Harm should not be a necessary criterion for mental disorder: some reflections on the DSM-5 definition of mental disorder

Psychopathology and Metaphysics: Can One Be a Realist About Mental Disorder?

Metaphysical realism about mental disorder is the thesis that mental disorder exists mind-independently. There are two ways to challenge metaphysical realism about mental disorder. The first is by denying that mental disorder exists. The second is by denying that mental disorder exists mind-independently. Or, differently put, by arguing that mental disorder is mind-dependent. The aim of this paper is three-fold: (a) to examine three ways in which mental disorder can be said to be mind-dependent (namely, by being causally dependent on the human mind, by being weakly dependent on human attitudes, and by being strongly dependent on human attitudes), (b) to clarify their differences, and (c) to discuss their implications regarding metaphysical realism about mental disorder. I argue that mental disorder being mind-dependent in the first two senses is compatible with metaphysical realism about mental disorder, whereas mental disorder being mind-dependent in the third sense is not.

Does Bother/Distress Contribute to the Diagnosis of Premature Ejaculation?

Introduction

The role of bother/distress in the diagnosis of premature ejaculation (PE) has received minimal investigation compared with the 2 other diagnostic criteria, ejaculatory control and ejaculatory latency (EL).

Aim

This study assessed (i) the added variance explained by bother/distress to the diagnostic accuracy of PE and (ii) determined its overall contribution to a PE diagnosis.

Methods

The 3 diagnostic criteria for PE were assessed in 2,589 men (mean age = 38.2 years, SD = 13.5) in order to determine the contribution of each factor to a dysfunctional diagnosis. A series of regression and discriminant analyses were used to assess the value of bother/distress in explaining ejaculatory control and in predicting accuracy of PE group status. Commonality analysis was used to determine the relative contribution of each of these factors to the diagnosis of PE.

Main Outcome Measure

The major outcome was the quantified contribution of “bother/distress” to a PE diagnosis.

Results

Bother/distress accounted for about 3–4% of the variation in ejaculatory control and added only minimally to the prediction accuracy of PE group status (no, probable, definite PE). Commonality analysis indicated that bother/distress comprised about 3.6% of the unique explained variation in the PE diagnosis, compared with ejaculatory control and EL which contributed 54.5% and 26.7%, respectively. Common variance among factors contributed the remaining 15.5% to the PE diagnosis.

Clinical Translation

Bother/distress contributes least to the determination of a PE diagnosis. Its contribution is largely redundant with the unique and combined contributions of ejaculatory control and EL.

Strengths and Limitations

Using a well-powered and multivariate analysis, this study parsed out the relative contributions of the 3 diagnostic criteria to a PE diagnosis. The study is limited by its use of estimated EL, a single item assessment of bother/distress, and the lack of differentiation of PE subtypes, lifelong and acquired.

Conclusion

Bother/distress contributes minimally to the PE diagnosis, yet its assessment may be key to understanding the experiences of the patient/couple and to developing an effective treatment strategy.

Rowland DL, McNabney SM, Hevesi K. Does Bother/Distress Contribute to the Diagnosis of Premature Ejaculation?. Sex Med 2022;10:100548.

The Tenuous Role of Distress in the Diagnosis of Premature Ejaculation: A Narrative Review

BACKGROUND

Unlike the other 2 criteria for diagnosing premature ejaculation (PE), namely lack of ejaculatory control and short ejaculation latency (EL), the role of bother/distress has received only minimal consideration and investigation.

AIM

The specific aim was to determine both why distress is included in the PE diagnosis and whether such inclusion is advantageous to achieving better diagnostic outcomes. To this end, the review explored the historical and theoretical underpinnings of the inclusion of "bother/ distress" in the diagnosis of PE, with reference to the larger role that distress has played in the diagnosis of mental disorders, in an attempt to understand the utility (or lack thereof) of this construct in making a PE diagnosis.

