Theories of consciousness

Neural Correlates of Psychedelic, Sleep, and Sedated States Support Global Theories of Consciousness

Understanding neural mechanisms of consciousness remains a challenging question in neuroscience. A central debate in the field concerns whether consciousness arises from global interactions that involve multiple brain regions or focal neural activity, such as in sensory cortex. Additionally, global theories diverge between the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) hypothesis, which emphasizes frontal and parietal areas, and the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which focuses on information integration within posterior cortical regions. To disentangle the global vs. local and frontoparietal vs. posterior dilemmas, we measured global functional connectivity and local neural synchrony with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data across a spectrum of conscious states in humans induced by psychedelics, sleep, and deep sedation. We found that psychedelic states are associated with increased global functional connectivity and decreased local neural synchrony. In contrast, non-REM sleep and deep sedation displayed the opposite pattern, suggesting that consciousness arises from global brain network interactions rather than localized activity. This mirror-image pattern between enhanced and diminished states was observed in both anterior-posterior (A-P) and posterior-posterior (P-P) brain regions but not within the anterior part of the brain alone. Moreover, anterior transmodal regions played a key role in A-P connectivity, while both posterior transmodal and posterior unimodal regions were critical for P-P connectivity. Overall, these findings provide empirical evidence supporting global theories of consciousness in relation to varying states of consciousness. They also bridge the gap between two prominent theories, GNW and IIT, by demonstrating how different theories can converge on shared neuronal mechanisms.

Only consciousness truly exists? Two problems for IIT 4.0's ontology

In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness 4.0: what we call the (i) the intrinsicality 2.0 problem, and (ii) the engineering problem. These problems entail that truly existing, conscious entities can depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist, which is problematic: if something does not exist in objective reality (i.e., in itself, independently of another entity's consciousness), then it seems that it cannot be part of the material basis and determinants of other entities that do exist on their own. We argue that the core origin of these problems lies in IIT's equation between true existence and phenomenal existence (consciousness), and the corresponding ontological exclusion of non-conscious physical entities (i.e., extrinsic entities) from objective reality. In short, these two problems seem to show that IIT should reconsider the ontological status of these extrinsic entities, because they need to exist objectively to account for the ontological implications of the scenarios we present here, which are permitted by the operational framework of the theory.

Fundamental constraints to the logic of living systems

It has been argued that the historical nature of evolution makes it a highly path-dependent process. Under this view, the outcome of evolutionary dynamics could have resulted in organisms with different forms and functions. At the same time, there is ample evidence that convergence and constraints strongly limit the domain of the potential design principles that evolution can achieve. Are these limitations relevant in shaping the fabric of the possible? Here, we argue that fundamental constraints are associated with the logic of living matter. We illustrate this idea by considering the thermodynamic properties of living systems, the linear nature of molecular information, the cellular nature of the building blocks of life, multicellularity and development, the threshold nature of computations in cognitive systems and the discrete nature of the architecture of ecosystems. In all these examples, we present available evidence and suggest potential avenues towards a well-defined theoretical formulation.

How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy

AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term-the attributability sense. More specifically, relying on work by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (In Praise of Desire, OUP 2014), we propose that the behavior of these systems can manifest their 'quality of will' and thus be regarded as something they can be blameworthy for. We develop this position in detail, justify some of its crucial presuppositions, and defend it against potential objections.

Local wakefulness-like activity of layer 5 cortex under general anaesthesia

Consciousness, defined as being aware of and responsive to one's surroundings, is characteristic of normal waking life and typically is lost during sleep and general anaesthesia. The traditional view of consciousness as a global brain state has evolved toward a more sophisticated interplay between global and local states, with the presence of local sleep in the awake brain and local wakefulness in the sleeping brain. However, this interplay is not clear for general anaesthesia, where loss of consciousness was recently suggested to be associated with a global state of brain-wide synchrony that selectively involves layer 5 cortical pyramidal neurons across sensory, motor and associative areas. According to this global view, local wakefulness of layer 5 cortex should be incompatible with deep anaesthesia, a hypothesis that deserves to be scrutinised with causal manipulations. Here, we show that unilateral chemogenetic activation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the sensorimotor cortex of isoflurane-anaesthetised mice induces a local state transition from slow-wave activity to tonic firing in the transfected hemisphere. This wakefulness-like activity dramatically disrupts layer 5 interhemispheric synchrony with mirror-image locations in the contralateral hemisphere, but does not reduce the level of unconsciousness under deep anaesthesia, nor in the transitions to/from anaesthesia. Global layer 5 synchrony may thus be a sufficient condition for anaesthesia-induced unconsciousness, but is not a necessary one, at least under isoflurane anaesthesia. Local wakefulness-like activity of layer 5 cortex can be induced and maintained under deep anaesthesia, encouraging further investigation into the local vs. global aspects of anaesthesia-induced unconsciousness. KEY POINTS: The neural correlates of consciousness have evolved from global brain states to a nuanced interplay between global and local states, evident in terms of local sleep in awake brains and local wakefulness in sleeping brains. The concept of local wakefulness remains unclear for general anaesthesia, where the loss of consciousness has been recently suggested to involve brain-wide synchrony of layer 5 cortical neurons. We found that local wakefulness-like activity of layer 5 cortical can be chemogenetically induced in anaesthetised mice without affecting the depth of anaesthesia or the transitions to and from unconsciousness. Global layer 5 synchrony may thus be a sufficient but not necessary feature for the unconsciousness induced by general anaesthesia. Local wakefulness-like activity of layer 5 neurons is compatible with general anaesthesia, thus promoting further investigation into the local vs. global aspects of anaesthesia-induced unconsciousness.

