1
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Manrique HM, Friston KJ, Walker MJ. 'Snakes and ladders' in paleoanthropology: From cognitive surprise to skillfulness a million years ago. Phys Life Rev 2024; 49:40-70. [PMID: 38513522 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2024.01.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2024] [Accepted: 01/15/2024] [Indexed: 03/23/2024]
Abstract
A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo - namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' - from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a 'snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' - as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective - that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses - affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind.
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Affiliation(s)
- Héctor Marín Manrique
- Department of Psychology and Sociology, Universidad de Zaragoza, Ciudad Escolar, s/n, Teruel 44003, Spain
| | - Karl John Friston
- Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, and The Wellcome Centre for Human Imaging, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK
| | - Michael John Walker
- Physical Anthropology, Departamento de Zoología y Antropología Física, Facultad de Biología, Universidad de Murcia, Campus Universitario de Espinardo Edificio 20, Murcia 30100, Spain.
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2
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Stein DJ, Nielsen K, Hartford A, Gagné-Julien AM, Glackin S, Friston K, Maj M, Zachar P, Aftab A. Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications. World Psychiatry 2024; 23:215-232. [PMID: 38727058 PMCID: PMC11083904 DOI: 10.1002/wps.21194] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/13/2024] Open
Abstract
Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both naturalist and normativist considerations are now viewed as important - psychiatric constructs necessitate a consideration of both facts and values. At a conceptual level, this integrative view encourages moving away from strict scientism to soft naturalism, while in clinical practice this facilitates both evidence-based and values-based mental health care. Second, in considering the nature of psychiatric science, there is now increasing emphasis on a pluralist approach, including ontological, explanatory and value pluralism. Conceptually, a pluralist approach acknowledges the multi-level causal interactions that give rise to psychopathology, while clinically it emphasizes the importance of a broad range of "difference-makers", as well as a consideration of "lived experience" in both research and practice. Third, in considering a range of questions about the brain-mind, and how both somatic and psychic factors contribute to the development and maintenance of mental disorders, conceptual and empirical work on embodied cognition provides an increasingly valuable approach. Viewing the brain-mind as embodied, embedded and enactive offers a conceptual approach to the mind-body problem that facilitates the clinical integration of advances in both cognitive-affective neuroscience and phenomenological psychopathology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dan J Stein
- South African Medical Research Council Unit on Risk and Resilience in Mental Disorders, Department of Psychiatry and Neuroscience Institute, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
| | - Kris Nielsen
- School of Psychology, Te Herenga Waka-Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
| | - Anna Hartford
- South African Medical Research Council Unit on Risk and Resilience in Mental Disorders, Department of Psychiatry and Neuroscience Institute, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
| | - Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien
- Centre for Research in Ethics, Canada Research Chair in Epistemic Injustice and Agency, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Shane Glackin
- Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Mario Maj
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Campania "L. Vanvitelli", Naples, Italy
| | - Peter Zachar
- Department of Psychology, Auburn University Montgomery, Montgomery, AL, USA
| | - Awais Aftab
- Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA
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3
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Mougenot D, Matheson H. Theoretical strategies for an embodied cognitive neuroscience: Mechanistic explanations of brain-body-environment systems. Cogn Neurosci 2024:1-13. [PMID: 38736314 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2024.2349546] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2023] [Indexed: 05/14/2024]
Abstract
Cognitive neuroscience seeks to explain mind, brain, and behavior. But how do we generate explanations? In this integrative theoretical paper, we review the commitments of the 'New Mechanist' movement within the philosophy of science, focusing specifically on the role of mechanistic models in scientific explanation. We highlight how this approach differs from other explanatory approaches within the field, showing its unique contributions to the efforts of scientific explanation. We then argue that the commitments of the Embodied Cognition framework converge with the commitments of the New Mechanist movement in a way that provides a necessary explanatory strategy available to cognitive neuroscience. We then discuss a number of consequences of this convergence, including issues related to the inadequacy of statistical prediction, neuroscientific reduction, the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience, and psychological and neuroscientific ontology. We hope that our integrative thesis provides researchers with a theoretical strategy for an embodied cognitive neuroscience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Davy Mougenot
- Department of Psychology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Canada
| | - Heath Matheson
- Department of Psychology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Canada
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4
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Sanz P, Tur N, Lana F. Mentalization-based approach for schizophrenia spectrum disorders: a psychotherapeutic proposal for evolved schizophrenic trajectories and serious mental disorders. Front Psychiatry 2024; 15:1240393. [PMID: 38779549 PMCID: PMC11109361 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2024.1240393] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2023] [Accepted: 04/16/2024] [Indexed: 05/25/2024] Open
Abstract
There is a growing interest in psychotherapeutic approaches to pre-psychotic high-risk states or first-episode psychosis, where mentalization-based treatment has shown its utility. This article presents a mentalization-based approach for the treatment of those individuals diagnosed with an evolved schizophrenia spectrum disorder, whose characteristics make them especially inaccessible to reflective psychotherapeutic treatment. A synthesis of the conceptual frameworks that justify the needs for technical modification of the mentalization-based treatment foundational techniques is carried out, followed by the proposal of adaptations, with a focus in self-agency and patient-therapist dyad. Therapeutic interventions are outlined, including illustrative examples. The mentalizing approach presented here holds promise for future research and treatment opportunities for patients with evolved schizophrenia and other serious mental disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pedro Sanz
- Programa de Trastorno Mental Grave, Area de Gestión Clínica de Psiquiatria y Salud Mental (AGCPSM), Hospital 12 de Octubre, Madrid, Spain
| | - Nuria Tur
- Servicio de Psiquiatria, Unidad del Niño y Adolescente, Hospital Clínico San Carlos, Madrid, Spain
| | - Fernando Lana
- Instituto de Neuropsiquiatría y Adiciones (INAD), Centro Emili Mira y Hospital del Mar, Parc de Salut Mar, Barcelona, Centro de Investigación en Red de Salud Mental (CIBERSAM), Departamento de Psiquiatría, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, EspañaIMIM (Hospital del Mar Medical Research Institute), Barcelona, Spain
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5
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Zárate-Rochín AM. Contemporary neurocognitive models of memory: A descriptive comparative analysis. Neuropsychologia 2024; 196:108846. [PMID: 38430963 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2024.108846] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/03/2023] [Revised: 02/27/2024] [Accepted: 02/27/2024] [Indexed: 03/05/2024]
Abstract
The great complexity involved in the study of memory has given rise to numerous hypotheses and models associated with various phenomena at different levels of analysis. This has allowed us to delve deeper in our knowledge about memory but has also made it difficult to synthesize and integrate data from different lines of research. In this context, this work presents a descriptive comparative analysis of contemporary models that address the structure and function of multiple memory systems. The main goal is to outline a panoramic view of the key elements that constitute these models in order to visualize both the current state of research and possible future directions. The elements that stand out from different levels of analysis are distributed neural networks, hierarchical organization, predictive coding, homeostasis, and evolutionary perspective.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alba Marcela Zárate-Rochín
- Instituto de Investigaciones Cerebrales, Universidad Veracruzana, Dr. Castelazo Ayala s/n, Industrial Animas, 91190, Xalapa-Enríquez, Veracruz, Mexico.
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6
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Parrotta E, Bach P, Perrucci MG, Costantini M, Ferri F. Heart is deceitful above all things: Threat expectancy induces the illusory perception of increased heartrate. Cognition 2024; 245:105719. [PMID: 38278039 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105719] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2023] [Revised: 11/24/2023] [Accepted: 01/08/2024] [Indexed: 01/28/2024]
Abstract
It has been suggested that our perception of the internal milieu, or the body's internal state, is shaped by our beliefs and previous knowledge about the body's expected state, rather than being solely based on actual interoceptive experiences. This study investigated whether heartbeat perception could be illusorily distorted towards prior subjective beliefs, such that threat expectations suffice to induce a misperception of heartbeat frequency. Participants were instructed to focus on their cardiac activity and report their heartbeat, either tapping along to it (Experiment 1) or silently counting (Experiment 2) while ECG was recorded. While completing this task, different cues provided valid predictive information about the intensity of an upcoming cutaneous stimulation (high- vs. low- pain). Results showed that participants expected a heart rate increase over the anticipation of high- vs. low-pain stimuli and that this belief was perceptually instantiated, as suggested by their interoceptive reports. Importantly, the perceived increase was not mirrored by the real heart rate. Perceptual modulations were absent when participants executed the same task but with an exteroceptive stimulus (Experiment 3). The findings reveal, for the first time, an interoceptive illusion of increased heartbeats elicited by threat expectancy and shed new light on interoceptive processes through the lenses of Bayesian predictive processes, providing tantalizing insights into how such illusory phenomena may intersect with the recognition and regulation of people's internal states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eleonora Parrotta
- School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, UK; School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, UK.
| | - Patric Bach
- School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, UK; School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, UK
| | - Mauro Gianni Perrucci
- Department of Neuroscience, Imaging and Clinical Sciences, "G. d'Annunzio" University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy; Institute for Advanced Biomedical Technologies - ITAB, "G. d'Annunzio" University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy
| | - Marcello Costantini
- Department of Psychological, Health and Territorial Sciences, "G. d'Annunzio" University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy; Institute for Advanced Biomedical Technologies - ITAB, "G. d'Annunzio" University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy
| | - Francesca Ferri
- Department of Neuroscience, Imaging and Clinical Sciences, "G. d'Annunzio" University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy; Institute for Advanced Biomedical Technologies - ITAB, "G. d'Annunzio" University of Chieti-Pescara, Chieti, Italy
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7
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Albarracin M, Bouchard-Joly G, Sheikhbahaee Z, Miller M, Pitliya RJ, Poirier P. Feeling our place in the world: an active inference account of self-esteem. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae007. [PMID: 38562605 PMCID: PMC10984624 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2023] [Revised: 12/21/2023] [Accepted: 02/20/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024] Open
Abstract
Self-esteem, the evaluation of one's own worth or value, is a critical aspect of psychological well-being and mental health. In this paper, we propose an active inference account of self-esteem, casting it as a sociometer or an inferential capacity to interpret one's standing within a social group. This approach allows us to explore the interaction between an individual's self-perception and the expectations of their social environment.When there is a mismatch between these perceptions and expectations, the individual needs to adjust their actions or update their self-perception to better align with their current experiences. We also consider this hypothesis in relation with recent research on affective inference, suggesting that self-esteem enables the individual to track and respond to this discrepancy through affective states such as anxiety or positive affect. By acting as an inferential sociometer, self-esteem allows individuals to navigate and adapt to their social environment, ultimately impacting their psychological well-being and mental health.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mahault Albarracin
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
| | - Gabriel Bouchard-Joly
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
| | - Zahra Sheikhbahaee
- CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, University of Montreal, 5757, Av. Decelles bureau 500, Montreal, QC H3S 2C3, Canada
| | - Mark Miller
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melboume, Australia
- Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada
| | - Riddhi J Pitliya
- Department of Experimental Psychology Oxford University, Oxford OX1 2JD, United Kingdom
| | - Pierre Poirier
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
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8
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McMillen P, Levin M. Collective intelligence: A unifying concept for integrating biology across scales and substrates. Commun Biol 2024; 7:378. [PMID: 38548821 PMCID: PMC10978875 DOI: 10.1038/s42003-024-06037-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/30/2023] [Accepted: 03/11/2024] [Indexed: 04/01/2024] Open
Abstract
A defining feature of biology is the use of a multiscale architecture, ranging from molecular networks to cells, tissues, organs, whole bodies, and swarms. Crucially however, biology is not only nested structurally, but also functionally: each level is able to solve problems in distinct problem spaces, such as physiological, morphological, and behavioral state space. Percolating adaptive functionality from one level of competent subunits to a higher functional level of organization requires collective dynamics: multiple components must work together to achieve specific outcomes. Here we overview a number of biological examples at different scales which highlight the ability of cellular material to make decisions that implement cooperation toward specific homeodynamic endpoints, and implement collective intelligence by solving problems at the cell, tissue, and whole-organism levels. We explore the hypothesis that collective intelligence is not only the province of groups of animals, and that an important symmetry exists between the behavioral science of swarms and the competencies of cells and other biological systems at different scales. We then briefly outline the implications of this approach, and the possible impact of tools from the field of diverse intelligence for regenerative medicine and synthetic bioengineering.
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Affiliation(s)
- Patrick McMillen
- Department of Biology, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 02155, USA
- Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University, Medford, MA, 02155, USA
| | - Michael Levin
- Department of Biology, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 02155, USA.
- Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University, Medford, MA, 02155, USA.
- Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
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9
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Biddell H, Solms M, Slagter H, Laukkonen R. Arousal coherence, uncertainty, and well-being: an active inference account. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae011. [PMID: 38504827 PMCID: PMC10949961 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2023] [Revised: 02/14/2024] [Accepted: 02/26/2024] [Indexed: 03/21/2024] Open
Abstract
Here we build on recent findings which show that greater alignment between our subjective experiences (how we feel) and physiological states (measurable changes in our body) plays a pivotal role in the overall psychological well-being. Specifically, we propose that the alignment or 'coherence' between affective arousal (e.g. how excited we 'feel') and autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate or pupil dilation) may be key for maintaining up-to-date uncertainty representations in dynamic environments. Drawing on recent advances in interoceptive and affective inference, we also propose that arousal coherence reflects interoceptive integration, facilitates adaptive belief updating, and impacts our capacity to adapt to changes in uncertainty, with downstream consequences to well-being. We also highlight the role of meta-awareness of arousal, a third level of inference, which may permit conscious awareness, learning about, and intentional regulation of lower-order sources of arousal. Practices emphasizing meta-awareness of arousal (like meditation) may therefore elicit some of their known benefits via improved arousal coherence. We suggest that arousal coherence is also likely to be associated with markers of adaptive functioning (like emotional awareness and self-regulatory capacities) and discuss mind-body practices that may increase coherence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hannah Biddell
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Saint Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia
| | - Mark Solms
- Department of Psychology, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, Western Cape 7701, South Africa
| | - Heleen Slagter
- Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1081 HV, The Netherlands
- Institute for Brain and Behaviour, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 1081 HV, The Netherlands
| | - Ruben Laukkonen
- School of Psychology, Southern Cross University, Gold Coast, QLD 4225, Australia
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10
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Schiller D, Yu ANC, Alia-Klein N, Becker S, Cromwell HC, Dolcos F, Eslinger PJ, Frewen P, Kemp AH, Pace-Schott EF, Raber J, Silton RL, Stefanova E, Williams JHG, Abe N, Aghajani M, Albrecht F, Alexander R, Anders S, Aragón OR, Arias JA, Arzy S, Aue T, Baez S, Balconi M, Ballarini T, Bannister S, Banta MC, Barrett KC, Belzung C, Bensafi M, Booij L, Bookwala J, Boulanger-Bertolus J, Boutros SW, Bräscher AK, Bruno A, Busatto G, Bylsma LM, Caldwell-Harris C, Chan RCK, Cherbuin N, Chiarella J, Cipresso P, Critchley H, Croote DE, Demaree HA, Denson TF, Depue B, Derntl B, Dickson JM, Dolcos S, Drach-Zahavy A, Dubljević O, Eerola T, Ellingsen DM, Fairfield B, Ferdenzi C, Friedman BH, Fu CHY, Gatt JM, de Gelder B, Gendolla GHE, Gilam G, Goldblatt H, Gooding AEK, Gosseries O, Hamm AO, Hanson JL, Hendler T, Herbert C, Hofmann SG, Ibanez A, Joffily M, Jovanovic T, Kahrilas IJ, Kangas M, Katsumi Y, Kensinger E, Kirby LAJ, Koncz R, Koster EHW, Kozlowska K, Krach S, Kret ME, Krippl M, Kusi-Mensah K, Ladouceur CD, Laureys S, Lawrence A, Li CSR, Liddell BJ, Lidhar NK, Lowry CA, Magee K, Marin MF, Mariotti V, Martin LJ, Marusak HA, Mayer AV, Merner AR, Minnier J, Moll J, Morrison RG, Moore M, Mouly AM, Mueller SC, Mühlberger A, Murphy NA, Muscatello MRA, Musser ED, Newton TL, Noll-Hussong M, Norrholm SD, Northoff G, Nusslock R, Okon-Singer H, Olino TM, Ortner C, Owolabi M, Padulo C, Palermo R, Palumbo R, Palumbo S, Papadelis C, Pegna AJ, Pellegrini S, Peltonen K, Penninx BWJH, Pietrini P, Pinna G, Lobo RP, Polnaszek KL, Polyakova M, Rabinak C, Helene Richter S, Richter T, Riva G, Rizzo A, Robinson JL, Rosa P, Sachdev PS, Sato W, Schroeter ML, Schweizer S, Shiban Y, Siddharthan A, Siedlecka E, Smith RC, Soreq H, Spangler DP, Stern ER, Styliadis C, Sullivan GB, Swain JE, Urben S, Van den Stock J, Vander Kooij MA, van Overveld M, Van Rheenen TE, VanElzakker MB, Ventura-Bort C, Verona E, Volk T, Wang Y, Weingast LT, Weymar M, Williams C, Willis ML, Yamashita P, Zahn R, Zupan B, Lowe L. The Human Affectome. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 158:105450. [PMID: 37925091 PMCID: PMC11003721 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105450] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2022] [Revised: 10/26/2023] [Accepted: 10/27/2023] [Indexed: 11/06/2023]
Abstract
Over the last decades, theoretical perspectives in the interdisciplinary field of the affective sciences have proliferated rather than converged due to differing assumptions about what human affective phenomena are and how they work. These metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions, shaped by academic context and values, have dictated affective constructs and operationalizations. However, an assumption about the purpose of affective phenomena can guide us to a common set of metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. In this capstone paper, we home in on a nested teleological principle for human affective phenomena in order to synthesize metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. Under this framework, human affective phenomena can collectively be considered algorithms that either adjust based on the human comfort zone (affective concerns) or monitor those adaptive processes (affective features). This teleologically-grounded framework offers a principled agenda and launchpad for both organizing existing perspectives and generating new ones. Ultimately, we hope the Human Affectome brings us a step closer to not only an integrated understanding of human affective phenomena, but an integrated field for affective research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniela Schiller
- Department of Psychiatry, the Nash Family Department of Neuroscience, and the Friedman Brain Institute, at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, United States.
| | - Alessandra N C Yu
- Nash Family Department of Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10029, United States.
| | - Nelly Alia-Klein
- Department of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, United States
| | - Susanne Becker
- Department of Cognitive and Clinical Neuroscience, Central Institute of Mental Health, Medical Faculty Mannheim, Heidelberg University, J5, 68159 Mannheim, Germany; Integrative Spinal Research Group, Department of Chiropractic Medicine, University Hospital Balgrist, University of Zurich, Balgrist Campus, Lengghalde 5, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland
| | - Howard C Cromwell
- J.P. Scott Center for Neuroscience, Mind and Behavior, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, United States
| | - Florin Dolcos
- Beckman Institute for Advanced Science & Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States
| | - Paul J Eslinger
- Departments of Neurology, Neural & Behavioral Science, Radiology, and Public Health Sciences, Penn State Hershey Medical Center and College of Medicine, Hershey, PA, United States
| | - Paul Frewen
- Departments of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
| | - Andrew H Kemp
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, Health & Life Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom
| | - Edward F Pace-Schott
- Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts General Hospital, Department of Psychiatry, Boston, MA, United States; Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Jacob Raber
- Department of Behavioral Neuroscience, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR 97239, United States; Departments of Neurology, Radiation Medicine, Psychiatry, and Division of Neuroscience, ONPRC, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR, United States
| | - Rebecca L Silton
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Elka Stefanova
- Faculty of Medicine, University of Belgrade, Serbia; Neurology Clinic, Clinical Center of Serbia, Serbia
| | - Justin H G Williams
- Griffith University, Gold Coast Campus, 1 Parklands Dr, Southport, QLD 4215, Australia
| | - Nobuhito Abe
- Institute for the Future of Human Society, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, Japan
| | - Moji Aghajani
- Institute of Education & Child Studies, Section Forensic Family & Youth Care, Leiden University, the Netherlands; Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC, Location VUMC, GGZ InGeest Research & Innovation, Amsterdam Neuroscience, the Netherlands
| | - Franziska Albrecht
- Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany; Clinic for Cognitive Neurology, University Hospital Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany; Division of Physiotherapy, Department of Neurobiology, Care Sciences and Society, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden; Karolinska University Hospital, Women's Health and Allied Health Professionals Theme, Medical unit Occupational Therapy & Physiotherapy, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Rebecca Alexander
- Neuroscience Research Australia, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia; Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
| | - Silke Anders
- Department of Neurology, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany; Center of Brain, Behavior and Metabolism, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Oriana R Aragón
- Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Ave, New Haven, CT, United States; Cincinnati University, Marketing Department, 2906 Woodside Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0145, United States
| | - Juan A Arias
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, Health & Life Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom; Department of Statistics, Mathematical Analysis, and Operational Research, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Spain; The Galician Center for Mathematical Research and Technology (CITMAga), 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
| | - Shahar Arzy
- Department of Medical Neurobiology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Tatjana Aue
- Institute of Psychology, University of Bern, Fabrikstr. 8, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
| | | | - Michela Balconi
- International Research Center for Cognitive Applied Neuroscience, Catholic University of Milan, Milan, Italy
| | - Tommaso Ballarini
- Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Scott Bannister
- Durham University, Palace Green, DH1 RL3 Durham, United Kingdom
| | | | - Karen Caplovitz Barrett
- Department of Human Development & Family Studies, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, United States; Department of Community & Behavioral Health, Colorado School of Public Health, Denver, CO, United States
| | | | - Moustafa Bensafi
- Research Center in Neurosciences of Lyon, CNRS UMR5292, INSERM U1028, Claude Bernard University Lyon 1, Lyon, Centre Hospitalier Le Vinatier, 95 bd Pinel, 69675 Bron Cedex, France
| | - Linda Booij
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada; CHU Sainte-Justine, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Jamila Bookwala
- Department of Psychology, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, United States
| | - Julie Boulanger-Bertolus
- Department of Anesthesiology and Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, United States
| | - Sydney Weber Boutros
- Department of Behavioral Neuroscience, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR 97239, United States
| | - Anne-Kathrin Bräscher
- Department of Clinical Psychology, Psychotherapy and Experimental Psychopathology, University of Mainz, Wallstr. 3, 55122 Mainz, Germany; Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Orangeburg, NY, United States
| | - Antonio Bruno
- Department of Biomedical, Dental Sciences and Morpho-Functional Imaging - University of Messina, Italy
| | - Geraldo Busatto
- Laboratory of Psychiatric Neuroimaging (LIM-21), Departamento e Instituto de Psiquiatria, Hospital das Clinicas HCFMUSP, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil
| | - Lauren M Bylsma
- Departments of Psychiatry and Psychology; and the Center for Neural Basis of Cognition, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | | | - Raymond C K Chan
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Nicolas Cherbuin
- Centre for Research on Ageing, Health, and Wellbeing, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
| | - Julian Chiarella
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada; CHU Sainte-Justine, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Pietro Cipresso
- Applied Technology for Neuro-Psychology Lab., Istituto Auxologico Italiano (IRCCS), Milan, Italy; Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Hugo Critchley
- Psychiatry, Department of Neuroscience, Brighton and Sussex Medical School (BSMS), University of Sussex, Sussex, United Kingdom
| | - Denise E Croote
- Departments of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai and Friedman Brain Institute, New York, NY 10029, United States; Hospital Universitário Gaffrée e Guinle, Universidade do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Heath A Demaree
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
| | - Thomas F Denson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Brendan Depue
- Departments of Psychological and Brain Sciences and Anatomical Sciences and Neurobiology, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, United States
| | - Birgit Derntl
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Tübingen Center for Mental Health, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
| | - Joanne M Dickson
- Edith Cowan University, Psychology Discipline, School of Arts and Humanities, 270 Joondalup Dr, Joondalup, WA 6027, Australia
| | - Sanda Dolcos
- Beckman Institute for Advanced Science & Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States
| | - Anat Drach-Zahavy
- The Faculty of Health and Welfare Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Olga Dubljević
- Neurology Clinic, Clinical Center of Serbia, Serbia; Institute for Biological Research "Siniša Stanković", National Institute of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia
| | - Tuomas Eerola
- Durham University, Palace Green, DH1 RL3 Durham, United Kingdom
| | - Dan-Mikael Ellingsen
- Department of Diagnostic Physics, Division of Radiology and Nuclear Medicine, Oslo University Hospital, Oslo, Norway
| | - Beth Fairfield
- Department of Humanistic Studies, University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy; UniCamillus, International Medical University, Rome, Italy
| | - Camille Ferdenzi
- Research Center in Neurosciences of Lyon, CNRS UMR5292, INSERM U1028, Claude Bernard University Lyon 1, Lyon, Centre Hospitalier Le Vinatier, 95 bd Pinel, 69675 Bron Cedex, France
| | - Bruce H Friedman
- Department of Psychology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, United States
| | - Cynthia H Y Fu
