Toward a computational theory of conscious processing

Neural and behavioral dynamics of error processing under chronic stress in healthy young adults

Chronic stress has a negative impact on cognitive function and physical health, particularly impairing cognitive control function. This study aimed to investigate the effects of chronic stress on error processing, specifically error monitoring and post-error adjustment. We assessed 61 healthy college students (32 females, 29 males, age: 18.80 ± 0.68 years) using the Student-Life Stress Inventory (SLSI) and a four-choice Flanker task with response-stimulus intervals (RSIs) of 200 ms, 700 ms, and 1500 ms to investigate the temporal dynamics of error monitoring and characteristics of different phases of post-error processing under chronic stress. Results revealed that higher chronic stress levels were associated with smaller post-error slowing (PES) and larger post-error accuracy decrease (PEAD). Dividing participants into high-chronic stress (n = 30) and low-chronic stress (n = 31) groups, we found that the ΔPe amplitude at 200 ms RSI in the low-stress group was significantly larger than that in the high-stress group, indicating that chronic stress impairs the recognition of error responses. At 200 ms RSI, the PEAD in the high-stress group was significantly larger than in the low-stress group. This suggests that high levels of chronic stress impair early-stage post-error adjustment processing. The study highlights that chronic stress impairs error monitoring and early post-error processing, revealing features of continuous processing stages in behavioral monitoring under chronic stress.

Revisiting the standard for modeling functional brain network activity: Application to consciousness

Functional connectivity (FC) of resting-state fMRI time series can be estimated using methods that differ in their temporal sensitivity (static vs. dynamic) and the number of regions included in the connectivity estimation (derived from a prior atlas). This paper presents a novel framework for identifying and quantifying resting-state networks using resting-state fMRI recordings. The study employs a linear latent variable model to generate spatially distinct brain networks and their associated activities. It specifically addresses the atlas selection problem, and the statistical inference and multivariate analysis of the obtained brain network activities. The approach is demonstrated on a dataset of resting-state fMRI recordings from monkeys under different anesthetics using static FC. Our results suggest that two networks, one fronto-parietal and cingular and another temporo-parieto-occipital (posterior brain) strongly influences shifts in consciousness, especially between anesthesia and wakefulness. Interestingly, this observation aligns with the two prominent theories of consciousness: the global neural workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness. The proposed method is also able to decipher the level of anesthesia from the brain network activities. Overall, we provide a framework that can be effectively applied to other datasets and may be particularly useful for the study of disorders of consciousness.

Better bridges: Integrating the neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness

Contemporary consciousness research has given rise to numerous theories in both the philosophical and neuroscientific domains (such as higher-order theory and global neuronal workspace), raising the question as to how well each is supported. This article develops a relatively novel method for determining this, which is to use evidence, not just from a theory's own domain, but also from its complementary domain (e.g., neuroscientific evidence is used to judge a philosophical theory, and vice versa). This approach works when a neuroscientific and a philosophical theory are conceptually linked, allowing evidence confirming or disconfirming one theory to do the same for the other. After developing this method, the article uses it to draw conclusions concerning some of our leading neuroscientific and philosophical theories of consciousness, including first- and second-order representationalism and theories emphasizing the prefrontal cortex's role in consciousness.

Measuring the dynamic balance of integration and segregation underlying consciousness, anesthesia, and sleep in humans

Consciousness requires a dynamic balance of integration and segregation in brain networks. We report an fMRI-based metric, the integration-segregation difference (ISD), which captures two key network properties: network efficiency (integration) and clustering (segregation). With this metric, we quantify brain state transitions from conscious wakefulness to unresponsiveness induced by the anesthetic propofol. The observed changes in ISD suggest a profound shift towards the segregation of brain networks during anesthesia. A common unimodal-transmodal sequence of disintegration and reintegration occurs in brain networks during, respectively, loss and return of responsiveness. Machine learning models using integration and segregation data accurately identify awake vs. unresponsive states and their transitions. Metastability (dynamic recurrence of non-equilibrium transient states) is more effectively explained by integration, while complexity (diversity of neural activity) is more closely linked with segregation. A parallel analysis of sleep states produces similar findings. Our results demonstrate that the ISD reliably indexes states of consciousness.

Quality space computations for consciousness

The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts.

Pre-frontal cortex guides dimension-reducing transformations in the occipito-ventral pathway for categorization behaviors

To interpret our surroundings, the brain uses a visual categorization process. Current theories and models suggest that this process comprises a hierarchy of different computations that transforms complex, high-dimensional inputs into lower-dimensional representations (i.e., manifolds) in support of multiple categorization behaviors. Here, we tested this hypothesis by analyzing these transformations reflected in dynamic MEG source activity while individual participants actively categorized the same stimuli according to different tasks: face expression, face gender, pedestrian gender, and vehicle type. Results reveal three transformation stages guided by the pre-frontal cortex. At stage 1 (high-dimensional, 50-120 ms), occipital sources represent both task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus features; task-relevant features advance into higher ventral/dorsal regions, whereas task-irrelevant features halt at the occipital-temporal junction. At stage 2 (121-150 ms), stimulus feature representations reduce to lower-dimensional manifolds, which then transform into the task-relevant features underlying categorization behavior over stage 3 (161-350 ms). Our findings shed light on how the brain's network mechanisms transform high-dimensional inputs into specific feature manifolds that support multiple categorization behaviors.