METHODS

We reviewed the role of bother/distress across current professional definitions for PE and then expanded this discussion to include the role of distress in other sexual dysfunctions. We then included a brief historical perspective regarding the role that distress has played in the diagnosis of PE. This discussion is followed by a deeper look at 2 nosological systems, namely DSM and ICD, to allow perspective on the inclusion of the bother/distress construct in the diagnosis of mental and behavioral disorders, including the assumptions/arguments put forward to include or exclude bother/distress as an important criterion underlying various professional assumptions.

OUTCOME

Determination of the value and/or need of including bother/distress as a necessary criterion for the diagnosis of PE.

RESULTS

Based on the research literature, bother/distress does not appear to be as critical for a PE diagnosis as either the lack of ejaculatory control or short EL. It is the weakest of the differences among men with and without PE, and recent evidence suggests that its inclusion is generally redundant with the severity of the 2 other criteria for PE, ejaculatory control and EL.

CLINICAL TRANSLATION

Bother/distress appears to serve little purpose in the diagnosis of PE yet its assessment may be important for the treatment strategy and for assessing treatment effectiveness.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

This review did not provide a critical analysis of the literature regarding the role of bother/distress in PE, but rather focused on its potential value in understanding and diagnosing PE.

CONCLUSION

Although bother/distress appears to add little to the improvement of accuracy for a PE diagnosis, understanding and assessing the man's or couple's experience of distress has important implications for the treatment strategy and focus, as well as for assessing treatment success. Rowland DL, Cooper SE. The Tenuous Role of Distress in the Diagnosis of Premature Ejaculation: A Narrative Review. Sex Med 2022;XX:XXXXXX.

Reconsidering harm in psychiatric manuals within an explicationist framework

The notion of harm has been a recurring and a significant notion in the characterization of mental disorder. It is present in eminent diagnostic manuals such as DSM and ICD, as well as in the discussion on mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. Recent demotion of harm in the definition of mental disorders in DSM-5 shows a general trend towards reducing the significance of harm when thinking about the nature of mental disorders. In this paper, we defend the relevance of the notion of harm in the characterization of mental disorder against some of these attacks. We approach this issue by using the method of conceptual explication pioneered by Rudolf Carnap. Within this framework, we argue that keeping the notion of harm not only helps to discriminate what is pathological from the nonpathological but also prevents potential misuses of psychiatric authority.

Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism

In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one 'normativist' label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position "value-conscious naturalism" about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.

Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder and the problem of defining harm to nonsentient organisms

This paper criticizes Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of disorder by arguing that the conceptual linkage it establishes between the medical concepts of health and disorder and the prudential notions of well-being and harm makes the account inapplicable to nonsentient organisms, such as plants, fungi, and many invertebrate animals. Drawing on a previous formulation of this criticism by Christopher Boorse, and noting that Wakefield could avoid it if he adopted a partly biofunction-based account of interests like that often advocated in the field of environmental ethics, I argue that integrating such an account of interests into the HDA would generate serious concerns. Specifically, it would make dysfunction sufficient for disorder and so reestablish between dysfunction and disorder precisely the kind of sufficiency relation that harm-requiring accounts of disorder strive to avoid; blur the line between the HDA's dysfunction and harm components and, in so doing, deprive the HDA of its alleged main advantage over monistic dysfunction-based accounts of disorders like Boorse's; and tie the HDA to an understanding of harm that is in itself problematic. I argue that these three concerns, and the dilemmas they generate, rob the HDA of much of its prima facie appeal, ultimately indicating that a satisfactory account of disorder should most likely eschew all references to prudential notions of well-being and harm.

The concept of disease in the time of COVID-19

Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease (disease judgements) and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick (sickness judgements). In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection with respect to four groups of people-positive and asymptomatic; positive and symptomatic; negative; and untested-and show how different concepts of disease impact on the disease and sickness judgements for these groups. The suggestion is that sickness judgements and social measures akin to those experienced during the current COVID-19 outbreak presuppose a concept of disease containing social (risk of) harm as a component. We indicate the problems that arise when adopting this kind of disease concept beyond a state of emergency.