- School of Psychology, University of East London, United Kingdom; Centre for Affective Disorders, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, United Kingdom
| | - Justine M Gatt
- Neuroscience Research Australia, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Beatrice de Gelder
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
| | - Guido H E Gendolla
- Geneva Motivation Lab, University of Geneva, FPSE, Section of Psychology, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
| | - Gadi Gilam
- The Institute of Biomedical and Oral Research, Faculty of Dental Medicine, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel; Systems Neuroscience and Pain Laboratory, Stanford University School of Medicine, CA, United States
| | - Hadass Goldblatt
- Department of Nursing, Faculty of Social Welfare & Health Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | | | - Olivia Gosseries
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness & Centre du Cerveau2, University and University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
| | - Alfons O Hamm
- Department of Biological and Clinical Psychology/Psychotherapy, University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany
| | - Jamie L Hanson
- Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15206, United States
| | - Talma Hendler
- Tel Aviv Center for Brain Function, Wohl Institute for Advanced Imaging, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, Tel Aviv, Israel; School of Psychological Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Cornelia Herbert
- Department of Applied Emotion and Motivation Psychology, Institute of Psychology and Education, Ulm University, Ulm, Germany
| | - Stefan G Hofmann
- Department of Clinical Psychology, Philipps University Marburg, Germany
| | - Agustin Ibanez
- Universidad de San Andres, Buenos Aires, Argentina; National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina; Latin American Brain Health Institute (BrainLat), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile; Global Brain Health Institute (GBHI), University of California San Francisco (UCSF), United States and Trinity Collegue Dublin (TCD), Ireland
| | - Mateus Joffily
- Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), 93 Chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Écully, France
| | - Tanja Jovanovic
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavaioral Neurosciences, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - Ian J Kahrilas
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Maria Kangas
- Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
| | - Yuta Katsumi
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States; Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Charlestown, MA, USA
| | - Elizabeth Kensinger
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Lauren A J Kirby
- Department of Psychology and Counseling, University of Texas at Tyler, Tyler, TX, United States
| | - Rebecca Koncz
- Centre for Healthy Brain Ageing, Discipline of Psychiatry and Mental Health, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia; Specialty of Psychiatry, The University of Sydney, Concord, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Ernst H W Koster
- Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | | | - Sören Krach
- Social Neuroscience Lab, Translational Psychiatry Unit, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Mariska E Kret
- Leiden University, Cognitive Psychology, Pieter de la Court, Waassenaarseweg 52, Leiden 2333 AK, the Netherlands
| | - Martin Krippl
- Faculty of Natural Sciences, Department of Psychology, Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Universitätsplatz 2, Magdeburg, Germany
| | - Kwabena Kusi-Mensah
- Department of Psychiatry, Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital, P. O. Box 1934, Kumasi, Ghana; Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, Darwin College, Silver Street, CB3 9EU Cambridge, United Kingdom; Behavioural Sciences Department, School of Medicine and Dentistry, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana
| | - Cecile D Ladouceur
- Departments of Psychiatry and Psychology and the Center for Neural Basis of Cognition (CNBC), University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | - Steven Laureys
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness & Centre du Cerveau2, University and University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
| | - Alistair Lawrence
- Scotland's Rural College, King's Buildings, Edinburgh, Scotland; The Roslin Institute, University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush, Scotland
| | - Chiang-Shan R Li
- Connecticut Mental Health Centre, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States
| | - Belinda J Liddell
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Navdeep K Lidhar
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada
| | - Christopher A Lowry
- Department of Integrative Physiology and Center for Neuroscience, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States
| | - Kelsey Magee
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
| | - Marie-France Marin
- Department of Psychology, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Canada; Research Center, Institut universitaire en santé mentale de Montréal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Veronica Mariotti
- Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
| | - Loren J Martin
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada
| | - Hilary A Marusak
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavaioral Neurosciences, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States; Merrill Palmer Skillman Institute for Child and Family Development, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - Annalina V Mayer
- Social Neuroscience Lab, Translational Psychiatry Unit, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Amanda R Merner
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
| | - Jessica Minnier
- School of Public Health, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR, United States
| | - Jorge Moll
- Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroinformatics Unit, D'Or Institute for Research and Education, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Robert G Morrison
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Matthew Moore
- Beckman Institute for Advanced Science & Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States; War Related Illness and Injury Study Center (WRIISC), Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Anne-Marie Mouly
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Center, CNRS-UMR 5292, INSERM U1028, Universite Lyon, Lyon, France
| | - Sven C Mueller
- Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | - Andreas Mühlberger
- Department of Psychology (Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy), University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Nora A Murphy
- Department of Psychology, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | | | - Erica D Musser
- Center for Children and Families, Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States
| | - Tamara L Newton
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, United States
| | - Michael Noll-Hussong
- Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, TU Muenchen, Langerstrasse 3, D-81675 Muenchen, Germany
| | - Seth Davin Norrholm
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavaioral Neurosciences, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - Georg Northoff
- Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics Research Unit, University of Ottawa Institute of Mental Health Research, Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre, Canada
| | - Robin Nusslock
- Department of Psychology and Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, United States
| | - Hadas Okon-Singer
- School of Psychological Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Thomas M Olino
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, 1701N. 13th St, Philadelphia, PA, United States
| | - Catherine Ortner
- Thompson Rivers University, Department of Psychology, 805 TRU Way, Kamloops, BC, Canada
| | - Mayowa Owolabi
- Department of Medicine and Center for Genomic and Precision Medicine, College of Medicine, University of Ibadan; University College Hospital, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria; Blossom Specialist Medical Center Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria
| | - Caterina Padulo
- Department of Psychological, Health and Territorial Sciences, University of Chieti, Chieti, Italy
| | - Romina Palermo
- School of Psychological Science, University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia
| | - Rocco Palumbo
- Department of Psychological, Health and Territorial Sciences, University of Chieti, Chieti, Italy
| | - Sara Palumbo
- Department of Surgical, Medical and Molecular Pathology and of Critical Care, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
| | - Christos Papadelis
- Jane and John Justin Neuroscience Center, Cook Children's Health Care System, Fort Worth, TX, United States; Department of Bioengineering, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, United States
| | - Alan J Pegna
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Saint Lucia, Queensland, Australia
| | - Silvia Pellegrini
- Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
| | - Kirsi Peltonen
- Research Centre for Child Psychiatry, University of Turku, Turku, Finland; INVEST Research Flagship, University of Turku, Turku, Finland
| | - Brenda W J H Penninx
- Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC, Location VUMC, GGZ InGeest Research & Innovation, Amsterdam Neuroscience, the Netherlands
| | | | - Graziano Pinna
- The Psychiatric Institute, Department of Psychiatry, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Rosario Pintos Lobo
- Center for Children and Families, Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States
| | - Kelly L Polnaszek
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Maryna Polyakova
- Neurology Department, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Christine Rabinak
- Department of Pharmacy Practice, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - S Helene Richter
- Department of Behavioural Biology, University of Münster, Badestraße 13, Münster, Germany
| | - Thalia Richter
- School of Psychological Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Giuseppe Riva
- Applied Technology for Neuro-Psychology Lab., Istituto Auxologico Italiano (IRCCS), Milan, Italy; Humane Technology Lab., Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy
| | - Amelia Rizzo
- Department of Biomedical, Dental Sciences and Morpho-Functional Imaging - University of Messina, Italy
| | | | - Pedro Rosa
- Laboratory of Psychiatric Neuroimaging (LIM-21), Departamento e Instituto de Psiquiatria, Hospital das Clinicas HCFMUSP, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil
| | - Perminder S Sachdev
- Centre for Healthy Brain Ageing, Discipline of Psychiatry and Mental Health, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia; Neuropsychiatric Institute, The Prince of Wales Hospital, Sydney, Australia
| | - Wataru Sato
- Psychological Process Research Team, Guardian Robot Project, RIKEN, 2-2-2 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto, Japan
| | - Matthias L Schroeter
- Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany; Clinic for Cognitive Neurology, University Hospital Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Susanne Schweizer
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - Youssef Shiban
- Department of Psychology (Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy), University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany; Department of Psychology (Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy Research), PFH - Private University of Applied Sciences, Gottingen, Germany
| | - Advaith Siddharthan
- Knowledge Media Institute, The Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, United Kingdom
| | - Ewa Siedlecka
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Robert C Smith
- Departments of Medicine and Psychiatry, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, United States
| | - Hermona Soreq
- Department of Biological Chemistry, Edmond and Lily Safra Center of Brain Science and The Institute of Life Sciences, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Derek P Spangler
- Department of Biobehavioral Health, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, United States
| | - Emily R Stern
- Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Orangeburg, NY, United States; New York University School of Medicine, New York, NY, United States
| | - Charis Styliadis
- Neuroscience of Cognition and Affection group, Lab of Medical Physics and Digital Innovation, School of Medicine, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
| | | | - James E Swain
- Departments of Psychiatry & Behavioral Health, Psychology, Obstetrics, Gynecology & Reproductive Medicine, and Program in Public Health, Renaissance School of Medicine at Stony Brook University, New York, United States
| | - Sébastien Urben
- Division of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV) and University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Jan Van den Stock
- Neuropsychiatry, Department of Neurosciences, Leuven Brain Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Michael A Vander Kooij
- Translational Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Universitatsmedizin der Johannes Guttenberg University Medical Center, Mainz, Germany
| | | | - Tamsyn E Van Rheenen
- University of Melbourne, Melbourne Neuropsychiatry Centre, Department of Psychiatry, 161 Barry Street, Carlton, VIC, Australia
| | - Michael B VanElzakker
- Division of Neurotherapeutics, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Carlos Ventura-Bort
- Department of Biological Psychology and Affective Science, Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
| | - Edelyn Verona
- Department of Psychology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States
| | - Tyler Volk
- Professor Emeritus of Biology and Environmental Studies, New York University, New York, NY, United States
| | - Yi Wang
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Leah T Weingast
- Department of Social Work and Human Services and the Department of Psychological Sciences, Center for Young Adult Addiction and Recovery, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, United States
| | - Mathias Weymar
- Department of Biological Psychology and Affective Science, Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany; Faculty of Health Sciences Brandenburg, University of Potsdam, Germany
| | - Claire Williams
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, Health & Life Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom; Elysium Neurological Services, Elysium Healthcare, The Avalon Centre, United Kingdom
| | - Megan L Willis
- School of Behavioural and Health Sciences, Australian Catholic University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Paula Yamashita
- Department of Integrative Physiology and Center for Neuroscience, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States
| | - Roland Zahn
- Centre for Affective Disorders, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, United Kingdom
| | - Barbra Zupan
- Central Queensland University, School of Health, Medical and Applied Sciences, Bruce Highway, Rockhampton, QLD, Australia
| | - Leroy Lowe
- Neuroqualia (NGO), Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada.