Functional and structural brain connectivity in disorders of consciousness

Brain connectivity, allowing information to be shared between distinct cortical areas and thus to be processed in an integrated way, has long been considered critical for consciousness. However, the relationship between functional intercortical interactions and the structural connections thought to underlie them is poorly understood. In the present work, we explore both functional (with an EEG-based metric: the median weighted symbolic mutual information in the theta band) and structural (with a brain MRI-based metric: fractional anisotropy) connectivities in a cohort of 78 patients with disorders of consciousness. Both metrics could distinguish patients in a vegetative state from patients in minimally conscious state. Crucially, we discovered a significant positive correlation between functional and structural connectivities. Furthermore, we showed that this structure-function relationship is more specifically observed when considering structural connectivity within the intra- and inter-hemispheric long-distance cortico-cortical bundles involved in the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory of consciousness, thus supporting predictions of this model. Altogether, these results support the interest of multimodal assessments of brain connectivity in refining the diagnostic evaluation of patients with disorders of consciousness.

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

Neural and Behavioral Measures of Stress-induced Impairment in Error Awareness and Post-error Adjustment

Exposure to stress negatively affects error processing, but the impact of stress on error awareness remains to be determined. In the present study, we examined the temporal dynamics of error awareness and post-error adjustment following acute stress. Forty-nine healthy men were randomly assigned to the control (n = 26) or stress group (n = 23). After stress induction, participants completed the error awareness task, and their brain activity was assessed by electroencephalography. Compared to the control group, the stress group demonstrated lower error awareness accuracy and smaller Pe (error positivity) and ΔPe amplitudes following aware error responses, which indicated impairment of error awareness following stress. Furthermore, the stress group had lower accuracy in post-aware error responses than in post-unaware error responses and the control group, which indicated poor post-error adjustment following stress. Our results showed a stress effect on sequential stages of error processing. Stress induces impaired error identification, which further generates maladaptive post-error performance.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn't the content NCC

Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the 'content NCC' for vision, i.e. it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine 'what' it is that we visually experience (e.g. whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this "upper-deck" form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: on the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object, shape, or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g. attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which "ensemble statistics" are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I'll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in the visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.

Electrophysiological correlates of sustained conscious perception

Previous research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in visual perception revealed an early event-related potential (ERP), the visual awareness negativity (VAN), to be associated with stimulus awareness. However, due to the use of brief stimulus presentations in previous studies, it remains unclear whether awareness-related negativities represent a transient onset-related response or correspond to the duration of a conscious percept. Studies are required that allow prolonged stimulus presentation under aware and unaware conditions. The present ERP study aimed to tackle this challenge by using a novel stimulation design. Male and female human participants (n = 62) performed a visual task while task-irrelevant line stimuli were presented in the background for either 500 or 1000 ms. The line stimuli sometimes contained a face, which needed so-called visual one-shot learning to be seen. Half of the participants were informed about the presence of the face, resulting in faces being perceived by the informed but not by the uninformed participants. Comparing ERPs between the informed and uninformed group revealed an enhanced negativity over occipitotemporal electrodes that persisted for the entire duration of stimulus presentation. Our results suggest that sustained visual awareness negativities (SVAN) are associated with the duration of stimulus presentation.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

The emergence of identity, agency and consciousness from the temporal dynamics of neural elaboration

Identity-differentiating self from external reality-and agency-being the author of one's acts-are generally considered intrinsic properties of awareness and looked at as mental constructs generated by consciousness. Here a different view is proposed. All physiological systems display complex time-dependent regulations to adapt or anticipate external changes. To interact with rapid changes, an animal needs a nervous system capable of modelling and predicting (not simply representing) it. Different algorithms must be employed to predict the momentary location of an object based on sensory information (received with a delay), or to design in advance and direct the trajectory of movement. Thus, the temporal dynamics of external events and action must be handled in differential ways, thereby generating the distinction between self and non-self ("identity") as an intrinsic computational construct in neuronal elaboration. Handling time is not what neurons are designed for. Neuronal circuits are based on parallel processing: each bit of information diverges on many neurons, each of which combines it with many other data. Spike firing reports the likelihood that the specific pattern the neuron is designed to respond to is present in the incoming data. This organization seems designed to process synchronous datasets. However, since neural networks can introduce delays in processing, time sequences can be transformed into simultaneous patterns and analysed as such. This way predictive algorithms can be implemented, and continually improved through neuronal plasticity. To successfully interact with the external reality, the nervous system must model and predict, but also differentially handle perceptual functions or motor activity, by putting in register information that becomes available at different time moments. Also, to learn through positive/negative reinforcement, modelling must establish a causal relation between motor control and its consequences: the contrast between phase lag in perception and phase lead (and control) in motor programming produces the emergence of identity (discerning self from surrounding) and agency (control on actions) as necessary computational constructs to model reality. This does not require any form of awareness. In a brain, capable of producing awareness, these constructs may evolve from mere computational requirements into mental (conscious) constructs.

Dismissing the role of the hippocampus in implicit memory is special pleading

Steinkrauss and Slotnick (this issue) argue against hippocampal involvement in implicit memory, bringing up some important considerations. Their critique, however, exhibits significant flaws. The argumentation is based on an ill-defined key concept of 'implicit memory,' and important theoretical context is missed. Potential confounds are brought to bear against a rather narrow selection of studies, often without explaining how exactly the studies are biased. Refining the conceptual scope, including a broader range of literature, and arguing more inclusively would provide more nuanced insights into the hippocampus's role in implicit memory.

Stimulus awareness is necessary for both instrumental learning and instrumental responding to previously learned stimuli

Instrumental conditioning is a crucial part of adaptive behaviour, allowing agents to selectively interact with stimuli in their environment. Recent evidence suggests that instrumental conditioning cannot proceed without stimulus awareness. However, whether accurate unconscious instrumental responding can emerge from consciously acquired knowledge of the stimulus-action-outcome contingencies is unknown. We studied this question using instrumental trace conditioning, where participants learned to make approach/avoid decisions in two within-subject modes: conscious (stimuli in plain view) and unconscious (visually masked). Both tasks were followed by an unconscious-only instrumental performance task. We show that even when the contingencies are reliably learned in the conscious mode, participants fail to act upon them in the unconscious responding task. We also replicate the previous results that no instrumental learning occurs in the unconscious mode. Consequently, the absence of stimulus awareness not only precludes instrumental conditioning, but also precludes any kind of instrumental responding to already known stimuli. This suggests that instrumental behaviour is entirely supported by conscious awareness of the world, and corroborates the proposals that consciousness may be necessary for adaptive behaviours requiring selective action.

Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report

Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).

Functional blindsight and its diagnosis

Even when brain scans fail to detect a striate lesion, functional evidence for blindsight can be adduced. In the aftermath of an automobile accident, JK became blind. Results of ophthalmic exams indicated that the blindness must be cortical. Nevertheless, multiple MRI scans failed to detect structural damage to the striate cortex. Prior to the accident JK had been an athlete; after the accident he retained some athletic abilities, arousing suspicions that he might be engaged in fraud. His residual athletic abilities-e.g., hitting a handball or baseball, or catching a Frisbee-coupled with his experienced blindness, suggested blindsight. But due to the apparent absence of striate lesions, we designed a series of tasks for temporal and spatial dimensions in an attempt to detect functional evidence of his disability. Indeed, test results revealed compelling neural evidence that comport with his subjective reports. This spatiotemporal task-related method that includes contrasts with healthy controls, and detailed understanding of the patient's conscious experience, can be generalized for clinical, scientific and forensic investigations of blindsight.

Error-related cardiac deceleration: Functional interplay between error-related brain activity and autonomic nervous system in performance monitoring

Coordinated interactions between the central and autonomic nervous systems are crucial for survival due to the inherent propensity for human behavior to make errors. In our ever-changing environment, when individuals make mistakes, these errors can have life-threatening consequences. In response to errors, specific reactions occur in both brain activity and heart rate to detect and correct errors. Specifically, there are two brain-related indicators of error detection and awareness known as error-related negativity and error positivity. Conversely, error-related cardiac deceleration denotes a momentary slowing of heart rate following an error, signaling an autonomic response. However, what is the connection between the brain and the heart during error processing? In this review, we discuss the functional and neuroanatomical connections between the brain and heart markers of error processing, exploring the experimental conditions in which they covary. Given the current limitations of available data, future research will continue to investigate the neurobiological factors governing the brain-heart interaction, aiming to utilize them as combined markers for assessing cognitive control in healthy and pathological conditions.

Early modulations of neural oscillations during the processing of emotional body language

The processing of threat-related emotional body language (EBL) has been shown to engage sensorimotor cortical areas early on and induce freezing in the observers' motor system, particularly when observing fearful EBL. To provide insights into the interplay between somatosensory and motor areas during observation of EBL, here, we used high-density electroencephalography (hd-EEG) in healthy humans while they observed EBL stimuli involving fearful and neutral expressions. To capture early sensorimotor brain response, we focused on P100 fronto-central event-related potentials (ERPs) and event-related desynchronization/synchronization (ERD/ERS) in the mu-alpha (8-13 Hz) and lower beta (13-20 Hz) bands over the primary motor (M1) and somatosensory (S1) cortices. Source-level ERP and ERD/ERS analyses were conducted using eLORETA. Results revealed higher P100 amplitudes in motor and premotor channels for 'Neutral' compared with 'Fear'. Additionally, analysis of ERD/ERS showed increased beta band desynchronization in M1 for 'Neutral', and the opposite pattern in S1. Source-level estimation showed significant differences between conditions mainly observed in the beta band over sensorimotor areas. These findings provide high-temporal resolution evidence suggesting that seeing fearful EBL induces early activation of somatosensory areas, which in turn could suppress M1 activity. These findings highlight early dynamics within the observer's sensorimotor system and hint at a sensorimotor mechanism supporting freezing during the processing of EBL.

A construct-first approach to consciousness science

We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.

Alterations in rat brain modular organization during unconsciousness are dependent on communication efficiency and metabolic cost

Spontaneous brain activity exhibits a highly structured modular organization that varies across individuals and reconfigures over time. Although it has been proposed that brain organization is shaped by an economic trade-off between minimizing costs and facilitating efficient information transfer, it remains untested whether modular variability and its changes during unconscious conditions might be constrained by the economy of brain organization. We acquired functional MRI and FDG-PET in rats under three different levels of consciousness induced by propofol administration. We examined alterations in brain modular variability during loss of consciousness from mild sedation to deep anesthesia. We also investigated the relationships between modular variability with glucose metabolism and functional connectivity strength as well as their alterations during unconsciousness. We observed that modular variability increased during loss of consciousness. Critically, across-individual modular variability is oppositely associated with functional connectivity strength and cerebral metabolism, and with deepening dosage of anesthesia, becoming increasingly dependent on basal metabolism over functional connectivity. These results suggested that, propofol-induced unconsciousness may lead to brain modular reorganization, which are putatively shaped by re-negotiations between energetic resources and communication efficiency.

An Attempt to Explain Visual Aesthetic Appreciation

We suggest an evolutionary based explanation for why humans are preoccupied with aesthetic aspects of visual input. Briefly, humans evolved to be swayed by positive and negative feelings in the form of rewards and punishments, and to pursue situations that induce rewards, even when the feeling is not sufficiently strong to be recognized as a reward. The brain is designed to offer rewards when a person focuses on certain types of visual stimuli. For example, warm colors are typically pleasant because they are associated with edible fruits, and complex images appeal to curiosity. At some point people began exploiting these types of brain rewards by beautifying objects and creating art. The utility of objects, and the associative (or communicative) aspects of art, may dominate the design, but the artist tends to add aesthetic elements. These elements imply visual aspects that do not add to the functional value or evoke memories or associations based on easily recognized features in the picture. The adaptive rationale for the rewards offered by the aesthetic elements should help explain human aesthetic appreciation.

