Anticipating cognitive effort: roles of perceived error-likelihood and time demands

Judgments of effort and associated cues are influenced by stimulus context

The experience of cognitive effort is ubiquitous as well as influential; however, our understanding of how judgments of effort are influenced by contextual change is currently limited. Recent work has suggested that explicit cue reports immediately after provision of judgments of effort are sensitive to the evaluation context in which the judgment is made (Ashburner & Risko, 2022). We extend this research here by examining whether a "mixed" vs. "pure" stimulus context (i.e., experience with multiple stimulus types vs. a single stimulus type) would also influence judgments of effort. Furthermore, using explicit cue reports, we investigated whether the cues used to make these judgments were likewise influenced by the stimulus context. Results demonstrated that the pattern of effort judgments and the explicit cue reports changed markedly across stimulus context. Implications of these results in terms of better understanding how individuals make judgments of effort are discussed.

Noninvasive Brain Stimulation over the Frontopolar Cortex Promotes Willingness to Exert Cognitive Effort in a Foraging-Like Sequential Choice Task

Individuals avoid spending cognitive effort unless expected rewards offset the perceived costs. Recent work employing tasks that provide explicit information about demands and incentives suggests causal involvement of the frontopolar cortex (FPC) in effort-based decision-making. Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether the FPC's role in motivating effort generalizes to sequential choice problems in which task demand and reward rates vary indirectly and as a function of experience. In a double-blind, within-subject design, 46 participants (36 female, 8 male, 1 "neither/other") received anodal (i.e., excitatory) or sham stimulation over the right FPC during an Effort Foraging Task, which required choosing between harvesting patches for successively decreasing resources or traveling to replenished patches by performing a cognitive task with environment-specific difficulty. As expected, participants exited patches later (i.e., exhibited lower exit thresholds) when traveling required greater (versus less) effort, indicating increased travel costs in high-effort environments. Under anodal tDCS, the difference in exit thresholds between environments was significantly smaller relative to sham. Finally, individual differences analyses hint that participants with lower self-reported motivation to exert effort exhibited greater travel cost reductions following tDCS. Together, these findings support the theorized causal role of the FPC in motivating cognitively effortful behavior, expand its role to more ecologically valid serial decisions, and highlight the potential for tDCS as a tool to increase motivation with potential clinical applications.

Are you worth the wait? Waiting time modulates the social feedback processing: Evidence from event-related potentials

Processing social feedback is essential for establishing appropriate social connections. However, social feedback is not always immediate, and the impact of waiting time on social feedback processing remains unexplored. Using electroencephalography (EEG) and event-related potentials (ERPs), the present study investigated how waiting time affects the N170, reward positivity (RewP), and P3. Participants (N = 36) completed a social evaluation task, awaiting feedback from liked and disliked peers with short (800-1200 ms) or long (5000-6000 ms) waiting times. Participants were more motivated to receive feedback from liked peers, and they rated acceptance from liked peers as more pleasant than rejection. Notably, participants found longer waits more worthwhile when receiving acceptance from liked peers, but less worthwhile when awaiting feedback from disliked peers. EEG results revealed that the RewP was increased for long waiting times for feedback from liked peers, and, conversely, reduced for long waiting times for feedback from disliked peers. Additionally, N170 and P3 were found to be sensitive to waiting time, with larger amplitudes for long compared to short waits. Overall, this study demonstrates that waiting time differentially affects social feedback processing, as reflected by changes in the N170, RewP, and P3. Our findings suggest that increased waiting time does not necessarily reduce reward value; it can enhance it depending on subjective social preferences. The increased N170 and P3 amplitudes during longer waits may indicate heightened attentional and memory demands. This study advances our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying social decision-making.