Quality space computations for consciousness

The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts.

Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness

A resurgence of panpsychism and dualism is a matter of ongoing debate in modern neuroscience. Although metaphysically hostile, panpsychism and dualism both persist in the science of consciousness because the former is proposed as a straightforward answer to the problem of integrating consciousness into the fabric of physical reality, whereas the latter proposes a simple solution to the problem of free will by endowing consciousness with causal power as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. I take the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a paradigmatic exemplar of a theory of consciousness (ToC) that makes its commitments to panpsychism and dualism within a unified framework. These features are not, however, unique for IIT. Many ToCs are implicitly prone to some degree of panpsychism whenever they strive to propose a universal definition of consciousness, associated with one or another known phenomenon. Yet, those ToCs that can be characterized as strongly emergent are at risk of being dualist. A remedy against both covert dualism and uncomfortable corollaries of panpsychism can be found in the evolutionary theory of life, called here "bioprotopsychism" and generalized in terms of autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Bioprotopsychism provides a biologically inspired basis for a minimalist approach to consciousness via the triad "chemotaxis-efference copy mechanism-counterfactual active inference" by associating the stream of weakly emergent conscious states with an amount of information (best guesses) of the brain, engaged in unconscious predictive processing.

Two Levels of Integrated Information Theory: From Autonomous Systems to Conscious Life

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is one of the most prominent candidates for a theory of consciousness, although it has received much criticism for trying to live up to expectations. Based on the relevance of three issues generalized from the developments of IITs, we have summarized the main ideas of IIT into two levels. At the second level, IIT claims to be strictly anchoring consciousness, but the first level on which it is based is more about autonomous systems or systems that have reached some other critical complexity. In this paper, we argue that the clear gap between the two levels of explanation of IIT has led to these criticisms and that its panpsychist tendency plays a crucial role in this. We suggest that the problems of IIT are far from being "pseudoscience", and by adding more necessary elements, when the first level is combined with the second level, IIT can genuinely move toward an appropriate theory of consciousness that can provide necessary and sufficient interpretations.

The Neural and Computational Architecture of Feedback Dynamics in Mouse Cortex during Stimulus Report

Conscious reportability of visual input is associated with a bimodal neural response in the primary visual cortex (V1): an early-latency response coupled to stimulus features and a late-latency response coupled to stimulus report or detection. This late wave of activity, central to major theories of consciousness, is thought to be driven by the prefrontal cortex (PFC), responsible for "igniting" it. Here we analyzed two electrophysiological studies in mice performing different stimulus detection tasks and characterized neural activity profiles in three key cortical regions: V1, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and PFC. We then developed a minimal network model, constrained by known connectivity between these regions, reproducing the spatiotemporal propagation of visual- and report-related activity. Remarkably, while PFC was indeed necessary to generate report-related activity in V1, this occurred only through the mediation of PPC. PPC, and not PFC, had the final veto in enabling the report-related late wave of V1 activity.

Consciousness makes sense in the light of evolution

I believe consciousness is a property of advanced nervous systems, and as such a product of evolution. Thus, to understand consciousness we need to describe the trajectory leading to its evolution and the selective advantages conferred. A deeper understanding of the neurology would be a significant contribution, but other advanced functions, such as hearing and vision, are explained with a comparable lack of detailed knowledge of the brain processes responsible. In this paper, I try to add details and credence to a previously suggested, evolution-based model of consciousness. According to this model, the feature started to evolve in early amniotes (reptiles, birds, and mammals) some 320 million years ago. The reason was the introduction of feelings as a strategy for making behavioral decisions.

The functional role of conscious sensation of movement

This paper proposes a new framework for investigating neural signals sufficient for a conscious sensation of movement and their role in motor control. We focus on signals sufficient for proprioceptive awareness, particularly from muscle spindle activation and from primary motor cortex (M1). Our review of muscle vibration studies reveals that afferent signals alone can induce conscious sensations of movement. Similarly, studies employing peripheral nerve blocks suggest that efferent signals from M1 are sufficient for sensations of movement. On this basis, we show that competing theories of motor control assign different roles to sensation of movement. According to motor command theories, sensation of movement corresponds to an estimation of the current state based on afferent signals, efferent signals, and predictions. In contrast, within active inference architectures, sensations correspond to proprioceptive predictions driven by efferent signals from M1. The focus on sensation of movement provides a way to critically compare and evaluate the two theories. Our analysis offers new insights into the functional roles of movement sensations in motor control and consciousness.

