The effects of action choice on temporal binding, agency ratings, and their correlation

The fusion point of temporal binding: Promises and perils of multisensory accounts

Performing an action to initiate a consequence in the environment triggers the perceptual illusion of temporal binding. This phenomenon entails that actions and following effects are perceived to occur closer in time than they do outside the action-effect relationship. Here we ask whether temporal binding can be explained in terms of multisensory integration, by assuming either multisensory fusion or partial integration of the two events. We gathered two datasets featuring a wide range of action-effect delays as a key factor influencing integration. We then tested the fit of a computational model for multisensory integration, the statistically optimal cue integration (SOCI) model. Indeed, qualitative aspects of the data on a group-level followed the principles of a multisensory account. By contrast, quantitative evidence from a comprehensive model evaluation indicated that temporal binding cannot be reduced to multisensory integration. Rather, multisensory integration should be seen as one of several component processes underlying temporal binding on an individual level.

Temporal binding and sense of agency in major depression

Background

Alterations in the experience of controlling oneself and one's environment are of high relevance to understanding the psychopathology of depression. This study investigated the relationship between Temporal Binding for action-event sequences, sense of agency, self-efficacy and symptom severity in Major Depressive Disorder.

Method

We employed the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS) and the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) to assess explicit Sense of Agency and self-efficacy in a group of 42 persons diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) [20 identifying as female, 19 as male; mean age 37.8 years (± 13.3)] and 40 control persons without a psychiatric diagnosis (CG) [22 identifying as female, 20 as male; mean age 38.0 years ( ± 13.3)]. Depressive symptom severity was measured using the BDI-II. We additionally performed a temporal binding paradigm as a potential correlate to Sense of Agency. Participants partook in a time estimation task judging three intervals (250ms, 450ms, 650ms) while either observing or causing stimulus presentations. The underestimation of intervals following intentional actions causing stimulus presentations (compared to merely observing the stimulus presentation) is interpreted as temporal binding.

Results

SoAS scores demonstrated an inverse correlation with depressive symptoms (CG: p=.032, R2=.113; MDD: p<.001, R2=.260) and a positive correlation with GSE scores (CG: p<.001, R2=.379; MDD: p<.001, R2=.254). We found distinct differences in temporal binding between healthy participants and the Major Depressive Disorder group without significant correlation between temporal binding and the SoAS or GSE scores. The data suggest group differences in time estimation particular pertaining to time intervals involving intentional action and increasingly complex multisensory stimuli.

Discussion

We investigated parameters of subjective control, namely Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy. Here, we were able to reveal their inverse relationship with depressive symptoms in patients with major depressive disorder, highlighting a profound experience of loss of control with increasing symptom load. Deficits in experiencing control, particularly involving intentional motor actions (and more complex multisensory stimuli), appear to be more pronounced in Major Depressive Disorder, involving not only negative self-efficacy expectations but also an altered Sense of Agency and temporal binding. Temporal binding and SoAS scores did not correlate, adding to the growing evidence that the two measures may not be directly related. We propose that future research be directed at this contiguous relationship between Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy in Major Depressive Disorder.

An investigation of the experience of control through the sense of agency in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder: a review and meta-analysis

The construct of sense of agency (SoA) has proven useful for understanding mechanisms underlying obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) phenomenology, especially in explaining the apparent dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions. Paradoxically, people with OCD appear to experience both diminished SoA (feeling unable to control their actions) and inflated SoA (having "magical" control over events). The present review investigated the extent to which the SoA is distorted in OCD, in terms of both implicit (ie, inferred from correlates and outcomes of voluntary actions) and explicit (ie, subjective judgment of one's control over an outcome) measures of SoA. Our search resulted in 15 studies that met the criteria for inclusion in a meta-analysis, where we also examined the potential moderating effects of the type of measure (explicit versus implicit) and of the actual control participants had over the outcome. We found that participants with OCD or with high levels of OCD symptoms show lower implicit measures of SoA and at the same time tend to overestimate their control in situations where they do not actually have it. Together, these findings support the hypothesized dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions.

