Perceptual reality monitoring: Neural mechanisms dissociating imagination from reality

The vividness of visualisations and autistic trait expression are not strongly associated

A minority of people (Aphantasics) report an inability to visualise. Aphantasia has been linked to Autism - a neurodevelopmental condition affecting social interactions. There is a risk of a circular logic informing proposed links, as the most popular metric of autistic traits, the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), has an Imagination subscale with items relating directly and indirectly to imagery. We tested for inter-relationships between imagery vividness ratings and the expression of autistic traits, using metrics that do and do not encompass an Imagination subscale. We also conducted hierarchical linear regression analyses to assess the contributions of different AQ subscale scores to imagery inter-relationships. Only in our highest-powered study (N = 308) were we able to detect a weak inter-relationship between AQ scores and imagery, independent of the Imagination subscale. We suggest that only a weak inter-relationship should exist, as many autistic people describe themselves as visual thinkers who have strong imagery.

Objective priming from pre-imagining inputs before binocular rivalry presentations does not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences

Most people can imagine images that they experience within their mind's eye. However, there are marked individual differences, with some people reporting that they are unable to visualise (aphantasics), and others who report having imagined experiences that are as realistic as seeing (hyper-phantasics). The vividness of imagery is most often measured via subjective self-report. Chang and Pearson (2018), however, have suggested that a binocular rivalry (BR) protocol can be used as an objective measure. They found that pre-imagining a moving input could enhance performance on an objective probe detection task when probes are embedded in imagery consistent inputs, as opposed to imagery inconsistent inputs. To date, nobody has assessed if this type of objective imagery priming can be used to predict the vividness of different people's visualisations. Here, we report that imagery priming of objective sensitivity to probes within static BR inputs does not correlate with the ratings people use to describe the vividness of their visualisations (a between participants effect). However, objective priming of sensitivity to probes embedded in BR inputs was greater on trials when participants reported that their pre-imagined experience had been more vivid than average (a within participants effect). Overall, our data suggest that while imagery can prime objective sensitivity to probes during BR, there is currently no strong evidence that this effect can be used as a reliable objective method to predict the subjective vividness of different people's visualisations.

Introspective psychophysics for the study of subjective experience

Studying subjective experience is hard. We believe that pain is not identical to nociception, nor pleasure a computational reward signal, nor fear the activation of "threat circuitry". Unfortunately, introspective self-reports offer our best bet for accessing subjective experience, but many still believe that introspection is "unreliable" and "unverifiable". But which of introspection's faults do we find most damning? Is it that introspection provides imperfect access to brain processes (e.g. perception, memory)? That subjective experience is not objectively verifiable? That it is hard to isolate from non-subjective processing capacity? Here, I argue none of these prevents us from building a meaningful, impactful psychophysical research program that treats subjective experience as a valid empirical target through precisely characterizing relationships among environmental variables, brain processes and behavior, and self-reported phenomenology. Following recent similar calls by Peters (Towards characterizing the canonical computations generating phenomenal experience. 2022. Neurosci Biobehav Rev: 142, 104903), Kammerer and Frankish (What forms could introspective systems take? A research programme. 2023. J Conscious Stud 30:13-48), and Fleming (Metacognitive psychophysics in humans, animals, and AI. 2023. J Conscious Stud 30:113-128), "introspective psychophysics" thus treats introspection's apparent faults as features, not bugs-just as the noise and distortions linking environment to behavior inspired Fechner's psychophysics over 150 years ago. This next generation of psychophysics will establish a powerful tool for building and testing precise explanatory models of phenomenology across many dimensions-urgency, emotion, clarity, vividness, confidence, and more.

Reflecting on the Origins of Subjective Experience

The capacity to change with experience infuses our perceptions, thoughts, and actions in and about the past, present, and future. The cognitive system supporting this capacity for change can be exquisitely responsive to external events and yet can influence how those external events affect us. This interplay between the external and internal has been a major theme of my lab group's research. We proposed that the fundamental ambiguity of subjective experience requires ongoing reality monitoring processes for evaluating its veridicality and proposed a source monitoring framework for exploring the encoding, activation, and evaluation of information. We further proposed a functional architecture, a multiple-entry modular memory system, that characterizes component subprocesses of cognition that give rise to remembering and other subjective phenomena (e.g., knowledge, beliefs, emotion, consciousness, self). I first discuss these approaches and some issues they address and then describe some educational and professional experiences that provided opportunities to investigate this fascinating epistemological puzzle.

The future, before, and after: Bayesian and multivariate analyses reveal shared and unique neural mechanisms of imagining and remembering the same unique event

Research shows that the brain regions that subserve our ability to remember the past are also involved in imagining the future. Given this similarity in brain activity, it remains unclear how brain activity distinguishes imagination from memory. In the current work, we scanned participants using functional magnetic resonance imaging before and after they performed a highly unique and elaborate activity wherein they went skydiving for the first time in their lives. Multivariate pattern analysis, Bayesian inference, and a tightly controlled experimental design were used to identify the neural activity that differentiates between memory and imagination of the same events. The results showed that large swaths of the default mode network exhibited identical patterns of activity in recollection and imagination; several frontal areas were involved in imagination (but not in recollection). Representational similarity analysis revealed that the left ventral precuneus exhibited different patterns of memory and imagination. Further examination revealed that this subarea may be especially important for recollection of specific episodes. These results advance our understanding of how the critical distinction between the past and future might be manifested in the brain.