Psychological dissociation and temporal integration/segregation across the senses: An experimental study

There are no studies that have experimentally tested how temporal integration/segregation of sensory inputs might be linked to the emergence of dissociative experiences and alterations of emotional functioning. Thirty-six participants completed 3 sensory integration tasks. Psychometric thresholds were estimated as indexes of temporal integration/segregation processes. We collected self-report measures of pre-task trait levels of dissociation, as well as pre- post-task changes in both dissociation and emotionality. An independent sample of 21 subjects completed a control experiment administering the Attention Network Test. Results showed: (i) a significant increase of dissociative experiences after the completion of sensory integration tasks, but not after the ANT task; (ii) that subjective thresholds predicted the emergence of dissociative states; (iii) temporal integration efforts affected positive emotionality, which was explained by the extent of task-dependent dissociative states. The present findings reveal that dissociation could be understood in terms of an imbalance between "hyper-segregation" and "hyper-integration" processes.

N, N-Dimethyltryptamine (DMT)-Occasioned Familiarity and the Sense of Familiarity Questionnaire (SOF-Q)

This study investigated the sense of familiarity attributed to N, N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT) experiences. 227 naturalistic inhaled-DMT experiences reporting a sense of familiarity were included. No experiences referenced a previous DMT or psychedelic experience as the source of the familiarity. A high prevalence of concomitant features discordant from ordinary consciousness were identified: features of a mystical experience (97.4%), ego-dissolution (16.3%), and a "profound experience of death" (11.0%). The Sense of Familiarity Questionnaire (SOF-Q) was developed assessing 19 features of familiarity across 5 themes: (1) Familiarity with the Feeling, Emotion, or Knowledge Gained; (2) Familiarity with the Place, Space, State, or Environment; (3) Familiarity with the Act of Going Through the Experience; (4) Familiarity with Transcendent Features; and (5) Familiarity Imparted by an Entity Encounter. Bayesian latent class modeling yielded two stable classes of participants who shared similar SOF-Q responses. Class 1 participants responded, "yes" more often for items within "Familiarity Imparted by an Entity Encounter" and "Familiarity with the Feeling, Emotion, or Knowledge Gained." Results catalogued features of the sense of familiarity imparted by DMT, which appears to be non-referential to a previous psychedelic experience. Findings provide insights into the unique and enigmatic familiarity reported during DMT experiences and offer a foundation for further exploration into this intriguing phenomenon.

Propofol anesthesia destabilizes neural dynamics across cortex

Every day, hundreds of thousands of people undergo general anesthesia. One hypothesis is that anesthesia disrupts dynamic stability-the ability of the brain to balance excitability with the need to be stable and controllable. To test this hypothesis, we developed a method for quantifying changes in population-level dynamic stability in complex systems: delayed linear analysis for stability estimation (DeLASE). Propofol was used to transition animals between the awake state and anesthetized unconsciousness. DeLASE was applied to macaque cortex local field potentials (LFPs). We found that neural dynamics were more unstable in unconsciousness compared with the awake state. Cortical trajectories mirrored predictions from destabilized linear systems. We mimicked the effect of propofol in simulated neural networks by increasing inhibitory tone. This in turn destabilized the networks, as observed in the neural data. Our results suggest that anesthesia disrupts dynamical stability that is required for consciousness.

Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain

After more than 30 years of extensive investigation, impressive progress has been made in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). However, the functional role of spatiotemporally distinct consciousness-related neural activity in conscious perception is debated. An influential framework proposed that consciousness-related neural activities could be dissociated into two distinct processes: phenomenal and access consciousness. However, though hotly debated, its authenticity has not been examined in a single paradigm with more informative intracranial recordings. In the present study, we employed a visual awareness task and recorded the local field potential (LFP) of patients with electrodes implanted in cortical and subcortical regions. Overall, we found that the latency of visual awareness-related activity exhibited a bimodal distribution, and the recording sites with short and long latencies were largely separated in location, except in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC). The mixture of short and long latencies in the lPFC indicates that it plays a critical role in linking phenomenal and access consciousness. However, the division between the two is not as simple as the central sulcus, as proposed previously. Moreover, in 4 patients with electrodes implanted in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, early awareness-related activity was confined to the contralateral side, while late awareness-related activity appeared on both sides. Finally, Granger causality analysis showed that awareness-related information flowed from the early sites to the late sites. These results provide the first LFP evidence of neural correlates of phenomenal and access consciousness, which sheds light on the spatiotemporal dynamics of NCC in the human brain.