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11
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Tendulkar M, Tendulkar R, Dhanda PS, Yadav A, Jain M, Kaushik P. Clinical potential of sensory neurites in the heart and their role in decision-making. Front Neurosci 2024; 17:1308232. [PMID: 38415053 PMCID: PMC10896837 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2023.1308232] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2023] [Accepted: 11/29/2023] [Indexed: 02/29/2024] Open
Abstract
The process of decision-making is quite complex involving different aspects of logic, emotion, and intuition. The process of decision-making can be summarized as choosing the best alternative among a given plethora of options in order to achieve the desired outcome. This requires establishing numerous neural networks between various factors associated with the decision and creation of possible combinations and speculating their possible outcomes. In a nutshell, it is a highly coordinated process consuming the majority of the brain's energy. It has been found that the heart comprises an intrinsic neural system that contributes not only to the decision-making process but also the short-term and long-term memory. There are approximately 40,000 cells present in the heart known as sensory neurites which play a vital role in memory transfer. The heart is quite a mysterious organ, which functions as a blood-pumping machine and an endocrine gland, as well as possesses a nervous system. There are multiple factors that affect this heart ecosystem, and they directly affect our decision-making capabilities. These interlinked relationships hint toward the sensory neurites which modulate cognition and mood regulation. This review article aims to provide deeper insights into the various roles played by sensory neurites in decision-making and other cognitive functions. The article highlights the pivotal role of sensory neurites in the numerous brain functions, and it also meticulously discusses the mechanisms through which they modulate their effects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mugdha Tendulkar
- K. J. Somaiya Medical College and Research Centre, Mumbai, India
| | - Reshma Tendulkar
- Vivekanand Education Society's College of Pharmacy, Mumbai, India
| | | | - Alpa Yadav
- Department of Botany, Indira Gandhi University, Rewari, India
| | - Mukul Jain
- Cell and Developmental Biology Lab, Center of Research for Development, Parul University, Vadodara, India
- Department of Life Sciences, Parul Institute of Applied Sciences, Parul University, Vadodara, India
| | - Prashant Kaushik
- Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University, Hisar, India
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12
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Schoeller F, Horowitz AH, Jain A, Maes P, Reggente N, Christov-Moore L, Pezzulo G, Barca L, Allen M, Salomon R, Miller M, Di Lernia D, Riva G, Tsakiris M, Chalah MA, Klein A, Zhang B, Garcia T, Pollack U, Trousselard M, Verdonk C, Dumas G, Adrien V, Friston K. Interoceptive technologies for psychiatric interventions: From diagnosis to clinical applications. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 156:105478. [PMID: 38007168 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105478] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/26/2023] [Revised: 11/16/2023] [Accepted: 11/19/2023] [Indexed: 11/27/2023]
Abstract
Interoception-the perception of internal bodily signals-has emerged as an area of interest due to its implications in emotion and the prevalence of dysfunctional interoceptive processes across psychopathological conditions. Despite the importance of interoception in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry, its experimental manipulation remains technically challenging. This is due to the invasive nature of existing methods, the limitation of self-report and unimodal measures of interoception, and the absence of standardized approaches across disparate fields. This article integrates diverse research efforts from psychology, physiology, psychiatry, and engineering to address this oversight. Following a general introduction to the neurophysiology of interoception as hierarchical predictive processing, we review the existing paradigms for manipulating interoception (e.g., interoceptive modulation), their underlying mechanisms (e.g., interoceptive conditioning), and clinical applications (e.g., interoceptive exposure). We suggest a classification for interoceptive technologies and discuss their potential for diagnosing and treating mental health disorders. Despite promising results, considerable work is still needed to develop standardized, validated measures of interoceptive function across domains and before these technologies can translate safely and effectively to clinical settings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Felix Schoeller
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA; Department Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel.
| | - Adam Haar Horowitz
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; Center for Sleep and Cognition, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Harvard Medical School, USA
| | - Abhinandan Jain
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
| | - Pattie Maes
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
| | - Nicco Reggente
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | | | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Laura Barca
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Micah Allen
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark; Cambridge Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, UK
| | - Roy Salomon
- Department Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel
| | - Mark Miller
- Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience, Hokkaido University, Japan
| | - Daniele Di Lernia
- Department of Psychology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy; Applied Technology for Neuro- Psychology Laboratory, IRCCS Istituto Auxologico Italiano, Milan, Italy
| | - Giuseppe Riva
- Department of Psychology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy; Applied Technology for Neuro- Psychology Laboratory, IRCCS Istituto Auxologico Italiano, Milan, Italy
| | - Manos Tsakiris
- The Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, University of London, UK; Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK; Department of Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
| | - Moussa A Chalah
- EA 4391, Excitabilité Nerveuse et Thérapeutique, Université Paris-Est Créteil, Créteil, France; Service de Physiologie - Explorations Fonctionnelles, Hôpital Henri Mondor, Créteil, France
| | - Arno Klein
- Child Mind Institute, New York City, USA
| | - Ben Zhang
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Teresa Garcia
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Ursula Pollack
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Marion Trousselard
- Institut de Recherche Biomédicale des Armées, Place Général Valérie André, 91220 Brétigny-sur-Orge, France
| | - Charles Verdonk
- Institut de Recherche Biomédicale des Armées, Place Général Valérie André, 91220 Brétigny-sur-Orge, France
| | | | - Vladimir Adrien
- Infrastructure for Clinical Research in Neurosciences (iCRIN) Psychiatry, Paris Brain Institute, Paris, France; Department of Psychiatry, Hôpital Saint-Antoine, AP-HP, Sorbonne Université, 75012 Paris, France
| | - Karl Friston
- Queen Sq, Institute of Neurology, UCL, London WC1N 3AR, UK
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13
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Bolton D. A revitalized biopsychosocial model: core theory, research paradigms, and clinical implications. Psychol Med 2023; 53:7504-7511. [PMID: 37681273 PMCID: PMC10755226 DOI: 10.1017/s0033291723002660] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/13/2022] [Revised: 05/31/2023] [Accepted: 08/18/2023] [Indexed: 09/09/2023]
Abstract
The biopsychosocial model (BPSM) was proposed by George Engel in 1977 as an improvement to the biomedical model (BMM), to take account of psychological and social as well as biological factors relevant to health and disease. Since then the BPSM has had a mixed reputation, as the overarching framework for psychiatry, perhaps for medicine generally, while also being criticized for being theoretically and empirically vacuous. Over the past few decades, substantial evidence has accumulated supporting the BPSM but its theory remains less clear. The first part of this paper reviews recent well-known, general theories in the relevant sciences that can provide a theoretical framework of the model, constituting a revitalized BPSM capable of theorizing causal interactions within and between biological, psychological, and social domains. Fundamental concepts in this new framework include causation as regulation and dysfunction as dysregulation. Associated research paradigms are outlined in Part 2. Research in psychological therapies and social epidemiology are major examples of programs that have produced results anomalous for the BMM and consistent with the BPSM. Theorized models of causal mechanisms enrich empirical data and two biopsychosocial examples are models of chronic stress and pain perception. Clinical implications are reviewed in Part 3. The BPSM accommodates psychological and social as well as biological treatment effects evident in the clinical trials literature. Personal, interpersonal, and institutional aspects of clinical care are out of the scope of the BMM, assigned to the art of healthcare rather than the science, but can be accommodated and theorized in the BPSM.
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Affiliation(s)
- Derek Bolton
- Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK
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14
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Bottemanne H, Berkovitch L, Gauld C, Balcerac A, Schmidt L, Mouchabac S, Fossati P. Storm on predictive brain: A neurocomputational account of ketamine antidepressant effect. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 154:105410. [PMID: 37793581 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105410] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2023] [Revised: 08/24/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 10/06/2023]
Abstract
For the past decade, ketamine, an N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDAr) antagonist, has been considered a promising treatment for major depressive disorder (MDD). Unlike the delayed effect of monoaminergic treatment, ketamine may produce fast-acting antidepressant effects hours after a single administration at subanesthetic dose. Along with these antidepressant effects, it may also induce transient dissociative (disturbing of the sense of self and reality) symptoms during acute administration which resolve within hours. To understand ketamine's rapid-acting antidepressant effect, several biological hypotheses have been explored, but despite these promising avenues, there is a lack of model to understand the timeframe of antidepressant and dissociative effects of ketamine. In this article, we propose a neurocomputational account of ketamine's antidepressant and dissociative effects based on the Predictive Processing (PP) theory, a framework for cognitive and sensory processing. PP theory suggests that the brain produces top-down predictions to process incoming sensory signals, and generates bottom-up prediction errors (PEs) which are then used to update predictions. This iterative dynamic neural process would relies on N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDAr) and α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole-propionic receptors (AMPAr), two major component of the glutamatergic signaling. Furthermore, it has been suggested that MDD is characterized by over-rigid predictions which cannot be updated by the PEs, leading to miscalibration of hierarchical inference and self-reinforcing negative feedback loops. Based on former empirical studies using behavioral paradigms, neurophysiological recordings, and computational modeling, we suggest that ketamine impairs top-down predictions by blocking NMDA receptors, and enhances presynaptic glutamate release and PEs, producing transient dissociative symptoms and fast-acting antidepressant effect in hours following acute administration. Moreover, we present data showing that ketamine may enhance a delayed neural plasticity pathways through AMPAr potentiation, triggering a prolonged antidepressant effect up to seven days for unique administration. Taken together, the two sides of antidepressant effects with distinct timeframe could constitute the keystone of antidepressant properties of ketamine. These PP disturbances may also participate to a ketamine-induced time window of mental flexibility, which can be used to improve the psychotherapeutic process. Finally, these proposals could be used as a theoretical framework for future research into fast-acting antidepressants, and combination with existing antidepressant and psychotherapy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hugo Bottemanne
- Paris Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), UMR 7225 / UMRS 1127, Sorbonne University / CNRS / INSERM, Paris, France; Sorbonne University, Department of Philosophy, Science Norm Democracy Research Unit, UMR, 8011, Paris, France; Sorbonne University, Department of Psychiatry, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), Paris, France.
| | - Lucie Berkovitch
- Saclay CEA Centre, Neurospin, Gif-Sur-Yvette Cedex, France; Department of Psychiatry, GHU Paris Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, Service Hospitalo-Universitaire, Paris, France
| | - Christophe Gauld
- Department of Child Psychiatry, CHU de Lyon, F-69000 Lyon, France; Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod, UMR 5229 CNRS & Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1, F-69000 Lyon, France
| | - Alexander Balcerac
- Paris Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), UMR 7225 / UMRS 1127, Sorbonne University / CNRS / INSERM, Paris, France; Sorbonne University, Department of Neurology, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), Paris, France
| | - Liane Schmidt
- Paris Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), UMR 7225 / UMRS 1127, Sorbonne University / CNRS / INSERM, Paris, France
| | - Stephane Mouchabac
- Paris Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), UMR 7225 / UMRS 1127, Sorbonne University / CNRS / INSERM, Paris, France; Sorbonne University, Department of Psychiatry, Saint-Antoine Hospital, Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP), Paris, France
| | - Philippe Fossati
- Paris Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), UMR 7225 / UMRS 1127, Sorbonne University / CNRS / INSERM, Paris, France; Sorbonne University, Department of Philosophy, Science Norm Democracy Research Unit, UMR, 8011, Paris, France
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15
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Zaidel A, Salomon R. Multisensory decisions from self to world. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2023; 378:20220335. [PMID: 37545311 PMCID: PMC10404927 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0335] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2023] [Accepted: 06/19/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Classic Bayesian models of perceptual inference describe how an ideal observer would integrate 'unisensory' measurements (multisensory integration) and attribute sensory signals to their origin(s) (causal inference). However, in the brain, sensory signals are always received in the context of a multisensory bodily state-namely, in combination with other senses. Moreover, sensory signals from both interoceptive sensing of one's own body and exteroceptive sensing of the world are highly interdependent and never occur in isolation. Thus, the observer must fundamentally determine whether each sensory observation is from an external (versus internal, self-generated) source to even be considered for integration. Critically, solving this primary causal inference problem requires knowledge of multisensory and sensorimotor dependencies. Thus, multisensory processing is needed to separate sensory signals. These multisensory processes enable us to simultaneously form a sense of self and form distinct perceptual decisions about the external world. In this opinion paper, we review and discuss the similarities and distinctions between multisensory decisions underlying the sense of self and those directed at acquiring information about the world. We call attention to the fact that heterogeneous multisensory processes take place all along the neural hierarchy (even in forming 'unisensory' observations) and argue that more integration of these aspects, in theory and experiment, is required to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of multisensory brain function. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Zaidel
- Gonda Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel
| | - Roy Salomon
- Gonda Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 3498838, Israel
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16
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Corcoran AW, Perrykkad K, Feuerriegel D, Robinson JE. Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2023:17456916231185343. [PMID: 37694720 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231185343] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/12/2023]
Abstract
Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew W Corcoran
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
| | - Kelsey Perrykkad
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
| | | | - Jonathan E Robinson
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
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17
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Brændholt M, Kluger DS, Varga S, Heck DH, Gross J, Allen MG. Breathing in waves: Understanding respiratory-brain coupling as a gradient of predictive oscillations. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 152:105262. [PMID: 37271298 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105262] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/10/2022] [Revised: 05/03/2023] [Accepted: 05/24/2023] [Indexed: 06/06/2023]
Abstract
Breathing plays a crucial role in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes by regulating the strength and synchronisation of neural oscillations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that respiratory rhythms govern a wide range of behavioural effects across cognitive, affective, and perceptual domains. Additionally, respiratory-modulated brain oscillations have been observed in various mammalian models and across diverse frequency spectra. However, a comprehensive framework to elucidate these disparate phenomena remains elusive. In this review, we synthesise existing findings to propose a neural gradient of respiratory-modulated brain oscillations and examine recent computational models of neural oscillations to map this gradient onto a hierarchical cascade of precision-weighted prediction errors. By deciphering the computational mechanisms underlying respiratory control of these processes, we can potentially uncover new pathways for understanding the link between respiratory-brain coupling and psychiatric disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Malthe Brændholt
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark
| | - Daniel S Kluger
- Institute for Biomagnetism and Biosignal Analysis, University of Münster, Germany.
