The elephant in the room: What matters cognitively in cumulative technological culture

Shaping the physical world to our ends through the left PF technical-cognition area

Our propensity to materiality, which consists in using, making, creating, and passing on technologies, has enabled us to shape the physical world according to our ends. To explain this proclivity, scientists have calibrated their lens to either low-level skills such as motor cognition or high-level skills such as language or social cognition. Yet, little has been said about the intermediate-level cognitive processes that are directly involved in mastering this materiality, that is, technical cognition. We aim to focus on this intermediate level for providing new insights into the neurocognitive bases of human materiality. Here, we show that a technical-reasoning process might be specifically at work in physical problem-solving situations. We found via two distinct neuroimaging studies that the area PF (parietal F) within the left parietal lobe is central for this reasoning process in both tool-use and non-tool-use physical problem-solving and can work along with social-cognitive skills to resolve day-to-day interactions that combine social and physical constraints. Our results demonstrate the existence of a specific cognitive module in the human brain dedicated to materiality, which might be the supporting pillar allowing the accumulation of technical knowledge over generations. Intensifying research on technical cognition could nurture a comprehensive framework that has been missing in fields interested in how early and modern humans have been interacting with the physical world through technology, and how this interaction has shaped our history and culture.

Beware of physiology: Anthropomorphism as a simplification mechanism for mastering complex human-machine interfaces

Humans' remarkable technical reasoning skills have led to the development of increasingly sophisticated tools. In particular, society has welcomed the advent and democratization of machines that produce effects through indirect causal chains. Intuitively, perfect mastery of such systems should require a detailed understanding of their underlying processes. This raises the question of the boundaries of human cognitive abilities in the context of tool use. In other words, can the human brain integrate the characteristics of any tool, or are there inherent limitations? The present study investigates the potential limits of human tool-use when faced with a complex human-machine interface. To this end, professional helicopter pilots conducted realistic flights in a high-fidelity helicopter simulator. A comprehensive analysis was then conducted on the flight trajectories, the directions of movement of their primary flight command, and the tilt of their head as a function of the aircraft's tilt in the roll plane. Our findings suggest that helicopter pilots severely restrict the capabilities of their aircraft. This simplification mechanism confines the operational range of the helicopter to conditions that elicit sensory inputs comparable to those experienced in everyday life. Our results further indicate some level of prediction regarding the sensory consequences of the motor-to-mechanical transformations. In sum, we postulate that control over complex human-machine interfaces is achieved by simplification through anthropomorphism in order to facilitate sensorimotor integration. These considerations have implications for the design of human-machine interfaces and raise safety concerns when interacting with highly sophisticated systems.

The technical-reasoning network is recruited when people observe others make or teach how to make tools: An fMRI study

Cumulative technological culture is defined as the increase in efficiency and complexity of tools over generations. The role of social cognitive skills in cultural transmission has been long acknowledged. However, recent accounts emphasized the importance of non-social cognitive skills during the social transmission of technical content with a focus on technical reasoning. Here, we contribute to this double process approach by reporting an fMRI study about the neurocognitive origins of social learning. Participants watched videos depicting tool-making episodes in three social-learning conditions: reverse engineering, observation, and teaching. Our results showed that the technical-reasoning network, centered around the area PF of the left inferior parietal cortex, was preferentially activated when watching tool-making episodes. Additionally, teaching elicited the right middle temporal gyrus. This study suggests that technical reasoning underpins technological culture, while social cognition enhances learners' technical reasoning by guiding attention to key aspects of the technology.

Do institutions evolve like material technologies?

Norms and institutions enable large-scale human cooperation by creating shared expectations and changing individuals' incentives via monitoring or sanctioning. Like material technologies, these social technologies satisfy instrumental ends and solve difficult problems. However, the similarities and differences between the evolution of material technologies and the evolution of social technologies remain unresolved. Here, we review evidence suggesting that, compared to the evolution of material technologies, institutional and normative evolution exhibits constraints in the production of variation and the selection of useful variants. These constraints stem from the frequency-dependent nature of social technologies and limit the pace and scope of normative and institutional evolution. We conclude by reviewing research on the social transmission of institutions and norms and highlighting an experimental paradigm to study their cultural evolution.

Human socio-technical evolution through the lens of an abstracted-wheel experiment: A critical look at a micro-society laboratory study

Micro-society experimental setups are increasingly used to infer aspects of human behavioural evolution. A key part of human society today is our dependence on, and use of, technology-whether simple (such as a knife) or complex (such as the technology that underpins AI). Previously, two groups of researchers used an abstracted-wheel experiment to explore the evolution of human technical behaviour, reaching fundamentally different outcomes. Whereas one group saw their results as indicating social learning only (void of causal understanding), the other inferred non-social technical reasoning as part of human technical behaviour. Here we report on the third generation of the micro-society abstracted-wheel experiment. We argue that causal reasoning is inseparable from both social learning and technical reasoning, and that these traits probably co-evolved into the current human socio-technical niche. Based on our outcomes, we present a critical assessment of what this experiment may (or may not) reveal about the evolution of human technical behaviour. We show that the abstracted-wheel experiment reflects behavioural output only, instead of testing for cognition. It is therefore limited in its ability to inform on aspects of human cognitive evolution, but it can provide useful insights into the interrelatedness of social learning, technical reasoning, and causal reasoning. Such a co-evolutionary insight has the potential to inform on aspects of human socio-technical evolution throughout the Pleistocene.

Martinez L, Criado-Boado F, Müeller J, Clark A. A computational approach to selective attention in embodied approaches to cognitive archaeology

This article proposes a novel computational approach to embodied approaches in cognitive archaeology called computational cognitive archaeology (CCA). We argue that cognitive archaeology, understood as the study of the human mind based on archaeological findings such as artefacts and material remains excavated and interpreted in the present, can benefit from the integration of novel methods in computational neuroscience interested in modelling the way the brain, the body and the environment are coupled and parameterized to allow for adaptive behaviour. We discuss the kind of tasks that CCA may engage in with a narrative example of how one can model the cumulative cultural evolution of the material and cognitive components of technologies, focusing on the case of knapping technology. This article thus provides a novel theoretical framework to formalize research in cognitive archaeology using recent developments in computational neuroscience.