Identifying conflict monitoring as a specific executive component that contributes to impaired self-awareness in patients with acquired brain injury

OBJECTIVE

Impaired self-awareness (SA) after acquired brain injury (ABI) has traditionally been linked to deficits in executive functions. However, conflicting findings about this relationship have been reported in the literature. This inconsistency is probably due to the multicomponent nature of both constructs, as not all aspects of executive functions may be equally relevant to all components of self-awareness. This study explored whether offline SA (i.e. metacognitive knowledge) and online SA (i.e. error detection) relate to a less studied executive component, conflict monitoring/resolution.

METHOD

Twenty-six patients with ABI performed the Three-Conflict Cognitive Control Task (3CCT), an experimental task that allowed to measure the ability to monitor and solve three different types of conflicts (Distractors-filtering, Spatial Stroop and Simon). Measures of SA were collected: offline SA was based on self-informant discrepancy about patient's everyday functional difficulties, and online SA was based on error detection abilities during a performance-based naturalistic task (The Breakfast Conflict Task).

RESULTS

After controlling for global cognition, the conflict monitoring measure of 3CCT demonstarted incremental validity in predicting offline and online SA measured in naturalistic tasks.

CONCLUSIONS

Conflict monitoring/resolution seems to be an important component of SA. This finding contributes to further understand the relationship between executive functions and SA. In addition, conflict monitoring/resolution is an executive component that should be considered when designing assessment and intervention strategies to deal with ISA.

An experimental manipulation of the value of effort

People who take on challenges and persevere longer are more likely to succeed in life. But individuals often avoid exerting effort, and there is limited experimental research investigating whether we can learn to value effort. We developed a paradigm to test the hypothesis that people can learn to value effort and will seek effortful challenges if directly incentivized to do so. We also dissociate the effects of rewarding people for choosing effortful challenges and performing well. The results provide limited evidence that rewarding effort increased people's willingness to choose harder tasks when rewards were no longer offered (near transfer). There was also mixed evidence that rewarding effort increased willingness to choose harder tasks in another unrelated and unrewarded task (far transfer). These heterogeneous results highlight the need for further research to understand when this paradigm may be the most effective for increasing and generalizing the value of effort.

Wagers for work: Decomposing the costs of cognitive effort

Some aspects of cognition are more taxing than others. Accordingly, many people will avoid cognitively demanding tasks in favor of simpler alternatives. Which components of these tasks are costly, and how much, remains unknown. Here, we use a novel task design in which subjects request wages for completing cognitive tasks and a computational modeling procedure that decomposes their wages into the costs driving them. Using working memory as a test case, our approach revealed that gating new information into memory and protecting against interference are costly. Critically, other factors, like memory load, appeared less costly. Other key factors which may drive effort costs, such as error avoidance, had minimal influence on wage requests. Our approach is sensitive to individual differences, and could be used in psychiatric populations to understand the true underlying nature of apparent cognitive deficits.

Sound localization in noisy contexts: performance, metacognitive evaluations and head movements

Localizing sounds in noisy environments can be challenging. Here, we reproduce real-life soundscapes to investigate the effects of environmental noise on sound localization experience. We evaluated participants' performance and metacognitive assessments, including measures of sound localization effort and confidence, while also tracking their spontaneous head movements. Normal-hearing participants (N = 30) were engaged in a speech-localization task conducted in three common soundscapes that progressively increased in complexity: nature, traffic, and a cocktail party setting. To control visual information and measure behaviors, we used visual virtual reality technology. The results revealed that the complexity of the soundscape had an impact on both performance errors and metacognitive evaluations. Participants reported increased effort and reduced confidence for sound localization in more complex noise environments. On the contrary, the level of soundscape complexity did not influence the use of spontaneous exploratory head-related behaviors. We also observed that, irrespective of the noisy condition, participants who implemented a higher number of head rotations and explored a wider extent of space by rotating their heads made lower localization errors. Interestingly, we found preliminary evidence that an increase in spontaneous head movements, specifically the extent of head rotation, leads to a decrease in perceived effort and an increase in confidence at the single-trial level. These findings expand previous observations regarding sound localization in noisy environments by broadening the perspective to also include metacognitive evaluations, exploratory behaviors and their interactions.

