1
|
Jebeile J. From regional climate models to usable information. Clim Change 2024; 177:53. [PMID: 38434209 PMCID: PMC10904437 DOI: 10.1007/s10584-024-03693-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/01/2021] [Accepted: 02/02/2024] [Indexed: 03/05/2024]
Abstract
Today, a major challenge for climate science is to overcome what is called the "usability gap" between the projections derived fromclimate models and the needs of the end-users. Regional Climate Models (RCMs) are expected to provide usable information concerning a variety of impacts and for a wide range of end-users. It is often assumed that the development of more accurate, more complex RCMs with higher spatial resolution should bring process understanding and better local projections, thus overcoming the usability gap. In this paper, I rather assume that the credibility of climate information should be pursued together with two other criteria of usability, which are salience and legitimacy. Based on the Swiss climate change scenarios, I study the attempts at meeting the needs of end-users and outline the trade-off modellers and users have to face with respect to the cascade of uncertainty. A conclusion of this paper is that the trade-off between salience and credibility sets the conditions under which RCMs can be deemed adequate for the purposes of addressing the needs of end-users and gearing the communication of the projections toward direct use and action.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Julie Jebeile
- Institute of Philosophy & Oeschger Center for Climate Change Research, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
- CNRM UMR 3589, Météo-France/CNRS, Centre National de Recherches Météorologiques, Toulouse, France
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Reutlinger A. When do non-epistemic values play an epistemically illegitimate role in science? How to solve one half of the new demarcation problem. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2022; 92:152-161. [PMID: 35182965 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.01.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2021] [Revised: 01/19/2022] [Accepted: 01/31/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
Solving the "new demarcation problem" requires a distinction between epistemically legitimate and illegitimate roles for non-epistemic values in science. This paper addresses one 'half' (i.e. a sub-problem) of the new demarcation problem articulated by the Gretchenfrage: What makes the role of a non-epistemic value in science epistemically illegitimate? I will argue for the Explaining Epistemic Errors (EEE) account, according to which the epistemically illegitimate role of a non-epistemic value is defined via an explanatory claim: the fact that an epistemic agent is motivated by a non-epistemic value explains why the epistemic agent commits a particular epistemic error. The EEE account is inspired by Douglas' and Steel's "functionalist" or "epistemic constraint" accounts of epistemic illegitimacy. I will suggest that the EEE account is able to meet two challenges that these two accounts face, while preserving the key intuition underlying both accounts. If my arguments succeed, then the EEE account provides a solution to one half of the new demarcation problem (by providing a definition of what makes the role of a non-epistemic value epistemically illegitimate) and it opens up new ways for addressing the other half (i.e. characterizing an epistemically legitimate role for non-epistemic values).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Alexander Reutlinger
- Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Ludwigstr. 31, 80539, München, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Amoretti MC, Lalumera E. Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism. Med Health Care Philos 2022; 25:47-60. [PMID: 34460042 PMCID: PMC8403532 DOI: 10.1007/s11019-021-10048-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/25/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one 'normativist' label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position "value-conscious naturalism" about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- M Cristina Amoretti
- DAFIST, Philosophy Section, and Research Center for Philosophy of Health and Disease, University of Genoa, Via Balbi 4, 16126, Genova, Italy.
