donation. Second, Ben Saunders argues that opt-out policies do secure people's actual-if not explicit-consent, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. I argue that Gill and Saunders' arguments are not successful. My conclusion does not imply that jurisdictions should not implement opt-out policies-their failure to secure people's actual consent may be outweighed by other considerations. But, my conclusion does imply that Gill and Saunders are mistaken to claim that opt-out policies are respectful of people's autonomy.

Could the organ shortage ever be met?

The organ shortage is commonly presented as having a clear solution, increase the number of organs donated and the problem will be solved. In the light of the Northern Ireland Assembly's consultation on moving to an opt-out organ donor register this article focuses on the social factors and complexities which impact strongly on both the supply of, and demand for, transplantable organs. Judging by the experience of other countries presumed consent systems may or may not increase donations but have not met demand. Donation rates have risen considerably in all parts of the UK recently but there is also an increasing demand for organs. Looking at international donation rates and attitudes, future demand for organs and education on donation, the question is whether the organ shortage could ever be met. The increase in longevity, in rates of diabetes and obesity and in alcohol related liver disease all contribute both to increased demand for transplants, and re-transplants, and a reduction in the number of usable organs. It is unlikely that demand could ever be met, since, if supply was unlimited, the focus would move to financial resources and competing demands on the health care budget in a publicly funded health system. These factors point to the need to focus on ways of reducing, or at least stabilizing, demand where lifestyle factors contribute to the underlying disease.

Governing the postmortem procurement of human body material for research

Human body material removed post mortem is a particularly valuable resource for research. Considering the efforts that are currently being made to study the biochemical processes and possible genetic causes that underlie cancer and cardiovascular and neurodegenerative diseases, it is likely that this type of research will continue to gain in importance. However, post mortem procurement of human body material for research raises specific ethical concerns, more in particular with regard to the consent of the research participant. In this paper, we attempt to determine which consent regime should govern the post mortem procurement of body material for research. In order to do so, we assess the various arguments that could be put forward in support of a duty to make body material available for research purposes after death. We argue that this duty does in practice not support conscription but is sufficiently strong to defend a policy of presumed rather than explicit consent.

Presumed consent for organ donation: a clinically unnecessary and corrupting influence in medicine and politics

Presumed consent is a legislative framework in which citizens must place their name on a national opt-out register, otherwise their consent for donating their organs will be presumed. The Welsh Assembly last year passed legislation to enable the introduction of presumed consent in Wales in 2015. The issue is currently being discussed in Northern Ireland, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland. However, there is scant evidence that presumed consent will be effective. Rather than legislating for consent of donors, we should be addressing the misgivings and misunderstandings of families to improve their consent rate, as has been done so successfully in Spain. National improvements in infrastructure in the UK have resulted in an outstanding 63% increase in deceased donation since 2007. If, now, family consent rates could be improved from the current 57% to Spanish levels of 85%, the UK's donation rate would be one of the best in the world.

Potential law reform for Australia's organ donation system

Australia's current organ donation rates are very low, particularly in comparison to several European countries such as Spain and Austria. Many Australians wait for many years to receive organs that they desperately need, and many die while waiting. Australia's current organ donation system is based on express consent, with intending donors registering that intent at the Australian Organ Donation Registry. However, given that organs can only be donated in certain circumstances, this system is proving to be inadequate. This article compares the current express consent (or "opt-in") system and the presumed consent (or "opt-out") system used in the European countries that have significantly higher donation rates. It suggests reforms to Australian legislation to change the current system to that of presumed consent, and considers whether it is likely to work in Australian society.

Misguided presumptions: British Medical Association (BMA) and National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidance on organ retrieval and 'opt out' or 'presumed consent'

Three documents have been produced in an attempt to increase the number of organs available for transplant: a National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) clinical guideline, a British Medical Association (BMA) report and a Welsh Government white paper. All three are ethically flawed: NICE and the BMA recommend that whenever there is intention to withdraw life-sustaining treatment and death is expected, patients should instead be stabilised to assess for donation. This is contrary to patients' best interests, the principles of mental capacity legislation and current criteria for accessing intensive care units. Regarding consent, the BMA and Welsh Government recommend an 'opt-out' policy, but consent in law requires information and cannot be 'presumed' or 'deemed' on the basis of failure to express or register 'opting out'. The language of all three proposals is manipulative, and patient trust may be undermined because the doctor's attention must move from the interests of the patient to those of the unknown organ recipients.