Why brain organoids are not conscious yet

Rapid advances in human brain organoid technologies have prompted the question of their consciousness. Although brain organoids resemble many facets of the brain, their shortcomings strongly suggest that they do not fit any of the operational definitions of consciousness. As organoids gain internal processing systems through statistical learning and closed loop algorithms, interact with the external world, and become embodied through fusion with other organ systems, questions of biosynthetic consciousness will arise.

The blushing brain: neural substrates of cheek temperature increase in response to self-observation

Darwin proposed that blushing-the reddening of the face owing to heightened self-awareness-is 'the most human of all expressions'. Yet, relatively little is known about the underlying mechanisms of blushing. Theories diverge on whether it is a rapid, spontaneous emotional response that does not involve reflection upon the self or whether it results from higher-order socio-cognitive processes. Investigating the neural substrates of blushing can shed light on the mental processes underlying blushing and the mechanisms involved in self-awareness. To reveal neural activity associated with blushing, 16-20 year-old participants (n = 40) watched pre-recorded videos of themselves (versus other people as a control condition) singing karaoke in a magnetic resonance imaging scanner. We measured participants' cheek temperature increase-an indicator of blushing-and their brain activity. The results showed that blushing is higher when watching oneself versus others sing. Those who blushed more while watching themselves sing had, on average, higher activation in the cerebellum (lobule V) and the left paracentral lobe and exhibited more time-locked processing of the videos in early visual cortices. These findings show that blushing is associated with the activation of brain areas involved in emotional arousal, suggesting that it may occur independently of higher-order socio-cognitive processes. Our results provide new avenues for future research on self-awareness in infants and non-human animals.

Ethics and responsibility in biohybrid robotics research

The industrial revolution of the 19th century marked the onset of an era of machines and robots that transformed societies. Since the beginning of the 21st century, a new generation of robots envisions similar societal transformation. These robots are biohybrid: part living and part engineered. They may self-assemble and emerge from complex interactions between living cells. While this new era of living robots presents unprecedented opportunities for positive societal impact, it also poses a host of ethical challenges. A systematic, nuanced examination of these ethical issues is of paramount importance to guide the evolution of this nascent field. Multidisciplinary fields face the challenge that inertia around collective action to address ethical boundaries may result in unexpected consequences for researchers and societies alike. In this Perspective, we i) clarify the ethical challenges associated with biohybrid robotics, ii) discuss the need for and elements of a potential governance framework tailored to this technology; and iii) propose tangible steps toward ethical compliance and policy formation in the field of biohybrid robotics.

Unifying biophysical consciousness theories with MaxCon: maximizing configurations of brain connectivity

There is such a vast proliferation of scientific theories of consciousness that it is worrying some scholars. There are even competitions to test different theories, and the results are inconclusive. Consciousness research, far from converging toward a unifying framework, is becoming more discordant than ever, especially with respect to theoretical elements that do not have a clear neurobiological basis. Rather than dueling theories, an integration across theories is needed to facilitate a comprehensive view on consciousness and on how normal nervous system dynamics can develop into pathological states. In dealing with what is considered an extremely complex matter, we try to adopt a perspective from which the subject appears in relative simplicity. Grounded in experimental and theoretical observations, we advance an encompassing biophysical theory, MaxCon, which incorporates aspects of several of the main existing neuroscientific consciousness theories, finding convergence points in an attempt to simplify and to understand how cellular collective activity is organized to fulfill the dynamic requirements of the diverse theories our proposal comprises. Moreover, a computable index indicating consciousness level is presented. Derived from the level of description of the interactions among cell networks, our proposal highlights the association of consciousness with maximization of the number of configurations of neural network connections -constrained by neuroanatomy, biophysics and the environment- that is common to all consciousness theories.

Streams of conscious visual experience

Consciousness, a cornerstone of human cognition, is believed to arise from complex neural interactions. Traditional views have focused on localized fronto-parietal networks or broader inter-regional dynamics. In our study, we leverage advanced fMRI techniques, including the novel Functionnectome framework, to unravel the intricate relationship between brain circuits and functional activity shaping visual consciousness. Our findings underscore the importance of the superior longitudinal fasciculus within the fronto-parietal fibers, linking conscious perception with spatial neglect. Additionally, our data reveal the critical contribution of the temporo-parietal fibers and the splenium of the corpus callosum in connecting visual information with conscious representation and their verbalization. Central to these networks is the thalamus, posited as a conductor in synchronizing these interactive processes. Contrasting traditional fMRI analyses with the Functionnectome approach, our results emphasize the important explanatory power of interactive mechanisms over localized activations for visual consciousness. This research paves the way for a comprehensive understanding of consciousness, highlighting the complex network of neural connections that lead to awareness.