Group Coordination Catalyzes Individual and Cultural Intelligence

A large program of research has aimed to ground large-scale cultural phenomena in processes taking place within individual minds. For example, investigating whether individual agents equipped with the right social learning strategies can enable cumulative cultural evolution given long enough time horizons. However, this approach often omits the critical group-level processes that mediate between individual agents and multi-generational societies. Here, we argue that interacting groups are a necessary and explanatory level of analysis, linking individual and collective intelligence through two characteristic feedback loops. In the first loop, more sophisticated individual-level social learning mechanisms based on Theory of Mind facilitate group-level complementarity, allowing distributed knowledge to be compositionally recombined in groups; these group-level innovations, in turn, ease the cognitive load on individuals. In the second loop, societal-level processes of cumulative culture provide groups with new cognitive technologies, including shared language and conceptual abstractions, which set in motion new group-level processes to further coordinate, recombine, and innovate. Taken together, these cycles establish group-level interaction as a dual engine of intelligence, catalyzing both individual cognition and cumulative culture.

The diversity of possible constitutive components in cognitive neurosciences

I aim to discuss which constitutive components are essential for explaining how the mind works. Rather than focusing on some specific components, I emphasize their diversity. Thus, I seek to complement the recent mechanistic proposal by underscoring that researchers should remain open-minded about which constitutive components should be investigated.

Forward effects from action observation: the role of attentional focus

After viewing an image representing an action on an object, we recognize the forward states of the seen action faster than the backward states. The present study exploits a variant of a new experimental paradigm to investigate cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect. Participants viewed a series of still photos of unfolding actions on objects, each followed by a photo depicting either one of three (instead of two of the original paradigm) different and temporally distant moments after the image or one moment before the image, along with photos of different actions. Experiment 1 revealed the classical forward effects in this new context: when the task was to judge whether the action in the second photo was the same as in the first photo, evaluations were faster for all forward photos than for backward photos. In Experiment 2, we examined the role of participants' attention to the object alongside the role of attention to action kinematics in triggering these "forward effects" by manipulating participants' attentional focus. As the results showed, evaluations were faster for all forward photos when the focus was on the action kinematics, but when the focus was on the object, evaluations were faster only for the last forward photo showing the final action state. These results seem to suggest that focusing on the object triggers a representation of the action goal and thus modulates the mental simulation underlying action anticipation.

Flexible Cultural Learning Through Action Coordination

The cultural transmission of technical know-how has proven vital to the success of our species. The broad diversity of learning contexts and social configurations, as well as the various kinds of coordinated interactions they involve, speaks to our capacity to flexibly adapt to and succeed in transmitting vital knowledge in various learning contexts. Although often recognized by ethnographers, the flexibility of cultural learning has so far received little attention in terms of cognitive mechanisms. We argue that a key feature of the flexibility of cultural learning is that both the models and learners recruit cognitive mechanisms of action coordination to modulate their behavior contingently on the behavior of their partner, generating a process of mutual adaptation supporting the successful transmission of technical skills in diverse and fluctuating learning environments. We propose that the study of cultural learning would benefit from the experimental methods, results, and insights of joint-action research and, complementarily, that the field of joint-action research could expand its scope by integrating a learning and cultural dimension. Bringing these two fields of research together promises to enrich our understanding of cultural learning, its contextual flexibility, and joint action coordination.

Infants' understanding of the causal power of agents and tools

Tools are objects that are manipulated by agents with the intention to cause an effect in the world. We show that the cognitive capacity to understand tools is present in young infants, even if these tools produce arbitrary, causally opaque effects. In experiments 1-2, we used pupillometry to show that 8-mo-old infants infer an invisible causal contact to account for the-otherwise unexplained-motion of a ball. In experiments 3, we probed 8-mo-old infants' account of a state change event (flickering of a cube) that lies outside of the explanatory power of intuitive physics. Infants repeatedly watched an intentional agent launch a ball behind an occluder. After a short delay, a cube, positioned at the other end of the occluder began flickering. Rare unoccluded events served to probe infants' representation of what happened behind the occluder. Infants exhibited larger pupil dilation, signaling more surprise, when the ball stopped before touching the cube, than when it contacted the cube, suggesting that infants inferred that the cause of the state change was contact between the ball and the cube. This effect was canceled in experiment 4, when an inanimate sphere replaced the intentional agent. Altogether, results suggest that, in the infants' eyes, a ball (an inanimate object) has the power to cause an arbitrary state change, but only if it inherits this power from an intentional agent. Eight-month-olds are thus capable of representing complex event structures, involving an intentional agent causing a change with a tool.

Tool mastering today - an interdisciplinary perspective

Tools have coined human life, living conditions, and culture. Recognizing the cognitive architecture underlying tool use would allow us to comprehend its evolution, development, and physiological basis. However, the cognitive underpinnings of tool mastering remain little understood in spite of long-time research in neuroscientific, psychological, behavioral and technological fields. Moreover, the recent transition of tool use to the digital domain poses new challenges for explaining the underlying processes. In this interdisciplinary review, we propose three building blocks of tool mastering: (A) perceptual and motor abilities integrate to tool manipulation knowledge, (B) perceptual and cognitive abilities to functional tool knowledge, and (C) motor and cognitive abilities to means-end knowledge about tool use. This framework allows for integrating and structuring research findings and theoretical assumptions regarding the functional architecture of tool mastering via behavior in humans and non-human primates, brain networks, as well as computational and robotic models. An interdisciplinary perspective also helps to identify open questions and to inspire innovative research approaches. The framework can be applied to studies on the transition from classical to modern, non-mechanical tools and from analogue to digital user-tool interactions in virtual reality, which come with increased functional opacity and sensorimotor decoupling between tool user, tool, and target. By working towards an integrative theory on the cognitive architecture of the use of tools and technological assistants, this review aims at stimulating future interdisciplinary research avenues.