BMA and NICE guidance on organ retrieval: neither misguided nor presumptuous

Organ donation from deceased donors should occur whenever appropriate: that is, when there is evidence, belief or understanding that donation was the stated wish of the potential donor or would be in accordance with their wishes, is lawful and in line with current guidelines and will not add further distress to the family. This is the underlying assumption of the British Medical Association (BMA) report, National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) Guideline and Welsh Government Assembly Report. For potential donors after circulatory death, it might be necessary to support the potential donor until the wishes of the person and their family are ascertained. Provided that such interventions are reasonable, explained and do not cause distress to the patient and their family, such measures are surely suitable and will also enable donation to occur when appropriate. Publication and adherence to guidelines that have clinical, legal and ethical validity will reassure the public. Organ donation not only improves the length and quality of life of recipients, but also saves resources for the NHS and provides benefit to the donor family.

Consenting options for posthumous organ donation: presumed consent and incentives are not favored

BACKGROUND

Posthumous organ procurement is hindered by the consenting process. Several consenting systems have been proposed. There is limited information on public relative attitudes towards various consenting systems, especially in Middle Eastern/Islamic countries.

METHODS

We surveyed 698 Saudi Adults attending outpatient clinics at a tertiary care hospital. Preference and perception of norm regarding consenting options for posthumous organ donation were explored. Participants ranked (1, most agreeable) the following, randomly-presented, options from 1 to 11: no-organ-donation, presumed consent, informed consent by donor-only, informed consent by donor-or-surrogate, and mandatory choice; the last three options ± medical or financial incentive.

RESULTS

Mean(SD) age was 32(9) year, 27% were males, 50% were patients' companions, 60% had ≥ college education, and 20% and 32%, respectively, knew an organ donor or recipient. Mandated choice was among the top three choices for preference of 54% of respondents, with an overall median[25%,75%] ranking score of 3[2,6], and was preferred over donor-or-surrogate informed consent (4[2,7], p < 0.001), donor-only informed consent (5[3,7], p < 0.001), and presumed consent (7[3,10], p < 0.001). The addition of a financial or medical incentive, respectively, reduced ranking of mandated choice to 7[4,9], p < 0.001, and 5[3,8], p < 0.001; for donor-or-surrogate informed consent to 7[5,9], p < 0.001, and 5[3,7], p = 0.004; and for donor-only informed consent to 8[6,10], p < 0.001, and 5[3,7], p = 0.56. Distribution of ranking score of perception of norm and preference were similar except for no-organ donation (11[7,11] vs. 11[6,11], respectively, p = 0.002). Compared to females, males more perceived donor-or-surrogate informed consent as the norm (3[1,6] vs. 5[3,7], p < 0.001), more preferred mandated choice with financial incentive option (6[3,8] vs. 8[4,9], p < 0.001), and less preferred mandated choice with medical incentive option (7[4,9] vs. 5[2,7], p < 0.001). There was no association between consenting options ranking scores and age, health status, education level, or knowing an organ donor or recipient.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that: 1) most respondents were in favor of posthumous organ donation, 2) mandated choice system was the most preferred and presumed consent system was the least preferred, 3) there was no difference between preference and perception of norm in consenting systems ranking, and 4) financial (especially in females) and medical (especially in males) incentives reduced preference.

Ethics, organ donation and tax: a reply to Quigley and Taylor

A national opt-out system of post-mortem donation of scarce organs is preferable to an opt-in system. Unfortunately, the former system is not always feasible, and so in a recent JME article we canvassed the possibility of offering people a tax break for opting-in as a way of increasing the number of organs available for donation under an opt-in regime. Muireann Quigley and James Stacey Taylor criticize our proposal. Roughly, Quigley argues that our proposal is costly and, hence, is unlikely to be implemented, while Taylor contests our response to a Titmuss-style objection to our scheme. In response to Quigley, we note that our proposal's main attraction lies in gains not reflected in the figures presented by Quigley and that the mere fact that it is costly does not imply that it is unfeasible. In response to Taylor, we offer some textual evidence in support of our interpretation of Taylor and responds to his favoured interpretation of the Titmuss-style objection that many people seem to want to donate to charities even if they can deduct their donations from their income tax. Finally, we show why our views do not commit us to endorsing a free organ-market.

Opt-out donation and tacit consent: a reply to Wilkinson and De Wispelaere

In this reply to Wilkinson and De Wispelaere, I argue that an opt-out donation system can be regarded as tacit consent. I first separate the opt-in/opt-out issue from that of the role that the family ought to play. I then argue that what De Wispelaere calls minimal approval-tracking is not obviously necessary and that, even if it were, opt-out schemes can satisfy this requirement.