Judging the difficulty of perceptual decisions

Deciding how difficult it is going to be to perform a task allows us to choose between tasks, allocate appropriate resources, and predict future performance. To be useful for planning, difficulty judgments should not require completion of the task. Here, we examine the processes underlying difficulty judgments in a perceptual decision-making task. Participants viewed two patches of dynamic random dots, which were colored blue or yellow stochastically on each appearance. Stimulus coherence (the probability, pblue, of a dot being blue) varied across trials and patches thus establishing difficulty, |pblue -0.5|. Participants were asked to indicate for which patch it would be easier to decide the dominant color. Accuracy in difficulty decisions improved with the difference in the stimulus difficulties, whereas the reaction times were not determined solely by this quantity. For example, when the patches shared the same difficulty, reaction times were shorter for easier stimuli. A comparison of several models of difficulty judgment suggested that participants compare the absolute accumulated evidence from each stimulus and terminate their decision when they differed by a set amount. The model predicts that when the dominant color of each stimulus is known, reaction times should depend only on the difference in difficulty, which we confirm empirically. We also show that this model is preferred to one that compares the confidence one would have in making each decision. The results extend evidence accumulation models, used to explain choice, reaction time, and confidence to prospective judgments of difficulty.

Computational mechanisms underlying the dynamics of physical and cognitive fatigue

The willingness to exert effort for reward is essential but comes at the cost of fatigue. Theories suggest fatigue increases after both physical and cognitive exertion, subsequently reducing the motivation to exert effort. Yet a mechanistic understanding of how this happens on a moment-to-moment basis, and whether mechanisms are common to both mental and physical effort, is lacking. In two studies, participants reported momentary (trial-by-trial) ratings of fatigue during an effort-based decision-making task requiring either physical (grip-force) or cognitive (mental arithmetic) effort. Using a novel computational model, we show that fatigue fluctuates from trial-to-trial as a function of exerted effort and predicts subsequent choices. This mechanism was shared across the domains. Selective to the cognitive domain, committing errors also induced momentary increases in feelings of fatigue. These findings provide insight into the computations underlying the influence of effortful exertion on fatigue and motivation, in both physical and cognitive domains.

Reliability of the empathy selection task, a novel behavioral measure of empathy avoidance

The empathy selection task is a novel behavioral paradigm designed to assess an individual's willingness to engage in empathy. Work with this task has demonstrated that people prefer to avoid empathy when some other activity is available, though individual differences that might predict performance on this task have been largely unexamined. Here, we assess the suitability of the empathy selection task for use in individual difference and experimental research by examining its reliability within and across testing sessions. We compare the reliability of summary scores on the empathy selection task (i.e., proportion of empathy choices) as an individual difference metric to that of two commonly used experimental tasks, the Stroop error rate and go/no-go commission rate. Next, we assess systematic changes at the item/trial level using generalized multilevel modeling which considers participants' individual performance variation. Across two samples (N = 89), we find that the empathy selection task is stable between testing sessions and has good/substantial test-retest reliability (ICCs = .65 and .67), suggesting that it is comparable or superior to other commonly used experimental tasks with respect to its ability to consistently rank individuals.

Judging the difficulty of perceptual decisions

Deciding how difficult it is going to be to perform a task allows us to choose between tasks, allocate appropriate resources, and predict future performance. To be useful for planning, difficulty judgments should not require completion of the task. Here we examine the processes underlying difficulty judgments in a perceptual decision making task. Participants viewed two patches of dynamic random dots, which were colored blue or yellow stochastically on each appearance. Stimulus coherence (the probability, p blue , of a dot being blue) varied across trials and patches thus establishing difficulty, p blue - 0.5 . Participants were asked to indicate for which patch it would be easier to decide the dominant color. Accuracy in difficulty decisions improved with the difference in the stimulus difficulties, whereas the reaction times were not determined solely by this quantity. For example, when the patches shared the same difficulty, reaction times were shorter for easier stimuli. A comparison of several models of difficulty judgment suggested that participants compare the absolute accumulated evidence from each stimulus and terminate their decision when they differed by a set amount. The model predicts that when the dominant color of each stimulus is known, reaction times should depend only on the difference in difficulty, which we confirm empirically. We also show that this model is preferred to one that compares the confidence one would have in making each decision. The results extend evidence accumulation models, used to explain choice, reaction time and confidence to prospective judgments of difficulty.