Tool use acquisition induces a multifunctional interference effect during object processing: evidence from the sensorimotor mu rhythm

A fundamental characteristic of human development is acquiring and accumulating tool use knowledge through observation and sensorimotor experience. Recent studies showed that, in children and adults, different action possibilities to grasp-to-move and grasp-to-use objects generate a conflict that extinguishes neural motor resonance phenomena during visual object processing. In this study, a training protocol coupled with EEG recordings was administered in virtual reality to healthy adults to evaluate whether a similar conflict occurs between novel tool use knowledge. Participants perceived and manipulated two novel 3D tools trained beforehand with either single or double-usage. A weaker reduction of mu-band (10-13 Hz) power, accompanied by a reduced inter-trial phase coherence, was recorded during the perception of the tool associated with the double-usage. These effects started within the first 200 ms of visual object processing and were predominantly recorded over the left motor system. Furthermore, interacting with the double usage tool delayed grasp-to-reach movements. The results highlight a multifunctional interference effect, such as tool use acquisition reduces the neural motor resonance phenomenon and inhibits the activation of the motor system during subsequent object recognition. These results imply that learned tool use information guides sensorimotor processes of objects.

Capuchin monkeys learn to use information equally well from individual exploration and social demonstration

The limited evidence of complex culture in non-human primates contrasts strikingly with human behaviour. This may be because non-human primates fail to use information acquired socially as effectively as they use information acquired individually. Here, monkeys were trained on a stimulus discrimination task with a win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) reward structure. In a social learning condition, the experimenter performed an information trial by choosing between the available stimuli; in an individual condition, monkeys made this choice themselves. The monkeys' subsequent test trials displayed the same stimulus array. They were rewarded for repetition of rewarded ('win-stay') and avoidance of unrewarded ('lose-shift') information trial selections. Nine monkeys reached our pre-determined performance criterion on the initial two-stimulus stage. Their ability to generalise the WSLS strategy was then evaluated by transfer to a three-stimulus stage. Minimal differences were found in information use between the social and individual conditions on two-stimuli. However, a bias was found towards repetition of the information trial, regardless of information source condition or whether the information trial selection was rewarded. Proficient subjects were found to generalise the strategy to three-stimuli following rewarded information trials, but performed at chance on unrewarded. Again, this was not found to vary by source condition. Overall, results suggest no fundamental barrier to non-human primates' use of information from a social source. However, the apparent struggle to learn from the absence of rewards hints at a difficulty with using information acquired from unsuccessful attempts; this could be linked to the limited evidence for cumulative culture in non-human primates.

Neuroplasticity enables bio-cultural feedback in Paleolithic stone-tool making

Stone-tool making is an ancient human skill thought to have played a key role in the bio-cultural co-evolutionary feedback that produced modern brains, culture, and cognition. To test the proposed evolutionary mechanisms underpinning this hypothesis we studied stone-tool making skill learning in modern participants and examined interactions between individual neurostructural differences, plastic accommodation, and culturally transmitted behavior. We found that prior experience with other culturally transmitted craft skills increased both initial stone tool-making performance and subsequent neuroplastic training effects in a frontoparietal white matter pathway associated with action control. These effects were mediated by the effect of experience on pre-training variation in a frontotemporal pathway supporting action semantic representation. Our results show that the acquisition of one technical skill can produce structural brain changes conducive to the discovery and acquisition of additional skills, providing empirical evidence for bio-cultural feedback loops long hypothesized to link learning and adaptive change.

What semantic dementia tells us about the ability to infer others' communicative intentions

As Heintz & Scott-Phillips rightly argued, pragmatics has been too commonly considered as a supplement to linguistic communication. Their aim to reorient the study of cognitive pragmatics as the foundation of many distinctive features of human behavior finds echo in the neuropsychological literature on tool use, in which the investigation of semantic dementia challenges the classical semantics versus pragmatics dissociation.

Cumulative Culture

Abstract: Although the spread of innovations through social learning is well documented in animals, resulting animal cultures have remained simple without an increase in complexity over time. Human culture, in contrast, evolves constantly and is unparalleled in terms of complexity and diversity. Why only human culture is cumulative is the subject of ongoing debates, but the most prevalent suggestions are that animals lack high-fidelity transmission and complex innovations. This article examines how the combination of two factors may have helped humans overcome these limitations: first, our having a big brain, inherited from our great-ape-like ancestors; second, our reliance on extensive allomaternal care that evolved convergently with other cooperatively breeding species. We provide support for this suggestion with recent evidence from cooperatively breeding common marmosets ( Callithrix jacchus), showing that motivation for cooperation can trump intelligence when it comes to solving problems and information transmission to the next generation.

Blind alleys and fruitful pathways in the comparative study of cultural cognition

A mere few decades ago, culture was thought a unique human attribute. Evidence to the contrary accumulated through the latter part of the twentieth century and has exploded in the present one, demonstrating the transmission of traditions through social learning across all principal vertebrate taxa and even invertebrates, notably insects. The scope of human culture is nevertheless highly distinctive. What makes our cultural capacities and their cognitive underpinnings so different? In this article I argue that in behavioural scientists' endeavours to answer this question, fruitful research pathways and their ensuing discoveries have come to exist alongside popular, yet in the light of current empirical evidence, highly questionable scenarios and even scientific blind alleys. I particularly re-evaluate theories that rely on the centrality of a supposed uniquely human capacity for imitative copying in explaining the distinctive capacity for massive cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) in our species. The most extreme versions of this perspective suffer logical incoherence and severe limits on scientific testability. By contrast the field has generated a range of rigorous observational and experimental methodologies that have revealed both long-term cultural fidelity and limited forms of CCE in non-human species. Attention now turns to directly investigating the scope, limits and underlying cognition of non-human versus human CCE, with a broader approach to factors additional to cultural transmission, notably the role of invention, innovation and evolved motivational biases underlying the scope of CCE in the species studied.