Functional and structural brain connectivity in disorders of consciousness

Brain connectivity, allowing information to be shared between distinct cortical areas and thus to be processed in an integrated way, has long been considered critical for consciousness. However, the relationship between functional intercortical interactions and the structural connections thought to underlie them is poorly understood. In the present work, we explore both functional (with an EEG-based metric: the median weighted symbolic mutual information in the theta band) and structural (with a brain MRI-based metric: fractional anisotropy) connectivities in a cohort of 78 patients with disorders of consciousness. Both metrics could distinguish patients in a vegetative state from patients in minimally conscious state. Crucially, we discovered a significant positive correlation between functional and structural connectivities. Furthermore, we showed that this structure-function relationship is more specifically observed when considering structural connectivity within the intra- and inter-hemispheric long-distance cortico-cortical bundles involved in the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory of consciousness, thus supporting predictions of this model. Altogether, these results support the interest of multimodal assessments of brain connectivity in refining the diagnostic evaluation of patients with disorders of consciousness.

Unconscious multisensory integration: behavioral and neural evidence from subliminal stimuli

Introduction

The prevailing theories of consciousness consider the integration of different sensory stimuli as a key component for this phenomenon to rise on the brain level. Despite many theories and models have been proposed for multisensory integration between supraliminal stimuli (e.g., the optimal integration model), we do not know if multisensory integration occurs also for subliminal stimuli and what psychophysical mechanisms it follows.

Methods

To investigate this, subjects were exposed to visual (Virtual Reality) and/or haptic stimuli (Electro-Cutaneous Stimulation) above or below their perceptual threshold. They had to discriminate, in a two-Alternative Forced Choice Task, the intensity of unimodal and/or bimodal stimuli. They were then asked to discriminate the sensory modality while recording their EEG responses.

Results

We found evidence of multisensory integration for supraliminal condition, following the classical optimal model. Importantly, even for subliminal trials participant's performances in the bimodal condition were significantly more accurate when discriminating the intensity of the stimulation. Moreover, significant differences emerged between unimodal and bimodal activity templates in parieto-temporal areas known for their integrative role.

Discussion

These converging evidences - even if preliminary and needing confirmation from the collection of further data - suggest that subliminal multimodal stimuli can be integrated, thus filling a meaningful gap in the debate about the relationship between consciousness and multisensory integration.

A synergistic workspace for human consciousness revealed by Integrated Information Decomposition

How is the information-processing architecture of the human brain organised, and how does its organisation support consciousness? Here, we combine network science and a rigorous information-theoretic notion of synergy to delineate a 'synergistic global workspace', comprising gateway regions that gather synergistic information from specialised modules across the human brain. This information is then integrated within the workspace and widely distributed via broadcaster regions. Through functional MRI analysis, we show that gateway regions of the synergistic workspace correspond to the human brain's default mode network, whereas broadcasters coincide with the executive control network. We find that loss of consciousness due to general anaesthesia or disorders of consciousness corresponds to diminished ability of the synergistic workspace to integrate information, which is restored upon recovery. Thus, loss of consciousness coincides with a breakdown of information integration within the synergistic workspace of the human brain. This work contributes to conceptual and empirical reconciliation between two prominent scientific theories of consciousness, the Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory, while also advancing our understanding of how the human brain supports consciousness through the synergistic integration of information.

Interfacing consciousness

The current stage of consciousness science has reached an impasse. We blame the physicalist worldview for this and propose a new perspective to make progress on the problems of consciousness. Our perspective is rooted in the theory of conscious agents. We thereby stress the fundamentality of consciousness outside of spacetime, the importance of agency, and the mathematical character of the theory. For conscious agent theory (CAT) to achieve the status of a robust scientific framework, it needs to be integrated with a good explanation of perception and cognition. We argue that this role is played by the interface theory of perception (ITP), an evolutionary-based model of perception that has been previously formulated and defended by the authors. We are specifically interested in what this tells us about the possibility of AI consciousness and conclude with a somewhat counter-intuitive proposal: we live inside a simulation instantiated, not digitally, but in consciousness. Such a simulation is just an interface representation of the dynamics of conscious agents for a conscious agent. This paves the way for employing AI in consciousness science through customizing our interface.

Development of emergent processes and threshold of consciousness with levels of processing

Introduction

The transition of experience from unconscious to conscious, the emergent process, is a crucial topic in consciousness studies. Three frameworks exist to explain the process: (1) consciousness arises in an all-or-none manner; (2) consciousness arises gradually; (3) consciousness arises either all at once or gradually, depending on the level of stimulus processing (low- vs. high-level). However, the development of emergent processes of consciousness remains unclear. This study examines the development of emergent processes of consciousness based on the level of stimulus processing framework.

Methods

Ninety-nine children (5-12 year-olds) and adults participated in two online discrimination tasks. These tasks involved color discrimination as lower-level processing and number magnitude discrimination as higher-level processing, as well as backward masking with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) varying from 16.7 to 266.7 ms. We measured objective discrimination accuracy and used a 4-scale Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) to assess subjective awareness. We fit the data to a four-parameter nonlinear function to estimate the center of the slope (threshold) and the range of the slope (gradualness, the measure of emergent process of consciousness) of the model.

