Euthanasia, consensual homicide, and refusal of treatment

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of consensual homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia.

Externalist argument against medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness

Medical assistance in dying, which includes voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, is legally permissible in a number of jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. Although medical assistance in dying is most commonly provided for suffering associated with terminal somatic illness, some jurisdictions have also offered it for severe and irremediable psychiatric illness. Meanwhile, recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry has led to a renewed understanding of psychiatric illness that emphasises the role of the relation between the person and the external environment in the constitution of mental disorder. In this paper, I argue that this externalist approach to mental disorder highlights an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness. At the level of the clinical assessment, externalism draws attention to potential social and environmental interventions that might have otherwise been overlooked by the standard approach to mental disorder, which may confound the judgement that there is no further reasonable alternative that could alleviate the person's suffering. At the level of the wider society, externalism underscores how social prejudices and structural barriers that contribute to psychiatric illness constrain the affordances available to people and result in them seeking medical assistance in dying when they otherwise might not have had under better social conditions.

Overcoming Conflicting Definitions of "Euthanasia," and of "Assisted Suicide," Through a Value-Neutral Taxonomy of "End-Of-Life Practices"

The term "euthanasia" is used in conflicting ways in the bioethical literature, as is the term "assisted suicide," resulting in definitional confusion, ambiguities, and biases which are counterproductive to ethical and legal discourse. I aim to rectify this problem in two parts. Firstly, I explore a range of conflicting definitions and identify six disputed definitional factors, based on distinctions between (1) killing versus letting die, (2) fully intended versus partially intended versus merely foreseen deaths, (3) voluntary versus nonvoluntary versus involuntary decisions, (4) terminally ill versus non-terminally ill patients, (5) patients who are fully conscious versus those in permanent comas or persistent vegetative states, and (6) patients who are suffering versus those who are not. Secondly, I distil these factors into six "building blocks" and combine them to develop an unambiguous, value-neutral taxonomy of "end-of-life practices." I hope that this taxonomy provides much-needed clarification and a solid foundation for future ethical and legal discourse.

Death as "benefit" in the context of non-voluntary euthanasia

I offer a principled objection to arguments in favour of legalizing non-voluntary euthanasia on the basis of the principle of beneficence. The objection is that the status of death as a benefit to people who cannot formulate a desire to die is more problematic than pain management care. I ground this objection on epistemic and political arguments. Namely, I argue that death is relatively more unknowable, and the benefits it confers more subjectively debatable, than pain management. I am not primarily referring to the claim that it is difficult to make comparisons between live and post-mortem states, but rather to the fact that it is epistemically and metaphysically problematic to impute a "life-worse-than-death" or a state of "suffering-calling-for-death" to people who cannot subjectively wish to die, as though this kind of suffering were a medically observable fact rather than a belief- and value-laden notion. On the contrary, people enduring similar causes of pain may have different experiences of suffering and views on how it affects the worthwhileness of their existence or the desirability of death or of continuing their lives. The projection of a "suffering-calling-for-death" onto infants or people with severe intellectual disabilities may not be indefensible, but it is more controversial than judging that pain management will improve their well-being from the perspective of beneficence. My argument also relies on our society's liberal endeavour to avoid endorsing unverifiable beliefs about life and death or controversial conceptions of the good life. My goal is not to suggest we should not attend the suffering of cognitively disabled people. On the contrary, I only cast doubt on too quick an assumption that ending their lives is the best way of caring for them, when robust palliative treatments are available. Moreover, I express the concern that a lack of attention to distinctions between "pain-calling-for-relief" and "suffering-calling-for-death" may be based on ableist projections and assumptions. I conclude that it is imperative to continue research into the nature of pain and suffering experienced by individuals with mental or cognitive impairments preventing them from expressing autonomous wishes about the kind of treatment that would most benefit them.

Killing in the name of: A merciful death?

"Mercy" holds a well-established place in the discourse on assisted death (AD), with mercy rhetoric used by both proponents and opponents of AD alike. In this paper, I interrogate the relationship between mercy, mercy killing and AD. Appeals to mercy introduce an ambiguity that carries implications for the enduring debate about healthcare professionals' participation in this controversial practice. The term "mercy killing" is used at different times to mean all of the following: killings that are acts of punitive leniency, killings motivated by pity, killings motivated by compassion, and acts of voluntary, involuntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia. I argue that killings that are acts of punitive leniency "track" a conceptually useful understanding of mercy and, by extension, mercy killing. However, if mercy is understood in this way, then "mercy killing" is a problematic way of characterizing physician-AD. While reference to mercy killing has been weeded out of AD legislation over time, the same cannot be said of public discourse, where the debate about physicians' character-and the locus of power with respect to who gets to decide when a life can rightly be ended-continues.