Inhalation boosts perceptual awareness and decision speed

The emergence of consciousness is one of biology's biggest mysteries. During the past two decades, a major effort has been made to identify the neural correlates of consciousness, but in comparison, little is known about the physiological mechanisms underlying first-person subjective experience. Attention is considered the gateway of information to consciousness. Recent work suggests that the breathing phase (i.e., inhalation vs. exhalation) modulates attention, in such a way that attention directed toward exteroceptive information would increase during inhalation. One key hypothesis emerging from this work is that inhalation would improve perceptual awareness and near-threshold decision-making. The present study directly tested this hypothesis. We recorded the breathing rhythms of 30 humans performing a near-threshold decision-making task, in which they had to decide whether a liminal Gabor was tilted to the right or the left (objective decision task) and then to rate their perceptual awareness of the Gabor orientation (subjective decision task). In line with our hypothesis, the data revealed that, relative to exhalation, inhalation improves perceptual awareness and speeds up objective decision-making, without impairing accuracy. Overall, the present study builds on timely questions regarding the physiological mechanisms underlying consciousness and shows that breathing shapes the emergence of subjective experience and decision-making.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Breathing is a ubiquitous biological rhythm in animal life. However, little is known about its effect on consciousness and decision-making. Here, we measured the respiratory rhythm of humans performing a near-threshold discrimination experiment. We show that inhalation, compared with exhalation, improves perceptual awareness and accelerates decision-making while leaving accuracy unaffected.

Temporospatial Nestedness in Consciousness: An Updated Perspective on the Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness

Time and space are fundamental elements that permeate the fabric of nature, and their significance in relation to neural activity and consciousness remains a compelling yet unexplored area of research. The Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) provides a framework that links time, space, neural activity, and consciousness, shedding light on the intricate relationships among these dimensions. In this review, I revisit the fundamental concepts and mechanisms proposed by the TTC, with a particular focus on the central concept of temporospatial nestedness. I propose an extension of temporospatial nestedness by incorporating the nested relationship between the temporal circuit and functional geometry of the brain. To further unravel the complexities of temporospatial nestedness, future research directions should emphasize the characterization of functional geometry and the temporal circuit across multiple spatial and temporal scales. Investigating the links between these scales will yield a more comprehensive understanding of how spatial organization and temporal dynamics contribute to conscious states. This integrative approach holds the potential to uncover novel insights into the neural basis of consciousness and reshape our understanding of the world-brain dynamic.

Learning how network structure shapes decision-making for bio-inspired computing

To better understand how network structure shapes intelligent behavior, we developed a learning algorithm that we used to build personalized brain network models for 650 Human Connectome Project participants. We found that participants with higher intelligence scores took more time to solve difficult problems, and that slower solvers had higher average functional connectivity. With simulations we identified a mechanistic link between functional connectivity, intelligence, processing speed and brain synchrony for trading accuracy with speed in dependence of excitation-inhibition balance. Reduced synchrony led decision-making circuits to quickly jump to conclusions, while higher synchrony allowed for better integration of evidence and more robust working memory. Strict tests were applied to ensure reproducibility and generality of the obtained results. Here, we identify links between brain structure and function that enable to learn connectome topology from noninvasive recordings and map it to inter-individual differences in behavior, suggesting broad utility for research and clinical applications.

Maternal Variability of Amplitudes of Frequency Fluctuations Is Related to the Progressive Self-Other Transposition Group Intervention in Autistic Children

The self-to-other model of empathy (SOME) states that a key reason for the empathic deficiency in autistic individuals is the imbalance of the self-other switch. The existing interventions of theory of mind contain training of self-other transposition ability but combined with other cognitive trainings. The self-other distinction brain areas of autistic individuals have been revealed, but the brain areas of the self-other transposition ability and its intervention have not been investigated. There are normalized amplitudes of low-frequency fluctuations (mALFFs) within 0.01-0.1 Hz and many normalized amplitudes of frequency fluctuations (mAFFs) within 0-0.01, 0.01-0.05, 0.05-0.1, 0.1-0.15, 0.15-0.2, and 0.2-0.25 Hz. Therefore, the current study established a progressive self-other transposition group intervention to specifically and systematically improve autistic children's self-other transposition abilities. The transposition test with a three mountains test, an unexpected location test, and a deception test was used to directly measure autistic children's transposition abilities. The Interpersonal Responsiveness Index Empathy Questionnaire with perspective-taking and fantasy subscales (IRI-T) was used to indirectly measure autistic children's transposition abilities. The Autism Treatment Evaluation Checklist (ATEC) was used to measure autistic children's autism symptoms. The experiment was designed with two (intervention: experimental group vs. control group) independent variables and two (test time: pretest vs. posttest or tracking test) × three (test: transposition test vs. IRI-T test vs. ATEC test) dependent variables. Furthermore, it used eyes-closed resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate and compare the relevant maternal mALFFs and average energy rank and energy rank variability of mAFFs of autistic children's transposition abilities, autism symptoms, and intervention effects. The results showed the following: (1) There were many improvements (pretest vs. posttest or tracking test) greater than chance 0 in the experimental group, such as the three mountains, lie, transposition, PT, IRI-T, PT tracking, cognition, behavior, ATEC, language tracking, cognition tracking, behavior tracking, and ATEC tracking improvements. However, there was no improvement greater than chance 0 in the control group. (2) The maternal mALFFs and maternal average energy rank and energy rank variability of mAFFs could predict the autistic children's transposition abilities, autism symptoms, and intervention effects with some overlap and some difference in maternal self-other distinction, sensorimotor, visual, facial expression recognition, language, memory and emotion, and self-consciousness networks. These results indicated that the progressive self-other transposition group intervention successfully improved autistic children's transposition abilities and reduced their autism symptoms; the intervention effects could be applied to daily life and last up to a month. The maternal mALFFs, average energy rank, and energy rank variability of mAFFs were three effective neural indictors of autistic children's transposition abilities, autism symptoms, and intervention effects, and the average energy rank and energy rank variability of mAFFs were two new neural indictors established in the current study. The maternal neural markers of the progressive self-other transposition group intervention effects for autistic children were found in part.