Eye did this! Sense of agency in eye movements

This study investigates the sense of agency (SoA) for saccades with implicit and explicit agency measures. In two eye tracking experiments, participants moved their eyes towards on-screen stimuli that subsequently changed color. Participants then either reproduced the temporal interval between saccade and color-change (Experiment 1) or reported the time points of these events with an auditory Libet clock (Experiment 2) to measure temporal binding effects as implicit indices of SoA. Participants were either made to believe to exert control over the color change or not (agency manipulation). Explicit ratings indicated that the manipulation of causal beliefs and hence agency was successful. However, temporal binding was only evident for caused effects, and only when a sufficiently sensitive procedure was used (auditory Libet clock). This suggests a feebler connection between temporal binding and SoA than previously proposed. The results also provide evidence for a relatively fast acquisition of sense of agency for previously never experienced types of action-effect associations. This indicates that the underlying processes of action control may be rooted in more intricate and adaptable cognitive models than previously thought. Oculomotor SoA as addressed in the present study presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social sense of agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: In this study, sense of agency for eye movements in the non-social domain is investigated in detail, using both explicit and implicit measures. Therefore, it offers novel and specific insights into comprehending sense of agency concerning effects induced by eye movements, as well as broader insights into agency pertaining to entirely newly acquired types of action-effect associations. Oculomotor sense of agency presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. Due to peculiarities of the oculomotor domain such as the varying degree of volitional control, eye movements could provide new information regarding more general theories of sense of agency in future research.

Evaluating the Bayesian causal inference model of intentional binding through computational modeling

Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time interval between an action and its consequence. While intentional binding has been widely used as a proxy for the sense of agency, its underlying mechanism has been largely veiled. Bayesian causal inference (BCI) has gained attention as a potential explanation, but currently lacks sufficient empirical support. Thus, this study implemented various computational models to describe the possible mechanisms of intentional binding, fitted them to individual observed data, and quantitatively evaluated their performance. The BCI models successfully isolated the parameters that potentially contributed to intentional binding (i.e., causal belief and temporal prediction) and generally better explained an observer's time estimation than traditional models such as maximum likelihood estimation. The estimated parameter values suggested that the time compression resulted from an expectation that the actions would immediately cause sensory outcomes. Furthermore, I investigated the algorithm that realized this BCI and found probability-matching to be a plausible candidate; people might heuristically reconstruct event timing depending on causal uncertainty rather than optimally integrating causal and temporal posteriors. The evidence demonstrated the utility of computational modeling to investigate how humans infer the causal and temporal structures of events and individual differences in that process.

Feelings of responsibility and temporal binding: A comparison of two measures of the sense of agency

Temporal binding refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between an action and its perceptual consequences. Temporal binding has often been used by researchers to indirectly measure participants' sense of agency (SoA), or the subjective sense of causing something to happen. Other studies have proposed links between temporal binding and feelings of moral responsibility. The present study compared subjective interval estimates to feelings of responsibility in a between-subjects design (Exp 1) and a within-subjects design (Exp 2). Participants either estimated the interval between two events (two tones in the passive condition, or a keypress followed by a tone in active conditions) or rated their feeling of responsibility for the tone(s). Manipulations of participant involvement and choice impacted feelings of responsibility more than temporal estimates. Overall, the two dependent variables followed different patterns, suggesting subjective interval estimates may not be a reliable proxy for feelings of responsibility.

A German translation and validation of the sense of agency scale

Sense of agency refers to the experience of controlling one's actions and through them events in the outside world. General agency beliefs can be measured with the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS), which consists of the sense of positive agency subscale (i.e., feeling of being in control over one's own body, mind, and environment) and the sense of negative agency subscale (i.e., feeling existentially helpless). The aim of the present study was to validate a German version of the SoAS. Using factor analyzes, we replicated the two-factor structure of the original version of the SoAS. Further, the German SoAS showed good model fits, good internal consistency, and moderate test-retest reliability. Construct validity was supported by significant low to moderate correlations of the German SoAS with other conceptually similar, but still distinct constructs such as general self-efficacy. Additionally, the German SoAS has an incremental value in explaining variance in the extent of subclinical symptoms of schizotypal personality disorder that goes beyond variance explained by constructs that are conceptually similar to sense of agency. Taken together, the results indicate that the German SoAS is a valid and suitable instrument to assess one's general agency beliefs.

Attention and expectation likely underlie temporal binding measured using the Libet Clock

An interesting finding that has emerged in studies of the sense of agency is that of a perceived compression of the temporal interval between actions and the outcomes they produce. This is generally referred to as temporal binding. Although temporal binding has been studied using various paradigms, possibly the most popular of these is the Libet Clock task. The Libet task is also interesting because it suggests that temporal binding can be decomposed into two components, one purportedly relating to actions and the other relating to outcomes. These are termed action binding and outcome binding, respectively. In this article, I focus specifically on temporal binding revealed using the Libet Clock task and propose the idea that attention underpins the action binding effect, while outcome binding, on the other hand, is driven by the effects of expectation.