Constitution of "The Already Dying": The Emergence of Voluntary Assisted Dying in Victoria

In June 2019 Victoria became the first state in Australia to permit "voluntary assisted dying" (VAD), with its governance detailed in the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic) ("VAD Act"). While taking lead from the regulation of medically assisted death practices in other parts of the world, Victoria's legislation nevertheless remains distinct. The law in Victoria only makes VAD available to persons determined to be "already dying": it is expressly limited to those medically prognosed to die "within weeks or months." In this article, we discuss the emergence of the Victorian legislation across key formative documents. We show how, in devising VAD exclusively for those "already at the end of their lives", the Victorian state mobilizes the medico-legal category of the already dying. We argue that this category functions to negotiate a path between what are seen as the unacceptable alternatives of violent suicide on the one hand, and an unlimited right to die on the other. Further, we argue that the category of the already dying operates to make medical practitioners the gatekeepers of this new life-ending choice and effectively limits the realization of autonomy at the end of life.

The people speak: social media on euthanasia/assisted dying

In New Zealand, aiding and abetting a person to commit suicide or euthanasia even with consent is unlawful. The introduction of a third Bill on assisted dying to the House of Representatives following a high-profile court case afforded an opportunity for examining how assisted dying was discussed in the public sphere. In this article, we report on a discourse analysis of a selection of social media to illustrate the ways in which citizens participate in the voluntary euthanasia debate. The volume of social media posts that made up our data set suggests that the legalisation of assisted dying is a highly topical and deeply salient societal issue. Social media postings represent the voices of ordinary citizens who may not participate in formal public consultation processes. Based on our analysis, the assignment of binary conclusions about public opinion is simplistic and fails to adequately represent the intricacies of public debate. Contributors' posts reveal deeply held sociocultural values, as well as tensions about the relationship between citizens and the apparatus of government.

Public reasoning about voluntary assisted dying: An analysis of submissions to the Queensland Parliament, Australia

The use of voluntary assisted dying as an end-of-life option has stimulated concerns and debates over the past decades. Although public attitudes towards voluntary assisted dying (including euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide) are well researched, there has been relatively little study of the different reasons, normative reasoning and rhetorical strategies that people invoke in supporting or contesting voluntary assisted dying in everyday life. Using a mix of computational textual mining techniques, keyword study and qualitative thematic coding to analyse public submissions to a parliamentary inquiry into voluntary assisted dying in Australia, this study critically examines the different reasons, normative reasoning and rhetorical strategies that people invoke in supporting or contesting voluntary assisted dying in everyday life. The analysis identified complex and potentially contradictory ethical principles being invoked on both sides of the debate. These findings deepen our understanding of the moral basis of public reasoning about end-of-life matters and will help to inform future discussions on policy and law reform. The findings underscore the importance of sound normative reasoning and the use of caution when interpreting opinion polls to inform policy.

Suicide-related Materials and Voluntary Assisted Dying

This column discusses the potential for conflict between the Federal laws forbidding the use of telecommunications to spread "suicide-related materials" and the laws in Victoria and Western Australia which have legalised forms of voluntary assisted dying. The column argues that the effect of the State laws is to differentiate the legal forms of voluntary assisted dying from suicide and assisted suicide, with the effect that Federal prohibitions do not apply to telecommunications between health practitioners and their patients regarding voluntary assisted dying.

What passive euthanasia is

BACKGROUND

Euthanasia can be thought of as being either active or passive; but the precise definition of "passive euthanasia" is not always clear. Though all passive euthanasia involves the withholding of life-sustaining treatment, there would appear to be some disagreement about whether all such withholding should be seen as passive euthanasia.

MAIN TEXT

At the core of the disagreement is the question of the importance of an intention to bring about death: must one intend to bring about the death of the patient in order for withholding treatment to count as passive euthanasia, as some sources would indicate, or does withholding in which death is merely foreseen belong to that category? We may expect that this unclarity would be important in medical practice, in law, and in policy. The idea that withholding life-sustaining treatment is passive euthanasia is traced to James Rachels's arguments, which lend themselves to the claim that passive euthanasia does not require intention to end life. Yet the argument here is that Rachels's arguments are flawed, and we have good reasons to think that intention is important in understanding the moral nature of actions. As such, we should reject any understanding of passive euthanasia that does not pay attention to intent.