The Area Prostriata may play a role in technical reasoning

Most recent research indicated how technical reasoning (TR), namely, a specific form of causal reasoning aimed at understanding the physical world, may support the development of tools and technologies of increasing complexity. We have recently identified the Area PF of the left inferior parietal lobe (PF) as a critical structural correlate of TR, as assessed by using two ad-hoc psycho-technical tests evaluating the two main aspects of TR, i.e., physical world's understanding and visuospatial imagery. Here, we extended our findings by implementing new ad-hoc analyses of our previous data by using a whole-brain approach. Results showed that the cortical thickness (CT) of the left Area Prostriata of the visual cortex, alongside the left Area PF CT, predicts TR performance.

A robust tool kit: First report of tool use in captive crested capuchin monkeys (Sapajus robustus)

Primate tool use is of great interest but has been reported only in a limited number of species. Here we report tool use in crested capuchin monkeys (Sapajus robustus), an almost completely unstudied robust capuchin species. Crested capuchins and their sister species, the yellow-breasted capuchin, diverged from a common ancestor over 2 million years ago, so this study fills a significant gap in understanding of tool use capacity and variation within the robust capuchin monkey radiation. Our study group was a captive population of seven individuals at the Santa Ana Zoo in California. The monkeys were given no prior training, and they were provided with a variety of enrichment items, including materials that could be used as tools as well as hard-to-access resources, for open-ended interactions. In 54 observation hours, monkeys performed eleven tool use actions: digging, hammering, probing, raking, sponging, striking, sweeping, throwing, waving, wedging, and wiping. We observed tool modification, serial tool use, and social learning opportunities, including monkeys' direct observation of tool use and tolerated scrounging of foods obtained through tool use. We also observed significant individual skew in tool use frequency, with one individual using tools daily, and two individuals never using tools during the study. While crested capuchins have never been reported to use tools in the wild, our findings provide evidence for the species' capacity and propensity for tool use, highlighting the urgent need for research on this understudied, endangered primate. By providing detailed data on clearly identified S. robustus individuals, this study marks an effort to counteract the overgeneralization in the captive literature in referring to any robust capuchins of unknown provenance or ancestry as Cebus apella, a practice that obfuscates potential differences among species in tool use performance and repertoire in one of the only species-rich tool-using genera in the world.

The cortical thickness of the area PF of the left inferior parietal cortex mediates technical-reasoning skills

Most recent research highlights how a specific form of causal understanding, namely technical reasoning, may support the increasing complexity of tools and techniques developed by humans over generations, i.e., the cumulative technological culture (CTC). Thus, investigating the neurocognitive foundations of technical reasoning is essential to comprehend the emergence of CTC in our lineage. Whereas functional neuroimaging evidence started to highlight the critical role of the area PF of the left inferior parietal cortex (IPC) in technical reasoning, no studies explored the links between the structural characteristics of such a brain region and technical reasoning skills. Therefore, in this study, we assessed participants’ technical-reasoning performance by using two ad-hoc psycho-technical tests; then, we extracted from participants’ 3 T T1-weighted magnetic-resonance brain images the cortical thickness (i.e., a volume-related measure which is associated with cognitive performance as reflecting the size, density, and arrangement of cells in a brain region) of all the IPC regions for both hemispheres. We found that the cortical thickness of the left area PF predicts participants’ technical-reasoning performance. Crucially, we reported no correlations between technical reasoning and the other IPC regions, possibly suggesting the specificity of the left area PF in generating technical knowledge. We discuss these findings from an evolutionary perspective, by speculating about how the evolution of parietal lobes may have supported the emergence of technical reasoning in our lineage.

Runaway Social Selection in Human Evolution

Darwin posited that social competition among conspecifics could be a powerful selective pressure. Alexander proposed a model of human evolution involving a runaway process of social competition based on Darwin’s insight. Here we briefly review Alexander’s logic, and then expand upon his model by elucidating six core arenas of social selection that involve runaway, positive-feedback processes, and that were likely involved in the evolution of the remarkable combination of adaptations in humans. We discuss how these ideas fit with the hypothesis that a key life history innovation that opened the door to runaway social selection, and cumulative culture, during hominin evolution was increased cooperation among individuals in small fission-fusion groups.

Physical understanding in neurodegenerative diseases

This quantitative review gives an overview of physical understanding (i.e., the ability to represent and use the laws of physics to interact with the physical world) impairments in Alzheimer's disease (AD), semantic dementia (SD), and corticobasal syndrome (CBS), as assessed mainly with mechanical problem-solving and tool use tests. This review shows that: (1) SD patients have apraxia of tool use because of semantic tool knowledge deficits, but normal performance in tests of physical understanding; (2) AD and CBS patients show impaired performance in mechanical problem-solving tests, probably not because of intrinsic deficits of physical understanding, but rather because of additional cognitive (AD) or motor impairments (CBS); (3) As a result, the performance in mechanical problem-solving tests is not a good predictor of familiar tool use in dementia; (4) Actual deficits of physical understanding are probably observed only in late stages of neurodegenerative diseases, and associated with functional loss.

Affect and Cognition in Managerial Decision Making: A Systematic Literature Review of Neuroscience Evidence

How do affect and cognition interact in managerial decision making? Over the last decades, scholars have investigated how managers make decisions. However, what remains largely unknown is the interplay of affective states and cognition during the decision-making process. We offer a systematization of the contributions produced on the role of affect and cognition in managerial decision making by considering the recent cross-fertilization of management studies with the neuroscience domain. We implement a Systematic Literature Review of 23 selected contributions dealing with the role of affect and cognition in managerial decisions that adopted neuroscience techniques/points of view. Collected papers have been analyzed by considering the so-called reflexive (X-) and reflective (C-) systems in social cognitive neuroscience and the type of decisions investigated in the literature. Results obtained help to support an emerging "unified" mind processing theory for which the two systems of our mind are not in conflict and for which affective states have a driving role toward cognition. A research agenda for future studies is provided to scholars who are interested in advancing the investigation of affect and cognition in managerial decision making, also through neuroscience techniques - with the consideration that these works should be at the service of the behavioral strategy field.

More Thumbs Than Rules: Is Rationality an Exaptation?