| | - Somogy Varga
- School of Culture and Society, Aarhus University, Denmark; The Centre for Philosophy of Epidemiology, Medicine and Public Health, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Detlef H Heck
- Department of Biomedical Sciences, University of Minnesota Medical School, Duluth, MN
| | - Joachim Gross
- Institute for Biomagnetism and Biosignal Analysis, University of Münster, Germany; Otto Creutzfeldt Center for Cognitive and Behavioral Neuroscience, University of Münster, Germany
| | - Micah G Allen
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark; Cambridge Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, UK
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18
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Shaffer C, Barrett LF, Quigley KS. Signal processing in the vagus nerve: Hypotheses based on new genetic and anatomical evidence. Biol Psychol 2023; 182:108626. [PMID: 37419401 PMCID: PMC10563766 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2023.108626] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2023] [Revised: 06/25/2023] [Accepted: 07/03/2023] [Indexed: 07/09/2023]
Abstract
Each organism must regulate its internal state in a metabolically efficient way as it interacts in space and time with an ever-changing and only partly predictable world. Success in this endeavor is largely determined by the ongoing communication between brain and body, and the vagus nerve is a crucial structure in that dialogue. In this review, we introduce the novel hypothesis that the afferent vagus nerve is engaged in signal processing rather than just signal relay. New genetic and structural evidence of vagal afferent fiber anatomy motivates two hypotheses: (1) that sensory signals informing on the physiological state of the body compute both spatial and temporal viscerosensory features as they ascend the vagus nerve, following patterns found in other sensory architectures, such as the visual and olfactory systems; and (2) that ascending and descending signals modulate one another, calling into question the strict segregation of sensory and motor signals, respectively. Finally, we discuss several implications of our two hypotheses for understanding the role of viscerosensory signal processing in predictive energy regulation (i.e., allostasis) as well as the role of metabolic signals in memory and in disorders of prediction (e.g., mood disorders).
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Affiliation(s)
- Clare Shaffer
- Department of Psychology, College of Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
| | - Lisa Feldman Barrett
- Department of Psychology, College of Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA; Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Charlestown, MA, USA
| | - Karen S Quigley
- Department of Psychology, College of Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
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19
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Harduf A, Shaked A, Yaniv AU, Salomon R. Disentangling the Neural Correlates of Agency, Ownership and Multisensory Processing. Neuroimage 2023:120255. [PMID: 37414232 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2023.120255] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/23/2022] [Revised: 06/25/2023] [Accepted: 06/27/2023] [Indexed: 07/08/2023] Open
Abstract
The experience of the self as an embodied agent in the world is an essential aspect of human consciousness. This experience arises from the feeling of control over one's bodily actions, termed the Sense of Agency, and the feeling that the body belongs to the self, Body Ownership. Despite long-standing philosophical and scientific interest in the relationship between the body and brain, the neural systems involved in Body Ownership and Sense of Agency, and especially their interactions, are not yet understood. In this preregistered study using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion inside an MR-scanner, we aimed to uncover the relationship between Body Ownership and Sense of Agency in the human brain. Importantly, by using both visuomotor and visuotactile stimulations and measuring online trial-by-trial fluctuations in the illusion magnitude, we were able to disentangle brain systems related to objective sensory stimulation and subjective judgments of the bodily-self. Our results indicate that at both the behavioral and neural levels, Body Ownership and Sense of Agency are strongly interrelated. Multisensory regions in the occipital and fronto-parietal regions encoded convergence of sensory stimulation conditions. The subjective judgments of the bodily-self were related to BOLD fluctuations in the Somatosensory cortex and in regions not activated by the sensory conditions, such as the insular cortex and precuneus. Our results highlight the convergence of multisensory processing in specific neural systems for both Body Ownership and Sense of Agency with partially dissociable regions for subjective judgments in regions of the Default Mode Network.
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Affiliation(s)
- Amir Harduf
- The Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel; The Faculty of Life Sciences, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel
| | - Ariel Shaked
- The Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel
| | - Adi Ulmer Yaniv
- The Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel; Center for Developmental Social Neuroscience, Reichman University, Herzliya 4610101, Israel
| | - Roy Salomon
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, Haifa University, Haifa 31905, Israel; The Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel
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20
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Levin M. Darwin's agential materials: evolutionary implications of multiscale competency in developmental biology. Cell Mol Life Sci 2023; 80:142. [PMID: 37156924 PMCID: PMC10167196 DOI: 10.1007/s00018-023-04790-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/05/2023] [Revised: 04/24/2023] [Accepted: 04/27/2023] [Indexed: 05/10/2023]
Abstract
A critical aspect of evolution is the layer of developmental physiology that operates between the genotype and the anatomical phenotype. While much work has addressed the evolution of developmental mechanisms and the evolvability of specific genetic architectures with emergent complexity, one aspect has not been sufficiently explored: the implications of morphogenetic problem-solving competencies for the evolutionary process itself. The cells that evolution works with are not passive components: rather, they have numerous capabilities for behavior because they derive from ancestral unicellular organisms with rich repertoires. In multicellular organisms, these capabilities must be tamed, and can be exploited, by the evolutionary process. Specifically, biological structures have a multiscale competency architecture where cells, tissues, and organs exhibit regulative plasticity-the ability to adjust to perturbations such as external injury or internal modifications and still accomplish specific adaptive tasks across metabolic, transcriptional, physiological, and anatomical problem spaces. Here, I review examples illustrating how physiological circuits guiding cellular collective behavior impart computational properties to the agential material that serves as substrate for the evolutionary process. I then explore the ways in which the collective intelligence of cells during morphogenesis affect evolution, providing a new perspective on the evolutionary search process. This key feature of the physiological software of life helps explain the remarkable speed and robustness of biological evolution, and sheds new light on the relationship between genomes and functional anatomical phenotypes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Levin
- Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University, 200 Boston Ave. 334 Research East, Medford, MA, 02155, USA.
- Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering at Harvard University, 3 Blackfan St., Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
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21
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Meling D, Scheidegger M. Not in the drug, not in the brain: Causality in psychedelic experiences from an enactive perspective. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1100058. [PMID: 37077857 PMCID: PMC10106622 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1100058] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/16/2022] [Accepted: 03/02/2023] [Indexed: 04/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Psychedelics are psychoactive substances that receive renewed interest from science and society. Increasing empirical evidence shows that the effects of psychedelics are associated with alterations in biochemical processes, brain activity, and lived experience. Still, how these different levels relate remains subject to debate. The current literature presents two influential views on the relationship between the psychedelic molecule, neural events, and experience: The integration view and the pluralistic view. The main aim of this article is to contribute a promising complementary view by re-evaluating the psychedelic molecule-brain-experience relationship from an enactive perspective. We approach this aim via the following main research questions: (1) What is the causal relationship between the psychedelic drug and brain activity? (2) What is the causal relationship between brain activity and the psychedelic experience? In exploring the first research question, we apply the concept of autonomy to the psychedelic molecule-brain relationship. In exploring the second research question, we apply the concept of dynamic co-emergence to the psychedelic brain-experience relationship. Addressing these two research questions from an enactive position offers a perspective that emphasizes interdependence and circular causality on multiple levels. This enactive perspective not only supports the pluralistic view but enriches it through a principled account of how multi-layered processes come to interact. This renders the enactive view a promising contribution to questions around causality in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics with important implications for psychedelic therapy and psychedelic research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Meling
- Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Psychiatric University Hospital Zurich, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
- Department of Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, Faculty of Medicine, Medical Center – University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany
- *Correspondence: Daniel Meling,
| | - Milan Scheidegger
- Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Psychiatric University Hospital Zurich, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
- Neuroscience Center Zurich (ZNZ), University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
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22
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Bongard J, Levin M. There’s Plenty of Room Right Here: Biological Systems as Evolved, Overloaded, Multi-Scale Machines. Biomimetics (Basel) 2023; 8:biomimetics8010110. [PMID: 36975340 PMCID: PMC10046700 DOI: 10.3390/biomimetics8010110] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2022] [Revised: 02/24/2023] [Accepted: 03/01/2023] [Indexed: 03/18/2023] Open
Abstract
The applicability of computational models to the biological world is an active topic of debate. We argue that a useful path forward results from abandoning hard boundaries between categories and adopting an observer-dependent, pragmatic view. Such a view dissolves the contingent dichotomies driven by human cognitive biases (e.g., a tendency to oversimplify) and prior technological limitations in favor of a more continuous view, necessitated by the study of evolution, developmental biology, and intelligent machines. Form and function are tightly entwined in nature, and in some cases, in robotics as well. Thus, efforts to re-shape living systems for biomedical or bioengineering purposes require prediction and control of their function at multiple scales. This is challenging for many reasons, one of which is that living systems perform multiple functions in the same place at the same time. We refer to this as “polycomputing”—the ability of the same substrate to simultaneously compute different things, and make those computational results available to different observers. This ability is an important way in which living things are a kind of computer, but not the familiar, linear, deterministic kind; rather, living things are computers in the broad sense of their computational materials, as reported in the rapidly growing physical computing literature. We argue that an observer-centered framework for the computations performed by evolved and designed systems will improve the understanding of mesoscale events, as it has already done at quantum and relativistic scales. To develop our understanding of how life performs polycomputing, and how it can be convinced to alter one or more of those functions, we can first create technologies that polycompute and learn how to alter their functions. Here, we review examples of biological and technological polycomputing, and develop the idea that the overloading of different functions on the same hardware is an important design principle that helps to understand and build both evolved and designed systems. Learning to hack existing polycomputing substrates, as well as to evolve and design new ones, will have massive impacts on regenerative medicine, robotics, and computer engineering.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joshua Bongard
- Department of Computer Science, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405, USA
| | - Michael Levin
- Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University, 200 Boston Ave., Suite 4600, Medford, MA 02155, USA
- Correspondence: ; Tel.: +(617)-627-6161
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23
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Bolis D, Dumas G, Schilbach L. Interpersonal attunement in social interactions: from collective psychophysiology to inter-personalized psychiatry and beyond. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2023; 378:20210365. [PMID: 36571122 PMCID: PMC9791489 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0365] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/27/2022] Open
Abstract
In this article, we analyse social interactions, drawing on diverse points of views, ranging from dialectics, second-person neuroscience and enactivism to dynamical systems, active inference and machine learning. To this end, we define interpersonal attunement as a set of multi-scale processes of building up and materializing social expectations-put simply, anticipating and interacting with others and ourselves. While cultivating and negotiating common ground, via communication and culture-building activities, are indispensable for the survival of the individual, the relevant multi-scale mechanisms have been largely considered in isolation. Here, collective psychophysiology, we argue, can lend itself to the fine-tuned analysis of social interactions, without neglecting the individual. On the other hand, an interpersonal mismatch of expectations can lead to a breakdown of communication and social isolation known to negatively affect mental health. In this regard, we review psychopathology in terms of interpersonal misattunement, conceptualizing psychiatric disorders as disorders of social interaction, to describe how individual mental health is inextricably linked to social interaction. By doing so, we foresee avenues for an inter-personalized psychiatry, which moves from a static spectrum of disorders to a dynamic relational space, focusing on how the multi-faceted processes of social interaction can help to promote mental health. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dimitris Bolis
- Independent Max Planck Research Group for Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, Kraepelinstrasse 2–10, Muenchen-Schwabing 80804, Germany,Centre for Philosophy of Science, University of Lisbon, Campo Grande, 1749-016 Lisbon, Portugal,Department of System Neuroscience, National Institute for Physiological Sciences (NIPS), Okazaki 444-0867, Japan
| | - Guillaume Dumas
- Precision Psychiatry and Social Physiology Laboratory, CHU Ste-Justine Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3T 1J4,Mila - Quebec AI Institute, University of Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2S 3H1,Culture Mind and Brain Program, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1A1
| | - Leonhard Schilbach
- Independent Max Planck Research Group for Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, Kraepelinstrasse 2–10, Muenchen-Schwabing 80804, Germany,Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Hospital, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Munich 40629, Germany,Department of General Psychiatry 2, LVR-Klinikum Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf 80336, Germany
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24
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Press C, Thomas ER, Yon D. Cancelling cancellation? Sensorimotor control, agency, and prediction. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 145:105012. [PMID: 36565943 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.105012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/30/2022] [Revised: 12/06/2022] [Accepted: 12/18/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
Abstract
For decades, classic theories of action control and action awareness have been built around the idea that the brain predictively 'cancels' expected action outcomes from perception. However, recent research casts doubt over this basic premise. What do these new findings mean for classic accounts of action? Should we now 'cancel' old data, theories and approaches generated under this idea? In this paper, we argue 'No'. While doubts about predictive cancellation may urge us to fundamentally rethink how predictions shape perception, the wider pyramid using these ideas to explain action control and agentic experiences can remain largely intact. Some adaptive functions assigned to predictive cancellation can be achieved through quasi-predictive processes, that influence perception without actively tracking the probabilistic structure of the environment. Other functions may rely upon truly predictive processes, but not require that these predictions cancel perception. Appreciating the role of these processes may help us to move forward in explaining how agents optimise their interactions with the external world, even if predictive cancellation is cancelled from theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Clare Press
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK.