Action representations in prevention behavior: Evidence from motor execution

Human actions sometimes aim at preventing an event from occurring. How these to-be-prevented events are represented, however, is poorly understood. Recent proposals in the literature point to a possible divide between effect-producing, operant actions, and effect-precluding, prevention actions, suggesting that the control of operant actions relies on codes of environment-related effects whereas prevention actions do not. Here we report two experiments on this issue, showing that spatial features (Experiment 1) as well as temporal features (Experiment 2) of to-be-prevented events influence actions in the same way as corresponding features of to-be-produced effects. This implies that selecting and executing prevention actions relies on anticipated environmental changes, comparable to operant actions.

Agency and social affordance shape visual perception

Research on the sense of agency has shown that being the author of an action changes the way we estimate the timing and the intensity of the action-effect. Yet, there is a dearth of attempts to assess the influence of agency on perception per se. The present study used the Representational Momentum paradigm to measure participants' visual anticipation of movement while manipulating their agency. In line with previous literature emphasizing the impact of social factors on visual anticipation and on the sense of agency, we additionally investigated the modulating power of social affordances on the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. We conducted two experiments where participants viewed a virtual agent directing a handshake gesture toward a second virtual agent. In a first experiment, we addressed the role of agency on visual anticipation by comparing a condition in which participants triggered the virtual agent's gesture with a condition where the computer triggered the gesture. Results showed greater forward movement anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. The second experiment investigated how altering social interaction parameters (interindividual distance and body posture) modulated the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. The outcome contrasted with the first experiment, with participants anticipating a backward movement of the hand when the computer triggered the gesture and displaying a null anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. Those two experiments highlighted how active involvement and environmental affordance interact to shape perception and allowed us to propose an updated model of agency processing.

The pursuit of the end: The effects of action-goal choices on temporal binding

The effect of action choice (whether one can choose their actions freely) on temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between a voluntary action and its effect, is controversial. The present study tried to distinguish action-goal choice (whether one could pursue the action-effect freely) from action choice. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the effect of action-goal choice on TB while the congruency between actions and outcomes was manipulated (i.e., 50% in Experiment 1 and 80% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the effect of action choice on TB when the outcome congruency was 80%. Results showed that free and instructed action-goals led to comparable magnitudes of TB while free actions led to a larger TB than instructed actions. Furthermore, the effect of outcome congruency on TB varied by action-goal choices (Experiment 2) but not action choices (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the potential differences between action choice and action-goal choice.

Distracted to a fault: Attention, actions, and time perception

In the last years, it has become general consensus that actions change our time perception. Performing an action to elicit a specific event seems to lead to a systematic underestimation of the interval between action and effect, a phenomenon termed temporal (or previously intentional) binding. Temporal binding has been closely associated with sense of agency, our perceived control over our actions and our environment, and because of its robust behavioral effects has indeed been widely utilized as an implicit correlate of sense of agency. The most robust and clear temporal binding effects are typically found via Libet clock paradigms. In the present study, we investigate a crucial methodological confound in these paradigms that provides an alternative explanation for temporal binding effects: a redirection of attentional resources in two-event sequences (as in classical operant conditions) versus singular events (as in classical baseline conditions). Our results indicate that binding effects in Libet clock paradigms may be based to a large degree on such attentional processes, irrespective of intention or action-effect sequences. Thus, these findings challenge many of the previously drawn conclusions and interpretations with regard to actions and time perception.

Induced feelings of external influence during instructed imaginations in healthy subjects

The psychopathological phenomenon of delusions of influence comprises variable disturbances of the self-environment-border leading to the feeling of external influence on thoughts, feelings, impulses or behaviors. Delusions of influence are a hallmark in psychotic illness, but nevertheless, attenuated forms can also appear in healthy individuals. Here we present a newly developed paradigm to induce and assess feelings of external influence during instructed imaginations in healthy individuals. In the current study, we asked 60 healthy individuals to visually imagine different objects. To induce feelings of external influence, we applied one of three different physical setups (low-amplitude transcranial direct current stimulation, eye contact, or skin-to-skin hand touch), and informed the participants whether or not an external influence was attempted during the respective trial. The physical setup (setup vs. no setup, Z = -3.847, p < 0.001, r = 0.497) as well as the information given to the participants (confirmation vs. negation, Z = -5.218, p < 0.001, r = 0.674) alone were able to modulate the feeling of external influence in all three interventions. The impact of information (whether influence was attempted or not attempted) significantly exceeded the impact of the physical setup on the ratings of experienced external influence (Z = -2.394, p = 0.016, r = 0.310). Moreover, the response latency correlated with the estimated feeling of external influence (r _S = 0.392, p = 0.002). Additional analyses addressed the influence of the emotional content of imagined objects and examined the intensity and emotional valence of the imaginations. Further supplemental analyses correlated external influence estimation of the participants with other psychopathological measures (trait markers for supernatural beliefs, proneness to hallucinations, and delusions and attributional style). In conclusion, this study endorses a quantitative model of psychopathological characteristics, in this case feelings of external influence that can be induced by external cues.