Metacognition of perceptual resolution across and around the visual field

Do people have accurate metacognition of non-uniformities in perceptual resolution across (i.e., eccentricity) and around (i.e., polar angle) the visual field? Despite its theoretical and practical importance, this question has not yet been empirically tested. This study investigated metacognition of perceptual resolution by guessing patterns during a degradation (i.e., loss of high spatial frequencies) localization task. Participants localized the degraded face among the nine faces that simultaneously appeared throughout the visual field: fovea (fixation at the center of the screen), parafovea (left, right, above, and below fixation at 4° eccentricity), and periphery (left, right, above, and below fixation at 10° eccentricity). We presumed that if participants had accurate metacognition, in the absence of a degraded face, they would exhibit compensatory guessing patterns based on counterfactual reasoning ("The degraded face must have been presented at locations with lower perceptual resolution, because if it were presented at locations with higher perceptual resolution, I would have easily detected it."), meaning that we would expect more guess responses for locations with lower perceptual resolution. In two experiments, we observed guessing patterns that suggest that people can monitor non-uniformities in perceptual resolution across, but not around, the visual field during tasks, indicating partial in-the-moment metacognition. Additionally, we found that global explicit knowledge of perceptual resolution is not sufficient to guide in-the-moment metacognition during tasks, which suggests a dissociation between local and global metacognition.

When visual metacognition fails: widespread anosognosia for visual deficits

Anosognosia for visual deficits - cases where significant visual deficits go unnoticed - challenges the view that our own conscious experiences are what we know best. We review these widespread and striking failures of awareness. Anosognosia can occur with total blindness, visual abnormalities induced by brain lesions, and eye diseases. We show that anosognosia for visual deficits is surprisingly widespread. Building on previous accounts, we introduce a framework showing how apparently disparate forms of anosognosia fit together. The central idea is that, to notice a deficit, individuals need to form expectations about normal vision, compare expectations and visual input, and judge any mismatch at the metacognitive level. A failure in any of these three steps may lead to unawareness of visual deficits.

Decoding reveals the neural representation of perceived and imagined musical sounds

Vividly imagining a song or a melody is a skill that many people accomplish with relatively little effort. However, we are only beginning to understand how the brain represents, holds, and manipulates these musical "thoughts." Here, we decoded perceived and imagined melodies from magnetoencephalography (MEG) brain data (N = 71) to characterize their neural representation. We found that, during perception, auditory regions represent the sensory properties of individual sounds. In contrast, a widespread network including fronto-parietal cortex, hippocampus, basal nuclei, and sensorimotor regions hold the melody as an abstract unit during both perception and imagination. Furthermore, the mental manipulation of a melody systematically changes its neural representation, reflecting volitional control of auditory images. Our work sheds light on the nature and dynamics of auditory representations, informing future research on neural decoding of auditory imagination.

Electrophysiological (EEG) microstates during dream-like bizarre experiences in a naturalistic scenario using immersive virtual reality

Monitoring the reality status of conscious experience is essential for a human being to interact successfully with the external world. Despite its importance for everyday functioning, reality monitoring can systematically become erroneous, for example, while dreaming or during hallucinatory experiences. To investigate brain processes associated with reality monitoring occurring online during an experience, i.e., perceptual reality monitoring, we assessed EEG microstates in healthy, young participants. In a within-subjects design, we compared the experience of reality when being confronted with dream-like bizarre elements versus realistic elements in an otherwise highly naturalistic real-world scenario in immersive virtual reality. Dream-like bizarreness induced changes in the subjective experience of reality and bizarreness, and led to an increase in the contribution of a specific microstate labelled C'. Microstate C' was related to the suspension of disbelief, i.e. the suppression of bizarre mismatches. Together with the functional interpretation of microstate C' as reported by previous studies, the findings of this study point to the importance of prefrontal meta-conscious control processes in perceptual reality monitoring.

Self-reported interoception and exteroception are atypical and excessively coupled in psychosis compared to healthy controls

Although psychotic disorders are characterized by an impaired ability to discriminate internal and external worlds, the role of interoceptive and exteroceptive perceptions in determining this alteration is still unclear. This observational study aimed at investigating (a) increases/decreases in interoceptive and exteroceptive perceptions in patients with psychosis (PSY) compared to healthy controls (HC); (b) the association between interoception and exteroception in HC and PSY. Two hundred and ten HC and 72 PSY completed the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive awareness (MAIA, 8 domains) and the Adolescent-Adult Sensory Profile (AASP, 4 domains). MAIA/AASP differences were evaluated with MANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests. MAIA and AASP scores were correlated to quantify the interoceptive-exteroceptive coupling as Spearman's rho coefficients. Subgroup analyses were performed dividing PSY in schizophrenia/schizoaffective versus other psychosis. Compared to HC, PSY showed increased mean scores in four MAIA and two AASP domains (Bonferroni-p < 0.01). The interoceptive-exteroceptive coupling followed two correlation patterns in HC. A first pattern displayed negative correlations between MAIA not-worrying and AASP sensory sensitivity/sensation avoidance, while the second pattern highlighted positive correlations between MAIA scores and AASP sensation seeking. The two correlation patterns between HC and other-PSY subgroup were similar. However, schizophrenia/schizoaffective PSY did not show positive correlations in the second pattern, rather displaying negative correlations between MAIA scores and AASP domains related to passive behavioral responses. Correlation values were more extreme in PSY subgroups, indicating stronger interoceptive-exteroceptive coupling compared to HC. This study demonstrates that interoception and exteroception are atypical and excessively coupled in psychosis compared to the general population.Clinical Trials Registration: Protocol Number 20210003663 (Pavia, Ethical Committee IRCCS Policlinico San Matteo).