The effects of propofol anaesthesia on molecular-enriched networks during resting-state and naturalistic listening

Placing a patient in a state of anaesthesia is crucial for modern surgical practice. However, the mechanisms by which anaesthetic drugs, such as propofol, impart their effects on consciousness remain poorly understood. Propofol potentiates GABAergic transmission, which purportedly has direct actions on cortex as well as indirect actions via ascending neuromodulatory systems. Functional imaging studies to date have been limited in their ability to unravel how these effects on neurotransmission impact the system-level dynamics of the brain. Here, we leveraged advances in multi-modal imaging, Receptor-Enriched Analysis of functional Connectivity by Targets (REACT), to investigate how different levels of propofol-induced sedation alter neurotransmission-related functional connectivity (FC), both at rest and when individuals are exposed to naturalistic auditory stimulation. Propofol increased GABA-A- and noradrenaline transporter-enriched FC within occipital and somatosensory regions respectively. Additionally, during auditory stimulation, the network related to the dopamine transporter showed reduced FC within bilateral regions of temporal and mid/posterior cingulate cortices, with the right temporal cluster showing an interaction between auditory stimulation and level of consciousness. In bringing together these micro- and macro-scale systems, we provide support for both direct GABAergic and indirect noradrenergic and dopaminergic-related network changes under propofol sedation. Further, we delineate a cognition-related reconfiguration of the dopaminergic network, highlighting the utility of REACT to explore the molecular substrates of consciousness and cognition.

Perceptual and semantic same-different processing under subliminal conditions

Although other types of subliminal integrative processing are widely refuted by recent studies, subliminal same-different processing (SSDP) remains unchallenged to this day. Using shapes, categorical images, and Chinese characters as stimuli, the current study assessed whether SSDP can occur on a perceptual and semantic basis. Although some significant results were found, the effects are much weaker than previous studies, with Bayes factors suggesting that these effects are not reliable. It is therefore concluded that substantiating claims of SSDP requires more reliable evidence than currently available.

Hierarchical psychophysiological pathways subtend perceptual asymmetries in Neglect

Stroke patients with left Hemispatial Neglect (LHN) show deficits in perceiving left contralesional stimuli with biased visuospatial perception towards the right hemifield. However, very little is known about the functional organization of the visuospatial perceptual neural network and how this can account for the profound reorganization of space representation in LHN. In the present work, we aimed at (1) identifying EEG measures that discriminate LHN patients against controls and (2) devise a causative neurophysiological model between the discriminative EEG measures. To these aims, EEG was recorded during exposure to lateralized visual stimuli which allowed for pre-and post-stimulus activity investigation across three groups: LHN patients, lesioned controls, and healthy individuals. Moreover, all participants performed a standard behavioral test assessing the perceptual asymmetry index in detecting lateralized stimuli. The between-groups discriminative EEG patterns were entered into a Structural Equation Model for the identification of causative hierarchical associations (i.e., pathways) between EEG measures and the perceptual asymmetry index. The model identified two pathways. A first pathway showed that the combined contribution of pre-stimulus frontoparietal connectivity and individual-alpha-frequency predicts post-stimulus processing, as measured by visual-evoked N100, which, in turn, predicts the perceptual asymmetry index. A second pathway directly links the inter-hemispheric distribution of alpha-amplitude with the perceptual asymmetry index. The two pathways can collectively explain 83.1% of the variance in the perceptual asymmetry index. Using causative modeling, the present study identified how psychophysiological correlates of visuospatial perception are organized and predict the degree of behavioral asymmetry in LHN patients and controls.

Topographic-dynamic reorganisation model of dreams (TRoD) - A spatiotemporal approach

Dreams are one of the most bizarre and least understood states of consciousness. Bridging the gap between brain and phenomenology of (un)conscious experience, we propose the Topographic-dynamic Re-organization model of Dreams (TRoD). Topographically, dreams are characterized by a shift towards increased activity and connectivity in the default-mode network (DMN) while they are reduced in the central executive network, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (except in lucid dreaming). This topographic re-organization is accompanied by dynamic changes; a shift towards slower frequencies and longer timescales. This puts dreams dynamically in an intermediate position between awake state and NREM 2/SWS sleep. TRoD proposes that the shift towards DMN and slower frequencies leads to an abnormal spatiotemporal framing of input processing including both internally- and externally-generated inputs (from body and environment). In dreams, a shift away from temporal segregation to temporal integration of inputs results in the often bizarre and highly self-centric mental contents as well as hallucinatory-like states. We conclude that topography and temporal dynamics are core features of the TroD, which may provide the connection of neural and mental activity, e.g., brain and experience during dreams as their "common currency".

An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory

The relationship between conscious experience and brain activity has intrigued scientists and philosophers for centuries. In the last decades, several theories have suggested different accounts for these relationships. These theories have developed in parallel, with little to no cross-talk among them. To advance research on consciousness, we established an adversarial collaboration between proponents of two of the major theories in the field, Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory. Together, we devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions of these theories concerning the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness, which have been endorsed by the theories' proponents. Predicted outcomes should either support, refute, or challenge these theories. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol specified here, using three complementary methods: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Magneto-Electroencephalography (M-EEG), and intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG). The study protocol will include built-in replications, both between labs and within datasets. Through this ambitious undertaking, we hope to provide decisive evidence in favor or against the two theories and clarify the footprints of conscious visual perception in the human brain, while also providing an innovative model of large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.