Results

The results showed the threshold of objective discrimination was significantly higher in 5-6 year-olds than in 7-12 year-olds, but not of subjective awareness. The emergent process of objective discrimination in the number task was more gradual than in the color task.

Discussion

The findings suggest that the thresholds of subjective awareness in 5-6 year-olds and objective discrimination in 7-9 year-olds are similar to those in adults. Moreover, the emergent processes of subjective awareness and objective discrimination in 5-6 year-olds are also similar to those in adults. Our results support the level of processing hypothesis but suggest that its effects may differ across developmental stages.

Exploring complex and integrated information during sleep

The Integrated Information Theory is a theoretical framework that aims to elucidate the nature of consciousness by postulating that it emerges from the integration of information within a system, and that the degree of consciousness depends on the extent of information integration within the system. When consciousness is lost, the core complex of consciousness proposed by the Integrated Information Theory disintegrates, and Φ measures, which reflect the level of integrated information, are expected to diminish. This study examined the predictions of the Integrated Information Theory using the global brain network acquired via functional magnetic resonance imaging during various tasks and sleep. We discovered that the complex located within the frontoparietal network remained constant regardless of task content, while the regional distribution of the complex collapsed in the initial stages of sleep. Furthermore, Φ measures decreased as sleep progressed under limited analysis conditions. These findings align with predictions made by the Integrated Information Theory and support its postulates.

Limitation of life sustaining therapy in disorders of consciousness: ethics and practice

Clinical conversations surrounding the continuation or limitation of life-sustaining therapies (LLST) are both challenging and tragically necessary for patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) following severe brain injury. Divergent cultural, philosophical and religious perspectives contribute to vast heterogeneity in clinical approaches to LLST-as reflected in regional differences and inter-clinician variability. Here we provide an ethical analysis of factors that inform LLST decisions among patients with DoC. We begin by introducing the clinical and ethical challenge and clarifying the distinction between withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining therapy. We then describe relevant factors that influence LLST decision-making including diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty, perception of pain, defining a 'good' outcome, and the role of clinicians. In concluding sections, we explore global variation in LLST practices as they pertain to patients with DoC and examine the impact of cultural and religious perspectives on approaches to LLST. Understanding and respecting the cultural and religious perspectives of patients and surrogates is essential to protecting patient autonomy and advancing goal-concordant care during critical moments of medical decision-making involving patients with DoC.

A hierarchy index for networks in the brain reveals a complex entangled organizational structure

Networks involved in information processing often have their nodes arranged hierarchically, with the majority of connections occurring in adjacent levels. However, despite being an intuitively appealing concept, the hierarchical organization of large networks, such as those in the brain, is difficult to identify, especially in absence of additional information beyond that provided by the connectome. In this paper, we propose a framework to uncover the hierarchical structure of a given network, that identifies the nodes occupying each level as well as the sequential order of the levels. It involves optimizing a metric that we use to quantify the extent of hierarchy present in a network. Applying this measure to various brain networks, ranging from the nervous system of the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans to the human connectome, we unexpectedly find that they exhibit a common network architectural motif intertwining hierarchy and modularity. This suggests that brain networks may have evolved to simultaneously exploit the functional advantages of these two types of organizations, viz., relatively independent modules performing distributed processing in parallel and a hierarchical structure that allows sequential pooling of these multiple processing streams. An intriguing possibility is that this property we report may be common to information processing networks in general.

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

Familiarity Alters the Bandwidth of Perceptual Awareness

Results from paradigms like change blindness and inattentional blindness indicate that observers are unaware of numerous aspects of the visual world. However, intuition suggests that perceptual experience is richer than these results indicate. Why does it feel like we see so much when the data suggests we see so little? One possibility stems from the fact that experimental studies always present observers with stimuli that they have never seen before. Meanwhile, when forming intuitions about perceptual experience, observers reflect on their experiences with scenes with which they are highly familiar (e.g., their office). Does prior experience with a scene change the bandwidth of perceptual awareness? Here, we asked if observers were better at noticing alterations to the periphery in familiar scenes compared with unfamiliar scenes. We found that observers noticed changes to the periphery more frequently with familiar stimuli. Signal detection theoretic analyses revealed that when observers are unfamiliar with a stimulus, they are less sensitive at noticing (d') and are more conservative in their response criterion (c). Taken together, these results suggest that prior knowledge expands the bandwidth of perceptual awareness. It should be stressed that these results challenge the widely held idea that prior knowledge fills in perception. Overall, these findings highlight how prior knowledge plays an important role in determining the limits of perceptual experience and is an important factor to consider when attempting to reconcile the tension between empirical observation and personal introspection.