The nested hierarchical model of self and its non-relational vs relational posttraumatic manifestation: an fMRI meta-analysis of emotional processing

Different kinds of traumatic experiences like natural catastrophes vs. relational traumatic experiences (e.g., sex/physical abuse, interpersonal partner violence) are involved in the development of the self and PTSD psychopathological manifestations. Looking at a neuroscience approach, it has been proposed a nested hierarchical model of self, which identifies three neural-mental networks: (i) interoceptive; (ii) exteroceptive; (iii) mental. However, it is still unclear how the self and its related brain networks might be affected by non-relational vs relational traumatic experiences. Departing from this background, the current study aims at conducting a meta-analytic review of task-dependent fMRI studies (i.e., emotional processing task) among patients with PTSD due to non-relational (PTSD-NR) and relational (PTSD-R) traumatic experiences using two approaches: (i) a Bayesian network meta-analysis for a region-of-interest-based approach; (ii) a coordinated-based meta-analysis. Our findings suggested that the PTSD-NR mainly recruited areas ascribed to the mental self to process emotional stimuli. Whereas, the PTSD-R mainly activated regions associated with the intero-exteroceptive self. Accordingly, the PTSD-R compared to the PTSD-NR might not reach a higher symbolic capacity to process stimuli with an emotional valence. These results are also clinically relevant in support of the development of differential treatment approaches for non-relational vs. relational PTSD.

Confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality

Perceptual reality monitoring refers to the ability to distinguish internally triggered imagination from externally triggered reality. Such monitoring can take place at perceptual or cognitive levels-for example, in lucid dreaming, perceptual experience feels real but is accompanied by a cognitive insight that it is not real. We recently developed a paradigm to reveal perceptual reality monitoring errors during wakefulness in the general population, showing that imagined signals can be erroneously attributed to perception during a perceptual detection task. In the current study, we set out to investigate whether people have insight into perceptual reality monitoring errors by additionally measuring perceptual confidence. We used hierarchical Bayesian modeling of confidence criteria to characterize metacognitive insight into the effects of imagery on detection. Over two experiments, we found that confidence criteria moved in tandem with the decision criterion shift, indicating a failure of reality monitoring not only at a perceptual but also at a metacognitive level. These results further show that such failures have a perceptual rather than a decisional origin. Interestingly, offline queries at the end of the experiment revealed global, task-level insight, which was uncorrelated with local, trial-level insight as measured with confidence ratings. Taken together, our results demonstrate that confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality during perceptual detection. Future research should further explore the different cognitive dimensions of insight into reality judgments and how they are related.

How to Become a Memory: The Individual and Collective Aspects of Mnemicity

Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions-most prominently according to their "mnemicity": we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are "remembering" or "imagining"). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because-for humans-the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals' remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.

Unraveling the brain mechanisms of source monitoring with non-invasive brain stimulation: A systematic review

Background/Objective

Source monitoring refers to the ability to determine the source of memories and encompasses three subprocesses: internal source monitoring, reality monitoring, and external source monitoring. Neuroimaging studies provide valuable insights about neural correlates of source monitoring, but the causal relationship between brain and behavior is lacking. This study aimed to identify brain circuits involved in source monitoring by synthesizing the effects of brain stimulation on source monitoring as a function of the targeted brain regions or circuits.

Method

We conducted a systematic review of interventional studies that have examined the effects of brain stimulation on source monitoring across six databases. The principal outcome was the difference of source monitoring performance between active and control stimulation conditions.

Results

23 studies (920 healthy participants and 54 patients with schizophrenia) were included. Our findings revealed the involvement of i) the lateral prefrontal and temporoparietal cortices in internal source monitoring, ii) the medial prefrontal and temporoparietal cortices in reality monitoring, and iii) the precuneus and the left angular gyrus in external source monitoring.

Conclusions

These findings deepen our understanding of the brain mechanisms of source monitoring and highlight specific stimulation targets to alleviate source monitoring deficits.