SHORT CONCLUSION

James Rachels's work on active and passive euthanasia has been immensely influential; but this is an influence that we ought to resist.

[Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide for patients with psychiatric illnesses: opinions of residents in psychiatry]

In the Netherlands there is an increasing amount of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (eas) for patients with psychiatric illnesses. However, in recent years, psychiatrists have become more reluctant to assist with or apply eas. In 1995, 47% of psychiatrists were prepared to grant a request for eas, compared with 37% in 2016. In the literature various personal, medical and ethical arguments are mentioned for reluctance or willingness regarding eas.<br/> AIM: To determine the point of view of residents in psychiatry about requests for eas, to gain insight into their arguments for being reluctant or willing regarding eas, and to determine their opinion on attention paid to eas during the medical training of a psychiatrist.<br/> METHOD: A survey on eas was developed based on a literature study. Residents in psychiatry from the consortium Zuid-Nederland-Noord (znn) (n=78) were asked to complete this survey online.<br/> RESULTS: A total of 37 residents (47%) responded. Of these, most residents (73%) found it conceivable that they would grant a request for eas from a patient with psychiatric illness. Residents did not agree with the classical arguments for reluctance. The training of psychiatrists paid insufficient structural attention to eas.<br/> CONCLUSION: This study shows that a majority of Dutch residents in psychiatry find it conceivable that they would grant a request for eas. According to these residents, more attention is warranted on eas in the medical training to psychiatrist.

[Preference for assisted dying: observations and considerations]

What is preferable for a patient who has requested euthanasia: self-administration of a lethal drink (assisted dying), or to have a drug administered intravenously (euthanasia)? We analysed data from a total of 226 patients who had been helped with assisted dying. In 86% of the cases (195 patients) death occurred within 30 minutes. Thus, the predictability of the process of dying after drinking the lethal drink is relatively high. This implies that other aspects can be taken into consideration when making the choice between euthanasia and assisted dying, including the patient's own responsibility and the impact the method will have on relatives. On the grounds of our analysis and these considerations, our preference is for assisted dying, subject to medical contra-indications. We expect that, with this knowledge, more doctors will be able to help with assisted dying.

A Phronetic Inquiry into the Australian Euthanasia Experience: Challenging Paternalistic Medical Culture and Unrepresentative Health Policy

Australia's intermittent attempts to legalise euthanasia are typically fraught with brief, polarised, and often sensationalised, public debate. Yet beyond the sensitive arguments in favour and in opposition of reform, the practical antecedents of change that may determine Australia's genuine aptitude to enact reforms have been largely neglected. Phronetic legal inquiry thus offers insights into the euthanasia law reform experience, using Australian and international case comparisons to examine covert power dynamics, cultural discourses, and social and institutional structures that affect the practices of the legislature. On this basis, it is argued that Australia's medical profession, and particularly its dominant providers of palliative care, are hampered by an entrenched culture of medicalisation and paternalism, within which patient autonomy provides only a veneer of self-determination. This can be strikingly contrasted with the Dutch approach of patient-centred care, which seeks to produce collaborative, respectful dialogue between physician and patient and to integrate the principles of autonomy and beneficence. Furthermore, these contrasting medical cultures represent issues in the broader policymaking context, as Australia's health policy remains unduly subject to the pressure of unrepresentative yet influential conservative interest groups, most prominently including the Australian Medical Association. This pressure serves to suppress public opinion on the issue of euthanasia in a parliamentary climate that remains stifled by bipartisan alliances and political inertia. It is therefore argued that Australia's prospects for successful voluntary euthanasia law reform rest on the dual pillars of developing a more patient-centred medical culture and challenging the prevailing paternalistic approach to health policymaking in Australia's currently unrepresentative political landscape.

The sensitivity argument against child euthanasia

Is there a moral difference between euthanasia for terminally ill adults and euthanasia for terminally ill children? Luc Bovens considers five arguments to this effect, and argues that each is unsuccessful. In this paper, I argue that Bovens' dismissal of the sensitivity argument is unconvincing.

[Euthanasia: Are there several types?]

Euthanasia has been discussed since Antiquity. Euthanasia and assisted suicide should be considered under the term "euthanasia" and under the same definition of "active and intentional death on demand of the patient, due to administration of medication, resulting from the decision of the physician, being independent of the executor", before being suithanasia, where the administration of medication was performed by the patient, or homothanasia, in the case of the doctor. The designations direct, active and voluntary, currently related to euthanasia should fall into disuse, because it assumes various kinds, of what is false. Greater openness of mindset and broader dialogue, based on scientific evidence and the clarification of definitions and objectives, are essential in the process of liberalizing euthanasia.