| | - Elisabetta Lalumera
- Department for Life Quality Studies, and Research Center for Philosophy of Health and Disease, University of Bologna, Largo Augusto 230, 47921, Rimini, Italy
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Lusk G. Does democracy require value-neutral science? Analyzing the legitimacy of scientific information in the political sphere. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 90:102-110. [PMID: 34619535 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.08.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/24/2020] [Revised: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 08/16/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
Philosophers now commonly reject the value free ideal for science by arguing that non-epistemic values, including personal or social values, are permissible within the core of scientific research. However, little attention has been paid to the normative political consequences of this position. This paper explores these consequences and shows how political theory is fruitful for proceeding in a world without value-neutral science. I draw attention to an oft-overlooked argument employed by proponents of the value free ideal I dub the "political legitimacy argument." This argument claims that the value-free ideal follows directly from the foundational principles of liberal democracy. If so, then the use of value-laden scientific information within democratic decision making would be illegitimate on purely political grounds. Despite highlighting this unaddressed and important argument, I show how it can be rejected. By appealing to deliberative democratic theory, I demonstrate scientific information can be value-laden and politically legitimate. The deliberative democratic account I develop is well suited for capturing the intuitions of many opponents of the value free ideal and points to a new set of questions for those interested in values in science.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Greg Lusk
- Lyman Briggs College and the Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Donhauser J. How to make value-driven climate science for policy more ethical. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 89:31-40. [PMID: 34329820 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.06.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2020] [Revised: 06/15/2021] [Accepted: 06/28/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
In previous works, I examine inferential methods employed in Probabilistic Weather Event Attribution studies (PEAs), and explored various ways they can be used to aid in climate policy decisions and decision-making about climate justice issues. This paper evaluates limitations of PEAs and considers how PEA researchers' attributions of "liability" to specific countries for specific extreme weather events could be made more ethical. In sum, I show that it is routinely presupposed that PEA methods are not prone to inductive risks and presuppose that PEA researchers thus have no epistemic consequences or responsibilities for their attributions of liability. I argue that although PEAs are nevertheless crucially useful for practical decision-making, the attributions of liability made by PEA researchers are in fact prone to indicative risks and are influenced by non-epistemic values that PEA researchers should make transparent to make such studies more ethical. Finally, I outline possible normative approaches for making sciences, including PEAs, more ethical; and discuss implications of my arguments for the ongoing debate about how PEAs should guide climate policy and relevant legal decisions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Justin Donhauser
- Bowling Green State University, USA; Indiana University Bloomington, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Gillette K, Inkpen SA, DesRoches CT. Does environmental science crowd out non-epistemic values? Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 87:81-92. [PMID: 34111825 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.01.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2020] [Revised: 11/24/2020] [Accepted: 01/21/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
While no one denies that science depends on epistemic values, many philosophers of science have wrestled with the appropriate role of non-epistemic values, such as social, ethical, and political values. Recently, philosophers of science have overwhelmingly accepted that non-epistemic values should play a legitimate role in science. The recent philosophical debate has shifted from the value-free ideal in science to questions about how science should incorporate non-epistemic values. This article engages with such questions through an exploration of the environmental sciences. These sciences are a mosaic of diverse fields characterized by interdisciplinarity, problem-orientation, policy-directedness, and ubiquitous non-epistemic values. This article addresses a frequently voiced concern about many environmental science practices: that they 'crowd out' or displace significant non-epistemic values by either (1) entailing some non-epistemic values, rather than others, or by (2) obscuring discussion of non-epistemic values altogether. With three detailed case studies - monetizing nature, nature-society dualism, and ecosystem health - we show that the alleged problem of crowding out emerges from active debates within the environmental sciences. In each case, critics charge that the scientific practice in question displaces non-epistemic values in at least one of the two senses distinguished above. We show that crowding out is neither necessary nor always harmful when it occurs. However, we do see these putative objections to the application of environmental science as teaching valuable lessons about what matters for successful environmental science, all things considered. Given the significant role that many environmental scientists see for non-epistemic values in their fields, we argue that these cases motivate lessons about the importance of value-flexibility (that practices can accommodate a plurality of non-epistemic values), transparency about value-based decisions that inform practice, and environmental pragmatism.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Kinley Gillette
- Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, 1866 Main Mall, Buchanan E370, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T 1Z1
| | - S Andrew Inkpen
- Department of Philosophy, Mount Allison University, 63D York St, Sackville, New Brunswick, E4L 1G9, Canada
| | - C Tyler DesRoches
- School of Sustainability and School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Wrigley Hall, 800 Cady Mall #108, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Varghese J. Non-epistemic values in shaping the parameters for evaluating the effectiveness of candidate vaccines: the case of an Ebola vaccine trial. Hist Philos Life Sci 2021; 43:63. [PMID: 33928412 DOI: 10.1007/s40656-021-00417-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/20/2020] [Accepted: 04/15/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
This paper examines the case of Ebola, ça Suffit trial which was conducted in Guinea during Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in 2015. I demonstrate that various non-epistemic considerations may legitimately influence the criteria for evaluating the efficacy and effectiveness of a candidate vaccine. Such non-epistemic considerations, which are social, ethical, and pragmatic, can be better placed and addressed in scientific research by appealing to non-epistemic values. I consider two significant features any newly developed vaccine should possess; (1) the duration of immunity the vaccine provides; and (2) safety with respect to the side effects of the vaccine. Then, I argue that social and ethical values are relevant and desirable in setting the parameters for evaluating these two features of vaccines. The parameters that are employed for setting up the criteria for assessing the features might have far-reaching implications on the well-being of society in general, and the health conditions of several thousand people in particular. The reason is that these features can play a decisive role during the evaluation of the efficacy and effectiveness of the vaccine. I conclude by showing why it is necessary to reject the concept of epistemic priority, at least when scientists engage in policy-oriented research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Joby Varghese
- Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Jammu, Jammu, Jammu & Kashmir, India.
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Ahn S. How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2020; 84:57-65. [PMID: 33218466 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.08.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2019] [Revised: 07/13/2020] [Accepted: 08/02/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Soohyun Ahn
- Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive, Northwest Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4, Canada.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Resnik DB, Elliott KC. Value-entanglement and the integrity of scientific research. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2019; 75:1-11. [PMID: 31426942 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/26/2018] [Revised: 11/26/2018] [Accepted: 12/24/2018] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
Throughout much of the 20th century, philosophers of science maintained a position known as the value-free ideal, which holds that non-epistemic (e.g., moral, social, political, or economic) values should not influence the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. In the last few decades, many philosophers of science have rejected this position by arguing that non-epistemic values can and should play an important role in scientific judgment and decision-making in a variety of contexts, including the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. Rejecting the value-free ideal creates some new and vexing problems, however. One of these is that relinquishing this philosophical doctrine may undermine the integrity of scientific research if practicing scientists decide to allow non-epistemic values to impact their judgment and decision-making. A number of prominent philosophers of science have sought to show how one can reject the value-free ideal without compromising the integrity of scientific research. In this paper, we examine and critique their views and offer our own proposal for protecting and promoting scientific integrity. We argue that the literature on research ethics and its focus on adherence to norms, rules, policies, and procedures that together promote the aims of science can provide a promising foundation for building an account of scientific integrity. These norms, rules, policies, and procedures provide a level of specificity that is lacking in most philosophical discussions of science and values, and they suggest an important set of tasks for those working in science and values-namely, assessing, justifying, and prioritizing them. Thus, we argue that bringing together the literature on research ethics with the literature on science and values will enrich both areas and generate a more sophisticated and detailed account of scientific integrity.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- David B Resnik
- Bioethics, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, National Institutes of Health, 111 Alexander Drive, Research Triangle Park, NC, 27709, USA.
| | - Kevin C Elliott
- Lyman Briggs College, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, and Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, USA
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Abstract
The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference. Based on a systematic analysis of the central aspects of the role of scientists as experts - that is, its aim, context, mode of output, and standards, I propose a moderate version of the separability view. Whereas the aim of scientific research is typically to produce new knowledge through the use of scientific method for evaluation and dissemination in internal settings, the aim of the expert is to provide policymakers and the public with relevant and applicable knowledge that can premise political reasoning and deliberation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Torbjørn Gundersen
- ARENA - Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway; Centre for the Study of Professions, OsloMet - Oslo Metropolitan University, Norway.
| |
Collapse
|