People are curious about immoral and morally ambiguous others

Looking to the popularity of superheroes, true crime stories, and anti-heroic characters like Tony Soprano, we investigated whether moral extremity, especially moral badness, piques curiosity. Across five experiments (N = 2429), we examine moral curiosity, testing under what conditions the moral minds of others spark explanation-seeking behavior. In Experiment 1, we find that among the most widely watched Netflix shows in the US over a five-month period, the more immoral the protagonist, the more hours people spent watching. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we find that when given a choice to learn more about morally good, bad, ambiguous, or average others, people preferred to learn more about morally extreme people, both good and bad. Experiment 3 reveals that people are more curious for explanations about (vs. descriptions of) morally bad and ambiguous people compared to morally good ones. Finally, Experiment 4 tests the uniqueness of curiosity for moral ambiguity. We find that people are more drawn to moral rather than aesthetic ambiguity, suggesting that ambiguity, which is cognitively taxing and sometimes avoided, preferentially engenders information seeking in the moral domain. These findings suggest deviations from moral normativity, especially badness, spur curiosity. People are curious about immorality and agents who differ from the norm.

Conscious cognitive effort in cognitive control

Cognitive effort is thought to be familiar in everyday life, ubiquitous across multiple variations of task and circumstance, and integral to cost/benefit computations that are themselves central to the proper functioning of cognitive control. In particular, cognitive effort is thought to be closely related to the assessment of cognitive control's costs. I argue here that the construct of cognitive effort, as it is deployed in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, is problematically unclear. The result is that talk of cognitive effort may paper over significant disagreement regarding the nature of cognitive effort, and its key functions for cognitive control. I highlight key points of disagreement, and several open questions regarding what causes cognitive effort, what cognitive effort represents, cognitive effort's relationship to action, and cognitive effort's relationship to consciousness. I also suggest that pluralism about cognitive effort-that cognitive effort may manifest as a range of intentional or non-intentional actions the function of which is to promote greater success at paradigmatic cognitive control tasks-may be a fruitful and irenic way to conceive of cognitive effort. Finally, I suggest that recent trends in work on cognitive control suggests that we might fruitfully conceive of cognitive effort as one key node in a complex network of mental value, and that studying this complex network may illuminate the nature of cognitive control, and the role of consciousness in cognitive control's proper functioning. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Neuroscience > Cognition.

Cognitive cost of empathizing with mothers and strangers by Chinese college students

Background

Empathy is a choice and the product of a dynamic decision process based on motivation. The value trade-off in empathy is object-specific and people are more likely to empathize with ingroup, especially empathize with whom we are particularly concerned. The mother is an integral part of the self-concept, but the status of the mother in the self-concept of the eastern and western subjects was different. Previous studies have shown that mother is integrated in self-concept and share the same motivational hierarchy with self in Chinese brain.

Objectives

The study's purpose is to investigate the empathic choice for mothers in Chinese culture and its regulatory mechanism.

Methods

Three experiments were conducted to investigate whether Chinese college students would choose to empathize with their mothers. Experiment 1 used the Empathy Selection Task to examine the empathic choices between mother-other and stranger-other conditions with two blocks of 50 trials, and used the NASA Task Load Index to evaluate the cognitive costs for each deck option presented; Experiment 2 induced a disagreeable emotional state and replicate the same conditions of the experiment 1; Experiment 3 induced an agreeable emotional state and replicate the same conditions of the experiment one.