Trajectories to seeking demedicalised assistance in suicide: a qualitative in-depth interview study

BACKGROUND

In the Netherlands, people can receive (limited) demedicalised assistance in suicide (DAS)-an option less well known than physician-assisted dying (PAD).

AIM

This study explores which trajectories people take to seek DAS, through open-coding and inductive analysis of in-depth interviews with 17 people who receive(d) DAS from counsellors facilitated by foundation De Einder.

RESULTS

People sought DAS as a result of current suffering or as a result of anticipating possible prospective suffering. People with current suffering were unable or assumed they would be unable to obtain PAD. For people anticipating possible prospective suffering, we distinguished two trajectories. In one trajectory, people preferred PAD but were not reassured of help by the physician in due time and sought DAS as a backup plan. In the other trajectory, people expressed a preference for DAS mainly as a result of emphasising self-determination, independence, taking their own responsibility and preparing suicide carefully. In all trajectories, dissatisfaction with physician-patient communication-for instance about (a denied request for) PAD or fearing to discuss this-influenced the decision to seek DAS.

CONCLUSIONS

While PAD is the preferred option of people in two trajectories, obtaining PAD is uncertain and not always possible. Dissatisfaction with physician-patient communication can result in the physician not being involved in DAS, being unable to diagnose diseases and offer treatment nor offer reassurance that people seem to seek. We plea for more mutual understanding, respect and empathy for the limitations and possibilities of the position of the physician and the patient in discussing assistance in dying.

Dutch Protocols for Deliberately Ending the Life of Newborns: A Defence

The Groningen Protocol, introduced in the Netherlands in 2005 and accompanied by revised guidelines published in a report commissioned by the Royal Dutch Medical Association in 2014, specifies conditions under which the lives of severely ill newborns may be deliberately ended. Its publication came four years after the Netherlands became the first nation to legalize the voluntary active euthanasia of adults, and the Netherlands remains the only country to offer a pathway to protecting physicians who might engage in deliberately ending the life of a newborn (DELN). In this paper, I offer two lines of argument. The first is a positive argument for the Protocol, grounded in the good of the newborn as unanimously determined by those in a position to determine it. The second addresses the widely shared belief that the killing of newborns is morally prohibited, where I offer two arguments-one grounded in the fact that the kinds of cases the Protocol is meant to govern are very rare and highly unusual, and the other focused more broadly on the role of pre-theoretical beliefs in moral reasoning-meant to undermine the strong role that the critic of the Protocol affords this belief. I argue that, given this second line of argument, the beliefs underlying my positive argument for the Protocol are in fact more secure than the widely shared belief underlying the critic's position.

[Euthanasia and advanced dementia]

Somewhere around 1975 there was a shift in our perception of suffering that is soon followed by death: it seemed a good idea to skip this unhappy stage of life. A complicated national debate arose, and continues to this day, about whether a life may be prematurely terminated in cases of insoluble misery. Legislation came into effect 2002, after 30 years of deliberation, and the rest of the world looked on in horror. England, in particular, liked to point out that the Dutch were on a very slippery slope.

Misconstrual of EAPC's position paper on euthanasia

This is a response to Barutta and Vollmann's article 'Physician-assisted death with limited access to palliative care.' I show how they misconstrue a key empirical statement made by the European Association for Palliative Care regarding legalisation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Additionally, I include some further remarks on the relationship between euthanasia and palliative care. I read with interest the article, which delineate well several positions and gives a nice overview of arguments presented on either side. I also found the line of argument unprejudiced and clear, and am sure people working within palliative care would benefit from reading it.

The public's viewpoint on the right to hastened death in Alberta, Canada: findings from a population survey study

A research study was conducted to determine public opinion in Alberta, a Canadian province, on the controversial topic of death hastening. Questions on the right to hastened death, end-of-life plans and end-of-life experiences were included in the Population Research Laboratory's annual 2010 health-care telephone survey, with 1203 adults providing results relatively representative of Albertans. Of all 1203, 72.6% said yes to the question: 'Should dying adults be able to request and get help from others to end their life early, in other words, this is a request for assisted suicide'? Among all who provided an answer, 36.8% indicated 'yes, every competent adult should have this right' and 40.6% indicated 'yes, but it should be allowed only in certain cases or situations'. Over 50% of respondents in all but one socio-demographic population sub-group (Religious-other) were supportive of the right to hastened death. However, multinomial regression analysis revealed that the experiences of deciding to euthanise a pet/animal and developing or planning to develop an advance directive predicted support, while self-reported religiosity predicted non-support. Finding majority public support for death hastening suggests that legalisation could potentially occur in the future; but with this policy first requiring a careful consideration of the model of assisted suicide or euthanasia that best protects people who are highly vulnerable to despair and suffering near the end of life.