Reality monitoring and metacognitive judgments in a false-memory paradigm

How well do we distinguish between different memory sources when the information from imagination and perception is similar? And how do metacognitive (confidence) judgments differ across different sources of experiences? To study these questions, we developed a reality monitoring task using semantically related words from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm of false memories. In an orientation phase, participants either perceived word pairs or had to voluntarily imagine the second word of a word pair. In a test phase, participants viewed words and had to judge whether the paired word was previously perceived, imagined, or new. Results revealed an interaction between memory source and judgment type on both response rates and confidence judgments: reality monitoring was better for new and perceived (compared to imagined) sources, and participants often incorrectly reported imagined experiences to be perceived. Individuals exhibited similar confidence between correct imagined source judgments and incorrect imagined sources reported to be perceived. Modeling results indicated that the observed judgments were likely due to an externalizing bias (i.e., a bias to judge the memory source as perceived). Additionally, we found that overall metacognitive ability was best in the perceived source. Together, these results reveal a source-dependent effect on response rates and confidence ratings, and provide evidence that observers are surprisingly prone to externalizing biases when monitoring their own memories.

A dual process model of spontaneous conscious thought

In the present article, I review theory and evidence on the psychological mechanisms of mind wandering, paying special attention to its relation with executive control. I then suggest applying a dual-process framework (i.e., automatic vs. controlled processing) to mind wandering and goal-directed thought. I present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of the view that mind wandering is based on automatic processing, also considering its relation to the concept of working memory. After that, I outline three scenarios for an interplay between mind wandering and goal-directed thought during task performance (parallel automatic processing, off-task thought substituting on-task thought, and non-disruptive mind wandering during controlled processing) and address the ways in which the mind-wandering and focused-attention spells can terminate. Throughout the article, I formulate empirical predictions. In conclusion, I discuss how automatic and controlled processing may be balanced in human conscious cognition.

To be or not to be hallucinating: Implications of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and lucid dreaming for brain disorders

The boundaries between waking and sleeping-when falling asleep (hypnagogic) or waking up (hypnopompic)-can be challenging for our ability to monitor and interpret reality. Without proper understanding, bizarre but relatively normal hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences can be misinterpreted as psychotic hallucinations (occurring, by definition, in the fully awake state), potentially leading to stigma and misdiagnosis in clinical contexts and to misconception and bias in research contexts. This Perspective proposes that conceptual and practical understanding for differentiating hallucinations from hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences may be offered by lucid dreaming, the state in which one is aware of dreaming while sleeping. I first introduce a possible systematization of the phenomenological range of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences that can occur in the transition from awake to REM dreaming (including hypnagogic perceptions, transition symptoms, sleep paralysis, false awakenings, and out-of-body experiences). I then outline how metacognitive strategies used by lucid dreamers to gain/confirm oneiric lucidity could be tested for better differentiating hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences from hallucinations. The relevance of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and lucid dreaming is analyzed for schizophrenia and narcolepsy, and discussed for neurodegenerative diseases, particularly Lewy-body disorders (i.e. Parkinson's disease, Parkinson's disease dementia, and dementia with Lewy bodies), offering testable hypotheses for empirical investigation. Finally, emotionally positive lucid dreams triggered or enhanced by training/induction strategies or by a pathological process may have intrinsic therapeutic value if properly recognized and guided. The overall intention is to raise awareness and foster further research about the possible diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic implications of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and lucid dreaming for brain disorders.

Explanatory power by vagueness. Challenges to the strong prior hypothesis on hallucinations exemplified by the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome

Predictive processing models are often ascribed a certain generality in conceptually unifying the relationships between perception, action, and cognition or the potential to posit a 'grand unified theory' of the mind. The limitations of this unification can be seen when these models are applied to specific cognitive phenomena or phenomenal consciousness. Our article discusses these shortcomings for predictive processing models of hallucinations by the example of the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. This case study shows that the current predictive processing account omits essential characteristics of stimulus-independent perception in general, which has critical phenomenological implications. We argue that the most popular predictive processing model of hallucinatory conditions - the strong prior hypothesis - fails to fully account for the characteristics of nonveridical perceptual experiences associated with Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. To fill this explanatory gap, we propose that the strong prior hypothesis needs to include reality monitoring to apply to more than just veridical percepts.

The noise in our brain: A systematic review and meta-analysis of neuroimaging and signal-detection studies on source monitoring in psychosis

OBJECTIVES

Noisy thoughts or perceptions are characteristics of psychosis (PSY) and, they are deeply related to source monitoring (SM) - the ability to discriminate the origin of internal/external experiences.

METHODS

This MOOSE, PRISMA-compliant meta-analysis compared SM performances in PSY compared to healthy controls (HC) focusing on signal-to-noise discrimination in order to: i) test whether neuroimaging procedures (fMRI/EEG) might be a group-specific source of noise for SM; ii) compare error- and accuracy-based indexes; iii) to meta-analyze signal-detection measures (i.e., discrimination index and response bias); iv) to determine the best index capturing SM deficits in psychosis. We conducted a 3-level meta-analysis for each aim to estimate pooled effect-sizes (Cohen's d). SM type, source discrimination and stimulus modality were used as meta-regressors. Heterogeneity (I2), publication bias (Egger's test) and multiple comparisons (Bonferroni correction) were considered.

RESULTS

Sixteen neuroimaging, 44 error/accuracy-based behavioral and 7 signal-detection trials were included (2297 PSY, age range = 18.78-52.6; 1745 HC, age range = 21.1-53.3). The noise generated by neuroimaging procedures slightly influenced error, but not accuracy. Accuracy-based (d = -0.83), but not error-based, indexes showed significant and large SM impairments in PSY compared to HC. Overall SM performance differences between PSY and HC were larger in discrimination index (d = -0.65) and accuracy (d = -0.61), followed by response bias (d = -0.59, ns) and error-based (d = 0.35) indexes.