Results and conclusions

The results showed that: (1) participants tended to avoid empathizing with their mothers and strangers for to the cognitive cost; (2) participants were more likely to choose empathy when the target was their mother rather than when the target was a stranger-other, due to the social reward; and (3) participants were more likely to opt to empathize with their mothers when positive emotions towards their mothers were primed. The results suggested that empathy is a choice and the product of a dynamic decision process based on motivation and the value trade-off in empathy is object-specific.

Everything Comes at a Price: Considerations in Modeling Effort-Based Choice

When observing human behavior, one of the key factors determining choice is effort. It is often assumed that people prefer an easier course of action when the alternative yields the same benefits. However, recent research demonstrates that this is not always the case: effort is not always costly and can also add value. A promising avenue to study effort-based choice is to utilize formal decision models that enable quantitative modeling. In this paper, we aim to present an overview of the current approaches to modeling effort-based choice and discuss some considerations that stem from theoretical and practical issues (present and previous) in studies on the role of effort, focusing on the connections and discrepancies between formal models and the findings from the body of empirical research. Considering that effort can, in some circumstances, act as a cost and as a benefit, reconciling these discrepancies is a practical and theoretical challenge that can ultimately lead to better predictions and increased model validity. Our review identifies and discusses these discrepancies providing direction for future empirical research.

More Effort, Less Fatigue: The Role of Interest in Increasing Effort and Reducing Mental Fatigue

People generally prefer easier over more difficult mental tasks. Using two different adaptations of a demand selection task, we show that interest can influence this effect, such that participants choose options with a higher cognitive workload. Interest was also associated with lower feelings of fatigue. In two studies, participants (N = 63 and N = 158) repeatedly made a choice between completing a difficult or easy math problem. Results show that liking math predicts choosing more difficult (vs. easy) math problems (even after controlling for perceived math skill). Two additional studies used the Academic Diligence Task (Galla et al., 2014), where high school students (N = 447 and N = 884) could toggle between a math task and playing a video game/watching videos. In these studies, we again find that math interest relates to greater proportion of time spent on the math problems. Three of these four studies also examined perceived fatigue, finding that interest relates to lower fatigue. An internal meta-analysis of the four studies finds a small but robust effect of interest on both the willingness to exert greater effort and the experience of less fatigue (despite engaging in more effort).

Comprehension, Perception, and Projection

Health social networks (HSNs) allow individuals with health information needs to connect and discuss health-related issues online. Political-technology intertwinement (e.g. GDPR and Digital Technology) highlights that users need to be aware, understand, and willing to provide electronic consent (eConsent) when sharing personal information online. The objective of this study is to explore the ‘As-Is’ factors which impact individuals’ decisional autonomy when consenting to the privacy policy (PP) and Terms and Conditions (T&Cs) on a HSN. We use a Situational Awareness (SA) lens to examine decision autonomy when providing eConsent. A mixed-methods approach reveals that technical and privacy comprehension, user perceptions, and projection of future consequences impact participants’ decision autonomy in providing eConsent. Without dealing with the privacy paradox at the outset, decision awareness and latterly decision satisfaction is negatively impacted. Movement away from clickwrap online consent to customised two-way engagement is the way forward for the design of eConsent.

Towards a common code for difficulty: Navigating a narrow gap is like memorizing an extra digit

What makes a task hard or easy? The question seems easy, but answering it has been hard. The only consensus has been that, all else being equal, easy tasks can be performed by more individuals than hard tasks, and easy tasks are usually preferred over hard tasks. Feghhi and Rosenbaum (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 45, 983-994, 2019) asked whether task difficulty might reflect a single amodal quantity. Based on their subjects' two-alternative forced-choice data from tasks involving choices of tasks with graded physical and mental challenges, the authors showed that the difficulty of passing through a narrow gap rather than a wide gap was psychologically equivalent to memorizing an extra .55 digits. In the present study, we extended this approach by adding new arguments for the hypothesis that task difficulty might reflect a single amodal quantity (inspired by considerations of physics, economics, and the common code hypothesis for the study of perception and action), and we tested narrower gaps than before to see whether we would find a larger equivalent memory-digit. Consistent with our prediction, we obtained a value of .95. We suggest that our multi-modal two-alternative forced-choice procedure can pave the way toward a better understanding of task difficulty.