Older peoples' attitudes towards euthanasia and an end-of-life pill in The Netherlands: 2001-2009

INTRODUCTION

With an ageing population, end-of-life care is increasing in importance. The present work investigated characteristics and time trends of older peoples' attitudes towards euthanasia and an end-of-life pill.

METHODS

Three samples aged 64 years or older from the Longitudinal Ageing Study Amsterdam (N=1284 (2001), N=1303 (2005) and N=1245 (2008)) were studied. Respondents were asked whether they could imagine requesting their physician to end their life (euthanasia), or imagine asking for a pill to end their life if they became tired of living in the absence of a severe disease (end-of-life pill). Using logistic multivariable techniques, changes of attitudes over time and their association with demographic and health characteristics were assessed.

RESULTS

The proportion of respondents with a positive attitude somewhat increased over time, but significantly only among the 64-74 age group. For euthanasia, these percentages were 58% (2001), 64% (2005) and 70% (2008) (OR of most recent versus earliest period (95% CI): 1.30 (1.17 to 1.44)). For an end-of-life pill, these percentages were 31% (2001), 33% (2005) and 45% (2008) (OR (95% CI): 1.37 (1.23 to 1.52)). For the end-of-life pill, interaction between the most recent time period and age group was significant.

CONCLUSIONS

An increasing proportion of older people reported that they could imagine desiring euthanasia or an end-of-life pill. This may imply an increased interest in deciding about your own life and stresses the importance to take older peoples' wishes seriously.

Do guidelines on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in Dutch hospitals and nursing homes reflect the law? A content analysis

To describe the content of practice guidelines on euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) and to compare differences between settings and guidelines developed before or after enactment of the euthanasia law in 2002 by means of a content analysis. Most guidelines stated that the attending physician is responsible for the decision to grant or refuse an EAS request. Due care criteria were described in the majority of guidelines, but aspects relevant for assessing these criteria were not always described. Half of the guidelines described the role of the nurse in the performance of euthanasia. Compared with hospital guidelines, nursing home guidelines were more often stricter than the law in excluding patients with dementia (30% vs 4%) and incompetent patients (25% vs 4%). As from 2002, the guidelines were less strict in categorically excluding patients groups (32% vs 64%) and in particular incompetent patients (10% vs 29%). Healthcare institutions should accurately state the boundaries of the law, also when they prefer to set stricter boundaries for their own institution. Only then can guidelines provide adequate support for physicians and nurses in the difficult EAS decision-making process.

End-of-life decision-making in Canada: the report by the Royal Society of Canada expert panel on end-of-life decision-making

This report on end-of-life decision-making in Canada was produced by an international expert panel and commissioned by the Royal Society of Canada. It consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 reviews what is known about end-of-life care and opinions about assisted dying in Canada. Chapter 2 reviews the legal status quo in Canada with regard to various forms of assisted death. Chapter 3 reviews ethical issues pertaining to assisted death. The analysis is grounded in core values central to Canada's constitutional order. Chapter 4 reviews the experiences had in a number of jurisdictions that have decriminalized or recently reviewed assisted dying in some shape or form. Chapter 5 provides recommendations with regard to the provision of palliative care in Canada, as well as recommendations for reform with respect to the various forms of assisted death covered in this document.

Donation after circulatory death: burying the dead donor rule

Despite continuing controversies regarding the vital status of both brain-dead donors and individuals who undergo donation after circulatory death (DCD), respecting the dead donor rule (DDR) remains the standard moral framework for organ procurement. The DDR increases organ supply without jeopardizing trust in transplantation systems, reassuring society that donors will not experience harm during organ procurement. While the assumption that individuals cannot be harmed once they are dead is reasonable in the case of brain-dead protocols, we argue that the DDR is not an acceptable strategy to protect donors from harm in DCD protocols. We propose a threefold alternative to justify organ procurement practices: (1) ensuring that donors are sufficiently protected from harm; (2) ensuring that they are respected through informed consent; and (3) ensuring that society is fully informed of the inherently debatable nature of any criterion to declare death.