CONCLUSION

Although both accuracy and discrimination indexes differentiate patients with PSY from HC, discrimination index is more reliable and may better capture the bi-directional nature of the internal/external source confusion.

From neural noise to co-adaptability: Rethinking the multifaceted architecture of motor variability

In the last decade, the source and the functional meaning of motor variability have attracted considerable attention in behavioral and brain sciences. This construct classically combined different levels of description, variable internal robustness or coherence, and multifaceted operational meanings. We provide here a comprehensive review of the literature with the primary aim of building a precise lexicon that goes beyond the generic and monolithic use of motor variability. In the pars destruens of the work, we model three domains of motor variability related to peculiar computational elements that influence fluctuations in motor outputs. Each domain is in turn characterized by multiple sub-domains. We begin with the domains of noise and differentiation. However, the main contribution of our model concerns the domain of adaptability, which refers to variation within the same exact motor representation. In particular, we use the terms learning and (social)fitting to specify the portions of motor variability that depend on our propensity to learn and on our largely constitutive propensity to be influenced by external factors. A particular focus is on motor variability in the context of the sub-domain named co-adaptability. Further groundbreaking challenges arise in the modeling of motor variability. Therefore, in a separate pars construens, we attempt to characterize these challenges, addressing both theoretical and experimental aspects as well as potential clinical implications for neurorehabilitation. All in all, our work suggests that motor variability is neither simply detrimental nor beneficial, and that studying its fluctuations can provide meaningful insights for future research.

Introspective inference counteracts perceptual distortion

Introspective agents can recognize the extent to which their internal perceptual experiences deviate from the actual states of the external world. This ability, also known as insight, is critically required for reality testing and is impaired in psychosis, yet little is known about its cognitive underpinnings. We develop a Bayesian modeling framework and a psychophysics paradigm to quantitatively characterize this type of insight while people experience a motion after-effect illusion. People can incorporate knowledge about the illusion into their decisions when judging the actual direction of a motion stimulus, compensating for the illusion (and often overcompensating). Furthermore, confidence, reaction-time, and pupil-dilation data all show signatures consistent with inferential adjustments in the Bayesian insight model. Our results suggest that people can question the veracity of what they see by making insightful inferences that incorporate introspective knowledge about internal distortions.

Expectation Cues and False Percepts Generate Stimulus-Specific Activity in Distinct Layers of the Early Visual Cortex

Perception has been proposed to result from the integration of feedforward sensory signals with internally generated feedback signals. Feedback signals are believed to play an important role in driving false percepts, that is, seeing things that are not actually there. Feedforward and feedback influences on perception can be studied using layer-specific fMRI, which we used here to interrogate neural activity underlying high-confidence false percepts while healthy human participants (N = 25, male and female) performed a perceptual orientation discrimination task. Auditory cues implicitly signaled the most likely upcoming orientation (referred to here as expectations). These expectations induced orientation-specific templates in the deep and superficial layers of V2, without affecting perception. In contrast, the orientation of falsely perceived stimuli with high confidence was reflected in the middle input layers of V2, suggesting a feedforward signal contributing to false percepts. The prevalence of high-confidence false percepts was related to everyday hallucination severity in a separate online sample (N = 100), suggesting a possible link with abnormal perceptual experiences. These results reveal a potential feedforward mechanism underlying false percepts, reflected by spontaneous stimulus-like activity in the input layers of the visual cortex, independent of top-down signals reflecting cued orientations.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT False percepts have been suggested to arise through excessive feedback signals. However, feedforward contributions to false percepts have remained largely understudied. Laminar fMRI has been shown to be useful in distinguishing feedforward from feedback activity as it allows the imaging of different cortical layers. In the present study we demonstrate that although cued orientations are encoded in the feedback layers of the visual cortex, the content of the false percepts are encoded in the feedforward layers and did not rely on these cued orientations. This shows that false percepts can in principle emerge from random feedforward signals in the visual cortex, with possible implications for disorders hallmarked by hallucinations like schizophrenia and Parkinson's disease.

Spatiotemporal dynamics of self-generated imagery reveal a reverse cortical hierarchy from cue-induced imagery

Visual imagery allows for the construction of rich internal experience in our mental world. However, it has remained poorly understood how imagery experience derives volitionally as opposed to being cue driven. Here, using electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging, we systematically investigate the spatiotemporal dynamics of self-generated imagery by having participants volitionally imagining one of the orientations from a learned pool. We contrast self-generated imagery with cue-induced imagery, where participants imagined line orientations based on associative cues acquired previously. Our results reveal overlapping neural signatures of cue-induced and self-generated imagery. Yet, these neural signatures display substantially differential sensitivities to the two types of imagery: self-generated imagery is supported by an enhanced involvement of the anterior cortex in representing imagery contents. By contrast, cue-induced imagery is supported by enhanced imagery representations in the posterior visual cortex. These results jointly support a reverse cortical hierarchy in generating and maintaining imagery contents in self-generated versus externally cued imagery.