Never run a changing system: Action-effect contingency shapes prospective agency

Human action control is highly sensitive to action-effect contingencies in the agent's environment. Here we show that the subjective sense of agency (SoA) contributes to this sensitivity as a subjective counterpart to instrumental action decisions. Participants (N = 556) experienced varying reward probabilities and were prompted to give summary evaluations of their SoA after a series of action-effect episodes. Results first revealed a quadratic relation of contingency and SoA, driven by a disproportionally strong impact of perfect action-effect contingencies. In addition to this strong situational determinant of SoA, we observed small but reliable interindividual differences as a function of gender, assertiveness, and neuroticism that applied especially at imperfect action-effect contingencies. Crucially, SoA not only reflected the reward structure of the environment but was also associated with the agent's future action decisions across situational and personal factors. These findings call for a paradigm shift in research on perceived agency, away from the retrospective assessment of single behavioral episodes and towards a prospective view that draws on statistical regularities of an agent's environment.

Sense of agency as synecdoche: Multiple neurobiological mechanisms may underlie the phenomenon summarized as sense of agency

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies on the sense of agency (SoA) have yielded heterogeneous findings identifying regional brain activity during tasks that probed SoA. In this review, we argue that the reason behind this between-study heterogeneity is a "synecdochic" way the field conceptualizes and studies SoA. Typically, a single feature is experimentally manipulated and then this is interpreted as covering all aspects of SoA. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the fMRI studies of SoA and attempt to provide meaningful categories whereby the heterogeneous findings may be classified. This classification is based on a separation of the experimental paradigms (Feedback Manipulations of ongoing movements, Action-Effect, and Sensory Attenuation) and type of report employed (implicit, explicit reports of graded or dichotic nature, and whether these concern self-other distinctions or sense of control). We only find that Feedback Manipulation and Action-Effect share common activation in supplementary motor area, insula and cerebellum in positive SoA and inferior frontal gyrus in the negative SoA, but observe large networks related to SoA only in Feedback Manipulation studies. To illustrate the advantages of this approach, we discuss the findings from an fMRI study which we conducted, within this framework.

The sense of agency in joint action: An integrative review

When people perform joint actions together, their individual actions (e.g., moving one end of a heavy couch) must be coordinated to achieve a collective goal (e.g., moving the couch across the room). Joint actions pose unique challenges for understanding people's sense of agency, because each person engaged in the joint action can have a sense of agency not only at the individual level (a sense that "I moved my end of the couch" or "My partner moved their end of the couch"), but also at the collective level (a sense that "We moved the couch together"). This review surveys research that has examined people's sense of agency in joint action, including explicit judgments of agency, implicit measures of agency, and first-hand accounts of agency in real-world settings. The review provides a comprehensive summary of the factors that influence individual- and collective-level agency in joint action; reveals the progress that has been made toward understanding different forms of collective-level agency in joint action, including the sense that agency is shared among co-actors and the sense that co-actors are acting as a single unit; and synthesizes evidence concerning the relationships between different measures of implicit agency and individual- versus collective-level agency in joint action. The review concludes by highlighting numerous outstanding questions and promising avenues for future research.

Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm

A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals.