Appealing to the cognitive miser: Using demand avoidance to modulate cognitive flexibility in cued and voluntary task switching

Current cognitive control accounts view goal-directed behavior as striking a balance between two antagonistic control demands: Stability, on the one hand, reflects a rigid, focused state of control and flexibility, while on the other, reflects a relaxed, distractible state, whereby goals can be rapidly updated to meet unexpected changes in demands. In the current study, we sought to test whether the avoidance of cognitive demand could motivate people to dynamically regulate control along the stability-flexibility continuum. In both cued (Experiment 1) and voluntary (Experiment 2) task-switching paradigms, we selectively associated either task-switches or task-repetitions with high cognitive demand (independent of task identity), and measured changes in performance in a following phase after the demand manipulation was removed. Contrasting performance with a control group, across both experiments, we found that selectively associating cognitive demand with task repetitions increased flexibility, but selectively associating cognitive demand with task switches failed to increase stability. The results of the current study provide novel evidence for avoidance-driven modulations of control regulation along the stability-flexibility continuum, while also highlighting some limitations in using task-switching paradigms to examine motivational influences on control adaptation. Data, analysis code, experiment code, and preprint available at osf.io/7rct9/. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

What matters in making demand-based decisions: Time alone or difficulty too?

Which task is easier, doing arithmetic problems of specified form for some specified duration, or carrying a bucket of specified weight over some specified distance? If it is possible to choose between the “more cognitive” task and the “more physical” task, how are the difficulty levels of the tasks compared? We conducted two experiments in which participants chose the easier of two tasks, one that involved solving addition or multiplication problems (Experiment 1) or addition problems with different numbers of addends (Experiment 2) for varying amounts of time (in both experiments), and one that involved carrying a bucket of different weights over a fixed distance (in both experiments). We found that the probability of choosing to do the bucket task was higher when the bucket was empty than when it was weighted, and increased when the cognitive task was harder and its duration grew. We could account for the choice probabilities by mapping the independent variables onto one abstract variable, Φ. The functional identity of Φ remains to be determined. It could be interpreted as an inferred effort variable, subjective duration, or an abstract, amodal common code for difficulty.

To organise or not to organise? Understanding search strategy preferences using Lego building blocks

Humans routinely organise or reconfigure the environment as part of their everyday activities, such as placing a set of keys in a designated location to reduce the need to remember its location. This type of spatial organisation is widely thought to reduce both the physical and cognitive demands of a task to allow individuals to perform tasks more easily. Although spatial organisation can be a useful strategy when searching for items in the environment, individuals do not always choose to utilise these organisational strategies when carrying out everyday tasks. Across three experiments, we examined individuals' preference for spatial organisation in the context of a real-world search task, and the degree to which individuals engaged in time- and effort-based cost-benefit analysis to inform whether to choose between an organisation-based or non-organisation-based search strategy. We found that individuals' strategy preferences could be explained by the perceived task time associated with each strategy, but not perceived task effort. However, even statistically controlling for relative perceived task time or reported effort, participants showed a strong systematic preference against organisation prior to engaging in the task, and, post-task, a strong preference towards organisation. Implications for understanding individuals' use of spatial organisation are discussed.

The impact of the narrative mindset on effectivity in social problem solving

The narrative mindset is a tendency to interpret social information in the frame of stories. Two experiments were conducted to determine if and why the narrative mindset increases social problem-solving effectivity. The experiments consisted of two parts: the experimental manipulation (inducing the narrative mindset or control condition) and the observation of effects. In the second part, presented as a separate study, a participant was asked to advise other people facing interpersonal problems (experiment 1) or emotional problems (experiment 2). Three pairs of coders judged each piece of advice independently on three scales: Effectivity of the advice, empathy, and personalization (using their own experiences in providing the advice). The results indicate that the narrative mindset increases empathy, supported by the co-occurring increase in the problem's personalization, which leads to higher effectivity. The results reveal the positive real-life implications of structuring social information within a story frame. It may encourage the introduction of the narrative mindset effects into an area of social cognition research. Finally, the experiments show that the narrative mindset may be activated experimentally, providing an effective instrument to test the impact of narrative knowledge on social cognition.