Metacognitive awareness in the sound-induced flash illusion

Hundreds (if not thousands) of multisensory studies provide evidence that the human brain can integrate temporally and spatially discrepant stimuli from distinct modalities into a singular event. This process of multisensory integration is usually portrayed in the scientific literature as contributing to our integrated, coherent perceptual reality. However, missing from this account is an answer to a simple question: how do confidence judgements compare between multisensory information that is integrated across multiple sources, and multisensory information that comes from a single, congruent source in the environment? In this paper, we use the sound-induced flash illusion to investigate if confidence judgements are similar across multisensory conditions when the numbers of auditory and visual events are the same, and the numbers of auditory and visual events are different. Results showed that congruent audiovisual stimuli produced higher confidence than incongruent audiovisual stimuli, even when the perceptual report was matched across the two conditions. Integrating these behavioural findings with recent neuroimaging and theoretical work, we discuss the role that prefrontal cortex may play in metacognition, multisensory causal inference and sensory source monitoring in general. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Neural Representations in Visual and Parietal Cortex Differentiate between Imagined, Perceived, and Illusory Experiences

Humans constantly receive massive amounts of information, both perceived from the external environment and imagined from the internal world. To function properly, the brain needs to correctly identify the origin of information being processed. Recent work has suggested common neural substrates for perception and imagery. However, it has remained unclear how the brain differentiates between external and internal experiences with shared neural codes. Here we tested this question in human participants (male and female) by systematically investigating the neural processes underlying the generation and maintenance of visual information from voluntary imagery, veridical perception, and illusion. The inclusion of illusion allowed us to differentiate between objective and subjective internality: while illusion has an objectively internal origin and can be viewed as involuntary imagery, it is also subjectively perceived as having an external origin like perception. Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, we observed superior orientation representations in parietal cortex during imagery compared with perception, and conversely in early visual cortex. This imagery dominance gradually developed along a posterior-to-anterior cortical hierarchy from early visual to parietal cortex, emerged in the early epoch of imagery and sustained into the delay epoch, and persisted across varied imagined contents. Moreover, representational strength of illusion was more comparable to imagery in early visual cortex, but more comparable to perception in parietal cortex, suggesting content-specific representations in parietal cortex differentiate between subjectively internal and external experiences, as opposed to early visual cortex. These findings together support a domain-general engagement of parietal cortex in internally generated experience.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does the brain differentiate between imagined and perceived experiences? Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, the current study revealed enhanced stimulus-specific representations in visual imagery originating from parietal cortex, supporting the subjective experience of imagery. This neural principle was further validated by evidence from visual illusion, wherein illusion resembled perception and imagery at different levels of cortical hierarchy. Our findings provide direct evidence for the critical role of parietal cortex as a domain-general region for content-specific imagery, and offer new insights into the neural mechanisms underlying the differentiation between subjectively internal and external experiences.

The neural signature of reality-monitoring: A meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies

Distinguishing imagination and thoughts from information we perceived from the environment, a process called reality-monitoring, is important in everyday situations. Although reality monitoring seems to overlap with the concept of self-monitoring, which allows one to distinguish self-generated actions or thoughts from those generated by others, the two concepts remain largely separate cognitive domains and their common brain substrates have received little attention. We investigated the brain regions involved in these two cognitive processes and explored the common brain regions they share. To do this, we conducted two separate coordinate-based meta-analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging studies assessing the brain regions involved in reality- and self-monitoring. Few brain regions survived threshold-free cluster enhancement family-wise multiple comparison correction (p < .05), likely owing to the small number of studies identified. Using uncorrected statistical thresholds recommended by Signed Differential Mapping with Permutation of Subject Images, the meta-analysis of reality-monitoring studies (k = 9 studies including 172 healthy subjects) revealed clusters in the lobule VI of the cerebellum, the right anterior medial prefrontal cortex and anterior thalamic projections. The meta-analysis of self-monitoring studies (k = 12 studies including 192 healthy subjects) highlighted the involvement of a set of brain regions including the lobule VI of the left cerebellum and fronto-temporo-parietal regions. We showed with a conjunction analysis that the lobule VI of the cerebellum was consistently engaged in both reality- and self-monitoring. The current findings offer new insights into the common brain regions underlying reality-monitoring and self-monitoring, and suggest that the neural signature of the self that may occur during self-production should persist in memories.

The moderating effect of cognitive impairment on the relationship between inner speech and auditory verbal hallucinations among chronic patients with schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Even though there is an increasing amount of evidence from behavioral and neuroimaging studies to suggest that pathological inner speech plays a role in the emergence of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), studies investigating the mechanisms underlying this relationship are rather scarce. Examining moderators might inform the development of new treatment options for AVH. We sought to extend the existing knowledge by testing the moderating role of cognitive impairment in the association between inner speech and hallucinations in a sample of Lebanese patients with schizophrenia.

METHODS

A cross-sectional study was conducted from May till August 2022, enrolling 189 chronic patients.