Imagination: The dawn of consciousness: Fighting some misconceptions in the discussion about consciousness

Several theories of consciousness (ToC) have been proposed, but it is hard to integrate them into a consensus theory. Each theory has its merits, in dealing with some aspects of the question, but the terminology is inconsistent, each ToC aims at answering a different question, and there is not even a reasonable agreement about what 'consciousness' is in the first place. Some common implicit assumptions, and the way some critical words - such as 'sensation', 'perception', 'neural correlate of consciousness' (NCC) - are thought to relate to consciousness, have introduced a series of misconceptions that make it difficult to pinpoint what consciousness consists in and how it arises in the brain. The purpose of this contribution is twofold: firstly, to discern the various steps that lead from the detection of a stimulus to a conscious experience, by redefining terms such as sensation and perception with an adequate operative meaning; secondly, to emphasize the inevitable contribution of emotions and the active role of imagination in this process. The diffuse view, for the layperson but among scientists as well, is that the brain produces an internal 'representation' of the external reality and of oneself. This tends to consign one to a Cartesian perspective, i.e., the idea that some entity must be there to witness and interpret such representation. This approach splits the conscious experience into brain activity, which generates a (possible) content of consciousness (still unconscious), and a vaguely defined entity or process that 'generates' consciousness and injects (or sheds the light of) consciousness onto the content of brain activity. This way, however, we learn nothing about how such consciousness would arise. We propose here that consciousness is the function that generates a subjectively relevant and emotionally coloured internal image of the experience one is living. In this process, endogenous, spontaneous activity (imaginative activity, consisting in recalling and reviving memories, prefiguring consequences, analysing conjectures) produces many vague and ambiguous hints, rich of symbolic links, which compete in giving rise to an implicit, emotionally characterized, and semantically pleiotropic, internal experience. Cognitive elaboration may extract from this a defined and univocal, complete and consistent, explicit experience, that can be verbally reported ('what it is like to...').

Feasibility of unconscious instrumental conditioning: A registered replication

The extent to which high-level, complex functions can proceed unconsciously has been a topic of considerable debate. While unconscious processing has been demonstrated for a range of low-level processes, from feature integration to simple forms of conditioning and learning, theoretical contributions suggest that increasing complexity requires conscious access. Here, we focus our attention on instrumental conditioning, which has been previously shown to proceed without stimulus awareness. Yet, instrumental conditioning also involves integrating information over a large temporal scale and distinct modalities in order to deploy selective action, constituting a process of substantial complexity. With this in mind, we revisit the question of feasibility of instrumental conditioning in the unconscious domain. Firstly, we address the theoretical and practical considerations relevant to unconscious learning in general. Secondly, we aim to replicate the first study to show instrumental conditioning in the absence of stimulus awareness (Pessiglione et al., 2008), following the original design and supplementing the original crucial analyses with a Bayesian approach (Experiment 1). We found that apparent unconscious learning took place when replicating the original methods directly and according to the tests of awareness used. However, we could not establish that the full sample was unaware in a separate awareness check. We therefore attempted to replicate the effect yet again with improved methods to address the issues related to sensitivity and immediacy (Experiment 2), including an individual threshold-setting task and a trial-by-trial awareness check permitting exclusion of individual aware trials. Here, we found evidence for absence of unconscious learning. This result provides evidence that instrumental conditioning did not occur without stimulus awareness in this paradigm, supporting the view that complex forms of learning may rely on conscious access. Our results provides support for the proposal that perceptual consciousness may be necessary for complex, flexible processes, especially where selective action and behavioural adaptation are required.

Unconscious integration: Current evidence for integrative processing under subliminal conditions

Integrative processing is traditionally believed to be dependent on consciousness. While earlier studies within the last decade reported many types of integration under subliminal conditions (i.e. without perceptual awareness), these findings are widely challenged recently. This review evaluates the current evidence for 10 types of subliminal integration that are widely studied: arithmetic processing, object-context integration, multi-word processing, same-different processing, multisensory integration and 5 different types of associative learning. Potential methodological issues concerning awareness measures are also taken into account. It is concluded that while there is currently no reliable evidence for subliminal integration, this does not necessarily refute 'unconscious' integration defined through non-subliminal (e.g. implicit) approaches.

Magnetoencephalography recordings reveal the spatiotemporal dynamics of recognition memory for complex versus simple auditory sequences

Auditory recognition is a crucial cognitive process that relies on the organization of single elements over time. However, little is known about the spatiotemporal dynamics underlying the conscious recognition of auditory sequences varying in complexity. To study this, we asked 71 participants to learn and recognize simple tonal musical sequences and matched complex atonal sequences while their brain activity was recorded using magnetoencephalography (MEG). Results reveal qualitative changes in neural activity dependent on stimulus complexity: recognition of tonal sequences engages hippocampal and cingulate areas, whereas recognition of atonal sequences mainly activates the auditory processing network. Our findings reveal the involvement of a cortico-subcortical brain network for auditory recognition and support the idea that stimulus complexity qualitatively alters the neural pathways of recognition memory.

What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models

The nature of consciousness is considered one of science's most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today's neuroscience is that all aspects of consciousness arise solely from interactions among neurons in the brain. However, the origin and mechanisms of qualia (i.e., subjective or phenomenological experience) are not understood. David Chalmers coined the term "the hard problem" to describe the difficulties in elucidating the origins of subjectivity from the point of view of reductive materialism. We propose that the hard problem arises because one or more assumptions within a materialistic worldview are either wrong or incomplete. If consciousness entails more than the activity of neurons, then we can contemplate new ways of thinking about the hard problem. This review examines phenomena that apparently contradict the notion that consciousness is exclusively dependent on brain activity, including phenomena where consciousness appears to extend beyond the physical brain and body in both space and time. The mechanisms underlying these "non-local" properties are vaguely suggestive of quantum entanglement in physics, but how such effects might manifest remains highly speculative. The existence of these non-local effects appears to support the proposal that post-materialistic models of consciousness may be required to break the conceptual impasse presented by the hard problem of consciousness.