Opt-out organ donation without presumptions

This paper defends an 'opt-out' scheme for organ procurement, by distinguishing this system from 'presumed consent' (which the author regards as an erroneous justification of it). It, first, stresses the moral importance of increasing the supply of organs and argues that making donation easier need not conflict with altruism. It then goes on to explore one way that donation can be increased, namely by adopting an opt-out system, in which cadaveric organs are used unless the deceased (or their family) registered an objection. Such policies are often labelled 'presumed consent', but it is argued that critics are right to be sceptical of this idea-consent is shown to be an action, rather than a mental attitude, and thus not something that can be presumed. Either someone has consented or they have not, whatever their attitude to the use of their organs. Thankfully, an opt-out scheme need not rest on the presumption of consent. Actual consent can be given implicitly, by one's actions, so it is argued that the failure to register an objection (given certain background conditions) should itself be taken as sign of consent. Therefore, it is permissible to use the organs of someone who did not opt out, because they have-by their silence-actually consented.

Internal organs, integral selves, and good communities: opt-out organ procurement policies and the 'separateness of persons'

Most people accept that if they can save someone from death at very little cost to themselves, they must do so; call this the 'duty of easy rescue.' At least for many such people, an instance of this duty is to allow their vital organs to be used for transplantation. Accordingly, 'opt-out' organ procurement policies, based on a powerfully motivated responsibility to render costless or very low-cost lifesaving aid, would seem presumptively permissible. Counterarguments abound. Here I consider, in particular, objections that assign a moral distinctiveness to the physical boundaries of our bodies and that concern autonomy and trust. These objections are singled out as they seem particularly pertinent to the stress I place on a distinctive benefit of the particular policy I defend. An opt-out system, resting not on the authority of 'presumed consent' but on the recognition of a duty to one another, has the prospect of prompting people to understand more richly the ways in which they are both physically embodied and communally embedded.

In the best interests of the deceased: a possible justification for organ removal without consent?

Opt-out systems of postmortem organ procurement are often supposed to be justifiable by presumed consent, but this justification turns out to depend on a mistaken mental state conception of consent. A promising alternative justification appeals to the analogical situation that occurs when an emergency decision has to be made about medical treatment for a patient who is unable to give or withhold his consent. In such cases, the decision should be made in the best interests of the patient. The analogous suggestion to be considered, then, is, if the potential donor has not registered either his willingness or his refusal to donate, the probabilities that he would or would not have preferred the removal of his organs need to be weighed. And in some actual cases the probability of the first alternative may be greater. This article considers whether the analogy to which this argument appeals is cogent, and concludes that there are important differences between the emergency and the organ removal cases, both as regards the nature of the interests involved and the nature of the right not to be treated without one's consent. Rather, if opt-out systems are to be justified, the needs of patients with organ failure and/or the possibility of tacit consent should be considered.

Tacitly consenting to donate one's organs

The common objection to opt-out systems of postmortal organ procurement is that they allow removal of a deceased person's organs without their actual consent. However, under certain conditions it is possible for 'silence'--failure to register any objection--conventionally and/or legally to count as genuine consent. Prominent conditions are that the consenter should be fully informed about the meaning of his or her silence and that the costs of registering dissent should be insignificant. This paper explicates this thesis and discusses some possible objections to it: (1) it cannot possibly be guaranteed that each citizen is aware of the meaning of silence; and (2) the system is slightly manipulative because it exploits a common defect in autonomous decision-making.

Normative consent and organ donation: a vindication

In an earlier article, I argued that David Estlund's notion of 'normative consent' could provide justification for an opt-out system of organ donation that does not involve presumptions about the deceased donor's consent. Where it would be wrong of someone to refuse their consent, then the fact that they have not actually given it is irrelevant, though an explicit denial of consent (as in opting out) may still be binding. My argument has recently been criticised by Potts et al, who argue that such a policy would involve taking organs from people whose organs should not be taken and would be a recipe for totalitarianism. The present response seeks to rebut both the ethical and political objections. I argue that people can indeed be under a moral obligation to donate their organs, even if they are not technically dead at the time and their donation does not save anyone else's life. Moreover, I argue that an opt-out system-unlike mandatory donation-is not totalitarian because it preserves the right of individuals to act morally wrongly, by opting out when they have no good moral reason to do so. The policy I propose is neither immoral nor totalitarian.