Judgements of effort as a function of post-trial versus post-task elicitation

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our perception of effort is limited. Performance is typically used as one way to assess effort in cognitive tasks (e.g., tasks that take longer are generally thought to be more effortful); however, Dunn and Risko reported a recent case where such “objective” measures of effort were dissociated from judgements of effort (i.e., subjective effort). This dissociation occurred when participants either made their judgements of effort after the task (i.e., reading stimuli composed of rotated words) or without ever performing the task. This leaves open the possibility that if participants made their judgements of effort more proximal to the actual experience of performing the task (e.g., right after a given trial) that these judgements might better correspond to putatively “objective” measures of effort. To address this question, we conducted two experiments replicating Dunn and Risko with additional probes for post-trial judgements of effort (i.e., a judgement of effort made right after each trial). Results provided some support for the notion that judgements of effort more closely follow reading times when made post-trial as opposed to post-task. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgements of effort are discussed.

Perceived effort for reaching is associated with self-reported fatigue

Perceived effort for goal-directed reaching may be impacted by the level of self-reported fatigue, however, the relationship between self-reported fatigue and perceived effort has not been examined. We examined how perceived effort changed under varied reach conditions and the relationship between fatigue, perceived effort and reach performance. Twenty-three young adults performed reach actions toward 9 different targets on a digitizing tablet. Perceived effort was measured using the Borg Rate of Perceived Exertion and Paas Mental Effort Rating Scale. Self-reported fatigue was quantified using the Fatigue Scales for Motor and Cognitive Functions. As reach conditions became more difficult, perceived effort increased significantly. Further, individuals who reported greater fatigue also reported greater perceived effort and showed greater endpoint error during reaching.

The psychology of task management: The smaller tasks trap

When people are confronted with multiple tasks, how do they decide which task to do first? Normatively, priority should be given to the most efficient task (i.e., the task with the best cost/benefit ratio). However, we hypothesize that people consistently choose to address smaller (involving less work) tasks first, and continue to focus on smaller tasks, even when this strategy emerges as less efficient, a phenomenon we term the “smaller tasks trap”. We also hypothesize that the preference for the smaller tasks is negatively related to individual differences in the tendency for rational thinking. To test these hypotheses, we developed a novel paradigm consisting of an incentive-compatible task management game, in which participants are saddled with multiple tasks and have to decide how to handle them. The results lend weight to the smaller tasks trap and indicate that individual differences in rational thinking predict susceptibility to this trap. That is, participants low in rational thinking preferred to start with a smaller (vs. larger) task and focused more on the smaller tasks regardless of their efficiency. Consequently, their overall performance in the task management game was significantly lower. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings and suggest possible interventions that may help people improve their task management.

Absence and Presence of Human Interaction: The Relationship Between Loneliness and Empathy

Loneliness is the negative experience of a discrepancy between the desired and actual personal network of relationships. Whereas past work have focused on the effect of loneliness on prosocial behaviors, the present research addressed the gap by exploring the effect of loneliness on empathy. Empathy is the emotional reaction of sharing in others' internal experiences. We adopted a new paradigm-empathy selection task, which uses free choices to assess the desire to empathize. Participants made a series of binary choices, selecting situations that instructed them to empathize or objectively describe. Results from two studies showed that, compared to non-lonely people, lonely people were more likely to choose positive empathy but to avoid negative empathy. The pattern occurs because lonely people perceived higher (vs. lower) social support in the positive (vs. negative) empathy tasks. Moreover, empathy served to be an adaptive emotion regulation strategy developed by lonely people to reduce their loneliness effectively. This research has resulted in both theoretical contributions to prosocial behavior literature and the further discovery of practical implications for loneliness intervention.