From Brain-Body Function to Conscious Interactions

In this review, we discuss empirical results inspiring the introduction of a formal mathematical multilayer model for the biological neuroscience of conscious experience. First, we motivate the discussion through evidence regarding the dynamic brain. Second, we review different brain-body couplings associated with conscious experience and its potential role in driving brain dynamics. Third, we introduce the machinery of multilayer networks to account for several types of interactions in brain-body systems. Then, a multilayer structure consists of two main generalizations: a formal semantic to study biological systems, and an integrative account for several signatures and models of consciousness. Finally, under this framework, we define composition of layers to account for entangled features of brain-body systems related to conscious experience. As such, a multilayer mathematical framework is highly integrative and thus may be more complete than other models. In this short review, we discuss a variety of empirical results inspiring the introduction of a formal mathematical multilayer model for the biological neuroscience of conscious experience.

Preserved Unconscious Processing in Schizophrenia: The Case of Motivation

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Motivation deficit is a hallmark of schizophrenia that has a strong impact on their daily life. An alteration of reward processing has been repeatedly highlighted in schizophrenia, but to what extent it involves a deficient amplification of reward representation through conscious processing remains unclear. Indeed, patients with schizophrenia exhibit a disruption of conscious processing, whereas unconscious processing appears to be largely preserved.

STUDY DESIGN

To further explore the nature of motivational deficit in schizophrenia and the implication of consciousness disruption in this symptom, we used a masking paradigm testing motivation both under conscious and unconscious conditions in patients with schizophrenia (n = 31) and healthy controls (n = 32). Participants were exposed to conscious or subliminal coin pictures representing money at stake and were subsequently asked to perform an effort-task by squeezing a handgrip as hard as possible to win this reward.

STUDY RESULTS

We observed a preserved effect of unconscious monetary rewards on force production in both groups, without any significant difference between them. By contrast, in the conscious condition, patients with schizophrenia were less sensitive to rewards than controls. Our results confirm that unconscious incentives have effects on exerted forces in the general population, and demonstrate that patients with schizophrenia exhibit a dissociation between an impaired conscious motivation and a preserved unconscious motivation.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggest the existence of several steps in motivational processes that can be differentially affected and might have implication for patient care.

The strength of weak integrated information theory

The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the 'hard problem', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.

A Dynamic Mechanistic Model of Perceptual Binding

The brain’s ability to create a unified conscious representation of an object by integrating information from multiple perception pathways is called perceptual binding. Binding is crucial for normal cognitive function. Some perceptual binding errors and disorders have been linked to certain neurological conditions, brain lesions, and conditions that give rise to illusory conjunctions. However, the mechanism of perceptual binding remains elusive. Here, I present a computational model of binding using two sets of coupled oscillatory processes that are assumed to occur in response to two different percepts. I use the model to study the dynamic behavior of coupled processes to characterize how these processes can modulate each other and reach a temporal synchrony. I identify different oscillatory dynamic regimes that depend on coupling mechanisms and parameter values. The model can also discriminate different combinations of initial inputs that are set by initial states of coupled processes. Decoding brain signals that are formed through perceptual binding is a challenging task, but my modeling results demonstrate how crosstalk between two systems of processes can possibly modulate their outputs. Therefore, my mechanistic model can help one gain a better understanding of how crosstalk between perception pathways can affect the dynamic behavior of the systems that involve perceptual binding.

Hypnotic Induction of Deafness to Elementary Sounds: An Electroencephalography Case-Study and a Proposed Cognitive and Neural Scenario

Hypnosis can be conceived as a unique opportunity to explore how top-down effects can influence various conscious and non-conscious processes. In the field of perception, such modulatory effects have been described in distinct sensory modalities. In the present study we focused on the auditory channel and aimed at creating a radical deafness to elementary sounds by a specific hypnotic suggestion. We report here a single case-study in a highly suggestible healthy volunteer who reported a total hypnotically suggested deafness. We recorded high-density scalp EEG during an auditory odd-ball paradigm before and after hypnotic deafness suggestion. While both early auditory event-related potentials to sounds (P1) and mismatch negativity component were not affected by hypnotic deafness, we observed a total disappearance of the late P3 complex component when the subject reported being deaf. Moreover, a centro-mesial positivity was present exclusively during the hypnotic condition prior to the P3 complex. Interestingly, source localization suggested an anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) origin of this neural event. Multivariate decoding analyses confirmed and specified these findings. Resting state analyses confirmed a similar level of conscious state in both conditions, and suggested a functional disconnection between auditory areas and other cortical areas. Taken together these results suggest the following plausible scenario: (i) preserved early processing of auditory information unaffected by hypnotic suggestion, (ii) conscious setting of an inhibitory process (ACC) preventing conscious access to sounds, (iii) functional disconnection between the modular and unconscious representations of sounds and global neuronal workspace. This single subject study presents several limits that are discussed and remains open to alternative interpretations. This original proof-of-concept paves the way to a larger study that will test the predictions stemming from our theoretical model and from this first report.