| | - Emily R Thomas
- Neuroscience Institute, New York University School of Medicine, 550 1st Ave, New York, NY 10016, USA
| | - Daniel Yon
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK
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Meredith Weiss S, Marshall PJ. Anticipation across modalities in children and adults: Relating anticipatory alpha rhythm lateralization, reaction time, and executive function. Dev Sci 2023; 26:e13277. [PMID: 35616474 PMCID: PMC10078525 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13277] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2020] [Revised: 02/14/2022] [Accepted: 04/22/2022] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
The development of the ability to anticipate-as manifested by preparatory actions and neural activation related to the expectation of an upcoming stimulus-may play a key role in the ontogeny of cognitive skills more broadly. This preregistered study examined anticipatory brain potentials and behavioral responses (reaction time; RT) to anticipated target stimuli in relation to individual differences in the ability to use goals to direct action (as indexed by measures of executive function; EF). A cross-sectional investigation was conducted in 40 adults (aged 18-25 years) and 40 children (aged 6-8 years) to examine the association of changes in the amplitude of modality-specific alpha-range rhythms in the electroencephalogram (EEG) during anticipation of lateralized visual, tactile, or auditory stimuli with inter- and intraindividual variation in RT and EF. Children and adults exhibited contralateral anticipatory reductions in the mu rhythm and the visual alpha rhythm for tactile and visual anticipation, respectively, indicating modality and spatially specific attention allocation. Variability in within-subject anticipatory alpha lateralization (the difference between contralateral and ipsilateral alpha power) was related to single-trial RT. This relation was more prominent in adults than in children, and was not apparent for auditory stimuli. Multilevel models indicated that interindividual differences in anticipatory mu rhythm lateralization contributed to the significant association with variability in EF, but this was not the case for visual or auditory alpha rhythms. Exploratory microstate analyses were undertaken to cluster global field power (GFP) into a distribution-free temporal analysis examining developmental differences across samples and in relation to RT and EF. Anticipation is suggested as a developmental bridge construct connecting neuroscience, behavior, and cognition, with anticipatory EEG oscillations being discussed as quantifiable and potentially malleable indicators of stimulus prediction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Staci Meredith Weiss
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.,Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Peter J Marshall
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
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26
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Neurodynamical Computing at the Information Boundaries of Intelligent Systems. Cognit Comput 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s12559-022-10081-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/28/2022]
Abstract
AbstractArtificial intelligence has not achieved defining features of biological intelligence despite models boasting more parameters than neurons in the human brain. In this perspective article, we synthesize historical approaches to understanding intelligent systems and argue that methodological and epistemic biases in these fields can be resolved by shifting away from cognitivist brain-as-computer theories and recognizing that brains exist within large, interdependent living systems. Integrating the dynamical systems view of cognition with the massive distributed feedback of perceptual control theory highlights a theoretical gap in our understanding of nonreductive neural mechanisms. Cell assemblies—properly conceived as reentrant dynamical flows and not merely as identified groups of neurons—may fill that gap by providing a minimal supraneuronal level of organization that establishes a neurodynamical base layer for computation. By considering information streams from physical embodiment and situational embedding, we discuss this computational base layer in terms of conserved oscillatory and structural properties of cortical-hippocampal networks. Our synthesis of embodied cognition, based in dynamical systems and perceptual control, aims to bypass the neurosymbolic stalemates that have arisen in artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and computational neuroscience.
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Saini F, Ponzo S, Silvestrin F, Fotopoulou A, David AS. Depersonalization disorder as a systematic downregulation of interoceptive signals. Sci Rep 2022; 12:22123. [PMID: 36543824 PMCID: PMC9772393 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-22277-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2022] [Accepted: 10/12/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Depersonalisation disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition characterised by a feeling of detachment from one's own body and surrounding, and it is understood as emerging from the downregulation of interoceptive afferents. However, the precise mechanisms that drive this 'interoceptive silencing' are yet to be clarified. Here we present a computational and neurobiologically plausible model of DPD within the active inference framework. Specifically, we describe DPD as arising from disrupted interoceptive processing at higher levels of the cortical hierarchy where the interoceptive and exteroceptive streams are integrated. We simulated the behaviour of an agent subjected to a situation of high interoceptive activation despite the absence of a perceivable threat in the external environment. The simulation showed how a similar condition, if perceived as inescapable, would result in a downregulation of interoceptive signals, whilst leaving the exteroceptive ones unaffected. Such interoceptive silencing would force the agent to over-rely on exteroceptive information and would ultimately lead to the DPD phenomenology. Finally, our simulation shows that repeated exposure to similar situations over time will lead the agent to increasingly disengage from bodily responses even in the face of a less triggering situation, explaining how a single episode of depersonalization can lead to chronic DPD.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fedal Saini
- grid.499389.60000 0004 0375 2443Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s London College, London, SE5 8AF UK
| | - Sonia Ponzo
- Flo Health, London, UK ,grid.83440.3b0000000121901201Institute of Health Informatics, University College London, London, UK
| | - Francesco Silvestrin
- Thrive Therapeutic Software Ltd., London, UK ,grid.8273.e0000 0001 1092 7967University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ UK
| | - Aikaterini Fotopoulou
- grid.83440.3b0000000121901201Division of Psychology & Language Sciences, Clinical, Educational & Health Psychology Research Department, University College London, London, UK
| | - Anthony S. David
- grid.83440.3b0000000121901201Institute of Mental Health, Faculty of Brain Sciences, University College London, London, UK
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28
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Park HD, Piton T, Kannape OA, Duncan NW, Lee KY, Lane TJ, Blanke O. Breathing is coupled with voluntary initiation of mental imagery. Neuroimage 2022; 264:119685. [PMID: 36252914 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119685] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2022] [Revised: 10/03/2022] [Accepted: 10/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous research has suggested that bodily signals from internal organs are associated with diverse cortical and subcortical processes involved in sensory-motor functions, beyond homeostatic reflexes. For instance, a recent study demonstrated that the preparation and execution of voluntary actions, as well as its underlying neural activity, are coupled with the breathing cycle. In the current study, we investigated whether such breathing-action coupling is limited to voluntary motor action or whether it is also present for mental actions not involving any overt bodily movement. To answer this question, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG), electromyography (EMG), and respiratory signals while participants were conducting a voluntary action paradigm including self-initiated motor execution (ME), motor imagery (MI), and visual imagery (VI) tasks. We observed that the voluntary initiation of ME, MI, and VI are similarly coupled with the respiration phase. In addition, EEG analysis revealed the existence of readiness potential (RP) waveforms in all three tasks (i.e., ME, MI, VI), as well as a coupling between the RP amplitude and the respiratory phase. Our findings show that the voluntary initiation of both imagined and overt action is coupled with respiration, and further suggest that the breathing system is involved in preparatory processes of voluntary action by contributing to the temporal decision of when to initiate the action plan, regardless of whether this culminates in overt movements.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hyeong-Dong Park
- Graduate Institute of Mind, Brain and Consciousness, Taipei Medical University, Taipei, Taiwan; Brain and Consciousness Research Centre, Shuang-Ho Hospital, New Taipei City, Taiwan.
| | - Timothy Piton
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Neuro-X Institute and Brain Mind Institute, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Oliver A Kannape
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Neuro-X Institute and Brain Mind Institute, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Niall W Duncan
- Graduate Institute of Mind, Brain and Consciousness, Taipei Medical University, Taipei, Taiwan; Brain and Consciousness Research Centre, Shuang-Ho Hospital, New Taipei City, Taiwan
| | - Kang-Yun Lee
- Division of Pulmonary Medicine, Department of Internal Medicine, Shuang Ho Hospital, Taipei Medical University, New Taipei City, Taiwan
| | - Timothy J Lane
- Graduate Institute of Mind, Brain and Consciousness, Taipei Medical University, Taipei, Taiwan; Brain and Consciousness Research Centre, Shuang-Ho Hospital, New Taipei City, Taiwan; Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
| | - Olaf Blanke
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Neuro-X Institute and Brain Mind Institute, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Geneva, Switzerland; Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
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29
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Intrinsic brain dynamics in the Default Mode Network predict involuntary fluctuations of visual awareness. Nat Commun 2022; 13:6923. [PMID: 36376303 PMCID: PMC9663583 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-34410-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2021] [Accepted: 10/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Brain activity is intrinsically organised into spatiotemporal patterns, but it is still not clear whether these intrinsic patterns are functional or epiphenomenal. Using a simultaneous fMRI-EEG implementation of a well-known bistable visual task, we showed that the latent transient states in the intrinsic EEG oscillations can predict upcoming involuntarily perceptual transitions. The critical state predicting a dominant perceptual transition was characterised by the phase coupling between the precuneus (PCU), a key node of the Default Mode Network (DMN), and the primary visual cortex (V1). The interaction between the lifetime of this state and the PCU- > V1 Granger-causal effect is correlated with the perceptual fluctuation rate. Our study suggests that the brain's endogenous dynamics are phenomenologically relevant, as they can elicit a diversion between potential visual processing pathways, while external stimuli remain the same. In this sense, the intrinsic DMN dynamics pre-empt the content of consciousness.
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30
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Ilan Y. The constrained disorder principle defines living organisms and provides a method for correcting disturbed biological systems. Comput Struct Biotechnol J 2022; 20:6087-6096. [DOI: 10.1016/j.csbj.2022.11.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2022] [Revised: 10/26/2022] [Accepted: 11/06/2022] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
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31
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Predictive coding, multisensory integration, and attentional control: A multicomponent framework for lucid dreaming. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2022; 119:e2123418119. [PMID: 36279459 PMCID: PMC9636904 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2123418119] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Lucid dreaming (LD) is a mental state in which we realize not being awake but are dreaming while asleep. It often involves vivid, perceptually intense dream images as well as peculiar kinesthetic sensations, such as flying, levitating, or out-of-body experiences. LD is in the cross-spotlight of cognitive neuroscience and sleep research as a particular case to study consciousness, cognition, and the neural background of dream experiences. Here, we present a multicomponent framework for the study and understanding of neurocognitive mechanisms and phenomenological aspects of LD. We propose that LD is associated with prediction error signals arising during sleep and occurring at higher or lower levels of the processing hierarchy. Prediction errors are resolved by generating a superordinate self-model able to integrate ambiguous stimuli arriving from sensory periphery and higher-order cortical regions. While multisensory integration enables lucidity maintenance and contributes to peculiar kinesthetic experiences, attentional control facilitates multisensory integration by dynamically regulating the balance between the influence of top-down mental models and the precision weighting of bottom-up sensory inputs. Our novel framework aims to link neural correlates of LD with current concepts of sleep and arousal regulation and provide testable predictions on interindividual differences in LD as well as neurocognitive mechanisms inducing lucid dreams.