The Subjective Value of Cognitive Effort is Encoded by a Domain-General Valuation Network

Cognitive control is necessary for goal-directed behavior, yet people treat cognitive control demand as a cost, which discounts the value of rewards in a similar manner as other costs, such as delay or risk. It is unclear, however, whether the subjective value (SV) of cognitive effort is encoded in the same putatively domain-general brain valuation network implicated in other cost domains, or instead engages a distinct frontoparietal network, as implied by recent studies. Here, we provide rigorous evidence that the valuation network, with core foci in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, also encodes SV during cognitive effort-based decision-making in healthy, male and female adult humans. We doubly dissociate this network from frontoparietal regions that are instead recruited as a function of decision difficulty. We show that the domain-general valuation network jointly and independently encodes both reward benefits and cognitive effort costs. We also demonstrate that cognitive effort SV signals predict choice and are influenced by state and trait motivation, including sensitivity to reward and anticipated task performance. These findings unify cognitive effort with other cost domains, and suggest candidate neural mechanisms underlying state and trait variation in willingness to expend cognitive effort.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Subjective effort costs are increasingly understood to diminish cognitive control over task performance and can thus undermine functioning across health and disease. Yet, we are only beginning to understand how decisions about cognitive effort are made. A key question is how subjective values are computed. Recent work suggests that the value of cognitive effort might be computed by networks that are distinct from those involved in other domains like intertemporal and risky decision-making, implying distinct mechanisms. Here we demonstrate that the domain-general network also encodes effort-discounted value, linking cognitive effort closely with other domains. Our results thus elucidate key mechanisms supporting decisions about cognitive effort, and point to candidate neural targets for intervention in disorders involving impaired cognitive motivation.

The Effort Paradox: Effort Is Both Costly and Valued

According to prominent models in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and economics, effort (be it physical or mental) is costly: when given a choice, humans and non-human animals alike tend to avoid effort. Here, we suggest that the opposite is also true and review extensive evidence that effort can also add value. Not only can the same outcomes be more rewarding if we apply more (not less) effort, sometimes we select options precisely because they require effort. Given the increasing recognition of effort's role in motivation, cognitive control, and value-based decision-making, considering this neglected side of effort will not only improve formal computational models, but also provide clues about how to promote sustained mental effort across time.

The Effects of Money on Fake Rating Behavior in E-Commerce: Electrophysiological Time Course Evidence From Consumers

Online ratings impose significant effects on the behaviors of potential customers. Thus, online merchants try to adopt strategies that affect this rating behavior, and most of these strategies are connected to money, such as the strategies of returning cash coupons if a consumer gives a five-star rating (RI strategy, an acronym for “returning” and “if”) or returning cash coupons directly with no additional requirements (RN strategy, an acronym for “returning” and “no”). The current study explored whether a certain strategy (RN or RI) was more likely to give rise to false rating behaviors, as assessed by event-related potentials. A two-stimulus paradigm was used in this experiment. The first stimulus (S1) was the picture of a product with four Chinese characters that reflected the product quality (slightly defective vs. seriously defective vs. not defective), and the second stimulus (S2) displayed the coupon strategy (RN or RI). The participants were asked to decide whether or not to give a five-star rating. The behavioral results showed that the RI strategy led to a higher rate of five-star ratings than the RN strategy. For the electrophysiological time courses, the N1, N2, and LPP components were evaluated. The slightly defective products elicited a larger amplitude of the N1 component than the seriously defective and not-defective products, reflecting that perceptual difficulty was associated with the processing of the slightly defective products. The RI strategy evoked a less negative N2 and a more positive LPP than the RN strategy, indicating that the subjects perceived less conflict and experienced stronger incentives when processing the RI strategy. These findings will benefit future studies of fake online comments and provide evidence supporting the policy of forbidding the use of the RI strategy in e-commerce.