RESULTS

Moderation analysis revealed that, after controlling for delusions, the interaction of experiencing voices of other people in inner speech by cognitive performance was significantly associated with AVH. In people having low (Beta = 0.69; t = 5.048; p < .001) and moderate (Beta = 0.45; t = 4.096; p < .001) cognitive performance, the presence of voices of other people in inner speech was significantly associated with more hallucinations. This association was not significant in patients with high cognitive function (Beta = 0.21; t = 1.417; p = .158).

CONCLUSION

This preliminarily study suggests that interventions aiming at improving cognitive performance may also have a beneficial effect in reducing hallucinations in schizophrenia.

Omission responses in local field potentials in rat auditory cortex

BACKGROUND

Non-invasive recordings of gross neural activity in humans often show responses to omitted stimuli in steady trains of identical stimuli. This has been taken as evidence for the neural coding of prediction or prediction error. However, evidence for such omission responses from invasive recordings of cellular-scale responses in animal models is scarce. Here, we sought to characterise omission responses using extracellular recordings in the auditory cortex of anaesthetised rats. We profiled omission responses across local field potentials (LFP), analogue multiunit activity (AMUA), and single/multi-unit spiking activity, using stimuli that were fixed-rate trains of acoustic noise bursts where 5% of bursts were randomly omitted.

RESULTS

Significant omission responses were observed in LFP and AMUA signals, but not in spiking activity. These omission responses had a lower amplitude and longer latency than burst-evoked sensory responses, and omission response amplitude increased as a function of the number of preceding bursts.

CONCLUSIONS

Together, our findings show that omission responses are most robustly observed in LFP and AMUA signals (relative to spiking activity). This has implications for models of cortical processing that require many neurons to encode prediction errors in their spike output.

Neurocognitive bases of self-monitoring of inner speech in hallucination prone individuals

Verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia patients might be seen as internal verbal productions mistaken for perceptions as a result of over-salient inner speech and/or defective self-monitoring processes. Similar cognitive mechanisms might underpin verbal hallucination proneness in the general population. We investigated, in a non-clinical sample, the cerebral activity associated with verbal hallucinatory predisposition during false recognition of familiar words -assumed to stem from poor monitoring of inner speech-vs. uncommon words. Thirty-seven healthy participants underwent a verbal recognition task. High- and low-frequency words were presented outside the scanner. In the scanner, the participants were then required to recognize the target words among equivalent distractors. Results showed that verbal hallucination proneness was associated with higher rates of false recognition of high-frequency words. It was further associated with activation of language and decisional brain areas during false recognitions of low-, but not high-, frequency words, and with activation of a recollective brain area during correct recognitions of low-, but not high-, frequency words. The increased tendency to report familiar words as targets, along with a lack of activation of the language, recollective, and decisional brain areas necessary for their judgement, suggests failure in the self-monitoring of inner speech in verbal hallucination-prone individuals.

Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination

Humans are voracious imaginers, with internal simulations supporting memory, planning and decision-making. Because the neural mechanisms supporting imagery overlap with those supporting perception, a foundational question is how reality and imagination are kept apart. One possibility is that the intention to imagine is used to identify and discount self-generated signals during imagery. Alternatively, because internally generated signals are generally weaker, sensory strength is used to index reality. Traditional psychology experiments struggle to investigate this issue as subjects can rapidly learn that real stimuli are in play. Here, we combined one-trial-per-participant psychophysics with computational modelling and neuroimaging to show that imagined and perceived signals are in fact intermixed, with judgments of reality being determined by whether this intermixed signal is strong enough to cross a reality threshold. A consequence of this account is that when virtual or imagined signals are strong enough, they become subjectively indistinguishable from reality.

Imagining the future self through thought experiments

The ability of the mind to conceptualize what is not present is essential. It allows us to reason counterfactually about what might have happened had events unfolded differently or had another course of action been taken. It allows us to think about what might happen - to perform 'Gedankenexperimente' (thought experiments) - before we act. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms mediating this ability are poorly understood. We suggest that the frontopolar cortex (FPC) keeps track of and evaluates alternative choices (what we might have done), whereas the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC) compares simulations of possible future scenarios (what we might do) and evaluates their reward values. Together, these brain regions support the construction of suppositional scenarios.

Comparative effects of hypnotic suggestion and imagery instruction on bodily awareness

Bodily awareness is informed by both sensory data and prior knowledge. Although misleading sensory signals have been repeatedly shown to affect bodily awareness, only scant attention has been given to the influence of cognitive variables. Hypnotic suggestion has recently been shown to impact visuospatial and sensorimotor representations of body-part size although the mechanisms subserving this effect are yet to be identified. Mental imagery might play a causal or facilitative role in this effect, as it has been shown to influence body awareness in previous studies. Nonetheless, current views ascribe only an epiphenomenal role to imagery in the implementation of hypnotic suggestions. This study compared the effects of hypnotic suggestion and imagery instruction for influencing the visuospatial and sensorimotor aspects of body-size representation. Both experimental manipulations produced significant increases (elongation) in both representations compared to baseline, although the effects were larger in the hypnotic suggestion condition. The effects of both manipulations were highly correlated across participants, suggesting overlapping mechanisms. Self-reports suggested that the use of voluntary imagery did not significantly contribute to the efficacy of either manipulation. Rather, top-down effects on body representations seem to be partly driven by response expectancies, spontaneous imagery, and hypnotic suggestibility in both conditions. These results are in line with current theories of suggestion and raise fundamental questions regarding the mechanisms driving the influence of cognition on body representations.