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32
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Katsumi Y, Theriault JE, Quigley KS, Barrett LF. Allostasis as a core feature of hierarchical gradients in the human brain. Netw Neurosci 2022; 6:1010-1031. [PMID: 38800458 PMCID: PMC11117115 DOI: 10.1162/netn_a_00240] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2021] [Accepted: 02/11/2022] [Indexed: 05/29/2024] Open
Abstract
This paper integrates emerging evidence from two broad streams of scientific literature into one common framework: (a) hierarchical gradients of functional connectivity that reflect the brain's large-scale structural architecture (e.g., a lamination gradient in the cerebral cortex); and (b) approaches to predictive processing and one of its specific instantiations called allostasis (i.e., the predictive regulation of energetic resources in the service of coordinating the body's internal systems). This synthesis begins to sketch a coherent, neurobiologically inspired framework suggesting that predictive energy regulation is at the core of human brain function, and by extension, psychological and behavioral phenomena, providing a shared vocabulary for theory building and knowledge accumulation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuta Katsumi
- Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
| | | | - Karen S. Quigley
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Lisa Feldman Barrett
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
- Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
- Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
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33
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The Emperor Is Naked: Replies to commentaries on the target article. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e219. [PMID: 36172792 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22000656] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
The 35 commentaries cover a wide range of topics and take many different stances on the issues explored by the target article. We have organised our response to the commentaries around three central questions: Are Friston blankets just Pearl blankets? What ontological and metaphysical commitments are implied by the use of Friston blankets? What kind of explanatory work are Friston blankets capable of? We conclude our reply with a short critical reflection on the indiscriminate use of both Markov blankets and the free energy principle.
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34
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Boundaries and borders gone! But life goes on. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e202. [PMID: 36172766 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22000152] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
Unlike machines, living systems are distinguished by the continual destruction and regeneration of their boundaries and other components. Stable Markov blankets may be a real feature of the world, or they may be merely a construction of particular models, but they are neither a feature of organisms nor of any model that can capture the necessary conditions of their existence.
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35
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Allen M, Levy A, Parr T, Friston KJ. In the Body’s Eye: The computational anatomy of interoceptive inference. PLoS Comput Biol 2022; 18:e1010490. [PMID: 36099315 PMCID: PMC9506608 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010490] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2021] [Revised: 09/23/2022] [Accepted: 08/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated ‘interoceptive lesions’ blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction. Understanding interactions between the brain and the body has become a topic of increased interest in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. A particular question here concerns how visceral, homeostatic rhythms such as the heart beat influence sensory, affective, and cognitive processing. To better understand these and other oscillatory brain-body interactions, we here introduce a novel computational model of interoceptive inference in which a synthetic agent’s perceptual beliefs are coupled to the rhythm of the heart. Our model both helps to explain emerging empirical data indicating that perceptual inference depends upon beat-to-beat heart rhythms, and can be used to better quantify intra- and inter-individual differences in heart-brain coupling. Using proof-of-principle simulations, we demonstrate how future empirical works could utilize our model to better understand and stratify disorders of interoception and brain-body interaction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Micah Allen
- Centre of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
- Cambridge Psychiatry, Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Andrew Levy
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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36
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Katyal S. Reducing and deducing the structures of consciousness through meditation. Front Psychol 2022; 13:884512. [PMID: 36160556 PMCID: PMC9493263 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.884512] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/26/2022] [Accepted: 08/12/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
According to many first-person accounts, consciousness comprises a subject-object structure involving a mental action or attitude starting from the “subjective pole” upon an object of experience. In recent years, many paradigms have been developed to manipulate and empirically investigate the object of consciousness. However, well-controlled investigation of subjective aspects of consciousness has been more challenging. One way, subjective aspects of consciousness are proposed to be studied is using meditation states that alter its subject-object structure. Most work to study consciousness in this way has been done using Buddhist meditation traditions and techniques. There is another meditation tradition that has been around for at least as long as early Buddhist traditions (if not longer) with the central goal of developing a fine-grained first-person understanding of consciousness and its constituents by its manipulation through meditation, namely the Tantric tradition of Yoga. However, due to the heavy reliance of Yogic traditions on the ancient Indian Samkhya philosophical system, their insights about consciousness have been more challenging to translate into contemporary research. Where such translation has been attempted, they have lacked accompanying phenomenological description of the procedures undertaken for making the precise subject-object manipulations as postulated. In this paper, I address these issues by first detailing how Tantric Yoga philosophy can be effectively translated as a systematic phenomenological account of consciousness spanning the entirety of the subject-object space divided into four “structures of consciousness” from subject to object. This follows from the work of the 20th century polymath and founder of the Tantric Yoga school of Ananda Marga, Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar, who expounded on the “cognitivization” of Samkhya philosophy. I then detail stepwise meditation procedures that make theoretical knowledge of these structures of consciousness a practical reality to a Tantric Yoga meditator in the first-person. This is achieved by entering meditative states through stepwise experiential reduction of the structures of consciousness from object to subject, as part of their meditative goal of “self-realization.” I end by briefly discussing the overlap of these putative meditation states with proposed states from other meditation traditions, and how these states could help advance an empirical study of consciousness.
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37
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Gunji YP, Shinohara S, Basios V. Connecting the free energy principle with quantum cognition. Front Neurorobot 2022; 16:910161. [PMID: 36119714 PMCID: PMC9478538 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.910161] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/01/2022] [Accepted: 07/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
It appears that the free energy minimization principle conflicts with quantum cognition since the former adheres to a restricted view based on experience while the latter allows deviations from such a restricted view. While free energy minimization, which incorporates Bayesian inference, leads to a Boolean lattice of propositions (classical logic), quantum cognition, which seems to be very dissimilar to Bayesian inference, leads to an orthomodular lattice of propositions (quantum logic). Thus, we address this challenging issue to bridge and connect the free energy minimization principle with the theory of quantum cognition. In this work, we introduce “excess Bayesian inference” and show that this excess Bayesian inference entails an underlying orthomodular lattice, while classic Bayesian inference entails a Boolean lattice. Excess Bayesian inference is implemented by extending the key idea of Bayesian inference beyond classic Bayesian inference and its variations. It is constructed by enhancing the idea of active inference and/or embodied intelligence. The appropriate lattice structure of its logic is obtained from a binary relation transformed from a distribution of the joint probabilities of data and hypotheses by employing a rough-set lattice technique in accordance with quantum cognition logic.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yukio-Pegio Gunji
- Department of Intermedia Arts and Science, School of Fundamental Science and Technology, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
- *Correspondence: Yukio-Pegio Gunji
| | - Shuji Shinohara
- School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Denki University, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Vasileios Basios
- Service de Physique des Systèmes Complexes et Mécanique Statistique and Interdisciplinary Center for Nonlinear Phenomena and Complex Systems (C.P.231 CeNoLi-ULB), Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
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38
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Mushiake H. Neurophysiological Perspective on Allostasis and Homeostasis: Dynamic Adaptation in Viable Systems. JOURNAL OF ROBOTICS AND MECHATRONICS 2022. [DOI: 10.20965/jrm.2022.p0710] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Allostasis is a physiological principle based on a dynamic regulatory system, contrary to homeostasis, in which the goal is to reach a steady state and recover from deviation from a set point in the internal environment. The concept of allostasis has continued to develop with advances in the field of neuroscience. In this short review, the author presents several new findings in neuroscience and extend the concept of allostasis as mutual regulation between cognitive, somatic, and autonomic systems. In this manner, biological systems adapt to external and internal environments by changing themselves.
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39
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Candia-Rivera D. Brain-heart interactions in the neurobiology of consciousness. CURRENT RESEARCH IN NEUROBIOLOGY 2022; 3:100050. [PMID: 36685762 PMCID: PMC9846460 DOI: 10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100050] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/13/2022] [Revised: 07/23/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 01/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Recent experimental evidence on patients with disorders of consciousness revealed that observing brain-heart interactions helps to detect residual consciousness, even in patients with absence of behavioral signs of consciousness. Those findings support hypotheses suggesting that visceral activity is involved in the neurobiology of consciousness, and sum to the existing evidence in healthy participants in which the neural responses to heartbeats reveal perceptual and self-consciousness. More evidence obtained through mathematical modeling of physiological dynamics revealed that emotion processing is prompted by an initial modulation from ascending vagal inputs to the brain, followed by sustained bidirectional brain-heart interactions. Those findings support long-lasting hypotheses on the causal role of bodily activity in emotions, feelings, and potentially consciousness. In this paper, the theoretical landscape on the potential role of heartbeats in cognition and consciousness is reviewed, as well as the experimental evidence supporting these hypotheses. I advocate for methodological developments on the estimation of brain-heart interactions to uncover the role of cardiac inputs in the origin, levels, and contents of consciousness. The ongoing evidence depicts interactions further than the cortical responses evoked by each heartbeat, suggesting the potential presence of non-linear, complex, and bidirectional communication between brain and heartbeat dynamics. Further developments on methodologies to analyze brain-heart interactions may contribute to a better understanding of the physiological dynamics involved in homeostatic-allostatic control, cognitive functions, and consciousness.
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40
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Clawson WP, Levin M. Endless forms most beautiful 2.0: teleonomy and the bioengineering of chimaeric and synthetic organisms. Biol J Linn Soc Lond 2022. [DOI: 10.1093/biolinnean/blac073] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
The rich variety of biological forms and behaviours results from one evolutionary history on Earth, via frozen accidents and selection in specific environments. This ubiquitous baggage in natural, familiar model species obscures the plasticity and swarm intelligence of cellular collectives. Significant gaps exist in our understanding of the origin of anatomical novelty, of the relationship between genome and form, and of strategies for control of large-scale structure and function in regenerative medicine and bioengineering. Analysis of living forms that have never existed before is necessary to reveal deep design principles of life as it can be. We briefly review existing examples of chimaeras, cyborgs, hybrots and other beings along the spectrum containing evolved and designed systems. To drive experimental progress in multicellular synthetic morphology, we propose teleonomic (goal-seeking, problem-solving) behaviour in diverse problem spaces as a powerful invariant across possible beings regardless of composition or origin. Cybernetic perspectives on chimaeric morphogenesis erase artificial distinctions established by past limitations of technology and imagination. We suggest that a multi-scale competency architecture facilitates evolution of robust problem-solving, living machines. Creation and analysis of novel living forms will be an essential testbed for the emerging field of diverse intelligence, with numerous implications across regenerative medicine, robotics and ethics.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Michael Levin
- Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University , Medford, MA , USA
- Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering at Harvard University , Boston, MA , USA
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41
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Bolton D. Looking forward to a decade of the biopsychosocial model. BJPsych Bull 2022; 46:1-5. [PMID: 35781123 PMCID: PMC9768524 DOI: 10.1192/bjb.2022.34] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/17/2021] [Revised: 04/12/2022] [Accepted: 05/18/2022] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
The topic of this article is the biopsychosocial model. My main contention is that - notwithstanding doubts as to what exactly it is, or indeed whether it is anything - there is a coherent account of it, in terms of both applications to particular health conditions and mechanisms with wide application. There is accumulating evidence from recent decades that psychosocial as well as biological factors are implicated in the aetiology and treatment of a large range of physical as well as mental health conditions. The original proposer of the biopsychosocial model, George Engel, back in 1977, was substantially correct about what he saw was on its way.
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42
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An Enactive-Ecological Model to Guide Patient-Centered Osteopathic Care. Healthcare (Basel) 2022; 10:healthcare10061092. [PMID: 35742142 PMCID: PMC9223169 DOI: 10.3390/healthcare10061092] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2022] [Revised: 05/31/2022] [Accepted: 06/10/2022] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Osteopaths commonly face complexity and clinical uncertainty in their daily professional practice as primary contact practitioners. In order to effectively deal with complex clinical presentations, osteopaths need to possess well-developed clinical reasoning to understand the individual patient’s lived experience of pain and other symptoms and how their problem impacts their personhood and ability to engage with their world. We have recently proposed (En)active inference as an integrative framework for osteopathic care. The enactivist and active inference frameworks underpin our integrative hypothesis. Here, we present a clinically based interpretation of our integrative hypothesis by considering the ecological niche in which osteopathic care occurs. Active inference enables patients and practitioners to disambiguate each other’s mental states. The patients’ mental states are unobservable and must be inferred based on perceptual cues such as posture, body language, gaze direction and response to touch and hands-on care. A robust therapeutic alliance centred on cooperative communication and shared narratives and the appropriate and effective use of touch and hands-on care enable patients to contextualize their lived experiences. Touch and hands-on care enhance the therapeutic alliance, mental state alignment, and biobehavioural synchrony between patient and practitioner. Therefore, the osteopath–patient dyad provides mental state alignment and opportunities for ecological niche construction. Arguably, this can produce therapeutic experiences which reduce the prominence given to high-level prediction errors—and consequently, the top-down attentional focus on bottom-up sensory prediction errors, thus minimizing free energy. This commentary paper primarily aims to enable osteopaths to critically consider the value of this proposed framework in appreciating the complexities of delivering person-centred care.