The literatures on bounded and ecological rationality are built on adaptationism-and its associated modular, cognitivist and computational paradigm-that does not address or explain the evolutionary origins of rationality. We argue that the adaptive mechanisms of evolution are not sufficient for explaining human rationality, and we posit that human rationality presents exaptive origins, where exaptations are traits evolved for other functions or no function at all, and later co-opted for new uses. We propose an embodied reconceptualization of rationality-embodied rationality-based on the reuse of the perception-action system, where many neural processes involved in the control of the sensory-motor system, salient in ancestral environments have been later co-opted to create-by tinkering-high-level reasoning processes, employed in civilized niches.

Technical reasoning bolsters cumulative technological culture through convergent transformations

Understanding the evolution of human technology is key to solving the mystery of our origins. Current theories propose that technology evolved through the accumulation of modifications that were mostly transmitted between individuals by blind copying and the selective retention of advantageous variations. An alternative account is that high-fidelity transmission in the context of cumulative technological culture is supported by technical reasoning, which is a reconstruction mechanism that allows individuals to converge to optimal solutions. We tested these two competing hypotheses with a microsociety experiment, in which participants had to optimize a physical system in partial- and degraded-information transmission conditions. Our results indicated an improvement of the system over generations, which was accompanied by an increased understanding of it. The solutions produced tended to progressively converge over generations. These findings show that technical reasoning can bolster high-fidelity transmission through convergent transformations, which highlights its role in the cultural evolution of technology.

Tools of the trade: the bio-cultural evolution of the human propensity to trade

Humans are standouts in their propensity to trade. More specially, the kind of trading found in humans-featuring the exchange of many different goods and services with many different others, for the mutual benefit of all the involved parties-far exceeds anything that is found in any other creature. However, a number of important questions about this propensity remain open. First, it is not clear exactly what makes this propensity so different in the human case from that of other animals. Second, it is not clear why other animals did not acquire this propensity to the extent that humans did. Third, it is not clear what explains the fact that the extent to which humans engage in trade is culturally highly variable. The paper argues that at the heart of the human-animal divergence in this propensity is the particular socio-cultural environment in which humans evolved. This has led them to sometimes, but not always, acquire the cognitive technology (writing, algebra, tallying devices, money, etc.) to support a sophisticated disposition and capacity for reciprocal cooperation, and deep and wide concepts of property and exchange value.

Why and How Did Narrative Fictions Evolve? Fictions as Entertainment Technologies

Narrative fictions have surely become the single most widespread source of entertainment in the world. In their free time, humans read novels and comics, watch movies and TV series, and play video games: they consume stories that they know to be false. Such behaviors are expanding at lightning speed in modern societies. Yet, the question of the origin of fictions has been an evolutionary puzzle for decades: Are fictions biological adaptations, or the by-products of cognitive mechanisms that evolved for another purpose? The absence of any consensus in cognitive science has made it difficult to explain how narrative fictions evolve culturally. We argue that current conflicting hypotheses are partly wrong, and partly right: narrative fictions are by-products of the human mind, because they obviously co-opt some pre-existing cognitive preferences and mechanisms, such as our interest for social information, and our abilities to do mindreading and to imagine counterfactuals. But humans reap some fitness benefits from producing and consuming such appealing cultural items, making fictions adaptive. To reconcile these two views, we put forward the hypothesis that narrative fictions are best seen as entertainment technologies that is, as items crafted by some people for the proximate goal to grab the attention of other people, and with the ultimate goal to fulfill other evolutionary-relevant functions that become easier once other people's attention is caught. This hypothesis explains why fictions are filled with exaggerated and entertaining stimuli, why they fit so well the changing preferences of the audience they target, and why producers constantly make their fictions more attractive as time goes by, in a cumulative manner.

Modeling Discontinuous Cultural Evolution: The Impact of Cross-Domain Transfer

This paper uses autocatalytic networks to model discontinuous cultural transitions involving cross-domain transfer, using as an illustrative example, artworks inspired by the oldest-known uncontested example of figurative art: the carving of the Hohlenstein-Stadel Löwenmensch, or lion-human. Autocatalytic networks provide a general modeling setting in which nodes are not just passive transmitters of activation; they actively galvanize, or "catalyze" the synthesis of novel ("foodset-derived") nodes from existing ones (the "foodset.") This makes them uniquely suited to model how new structure grows out of earlier structure, i.e., cumulative, generative network growth. They have been used to model the origin and early evolution of biological life, and the emergence of cognitive structures capable of undergoing cultural evolution. We conducted a study in which six individual creators and one group generated music, prose, poetry, and visual art inspired by the Hohlenstein-Stadel Löwenmensch, and answered questions about the process. The data revealed four through-lines by which they expressed the Löwenmensch in an alternative art form: (1) lion-human hybrid, (2) subtracting from the whole to reveal the form within, (3) deterioration, and (4) waiting to be found with a story to tell. Autocatalytic networks were used to model how these four spontaneously derived through-lines form a cultural lineage from Löwenmensch to artist to audience. We used the resulting data from three creators to model the cross-domain transfer from inspirational source (sculpted figurine) to creative product (music, poetry, prose, visual art). These four spontaneously-generated threads of cultural continuity formed the backbone of this Löwenmensch-inspired cultural lineage, enabling culture to evolve even in the face of discontinuity at the level conventional categories or domains. We know of no other theory of cultural evolution that accommodates cross-domain transfer or other forms of discontinuity. The approach paves the way for a broad scientific framework for the origins of evolutionary processes.

From Beethoven to Beyoncé: Do Changing Aesthetic Cultures Amount to "Cumulative Cultural Evolution?"