Heartbeat-evoked neural response abnormalities in generalized anxiety disorder during peripheral adrenergic stimulation

Hyperarousal symptoms in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) are often incongruent with the observed physiological state, suggesting that abnormal processing of interoceptive signals is a characteristic feature of the disorder. To examine the neural mechanisms underlying interoceptive dysfunction in GAD, we evaluated whether adrenergic modulation of cardiovascular signaling differentially affects the heartbeat-evoked potential (HEP), an electrophysiological marker of cardiac interoception, during concurrent electroencephalogram and functional magnetic resonance imaging (EEG-fMRI) scanning. Intravenous infusions of the peripheral adrenergic agonist isoproterenol (0.5 and 2.0 micrograms, μg) were administered in a randomized, double-blinded and placebo-controlled fashion to dynamically perturb the cardiovascular system while recording the associated EEG-fMRI responses. During the 0.5 μg isoproterenol infusion, the GAD group (n = 24) exhibited significantly larger changes in HEP amplitude in an opposite direction than the healthy comparison (HC) group (n = 24). In addition, the GAD group showed significantly larger absolute HEP amplitudes than the HC group during saline infusions, when cardiovascular tone did not increase. No significant group differences in HEP amplitude were identified during the 2.0 μg isoproterenol infusion. Using analyzable blood oxygenation level-dependent fMRI data from participants with concurrent EEG-fMRI data (21 GAD and 21 HC), we found that the aforementioned HEP effects were uncorrelated with fMRI signals in the insula, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, and somatosensory cortex, brain regions implicated in cardiac signal processing in prior fMRI studies. These findings provide additional evidence of dysfunctional cardiac interoception in GAD and identify neural processes at the electrophysiological level that may be independent from blood oxygen level-dependent responses during peripheral adrenergic stimulation.

Individualized music induces theta-gamma phase-amplitude coupling in patients with disorders of consciousness

Objective

This study aimed to determine whether patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) could experience neural entrainment to individualized music, which explored the cross-modal influences of music on patients with DoC through phase-amplitude coupling (PAC). Furthermore, the study assessed the efficacy of individualized music or preferred music (PM) versus relaxing music (RM) in impacting patient outcomes, and examined the role of cross-modal influences in determining these outcomes.

Methods

Thirty-two patients with DoC [17 with vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and 15 with minimally conscious state (MCS)], alongside 16 healthy controls (HCs), were recruited for this study. Neural activities in the frontal-parietal network were recorded using scalp electroencephalography (EEG) during baseline (BL), RM and PM. Cerebral-acoustic coherence (CACoh) was explored to investigate participants' abilitiy to track music, meanwhile, the phase-amplitude coupling (PAC) was utilized to evaluate the cross-modal influences of music. Three months post-intervention, the outcomes of patients with DoC were followed up using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R).

Results

HCs and patients with MCS showed higher CACoh compared to VS/UWS patients within musical pulse frequency (p = 0.016, p = 0.045; p < 0.001, p = 0.048, for RM and PM, respectively, following Bonferroni correction). Only theta-gamma PAC demonstrated a significant interaction effect between groups and music conditions (F (2,44) = 2.685, p = 0.036). For HCs, the theta-gamma PAC in the frontal-parietal network was stronger in the PM condition compared to the RM (p = 0.016) and BL condition (p < 0.001). For patients with MCS, the theta-gamma PAC was stronger in the PM than in the BL (p = 0.040), while no difference was observed among the three music conditions in patients with VS/UWS. Additionally, we found that MCS patients who showed improved outcomes after 3 months exhibited evident neural responses to preferred music (p = 0.019). Furthermore, the ratio of theta-gamma coupling changes in PM relative to BL could predict clinical outcomes in MCS patients (r = 0.992, p < 0.001).

Conclusion

Individualized music may serve as a potential therapeutic method for patients with DoC through cross-modal influences, which rely on enhanced theta-gamma PAC within the consciousness-related network.

The experimental study of consciousness: Is psychology travelling back to the future?

It was with the promise of rendering an experimental approach to consciousness that psychology started its trajectory as an independent science more than 150 years ago. Here, we will posit that the neurosciences were instrumental in leading psychology to resume the study of consciousness by projecting an empirical agenda for the future. First, we will start by showing how scientists were able to venture into the consciousness of supposedly unconscious patients, opening the door for the identification of important neural correlates of distinct consciousness states. Then, we will describe how different technological advances and elegant experimental paradigms helped in establishing important neuronal correlates of global consciousness (i.e., being conscious at all), perceptual consciousness (i.e., being conscious of something), and self-consciousness (i.e., being conscious of itself). Finally, we will illustrate how the study of complex consciousness experiences may contribute to the clarification of the mechanisms associated with global consciousness, the relationship between perceptual and self-consciousness, and the interface among distinct self-consciousness domains. In closing, we will elaborate on the road ahead of us for re-establishing psychology as a science of consciousness.