Informed consent in research to improve the number and quality of deceased donor organs

Improving the management of potential organ donors in the intensive care unit could meet an important public health goal by increasing the number and quality of transplantable organs. However, randomized clinical trials are needed to quantify the extent to which specific interventions might enhance organ recovery and outcomes among transplant recipients. Among several barriers to conducting such studies are the absence of guidelines for obtaining informed consent for such studies and the fact that deceased organ donors are not covered by extant federal regulations governing oversight of research with human subjects. This article explores the underexamined ethical issues that arise in the context of donor management studies and provides ethical guidelines and suggested regulatory oversight mechanisms to enable such studies to be conducted ethically. We conclude that both the respect that is traditionally accorded to the prior wishes of the dead and the possibility of postmortem harm support a role for surrogate consent of donors in such randomized controlled trials. Furthermore, although recipients will often be considered human subjects under federal regulations, several ethical arguments support waiving requirements for recipient consent in donor management randomized controlled trials. Finally, we suggest that new regulatory mechanisms, perhaps linked to existing regional and national organ donation and transplantation infrastructures, must be established to protect patients in donor management studies while limiting unnecessary barriers to the conduct of this important research.

Ethical disputes in living donor kidney transplantation: what should we do to save lives?

Living donor kidney transplantation has strong opposition and proponents. Opponents argue that this would exploit poor and female while proponents discuss the high mortality rate of ESRD patients and the low risk of a living donation. In this debate, we reviewed disputes in ethical aspects of living donor kidney transplantation to reach to a good overview of the current concepts on the issue.

The potential impact of an opt-out system for organ donation in the UK

The recent report of the UK government's Organ Donation Taskforce is in favour of continuing with the current organ donation system rather than changing to an opt-out system where people are assumed to be willing to donate. How did it reach this decision and is it correct?

Normative consent and presumed consent for organ donation: a critique

Ben Saunders claims that actual consent is not necessary for organ donation due to 'normative consent', a concept he borrows from David Estlund. Combining normative consent with Peter Singer's 'greater moral evil principle', Saunders argues that it is immoral for an individual to refuse consent to donate his or her organs. If a presumed consent policy were thus adopted, it would be morally legitimate to remove organs from individuals whose wishes concerning donation are not known. This paper disputes Saunders' arguments. First, if death caused by the absence of organ transplant is the operational premise, then, there is nothing of comparable moral precedence under which a person is not obligated to donate. Saunders' use of Singer's principle produces a duty to donate in almost all circumstances. However, this premise is based on a flawed interpretation of cause and effect between organ availability and death. Second, given growing moral and scientific agreement that the organ donors in heart-beating and non-heart-beating procurement protocols are not dead when their organs are surgically removed, it is not at all clear that people have a duty to consent to their lives being taken for their organs. Third, Saunders' claim that there can be good reasons for refusing consent clashes with his claim that there is a moral obligation for everyone to donate their organs. Saunders' argument is more consistent with a conclusion of 'mandatory consent'. Finally, it is argued that Saunders' policy, if put into place, would be totalitarian in scope and would therefore be inconsistent with the freedom required for a democratic society.

The metaphysical basis of a liberal organ procurement policy

There remains a need to properly analyze the metaphysical assumptions underlying two organ procurement policies: presumed consent and organ sales. Our contention is that if one correctly understands the metaphysics of both the human body and material property, then it will turn out that while organ sales are illiberal, presumed consent is not. What we mean by illiberal includes violating rights of bodily integrity, property, or autonomy, as well as arguing for or against a policy in a manner that runs afoul of Rawlsian public reason.

Presumed consent in organ donation: is the duty finally upon us?

In recent years there has been a renewed interest in presumed consent systems for organ donation. The U.K.'s Organ Donation (Presumed Consent and Safeguards) Bill of 2004 proposed a sweeping change in the law in the form of an opt-out system for the donation of cadaver organs. The Organ Donation Task-force in 2008 later examined the idea of presumed consent at length, before concluding that our current organ procurement system needs a radical overhaul. Most recently, the Organ Donation (Presumed Consent) Bill of 2009 ("the 2009 Bill") provided the most comprehensive proposal yet for an opt-out organ donation system in the United Kingdom. Is it now time to take this controversial issue seriously? If the 2009 Bill provides a window into the future, what practical and ethical difficulties will this new presumed consent legislation impart upon our current organ procurement system? This article will provide an overview of the previous attempts in the U.K. to implement an opt-out system for organ donation, before examining in detail the content of the 2009 Bill as a potential template for a new presumed consent law. Finally, some sweeping amendments to the 2009 Bill will be suggested, and it will be concluded that a new piece of legislation may change our national and international views of organ donation for the better.