The obedient mind and the volitional brain: A neural basis for preserved sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion

Milgram’s classical studies famously suggested a widespread willingness to obey authority, even to the point of inflicting harm. Important situational factors supporting obedience, such as proximity with the victim, have been established. Relatively little work has focused on how coercion affects individual cognition, or on identifying the cognitive factors that underlie inter-individual differences in the tendency to yield to coercion. Here, we used fMRI to investigate the neural systems associated with changes in volitional processes associated with sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion. Participants either freely chose, or were instructed by the experimenter, to give mildly painful electric shocks to another participant, or to refrain from doing so. We have previously shown that coercion reduces temporal binding, which has been proposed as an implicit proxy measure of sense of agency. We tested how reduced agency under coercion related to differences in neural activity between free choice and coercion. In contrast to previous studies and to participants performing the task outside the MRI scanner, on average there was no effect of coercion on agency for participants in the scanner. However, greater activity in the medial frontal gyrus was reliably associated with greater agency under coercion. A similar association was found using explicit responsibility ratings. Our findings suggest that medial frontal processes, perhaps related to volition during action planning and execution, may help to preserve a sense of accountability under coercion. Further, participants who administered more shocks under free choice showed reduced activity during free choice trials in brain areas associated with social cognition. Possibly, this might reflect participants cognitively distancing themselves from the recipient of the shocks under free choice, whereas this was not observed under coercion.

Two faces of temporal binding: Action- and effect-binding are not correlated

Research on the sense of agency has proliferated a range of explicit and implicit measures. However, the relation of different measures is poorly understood with especially mixed findings on the correlation between explicit judgments of agency and the implicit perceptual bias of temporal binding. Here, we add to the conundrum by showing that the two sub-components of temporal binding - action-binding and effect-binding, respectively - are not correlated across participants either, suggesting independent processes for both components. Research on inter-individual differences regarding the sense of agency is thus well-advised to rely on other implicit measures until the phenomenon of temporal binding is better understood.

Exploring the relationship between perceived Action-Outcome distance and Agency: Evidence from temporal binding

Intentional actions are usually accompanied by a sense of agency (SoA), along with a perceived shortening of action-outcome intervals known as the intentional binding (IB) effect. This is at least partly associated with the perceived strength of action-outcome relationships, which have been described in terms of distance (e.g., a 'distancing effect'). Given that actions in the modern world are increasingly distant from their outcomes, the current study aimed to explore the effect of perceived spatial distance on the strength of IB. Participants voluntarily triggered, or passively observed, a circle on a background that was either flat or appeared three-dimensional, and estimated action-outcome delays. Depth cues modified the circle's perceived distance while the circle itself did not change. When viewed on a forced-perspective background, interval estimates increased with apparent distance, but only when outcomes were caused by intentional actions. This suggests that agency is reduced for outcomes that appear further away.

Disappearing and appearing: Temporal binding effects are consistent across situations

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over actions and action outcomes. Previous studies were mostly confined to the situation of performing actions to make objects appear, while it remains unexplored whether we experience sense of agency when making objects disappear. Here, we examined the temporal binding effect, an implicit index of sense of agency, in performing actions to make objects disappear and compared the magnitude of this effect in the appearing and disappearing situations. Results showed that the temporal binding effect emerged when object's disappearances served as action outcomes. Moreover, the temporal binding effects in the appearing and disappearing situations did not differ significantly. Our findings extend the temporal binding effect to the situation of voluntarily making objects disappear, suggesting a comparable level of implicit sense of agency when voluntarily making objects disappear and appear.

Temporal binding past the Libet clock: testing design factors for an auditory timer

Voluntary actions and causally linked sensory stimuli are perceived to be shifted towards each other in time. This so-called temporal binding is commonly assessed in paradigms using the Libet Clock. In such experiments, participants have to estimate the timing of actions performed or ensuing sensory stimuli (usually tones) by means of a rotating clock hand presented on a screen. The aforementioned task setup is however ill-suited for many conceivable setups, especially when they involve visual effects. To address this shortcoming, the line of research presented here establishes an alternative measure for temporal binding by using a sequence of timed sounds. This method uses an auditory timer, a sequence of letters presented during task execution, which serve as anchors for temporal judgments. In four experiments, we manipulated four design factors of this auditory timer, namely interval length, interval filling, sequence predictability, and sequence length, to determine the most effective and economic method for measuring temporal binding with an auditory timer.

Temporal binding as multisensory integration: Manipulating perceptual certainty of actions and their effects

It has been proposed that statistical integration of multisensory cues may be a suitable framework to explain temporal binding, that is, the finding that causally related events such as an action and its effect are perceived to be shifted towards each other in time. A multisensory approach to temporal binding construes actions and effects as individual sensory signals, which are each perceived with a specific temporal precision. When they are integrated into one multimodal event, like an action-effect chain, the extent to which they affect this event's perception depends on their relative reliability. We test whether this assumption holds true in a temporal binding task by manipulating certainty of actions and effects. Two experiments suggest that a relatively uncertain sensory signal in such action-effect sequences is shifted more towards its counterpart than a relatively certain one. This was especially pronounced for temporal binding of the action towards its effect but could also be shown for effect binding. Other conceptual approaches to temporal binding cannot easily explain these results, and the study therefore adds to the growing body of evidence endorsing a multisensory approach to temporal binding.