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An informal reconstruction of the free-energy framework, examining the conceptual problems that arise. Neuropsychologia 2022; 173:108281. [PMID: 35662551 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2022.108281] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/22/2021] [Revised: 05/19/2022] [Accepted: 05/26/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Recent decades have seen increasing attention given to the free-energy framework. This proposes that many of the phenomena we associate with life, intelligence and adaptation can be explained in terms of a single, mathematical precept: the free-energy principle. This is claimed to apply to the adaptive behavior of primitive organisms as much as it does to the physiological structures of human brains. The proposal is potentially of interest to theorists from multiple disciplines. But as presentations often make intensive use of mathematical notation, it can be hard to understand, even for experts. The present article presents an informal reconstruction, using schematic illustrations. Mathematical notation is largely avoided, while detail and precision are retained as far as possible. The specifically conceptual problems that come to notice in the reconstruction are highlighted and discussed.
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Gerrans P. Alienation and identification in addiction. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2067034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Philip Gerrans
- Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia
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Sherman MT, Wang HT, Garfinkel SN, Critchley HD. The Cardiac Timing Toolbox (CaTT): Testing for physiologically plausible effects of cardiac timing on behaviour. Biol Psychol 2022; 170:108291. [PMID: 35202742 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2022.108291] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2021] [Revised: 02/19/2022] [Accepted: 02/19/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
Abstract
There is a long history of, and renewed interest in, cardiac timing effects on behaviour and cognition. Cardiac timing effects may be identified by expressing events as a function of their location in the cardiac cycle, and applying circular (i.e. directional) statistics to test cardiac time-behaviour associations. Typically this approach 'stretches' all points in the cardiac cycle equally, but this is not necessarily physiologically valid. Moreover, many tests impose distributional assumptions that are not met by such data. We present a set of statistical techniques robust to this, instantiated within our new Cardiac Timing Toolbox (CaTT) for MATLAB: A physiologically-motivated method of wrapping behaviour to the cardiac cycle; and a set of non-parametric statistical tests that control for common confounds and distributional characteristics of these data. Using a reanalysis of previously published data, we guide readers through analyses using CaTT, aiding researchers in identifying physiologically plausible associations between heart-timing and cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maxine T Sherman
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Brighton and Sussex Medical School, Brighton, UK; School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
| | - Hao-Ting Wang
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Brighton and Sussex Medical School, Brighton, UK
| | - Sarah N Garfinkel
- Brighton and Sussex Medical School, Brighton, UK; Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK
| | - Hugo D Critchley
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Brighton and Sussex Medical School, Brighton, UK
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Esteves JE, Cerritelli F, Kim J, Friston KJ. Osteopathic Care as (En)active Inference: A Theoretical Framework for Developing an Integrative Hypothesis in Osteopathy. Front Psychol 2022; 13:812926. [PMID: 35250743 PMCID: PMC8894811 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.812926] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/10/2021] [Accepted: 01/11/2022] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Osteopathy is a person-centred healthcare discipline that emphasizes the body’s structure-function interrelationship—and its self-regulatory mechanisms—to inform a whole-person approach to health and wellbeing. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for developing an integrative hypothesis in osteopathy, which is based on the enactivist and active inference accounts. We propose that osteopathic care can be reconceptualised under (En)active inference as a unifying framework. Active inference suggests that action-perception cycles operate to minimize uncertainty and optimize an individual’s internal model of the lived world and, crucially, the consequences of their behaviour. We argue that (En)active inference offers an integrative framework for osteopathy, which can evince the mechanisms underlying dyadic and triadic (e.g., in paediatric care) exchanges and osteopathic care outcomes. We propose that this theoretical framework can underpin osteopathic care across the lifespan, from preterm infants to the elderly and those with persistent pain and other physical symptoms. In situations of chronicity, as an ecological niche, the patient-practitioner dyad provides the osteopath and the patient with a set of affordances, i.e., possibilities for action provided by the environment, that through shared intentionally, can promote adaptations and restoration of productive agency. Through a dyadic therapeutic relationship, as they engage with their ecological niche’s affordances—a structured set of affordances shared by agents—osteopath and patient actively construct a shared sense-making narrative and realise a shared generative model of their relation to the niche. In general, touch plays a critical role in developing a robust therapeutic alliance, mental state alignment, and biobehavioural synchrony between patient and practitioner. However, its role is particularly crucial in the fields of neonatology and paediatrics, where it becomes central in regulating allostasis and restoring homeostasis. We argue that from an active inference standpoint, the dyadic shared ecological niche underwrites a robust therapeutic alliance, which is crucial to the effectiveness of osteopathic care. Considerations and implications of this model—to clinical practice and research, both within- and outside osteopathy—are critically discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge E. Esteves
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
- Malta ICOM Educational, Gżira, Malta
- Research Department, University College of Osteopathy, London, United Kingdom
- *Correspondence: Jorge E. Esteves,
| | - Francesco Cerritelli
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
| | - Joohan Kim
- Department of Communication, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, London, United Kingdom
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Minimal Developmental Computation: A Causal Network Approach to Understand Morphogenetic Pattern Formation. ENTROPY 2022; 24:e24010107. [PMID: 35052133 PMCID: PMC8774453 DOI: 10.3390/e24010107] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2021] [Revised: 01/05/2022] [Accepted: 01/07/2022] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
What information-processing strategies and general principles are sufficient to enable self-organized morphogenesis in embryogenesis and regeneration? We designed and analyzed a minimal model of self-scaling axial patterning consisting of a cellular network that develops activity patterns within implicitly set bounds. The properties of the cells are determined by internal ‘genetic’ networks with an architecture shared across all cells. We used machine-learning to identify models that enable this virtual mini-embryo to pattern a typical axial gradient while simultaneously sensing the set boundaries within which to develop it from homogeneous conditions—a setting that captures the essence of early embryogenesis. Interestingly, the model revealed several features (such as planar polarity and regenerative re-scaling capacity) for which it was not directly selected, showing how these common biological design principles can emerge as a consequence of simple patterning modes. A novel “causal network” analysis of the best model furthermore revealed that the originally symmetric model dynamically integrates into intercellular causal networks characterized by broken-symmetry, long-range influence and modularity, offering an interpretable macroscale-circuit-based explanation for phenotypic patterning. This work shows how computation could occur in biological development and how machine learning approaches can generate hypotheses and deepen our understanding of how featureless tissues might develop sophisticated patterns—an essential step towards predictive control of morphogenesis in regenerative medicine or synthetic bioengineering contexts. The tools developed here also have the potential to benefit machine learning via new forms of backpropagation and by leveraging the novel distributed self-representation mechanisms to improve robustness and generalization.
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Legrand N, Nikolova N, Correa C, Brændholt M, Stuckert A, Kildahl N, Vejlø M, Fardo F, Allen M. The heart rate discrimination task: a psychophysical method to estimate the accuracy and precision of interoceptive beliefs. Biol Psychol 2021; 168:108239. [PMID: 34902450 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108239] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/19/2021] [Revised: 11/19/2021] [Accepted: 12/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/02/2022]
Abstract
Interoception - the physiological sense of our inner bodies - has risen to the forefront of psychological and psychiatric research. Much of this research utilizes tasks that attempt to measure the ability to accurately detect cardiac signals. Unfortunately, these approaches are confounded by well-known issues limiting their validity and interpretation. At the core of this controversy is the role of subjective beliefs about the heart rate in confounding measures of interoceptive accuracy. Here, we recast these beliefs as an important part of the causal machinery of interoception, and offer a novel psychophysical "heart rate discrimination" method to estimate their accuracy and precision. By applying this task in 223 healthy participants, we demonstrate that cardiac interoceptive beliefs are more biased, less precise, and are associated with poorer metacognitive insight relative to an exteroceptive control condition. Our task, provided as an open-source python package, offers a robust approach to quantifying cardiac beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicolas Legrand
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
| | - Niia Nikolova
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
| | - Camile Correa
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
| | - Malthe Brændholt
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
| | - Anna Stuckert
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
| | - Nanna Kildahl
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
| | - Melina Vejlø
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
| | - Francesca Fardo
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark; Danish Pain Research Center
| | - Micah Allen
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark; Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Denmark; Cambridge Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
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Lyu D, Pappas I, Menon DK, Stamatakis EA. A Precuneal Causal Loop Mediates External and Internal Information Integration in the Human Brain. J Neurosci 2021; 41:9944-9956. [PMID: 34675087 PMCID: PMC8638689 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.0647-21.2021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2021] [Revised: 08/29/2021] [Accepted: 09/14/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Human brains interpret external stimuli based on internal representations. One untested hypothesis is that the default-mode network (DMN), widely considered responsible for internally oriented cognition, can decode external information. Here, we posit that the unique structural and functional fingerprint of the precuneus (PCu) supports a prominent role for the posterior part of the DMN in this process. By analyzing the imaging data of 100 participants performing two attention-demanding tasks, we found that the PCu is functionally divided into dorsal and ventral subdivisions. We then conducted a comprehensive examination of their connectivity profiles and found that at rest, both the ventral PCu (vPCu) and dorsal PCu (dPCu) are mainly connected with the DMN but also are differentially connected with internally oriented networks (IoN) and externally oriented networks (EoN). During tasks, the double associations between the v/dPCu and the IoN/EoN are correlated with task performance and can switch depending on cognitive demand. Furthermore, dynamic causal modeling (DCM) revealed that the strength and direction of the effective connectivity (EC) between v/dPCu is modulated by task difficulty in a manner potentially dictated by the balance of internal versus external cognitive demands. Our study provides evidence that the posterior medial part of the DMN may drive interactions between large-scale networks, potentially allowing access to stored representations for moment-to-moment interpretation of an ever-changing environment.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The default-mode network (DMN) is widely known for its association with internalized thinking processes, e.g., spontaneous thoughts, which is the most interesting but least understood component in human consciousness. The precuneus (PCu), a posteromedial DMN hub, is thought to play a role in this, but a mechanistic explanation has not yet been established. In this study we found that the associations between ventral PCu (vPCu)/dorsal PCu (dPCu) subdivisions and internally oriented network (IoN)/externally oriented network (EoN) are flexibly modulated by cognitive demand and correlate with task performance. We further propose that the recurrent causal connectivity between the ventral and dorsal PCu supports conscious processing by constantly interpreting external information based on an internal model, meanwhile updating the internal model with the incoming information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dian Lyu
- University Division of Anaesthesia, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge CB2 0SP, United Kingdom
- Department of Clinical Neuroscience, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge CB2 0SP, United Kingdom
| | - Ioannis Pappas
- University Division of Anaesthesia, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge CB2 0SP, United Kingdom
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720
| | - David K Menon
- University Division of Anaesthesia, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge CB2 0SP, United Kingdom
- Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 0QQ, United Kingdom
| | - Emmanuel A Stamatakis
- University Division of Anaesthesia, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge CB2 0SP, United Kingdom
- Department of Clinical Neuroscience, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge CB2 0SP, United Kingdom
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Sensory-Motor Modulations of EEG Event-Related Potentials Reflect Walking-Related Macro-Affordances. Brain Sci 2021; 11:brainsci11111506. [PMID: 34827505 PMCID: PMC8615990 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci11111506] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2021] [Revised: 11/11/2021] [Accepted: 11/11/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
One fundamental principle of the brain functional organization is the elaboration of sensory information for the specification of action plans that are most appropriate for interaction with the environment. Using an incidental go/no-go priming paradigm, we have previously shown a facilitation effect for the execution of a walking-related action in response to far vs. near objects/locations in the extrapersonal space, and this effect has been called “macro-affordance” to reflect the role of locomotion in the coverage of extrapersonal distance. Here, we investigated the neurophysiological underpinnings of such an effect by recording scalp electroencephalography (EEG) from 30 human participants during the same paradigm. The results of a whole-brain analysis indicated a significant modulation of the event-related potentials (ERPs) both during prime and target stimulus presentation. Specifically, consistent with a mechanism of action anticipation and automatic activation of affordances, a stronger ERP was observed in response to prime images framing the environment from a far vs. near distance, and this modulation was localized in dorso-medial motor regions. In addition, an inversion of polarity for far vs. near conditions was observed during the subsequent target period in dorso-medial parietal regions associated with spatially directed foot-related actions. These findings were interpreted within the framework of embodied models of brain functioning as arising from a mechanism of motor-anticipation and subsequent prediction error which was guided by the preferential affordance relationship between the distant large-scale environment and locomotion. More in general, our findings reveal a sensory-motor mechanism for the processing of walking-related environmental affordances.
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