Culture can be defined as "group typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a community that rely on socially learned and transmitted information" (Laland and Hoppitt, 2003, p. 151). Once thought to be a distinguishing characteristic of humans relative to other animals (Dean et al., 2014) it is now generally accepted to exist more widely, with especially abundant evidence in non-human primates, cetaceans, and birds (Rendell and Whitehead, 2001; Aplin, 2019; Whiten, 2021). More recently, cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) has taken on this distinguishing role (Henrich, 2015; Laland, 2018). CCE, it is argued, allows humans, uniquely, to ratchet up the complexity or efficiency of cultural traits over time. This "ratchet effect" (Tomasello, 1994) gives the capacity to accumulate beneficial modifications over time beyond the capacities of a single individual (Sasaki and Biro, 2017). Mesoudi and Thornton (2018) define a core set of criteria for identifying CCE in humans and non-human animals that places emphasis on some performance measure of traits increasing over time. They suggest this emphasis is also pertinent to cultural products in the aesthetic domain, but is this the case? Music, art and dance evolve over time (Savage, 2019), but can we say they gain beneficial modifications that increase their aesthetic value? Here we bring together perspectives from philosophy, musicology and biology to build a conceptual analysis of this question. We summarise current thinking on cumulative culture and aesthetics across fields to determine how aesthetic culture fits into the concept of CCE. We argue that this concept is problematic to reconcile with dominant views of aesthetics in philosophical analysis and struggles to characterise aesthetic cultures that evolve over time. We suggest that a tension arises from fundamental differences between cultural evolution in aesthetic and technological domains. Furthermore, this tension contributes to current debates between reconstructive and preservative theories of cultural evolution.

Efficiency fosters cumulative culture across species

Recent studies in several taxa have demonstrated that animal culture can evolve to become more efficient in various contexts ranging from tool use to route learning and migration. Under recent definitions, such increases in efficiency might satisfy the core criteria of cumulative cultural evolution (CCE). However, there is not yet a satisfying consensus on the precise definition of efficiency, CCE or the link between efficiency and more complex, extended forms of CCE considered uniquely human. To bring clarity to this wider discussion of CCE, we develop the concept of efficiency by (i) reviewing recent potential evidence for CCE in animals, and (ii) clarifying a useful definition of efficiency by synthesizing perspectives found within the literature, including animal studies and the wider iterated learning literature. Finally, (iii) we discuss what factors might impinge on the informational bottleneck of social transmission, and argue that this provides pressure for learnable behaviours across species. We conclude that framing CCE in terms of efficiency casts complexity in a new light, as learnable behaviours are a requirement for the evolution of complexity. Understanding how efficiency greases the ratchet of cumulative culture provides a better appreciation of how similar cultural evolution can be between taxonomically diverse species-a case for continuity across the animal kingdom. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'.

Human cumulative culture and the exploitation of natural phenomena

Cumulative cultural evolution (CCE)-defined as the process by which beneficial modifications are culturally transmitted and progressively accumulated over time-has long been argued to underlie the unparalleled diversity and complexity of human culture. In this paper, I argue that not just any kind of cultural accumulation will give rise to human-like culture. Rather, I suggest that human CCE depends on the gradual exploitation of natural phenomena, which are features of our environment that, through the laws of physics, chemistry or biology, generate reliable effects which can be exploited for a purpose. I argue that CCE comprises two distinct processes: optimizing cultural traits that exploit a given set of natural phenomena (Type I CCE) and expanding the set of natural phenomena we exploit (Type II CCE). I argue that the most critical features of human CCE, including its open-ended dynamic, stems from Type II CCE. Throughout the paper, I contrast the two processes and discuss their respective socio-cognitive requirements. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'.

Negative observational learning might play a limited role in the cultural evolution of technology

Theoretical and empirical studies of the cultural evolution in technology have often focused on positive observational learning, i.e., copying a successful individual. However, negative observational learning, i.e., avoiding negative or bad exemplar behavior, is ubiquitous in humans and other animals. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether observing negative examples can assist in tool making in the virtual arrowhead task, which has been widely applied to test the theory of cultural evolution in the technological domain. We set three conditions that differ in the kinds of social learning available to participants: (1) positive observational learning, (2) negative observational learning, and (3) pure asocial learning. The results of the positive observational and pure asocial learning conditions replicated previous studies; i.e., participants in the positive observational learning condition outperformed those in the asocial learning condition. In contrast, opportunities to observe negative examples did not increase the performance compared to pure asocial learning. Computer simulations in the same setting showed that the presence of negative exemplars is in theory beneficial to participants, providing additional pieces of information on the relationship between arrowhead designs and their performance scores. These findings together suggest that negative observational learning might play only a limited role in the cultural evolution of technologies possibly due to a cognitive bias in humans toward copying.

On the psychological origins of tool use

The ubiquity of tool use in human life has generated multiple lines of scientific and philosophical investigation to understand the development and expression of humans' engagement with tools and its relation to other dimensions of human experience. However, existing literature on tool use faces several epistemological challenges in which the same set of questions generate many different answers. At least four critical questions can be identified, which are intimately intertwined-(1) What constitutes tool use? (2) What psychological processes underlie tool use in humans and nonhuman animals? (3) Which of these psychological processes are exclusive to tool use? (4) Which psychological processes involved in tool use are exclusive to Homo sapiens? To help advance a multidisciplinary scientific understanding of tool use, six author groups representing different academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, psychology, neuroscience) and different theoretical perspectives respond to each of these questions, and then point to the direction of future work on tool use. We find that while there are marked differences among the responses of the respective author groups to each question, there is a surprising degree of agreement about many essential concepts and questions. We believe that this interdisciplinary and intertheoretical discussion will foster a more comprehensive understanding of tool use than any one of these perspectives (or any one of these author groups) would (or could) on their own.

Technical reasoning is important for cumulative technological culture

Human technology has evolved in an unparalleled way, allowing us to expand across the globe. One fascinating question is, how do we understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon, which is known as cumulative technological culture (CTC)? The dominant view posits that CTC results from our unique ability to learn from each other. The cultural niche hypothesis even minimizes the involvement of non-social cognitive skills in the emergence of CTC, claiming that technologies can be optimized without us understanding how they work, but simply through the retention of small improvements over generations. Here we conduct a partial replication of the experimental study of Derex et al. (Nature Human Behaviour, 2019) and show that the improvement of a physical system over generations is accompanied by an increased understanding of it. These findings indicate that technical-reasoning skills (non-social cognitive skills) are important in the acquisition, understanding and improvement of technical content-that is, specific to the technological form of cumulative culture-thereby making social learning a salient source of technical inspiration.