Influence of levels of automation on the sense of agency during continuous action

Recent advances in automation technology can lead to unsafe situations where operators lose their sense of agency over the automated equipment. On the other hand, increasing evidence has shown that providing operators with opportunities of continuous operation and helping them improve their performance on tasks through automation can boost their sense of agency. However, it is challenging to ensure that the operator maintains a sense of agency when working with a fully automated tool that removes him/her from the control loop. By demonstrating a tracking task in which participants continuously tracked a moving target through a cursor controlled by a joystick under different levels of automation, we illustrate how the participants’ sense of agency and tracking performance were altered in accordance with the level of automation. The results showed that their sense of agency was enhanced by increasing automation but began to decline when the level of automation exceeded 90%. More generally, this suggests that allowing operators a little contribution to control over the continuous operation of an automated tool may be sufficient to maintain their sense of agency while yielding the maximum improvement in performance.

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.

To prevent means to know: Explicit but no implicit agency for prevention behavior

Human agents draw on a variety of explicit and implicit cues to construct a sense of agency for their actions and the effects of these actions on the outside world. Associative mechanisms binding actions to their immediate effects support the evolution of agency for operant actions. However, human agents often also act to prevent a certain event from occurring. Such prevention behavior poses a critical challenge for the sense of agency, as successful prevention inherently revolves around the absence of a perceivable effect. By assessing the psychological microstructure of singular operant and prevention actions we show that this comes with profound consequences: agency for prevention actions is only evident in explicit measures but not in corresponding implicit proxies. These findings attest to an altered action representation in prevention behavior and they support recent proposals to model related processes such as avoidance learning in terms of propositional rather than associative terms.

Spatial action-effect binding depends on type of action-effect transformation

Spatial action-effect binding denotes the mutual attraction between the perceived position of an effector (e.g., one's own hand) and a distal object that is controlled by this effector. Such spatial binding can be construed as an implicit measure of object ownership, thus the belonging of a controlled object to the own body. The current study investigated how different transformations of hand movements (body-internal action component) into movements of a visual object (body-external action component) affect spatial action-effect binding, and thus implicit object ownership. In brief, participants had to bring a cursor on the computer screen into a predefined target position by moving their occluded hand on a tablet and had to estimate their final hand position. In Experiment 1, we found a significantly lower drift of the proprioceptive position of the hand towards the visual object when hand movements were transformed into laterally inverted cursor movements, rather than cursor movements in the same direction. Experiment 2 showed that this reduction reflected an elimination of spatial action-effect binding in the inverted condition. The results are discussed with respect to the prerequisites for an experience of ownership over artificial, noncorporeal objects. Our results show that predictability of an object movement alone is not a sufficient condition for ownership because, depending on the type of transformation, integration of the effector and a distal object can be fully abolished even under conditions of full controllability.

Measures of agency

The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of controlling one’s own actions, and through them, changes in the external environment. It is often assumed that this experience is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We argue that we should acknowledge four possible agency-related psychological constructs. Having a clear grasp of the possible constructs is important since experimental procedures are only able to target some but not all the possible constructs. The unacknowledged misalignment of the possible constructs of a sense of agency and the experimental procedures is a major theoretical and methodological obstacle to studying the sense of agency. Only if we recognize the nature of this obstacle will we be able to design the experimental paradigms that would enable us to study the responsible computational mechanisms.

Connecting action control and agency: Does action-effect binding affect temporal binding?

The sense of agency, i.e., the notion that we, as agents, are in control of our own actions and can affect our environment by acting, is an integral part of human volition. Recent work has attempted to ground agency in basic mechanisms of human action control. Along these lines, action-effect binding has been shown to affect explicit judgments of agency. Here, we investigate if such action-effect bindings are also related to temporal binding which is often used as an implicit measure of agency. In two experiments, we found evidence for the establishment of short-term action-effect bindings as well as temporal binding effects. However, the two phenomena were not associated with each other. This finding suggests that the relation of action control and agency is not a simple one, and it adds to the evidence in favor of a dissociation between subjective agency and perceptual biases such as temporal binding.