Bodies, organs and saving lives: the alternatives

In a paper in the last issue of Clinical Medicine, some of the background to attitudes to newly dead bodies, the current context of an urgent need for organs for transplant and the objections to calling a proposal to address this 'presumed consent' were outlined. Here further concerns are explored.

Normative consent and opt-out organ donation

One way of increasing the supply of organs available for transplant would be to switch to an opt-out system of donor registration. This is typically assumed to operate on the basis of presumed consent, but this faces the objection that not all of those who fail to opt out would actually consent to the use of their cadaveric organs. This paper defuses this objection, arguing that people's actual, explicit or implicit, consent to use their organs is not needed. It borrows David Estlund's notion of 'normative consent' from the justification of political authority and applies it to the case of organ donation. According to this idea, when it is wrong to withhold consent to something, the moral force of that lack of consent may be null and void. If it is wrong of a person to refuse to donate their cadaveric organs to others, then it may be that their actual consent is not needed. This supports an opt-out system, which provides protection for those who have genuine reasons to refuse donation, and spares the worries as to what the deceased would actually have wanted.

The transplantable organ shortage in Singapore: has implementation of presumed consent to organ donation made a difference?

The success of solid organ transplantation in the treatment of end-stage organ failure has fuelled a growing demand for transplantable organs worldwide that has far outstripped the supply from brain dead heart-beating donors. In Singapore, this has resulted in long waiting lists of patients for transplantable organs, especially kidneys. The Human Organ Transplant Act, introduced in 1987, is an opt-out scheme that presumes consent to removal of certain organs for transplantation upon death. Despite this legislation, the number of deceased organ donors in Singapore, at 7 to 9 per million population per year, remains low compared to many other developed countries. In this paper, we reviewed the clinical challenges and ethical dilemmas encountered in managing and identifying potential donors in the neurological intensive care unit (ICU) of a major general hospital in Singapore. The large variance in donor actualisation rates among local restructured hospitals, at 0% to 56.6% (median 8.8%), suggests that considerable room still exists for improvement. To address this, local hospitals need to review their processes and adopt changes and best practices that will ensure earlier identification of potential donors, avoid undue delays in diagnosing brain death, and provide optimal care of multi-organ donors to reduce donor loss from medical failures.

Ethical and legal considerations in video recording neonatal resuscitations

As guidelines for neonatal resuscitation evolve from a growing evidence base, clinicians must ensure that practice is closely aligned with the available evidence, based on methodologically sound and ethically conducted research. This paper reviews ethical, legal and risk-management issues arising during the design of a quality-assurance project to make video recordings of neonatal resuscitations after high-risk deliveries. The issues, which affect patients, researchers, staff and the hospital at large, include the following: 1) Informed consent for research involving emergency procedures is often not possible, for lack of time to provide sufficient information. The mental capacity of the subject or parent may be compromised by the impending emergency, and freedom of choice is threatened by the time pressure to consent. 2) Video recording of the inevitable medical errors raises issues of whether participating staff may be identifiable and accountable, affecting their willingness to participate in such research. The approach to staff participation and identification is reviewed. 3) The use of video data for education threatens the privacy of research subjects. The ethics of maintaining privacy is balanced with the ethics of using the data to improve practice of resuscitation. 4) The research subjects (patients, or the staff whose performance is being monitored) must be defined. 5) There are legal and ethical aspects of management and ownership of data. 6) The role of the Human Research Ethics Committee in protecting the research subject and possibly the medicolegal interests of the hospital is discussed. This paper reviews the literature and discusses the issues.

A bit of give and take

The U.K. is short of organs for transplant. Presumed consent raises issues about mental capacity and language skills, and religious questions. There are concerns presumed consent could make doctors too quick to pronounce a patient dead.

Theological reflections on donation after circulatory death: the wisdom of Paul Ramsey and Moshe Feinstein

Due to the worldwide shortage of organs for transplantation, there has been an increased use of organs obtained after circulatory death alone. A protocol for this procedure has recently been approved by a major transplant consortium. This development raises serious moral and ethical concerns. Two renowned theologians of the previous generation, Paul Ramsey and Moshe Feinstein, wrote extensively on the ethical issues relating to transplantation, and their work has much relevance to current moral dilemmas. Their writings relating to definition of death, organ transplantation and the care of the terminally ill are briefly presented, and their potential application to the moral problem of organ donation after circulatory death is discussed.