Using Extended Reality to Study the Experience of Presence

Extended reality (XR), encompassing various forms of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR), has become a powerful experimental tool in consciousness research due to its capability to create holistic and immersive experiences of oneself and surrounding environments through simulation. One hallmark of a successful XR experience is when it elicits a strong sense of presence, which can be thought of as a subjective sense of reality of the self and the world. Although XR research has shed light on many factors that may influence presence (or its absence) in XR environments, there remains much to be discovered about the detailed and diverse phenomenology of presence, and the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie it. In this chapter, we analyse the concept of presence and relate it to the way in which humans may generate and maintain a stable sense of reality during both natural perception and virtual experiences. We start by reviewing the concept of presence as developed in XR research, covering both factors that may influence presence and potential ways of measuring presence. We then discuss the phenomenological characteristics of presence in human consciousness, drawing on clinical examples where presence is disturbed. Next, we describe two experiments using XR that investigated the effects of sensorimotor contingency and affordances on a specific form of presence related to the sense of objects as really existing in the world, referred to as 'objecthood'. We then go beyond perceptual presence to discuss the concept of 'conviction about reality', which corresponds to people's beliefs about the reality status of their perceptual experiences. We finish by exploring how the novel XR method of 'Substitutional Reality' can allow experimental investigation of these topics, opening new experimental directions for studying presence beyond the 'as-if' experience of fully simulated environments.

Neural Mechanisms and Psychology of Psychedelic Ego Dissolution

Neuroimaging studies of psychedelics have advanced our understanding of hierarchical brain organization and the mechanisms underlying their subjective and therapeutic effects. The primary mechanism of action of classic psychedelics is binding to serotonergic 5-HT2A receptors. Agonist activity at these receptors leads to neuromodulatory changes in synaptic efficacy that can have a profound effect on hierarchical message-passing in the brain. Here, we review the cognitive and neuroimaging evidence for the effects of psychedelics: in particular, their influence on selfhood and subject-object boundaries-known as ego dissolution-surmised to underwrite their subjective and therapeutic effects. Agonism of 5-HT2A receptors, located at the apex of the cortical hierarchy, may have a particularly powerful effect on sentience and consciousness. These effects can endure well after the pharmacological half-life, suggesting that psychedelics may have effects on neural plasticity that may play a role in their therapeutic efficacy. Psychologically, this may be accompanied by a disarming of ego resistance that increases the repertoire of perceptual hypotheses and affords alternate pathways for thought and behavior, including those that undergird selfhood. We consider the interaction between serotonergic neuromodulation and sentience through the lens of hierarchical predictive coding, which speaks to the value of psychedelics in understanding how we make sense of the world and specific predictions about effective connectivity in cortical hierarchies that can be tested using functional neuroimaging. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Classic psychedelics bind to serotonergic 5-HT2A receptors. Their agonist activity at these receptors leads to neuromodulatory changes in synaptic efficacy, resulting in a profound effect on information processing in the brain. Here, we synthesize an abundance of brain imaging research with pharmacological and psychological interpretations informed by the framework of predictive coding. Moreover, predictive coding is suggested to offer more sophisticated interpretations of neuroimaging findings by bridging the role between the 5-HT2A receptors and large-scale brain networks.

Organizational Neuroscience of Industrial Adaptive Behavior

Organizational neuroscience is recognized in organizational behavior literature as offering an interpretive framework that can shed new light on existing organizational challenges. In this paper, findings from neuroscience studies concerned with adaptive behavior for ecological fitness are applied to explore industrial adaptive behavior. This is important because many companies are not able to manage dynamics between adaptability and stability. The reported analysis relates business-to-business signaling in competitive environments to three levels of inference. In accordance with neuroscience studies concerned with adaptive behavior, trade-offs between complexity and accuracy in business-to-business signaling and inference are explained. In addition, signaling and inference are related to risks and ambiguities in competitive industrial markets. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive analysis of industrial adaptive behavior in terms of relevant neuroscience constructs. In doing so, the paper makes a contribution to the field of organizational neuroscience, and to research concerned with industrial adaptive behavior. The reported analysis is relevant to organizational adaptive behavior that involves combining human intelligence and artificial intelligence.

Imagery adds stimulus-specific sensory evidence to perceptual detection

Internally generated imagery and externally triggered perception rely on overlapping sensory processes. This overlap poses a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: determining whether sensory signals reflect reality or imagination. In this study, we used psychophysics to investigate how imagery and perception interact to determine visual experience. Participants were instructed to detect oriented gratings that gradually appeared in noise while simultaneously either imagining the same grating, a grating perpendicular to the to-be-detected grating, or nothing. We found that, compared to both incongruent imagery and no imagery, congruent imagery caused a leftward shift of the psychometric function relating stimulus contrast to perceptual threshold. We discuss how this effect can best be explained by a model in which imagery adds sensory signal to the perceptual input, thereby increasing the visibility of perceived stimuli. These results suggest that, in contrast to changes in sensory signals caused by self-generated movement, the brain does not discount the influence of self-generated sensory signals on perception.