Voluntary auditory change: First-person access to agentive aspects of attention regulation

In perceptual psychology, audition and introspection have not yet received as much attention as other topics (e.g., vision) and methods (third-person paradigms). Practical examples and theoretical considerations show that it nevertheless seems promising to treat both topics in conjunction to gain insights into basic structures of attention regulation and respective agentive awareness. To this end, an empirical study on voluntary auditory change was conducted with a non-reactive first-person design. Data were analyzed with a mixed methods approach and compared with an analogous study on visual reversal. Qualitative hierarchical coding and explorative statistics yield a cross-modal replication of frequency patterns of mental activity as well as significant differences between the modalities. On this basis, the role of mental agency in perception is refined in terms of different levels of intention and discussed in the context of the philosophical mental action debate as well as of the Global Workspace/Working Memory account. As a main result, this work suggests the existence and structure of a gradual and developable agentive attention awareness on which voluntary attention regulation can build, and which justifies speaking, in a certain sense, of attentional self-perception.

Early correlates of error-related brain activity predict subjective timing of error awareness

Humans are remarkably reliable in detecting errors in their behavior. Whereas error awareness has been assumed to emerge not until 200-400 ms after an error, the so-called early error sensations refer to the subjective feeling of having detected an error even before the erroneous response was executed. Here, we collected electroencephalogram (EEG) to track how early error sensations are reflected in neural correlates of performance monitoring. Participants first had to perform a task, and then had to indicate whether an error has occurred and whether this error was detected before or after response execution. EEG results showed that early error sensations were associated with an earlier peak of the error-related negativity (Ne/ERN), a component of error-related brain activity that occurs briefly after the error response. This demonstrates that early error-related activity influences metacognitive judgments on the time course of error awareness, and thus contributes to error awareness.

Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) - Bridging the gap of neuronal activity and phenomenal states

Consciousness and its neural mechanisms remain a mystery. Current neuroscientific theories focus predominantly on the external input/stimulus and the associated stimulus-related activity during conscious contents. Despite all progress, we encounter two gaps: (i) a gap between spontaneous and stimulus-related activity; (ii) a gap between neuronal and phenomenal features. A novel, different, and unique approach, Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC) aims to bridge both gaps. The TTC focuses on the brain's spontaneous activity and how its spatial topography and temporal dynamic shape stimulus-related activity and resurface in the corresponding spatial and temporal features of consciousness, i.e., 'common currency'. The TTC introduces four temporo-spatial mechanisms: expansion, globalization, alignment, and nestedness. These are associated with distinct dimensions of consciousness including phenomenal content, access, form/structure, and level/state, respectively. Following up on the first introduction of the TTC in 2017, we review updates, further develop these temporo-spatial mechanisms, and postulate specific neurophenomenal hypotheses. We conclude that the TTC offers a viable approach for (i) linking spontaneous and stimulus-related activity in conscious states; (ii) determining specific neuronal and neurophenomenal mechanisms for the distinct dimensions of consciousness; (iii) an integrative and unifying framework of different neuroscientific theories of consciousness; and (iv) offers novel empirically grounded conceptual assumptions about the biological and ontological nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain.

Emotions as Abstract Evaluation Criteria in Biological and Artificial Intelligences

Biological as well as advanced artificial intelligences (AIs) need to decide which goals to pursue. We review nature's solution to the time allocation problem, which is based on a continuously readjusted categorical weighting mechanism we experience introspectively as emotions. One observes phylogenetically that the available number of emotional states increases hand in hand with the cognitive capabilities of animals and that raising levels of intelligence entail ever larger sets of behavioral options. Our ability to experience a multitude of potentially conflicting feelings is in this view not a leftover of a more primitive heritage, but a generic mechanism for attributing values to behavioral options that can not be specified at birth. In this view, emotions are essential for understanding the mind. For concreteness, we propose and discuss a framework which mimics emotions on a functional level. Based on time allocation via emotional stationarity (TAES), emotions are implemented as abstract criteria, such as satisfaction, challenge and boredom, which serve to evaluate activities that have been carried out. The resulting timeline of experienced emotions is compared with the “character” of the agent, which is defined in terms of a preferred distribution of emotional states. The long-term goal of the agent, to align experience with character, is achieved by optimizing the frequency for selecting individual tasks. Upon optimization, the statistics of emotion experience becomes stationary.

The Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape: Reconciling Neuroscientific Theories With the Phenomenology of Consciousness

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of neuroscientific theories of consciousness. These include theories which explicitly point to EM fields, notably Operational Architectonics and, more recently, the General Resonance Theory. In phenomenological terms, human consciousness is a unified composition of contents. These contents are specific and meaningful, and they exist from a subjective point of view. Human conscious experience is temporally continuous, limited in content, and coherent. Based upon those phenomenal observations, pre-existing theories of consciousness, and a large body of experimental evidence, I derived the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). In brief, the TICL proposes that the neural correlate of consciousness is a structure of temporally integrated causality occurring over a large portion of the thalamocortical system. This structure is composed of a large, integrated set of neuronal elements (the System), which contains some subsystems, defined as having a higher level of temporally-integrated causality than the System as a whole. Each Subsystem exists from the point of view of the System, in the form of meaningful content. In this article, I review the TICL and consider the importance of EM forces as a mechanism of neural causality. I compare the fundamentals of TICL to those of several other neuroscientific theories. Using five major characteristics of phenomenal consciousness as a standard, I compare the basic tenets of Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace, General Resonance Theory, Operational Architectonics, and the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness with the framework of the TICL. While the literature concerned with these theories tends to focus on different lines of evidence, there are fundamental areas of agreement. This means that, in time, it may be possible for many of them to converge upon the truth. In this analysis, I conclude that a primary distinction which divides these theories is the feature of spatial and temporal nesting. Interestingly, this distinction does not separate along the fault line between theories explicitly concerned with EM fields and those which are not. I believe that reconciliation is possible, at least in principle, among those theories that recognize the following: just as the contents of consciousness are distinctions within consciousness, the neural correlates of conscious content should be distinguishable from but fall within the spatial and temporal boundaries of the full neural correlates of consciousness.

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.