The Creative Neurons

Creativity generates novel solutions to tasks by processing information. Imagination and mental representations are part of the creative process; we can mull over ideas of our own making, and construct algorithms or scenarios from them. Social scenario-building can be viewed as a human cognitive "super-power" that involves abstraction, meta-representation, time-travel, and directed imaginative thought. We humans have a "theater in our minds" to play out a near-infinite array of social strategies and contingencies. Here we propose an integrative model for why and how humans evolved extraordinary creative abilities. We posit that a key aspect of hominin evolution involved relatively open and fluid social relationships among communities, enabled by a unique extended family structure similar to that of contemporary hunter-gatherer band societies. Intercommunity relationships facilitated the rapid flow of information-"Culture"-that underpinned arms-races in information processing, language, imagination, and creativity that distinguishes humans from other species.

Intersubjectivity and social learning: Representation of beliefs enables the accumulation of cultural knowledge

I accept the main thesis of the article according to which representation of knowledge is more basic than representation of belief. But I question the authors' contention that humans' unique capacity to represent belief does not underwrite the capacity for the accumulation of cultural knowledge.

Making Cognitive Niches Explicit: On the Importance of External Cognitive Representations in Accounting for Cumulative Culture

Cumulative transmission and innovation are the hallmark properties of the cultural achievements of human beings. Cognitive scientists have traditionally explained these properties in terms of social learning and creativity. The non-social cognitive dimension of cumulative culture, the so-called technical reasoning, has also been accounted for recently. These explanatory perspectives are methodologically individualistic since they frame cumulative and innovative culture in terms of the processing of inner cognitive representations. Here we show that going beyond methodological individualism could facilitate an understanding of why some inventions are disseminated in a stable form and constitute the basis for further modifications. Drawing on three cases of cognitive history of prominent achievements of Antiquity, i.e., Homerian epics, Euclidean geometry, and Roman law, we investigate which properties of cognitive artifacts shaped cognitive niches for modifying original cognitive tasks or developing new ones. These niches both constrained and enabled the cognitive skills of humans to promote cumulative culture and further innovations. At the same time, we claim that "wide cognition," incorporating both intracranial resources and external cognitive representations, constitutes a platform for building explanations of cognitive phenomena developing over a historical time scale.

Pantomime of tool use: looking beyond apraxia

Pantomime has a long tradition in clinical neuropsychology of apraxia. It has been much more used by researchers and clinicians to assess tool-use disorders than real tool use. Nevertheless, it remains incompletely understood and has given rise to controversies, such as the involvement of the left inferior parietal lobe or the nature of the underlying cognitive processes. The present article offers a comprehensive framework, with the aim of specifying the neural and cognitive bases of pantomime. To do so, we conducted a series of meta-analyses of brain-lesion, neuroimaging and behavioural studies about pantomime and other related tasks (i.e. real tool use, imitation of meaningless postures and semantic knowledge). The first key finding is that the area PF (Area PF complex) within the left inferior parietal lobe is crucially involved in both pantomime and real tool use as well as in the kinematics component of pantomime. The second key finding is the absence of a well-defined neural substrate for the posture component of pantomime (both grip errors and body-part-as-tool responses). The third key finding is the role played by the intraparietal sulcus in both pantomime and imitation of meaningless postures. The fourth key finding is that the left angular gyrus seems to be critical in the production of motor actions directed towards the body. The fifth key finding is that performance on pantomime is strongly correlated with the severity of semantic deficits. Taken together, these findings invite us to offer a neurocognitive model of pantomime, which provides an integrated alternative to the two hypotheses that dominate the field: The gesture-engram hypothesis and the communicative hypothesis. More specifically, this model assumes that technical reasoning (notably the left area PF), the motor-control system (notably the intraparietal sulcus), body structural description (notably the left angular gyrus), semantic knowledge (notably the polar temporal lobes) and potentially theory of mind (notably the middle prefrontal cortex) work in concert to produce pantomime. The original features of this model open new avenues for understanding the neurocognitive bases of pantomime, emphasizing that pantomime is a communicative task that nevertheless originates in specific tool-use (not motor-related) cognitive processes. .

On the Neurocognitive Co-Evolution of Tool Behavior and Language: Insights from the Massive Redeployment Framework

Understanding the link between brain evolution and the evolution of distinctive features of modern human cognition is a fundamental challenge. A still unresolved question concerns the co-evolution of tool behavior (i.e., tool use or tool making) and language. The shared neurocognitive processes hypothesis suggests that the emergence of the combinatorial component of language skills within the frontal lobe/Broca's area made possible the complexification of tool-making skills. The importance of the frontal lobe/Broca's area in tool behavior is somewhat surprising with regard to the literature on neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience, which has instead stressed the critical role of the left inferior parietal lobe. Therefore, to be complete, any version of the shared neurocognitive processes hypothesis needs to integrate the potential interactions between the frontal lobe/Broca's area and the left inferior parietal lobe as well as their co-evolution at a phylogenetic level. Here, we sought to provide the first elements of answer through the use of the massive deployment framework, which posits that evolutionarily older brain areas are deployed in more cognitive functions (i.e., they are less specific). We focused on the left parietal cortex, and particularly the left areas PF, PGI, and anterior intraparietal (AIP), which are known to be involved in tool use, language, and motor control, respectively. The deployment of each brain area in different cognitive functions was measured by conducting a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Our results confirmed the pattern of specificity for each brain area and also showed that the left area PGI was far less specific than the left areas PF and AIP. From these findings, we discuss the different evolutionary scenarios depicting the potential co-evolution of the combinatorial and generative components of language and tool behavior in our lineage.

Cultural diversity and wisdom of crowds are mutually beneficial and evolutionarily stable

The ability to learn from others (social learning) is often deemed a cause of human species success. But if social learning is indeed more efficient (whether less costly or more accurate) than individual learning, it raises the question of why would anyone engage in individual information seeking, which is a necessary condition for social learning's efficacy. We propose an evolutionary model solving this paradox, provided agents (i) aim not only at information quality but also vie for audience and prestige, and (ii) do not only value accuracy but also reward originality-allowing them to alleviate herding effects. We find that under some conditions (large enough success rate of informed agents and intermediate taste for popularity), both social learning's higher accuracy and the taste for original opinions are evolutionarily-stable, within a mutually beneficial division of labour-like equilibrium. When such conditions are not met, the system most often converges towards mutually detrimental equilibria.

