The ethical issues of the postmarketing surveillance of drug teratogenicity in Hungary

PURPOSE

To discuss some ethical issues of the postmarketing surveillance of drug teratogenicity.

METHODS

To describe the three study groups of the Hungarian Case-Control Surveillance of Congenital Abnormalities with the three sources of data collection.

RESULTS

This large population-based surveillance system comprised 22,843 cases with congenital abnormalities, 38,151 population controls without congenital abnormalities and 834 patient controls with Down syndrome between 1980 and 1996. The major ethical issue is connected with personal data protection (confidential handling of data and informed consent). However, the Hungarian experiences displayed the ethical dilemma between the balance of individual and community rights and interest (mandatory notification, mandatory autopsy of infant deaths, personal identification number). Finally the medical consequences of publication bias at the evaluation of drug teratogenicity are presented as these also have some ethical aspects.

CONCLUSION

The ethical issues of postmarketing surveillance of drug teratogenicity show similarities with general epidemiological research but this public health system also has some special aspects.

[Type 2 spinocerebellar ataxia: acceptance of prenatal diagnosis in descendents at risk]

INTRODUCTION

Type 2 spinocerebellar ataxia is a hereditary degenerative disorder of the nervous system. Advances in molecular genetics have made it possible to carry out presymptomatic and prenatal studies. A programme to define the strategies and principles for doing this has been devised.

OBJECTIVE

To find the level of acceptance of prenatal diagnosis in couples at risk, and to determine the effect of different variables on this acceptance.

PATIENTS AND METHODS

We made a descriptive type study of a series of cases. The study group included 226 persons. Forty of these were couples of descendents and the remainder were asymptomatic descendents. We applied a questionnaire, after prior information as to the aims of the study and obtaining the consent of the participants.

RESULTS

Regarding acceptance of prenatal diagnosis by couples of descendents, we found that most (77.5%) accepted this and only 2.5% did not. Prenatal diagnosis was accepted by 67.74% of the descendents themselves.

CONCLUSIONS

In general there was a high level of acceptance. 159 of the 226 questioned claimed that they would like to have more children and 98.7% of these accepted the test, whilst only 0.01% refused it. The main reasons given were the hope of having healthy children and that the disease would not occur in future generations.

Response to Erich Loewy: commentary

The capacity to suffer, the vulnerability with respect to suffering, confers on all animals with that capacity (not just human beings) a prima facie right not to be caused suffering. Nurturing in order to stave off such suffering is the first act of the community toward the individual, primarily in infancy. Hence for Loewy, autonomy, the gradual growth of self-determination in individuals, is grounded in a broader moral commitment of the community, that of beneficence. This is the critical point in his argument, for it represents a wholesale critique of modern libertarianism. Libertarians, in contrast to Loewy's argument, seem to ground the nature of the community in the prima facie right of autonomy. For Loewy, the community not only has an obligation to refrain from harming individuals (nonmaleficence), but it also has an active duty to ameliorate and prevent, as far as possible, the suffering of its members. Thus, if there is a social contract, it is one of nurturing one another to overcome the vulnerability of suffering, not primarily one of protecting autonomy. This is most significant for clinical ethics as well. Once the primary obligation to ameliorate suffering is no longer necessary, when the individual loses or does not have the primary moral worth prompted by the capacity to suffer, then secondary and symbolic obligations emerge. Loewy is thereby able to suggest a "calculus" of moral worth, wherein our obligations to individuals in a permanent vegetative state or to anencephalics (almost always the individual will have lost the capacity to suffer through some cerebral event) must be weighed against other primary obligations. Although Loewy admits that grounding clinical ethics in the capacity to suffer might be "thin," it nevertheless prompts serious discussion about the nature of the "good" in good clinical ethics decisions.

The social individual in clinical ethics

Except for several provocative final sentences, Sigrid Fry-Revere's "A Libertarian Critique of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.'s The Foundations of Bioethics" is not a libertarian so much as it is a philosophical critique. Engelhardt's work has been widely reviewed, and its arguments have been discussed in Fry-Revere's article and elsewhere. Although it would be impractical in this context to undertake the development of a full-scale, philosophical alternative to libertarianism in bioethics, some recent work in philosophy and clinical ethics bears strongly on the challenge that Engelhardt's work represents. In this commentary I will focus on the implications of a certain alternative philosophy -- and by comparison the limitations of Engelhardt's libertarianism -- for one important aspect of clinical ethics: our understanding of the nature of individuality, with special reference to the situation of the patient. I write as an admiring critic of Engelhardt's work, from which I have learned and drawn inspiration....