Deciphering brain cellular and behavioral mechanisms: Insights from single-cell and spatial RNA sequencing

The brain is a complex computing system composed of a multitude of interacting neurons. The computational outputs of this system determine the behavior and perception of every individual. Each brain cell expresses thousands of genes that dictate the cell's function and physiological properties. Therefore, deciphering the molecular expression of each cell is of great significance for understanding its characteristics and role in brain function. Additionally, the positional information of each cell can provide crucial insights into their involvement in local brain circuits. In this review, we briefly overview the principles of single-cell RNA sequencing and spatial transcriptomics, the potential issues and challenges in their data processing, and their applications in brain research. We further outline several promising directions in neuroscience that could be integrated with single-cell RNA sequencing, including neurodevelopment, the identification of novel brain microstructures, cognition and behavior, neuronal cell positioning, molecules and cells related to advanced brain functions, sleep-wake cycles/circadian rhythms, and computational modeling of brain function. We believe that the deep integration of these directions with single-cell and spatial RNA sequencing can contribute significantly to understanding the roles of individual cells or cell types in these specific functions, thereby making important contributions to addressing critical questions in those fields. This article is categorized under: RNA Evolution and Genomics > Computational Analyses of RNA RNA in Disease and Development > RNA in Development RNA in Disease and Development > RNA in Disease.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Consciousness and the Dying Brain

The near-death experience has been reported since antiquity and is often characterized by the perception of light, interactions with other entities, and life recall. Near-death experiences can occur in a variety of situations, but they have been studied systematically after in-hospital cardiac arrest, with an incidence of 10 to 20%. Long attributed to metaphysical or supernatural causes, there have been recent advances in understanding the neurophysiologic basis of this unique category of conscious experience. This article reviews the epidemiology and neurobiology of near-death experiences, with a focus on clinical and laboratory evidence for a surge of neurophysiologic gamma oscillations and cortical connectivity after cardiac and respiratory arrest.

Toward a universal theory of consciousness

While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of "Universality" as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.

Ultrahigh Field fMRI Reveals Different Roles of the Temporal and Frontoparietal Cortices in Subjective Awareness

A central question in consciousness theories is whether one is dealing with a dichotomous ("all-or-none") or a gradual phenomenon. In this 7T fMRI study, we investigated whether dichotomy or gradualness in fact depends on the brain region associated with perceptual awareness reports. Both male and female human subjects performed an emotion discrimination task (fear vs neutral bodies) presented under continuous flash suppression with trial-based perceptual awareness measures. Behaviorally, recognition sensitivity increased linearly with increased stimuli awareness and was at chance level during perceptual unawareness. Physiologically, threat stimuli triggered a slower heart rate than neutral ones during "almost clear" stimulus experience, indicating freezing behavior. Brain results showed that activity in the occipitotemporal, parietal, and frontal regions as well as in the amygdala increased with increased stimulus awareness while early visual areas showed the opposite pattern. The relationship between temporal area activity and perceptual awareness best fitted a gradual model while the activity in frontoparietal areas fitted a dichotomous model. Furthermore, our findings illustrate that specific experimental decisions, such as stimulus type or the approach used to evaluate awareness, play pivotal roles in consciousness studies and warrant careful consideration.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness

Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.

Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness

In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces of sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of the data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness and then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions.

An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Breakdown of effective information flow in disorders of consciousness: Insights from TMS-EEG

BACKGROUND

The complexity of the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying human consciousness is widely acknowledged, with information processing and flow originating in cortex conceived as a core mechanism of consciousness emergence. Combination of transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (TMS-EEG) is considered as a promising technique to understand the effective information flow associated with consciousness.

OBJECTIVES

To investigate information flow with TMS-EEG and its relationship to different consciousness states.

METHODS

We applied an effective information flow analysis by combining time-varying multivariate adaptive autoregressive model and adaptive directed transfer function on TMS-EEG data of frontal, motor and parietal cortex in patients with disorder of consciousness (DOC), including 14 vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) patients, 21 minimally conscious state (MCS) patients, and 22 healthy subjects.

RESULTS

TMS in DOC patients, particularly VS/UWS, induced a significantly weaker effective information flow compared to healthy subjects. The bidirectional directed information flow was lost in DOC patients with TMS of frontal, motor and parietal cortex. The interactive ROI rate of the information flow network induced by TMS of frontal and parietal cortex was significantly lower in VS/UWS than in MCS. The interactive ROI rate correlated with DOC clinical scales.

CONCLUSIONS

TMS-EEG revealed a physiologically relevant correlation between TMS-induced information flow and levels of consciousness. This suggests that breakdown of effective cortical information flow serves as a viable marker of human consciousness.

SIGNIFICANCE

Findings offer a unique perspective on the relevance of information flow in DOC, thus providing a novel way of understanding the physiological basis of human consciousness.

Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.