Carry-over effects of tool functionality and previous unsuccessfulness increase overimitation in children

Children 'overimitate' causally irrelevant actions in experiments where both irrelevant and relevant actions involve a single common tool. This study design may make it harder for children to recognize the irrelevant actions, as the perceived functionality of the tool during the demonstration of the relevant action may be carried over to the irrelevant action, potentially increasing overimitation. Moreover, little is known how overimitation is affected by the demonstrator's expressed emotions and the child's prior success with the task. Here, 131 nine- to ten-year-old French and German children first engaged in a tool-based task, being successful or unsuccessful, and then watched an adult demonstrating the solution involving one irrelevant and one relevant action before smiling or remaining neutral. These actions were performed with the same tool or with two separate tools, testing potential carry-over effects of the functionality of the relevant action on the irrelevant action. We show that overimitation was higher when the same tool was used for both actions and when children were previously unsuccessful, but was not affected by the demonstrator's displayed emotion. Our results suggest that future overimitation research should account for the number of tools used in a demonstration and participants' previous task experience.

Human biases limit cumulative innovation

Is technological advancement constrained by biases in human cognition? People in all societies build on discoveries inherited from previous generations, leading to cumulative innovation. However, biases in human learning and memory may influence the process of knowledge transmission, potentially limiting this process. Here, we show that cumulative innovation in a continuous optimization problem is systematically constrained by human biases. In a large (n = 1250) behavioural study using a transmission chain design, participants searched for virtual technologies in one of four environments after inheriting a solution from previous generations. Participants converged on worse solutions in environments misaligned with their biases. These results substantiate a mathematical model of cumulative innovation in Bayesian agents, highlighting formal relationships between cultural evolution and distributed stochastic optimization. Our findings provide experimental evidence that human biases can limit the advancement of knowledge in a controlled laboratory setting, reinforcing concerns about bias in creative, scientific and educational contexts.

Cognitive prerequisites for cumulative culture are context-dependent: Children's potential for ratcheting depends on cue longevity

Human cumulative culture has been suggested to depend on human-unique cognitive mechanisms, explaining its apparent absence in other species. We show that the potential for exhibiting cumulative culture depends on the cognitive abilities of the agents and the demands associated with using information generated by others' activity. 154 children aged 3-6 years played a searching game ("Find the Treasure"), taking their turn after a puppet demonstrator. The puppet's attempt revealed information about the contents of the locations searched, which could be exploited to target rewarded locations, and avoid unrewarded ones. Two conditions were presented, intended to capture realistic variation in the transience of the cues generated by another individual's activity. In one condition, the puppet's demonstration provided transient information - boxes were opened, seen to be rewarded or not, and then closed. In the other condition the puppet's chosen boxes remained partially open, providing an enduring visible cue as to whether that location was rewarded. Children undertook three trials of varying demonstration success, and we used patterns of performance to infer the potential for improvement over multiple generations of transmission. In the Enduring Cues condition, children's performance demonstrated the potential for cumulative culture. In contrast, in the Transient Information condition, only older children showed improved performances following higher success demonstrations and overall performance was not compatible with the possibility of improvements over generations of social transmission. We conclude that under certain conditions cumulative culture could occur in many species, but in a broader range of contexts in humans.

New Caledonian crows keep 'valuable' hooked tools safer than basic non-hooked tools

The temporary storage and re-use of tools can significantly enhance foraging efficiency. New Caledonian crows in one of our study populations use two types of stick tools - hooked and non-hooked - which differ in raw material, manufacture costs, and foraging performance. Using a large sample of wild-caught, temporarily captive New Caledonian crows, we investigated experimentally whether individuals prefer one tool type over the other when given a choice and whether they take better care of their preferred tools between successive episodes of use, safely storing them underfoot or in nearby holes. Crows strongly preferred hooked stick tools made from Desmanthus virgatus stems over non-hooked stick tools. Importantly, this preference was also reflected in subsequent tool-handling behaviour, with subjects keeping hooked stick tools safe more often than non-hooked stick tools sourced from leaf litter. These results suggest that crows 'value' hooked stick tools, which are both costlier to procure and more efficient to use, more than non-hooked stick tools. Results from a series of control treatments suggested that crows altered their tool 'safekeeping' behaviour in response to a combination of factors, including tool type and raw material. To our knowledge, our study is the first to use safekeeping behaviour as a proxy for assessing how non-human animals value different tool types, establishing a novel paradigm for productive cross-taxonomic comparisons.

The Pedagogue, the Engineer, and the Friend : From Whom Do We Learn?

Humans can follow different social learning strategies, sometimes oriented toward the models' characteristics (i.e., who-strategies). The goal of the present study was to explore which who-strategy is preferentially followed in the technological context based on the models' psychological characteristics. We identified three potential who-strategies: Copy the pedagogue (a model with high theory-of-mind skills), copy the engineer (a model with high technical-reasoning skills), and copy the friend (a model with high level of prosocialness). We developed a closed-group micro-society paradigm in which participants had to build the highest possible towers. Participants began with an individual building phase. Then, they were gathered to discuss the best solutions to increase tower height. After this discussion phase, they had to make a new building attempt, followed by another discussion phase, and so forth for a total of six building phases and five discussion rounds. This methodology allowed us to create an attraction score for each participant (the more an individual was copied in a group, the greater the attraction score). We also assessed participants' theory-of-mind skills, technical-reasoning skills, and prosocialness to predict participants' attraction scores based on these measures. Results show that we learn from engineers (high technical-reasoning skills) because they are the most successful. Their attraction power is not immediate, but after they have been identified as attractors, their technique is copied irrespective of their pedagogy (theory-of-mind skills) or friendliness (prosocialness). These findings open avenues for the study of the cognitive bases of human technological culture.