The effect of military training on the sense of agency and outcome processing

Influence of AI behavior on human moral decisions, agency, and responsibility

There is a growing interest in understanding the effects of human-machine interaction on moral decision-making (Moral-DM) and sense of agency (SoA). Here, we investigated whether the "moral behavior" of an AI may affect both moral-DM and SoA in a military population, by using a task in which cadets played the role of drone operators on a battlefield. Participants had to decide whether or not to initiate an attack based on the presence of enemies and the risk of collateral damage. By combining three different types of trials (Moral vs. two No-Morals) in three blocks with three type of intelligent system support (No-AI support vs. Aggressive-AI vs. Conservative-AI), we showed that participants' decisions in the morally challenging situations were influenced by the inputs provided by the autonomous system. Furthermore, by measuring implicit and explicit agency, we found a significant increase in the SoA at the implicit level in the morally challenging situations, and a decrease in the explicit responsibility during the interaction with both AIs. These results suggest that the AI behavior influences human moral decision-making and alters the sense of agency and responsibility in ethical scenarios. These findings have implications for the design of AI-assisted decision-making processes in moral contexts.

Neural correlates of the sense of agency in free and coerced moral decision-making among civilians and military personnel

The sense of agency, the feeling of being the author of one's actions and outcomes, is critical for decision-making. While prior research has explored its neural correlates, most studies have focused on neutral tasks, overlooking moral decision-making. In addition, previous studies mainly used convenience samples, ignoring that some social environments may influence how authorship in moral decision-making is processed. This study investigated the neural correlates of sense of agency in civilians and military officer cadets, examining free and coerced choices in both agent and commander roles. Using a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm where participants could either freely choose or follow orders to inflict a mild shock on a victim, we assessed sense of agency through temporal binding-a temporal distortion between voluntary and less voluntary decisions. Our findings suggested that sense of agency is reduced when following orders compared to acting freely in both roles. Several brain regions correlated with temporal binding, notably the occipital lobe, superior/middle/inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus, and lateral occipital cortex. Importantly, no differences emerged between military and civilians at corrected thresholds, suggesting that daily environments have minimal influence on the neural basis of moral decision-making, enhancing the generalizability of the findings.

The neural correlates of guilt highlight preclinical manifestations between bipolar and major depressive disorders

BACKGROUND

Over 25 % of bipolar disorder (BD) patients are misdiagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD). An urgent need exists for a biomarker to differentiate BD from MDD. Various manifestations and intensities of maladaptive guilt processing might uniquely contribute to the pathogenesis of BD compared to MDD.

METHOD

This study adopted a first-person perspective guilt-provoking functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) task, respectively induced by painful and ambiguous scenarios in 111 individuals: 35 with remitted MDD, 38 with remitted bipolar I disorder (BD-I), and 38 matched controls.

RESULTS

A significant interaction between group and sense of agency in predicting guilt ratings for ambiguous, rather than painful, scenarios. The association between sense of agency and guilt was significant in MDD but not in BD-I patients or controls. Activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC), and right inferior parietal lobule (IPL) was higher in BD-I than MDD subjects in response to ambiguous scenarios, whereas these were comparable to painful ones. The correlation between guilt ratings and activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) to ambiguous scenarios was significant in MDD, but not in BD-I or controls. The results of the multivariate pattern classification analysis showed that in the ambiguous scenarios, the accuracy of using brain activation patterns in the dmPFC, pgACC, and IPL to distinguish between participants with MDD and BD-I was 70.0 %, 71.5 %, and 68.7 %, respectively. An additional test of the classification model, employing a combined mask of the three ROIs to distinguish between the two mood disorders in ambiguous scenarios, achieved an accuracy of 78.6 % and an AUC value of 0.84.

CONCLUSIONS

Subjective reports and neural correlates of guilt in ambiguous social situations, as well as a sense of agency, could provide to be a potential biomarker to help distinguish between BD-I and MDD even in the remitted stage.

Choice effects on temporal binding of action and outcomes: Examining the role of outcome focus and measures of time interval estimation

The ability to make one's own choices is vital to the experience of intentional behavior. Such agency experiences are reflected in the perceptual compression of time between actions and resulting outcomes. Whereas some studies show that choice limitations weaken temporal binding, other studies do not find such an effect. Reviewing the literature, we noted two potential factors that may moderate choice limitation effects on temporal binding: (a) the extent to which individuals represent their actions in terms of the consequences they produce; and (b) the response mode of the time interval estimation measurement where participants report numbers or use a slider to indicate time intervals. Testing these conceptual and methodological factors in two separate experiments yielded clear effects of choice limitation on temporal binding but no clear moderator role of the two factors. Interestingly, overall analyses showed that the choice limitation effect gradually vanishes over time.

When performing actions with robots, attribution of intentionality affects the sense of joint agency

Sense of joint agency (SoJA) is the sense of control experienced by humans when acting with others to bring about changes in the shared environment. SoJA is proposed to arise from the sensorimotor predictive processes underlying action control and monitoring. Because SoJA is a ubiquitous phenomenon occurring when we perform actions with other humans, it is of great interest and importance to understand whether-and under what conditions-SoJA occurs in collaborative tasks with humanoid robots. In this study, using behavioral measures and neural responses measured by electroencephalography (EEG), we aimed to evaluate whether SoJA occurs in joint action with the humanoid robot iCub and whether its emergence is influenced by the perceived intentionality of the robot. Behavioral results show that participants experienced SoJA with the robot partner when it was presented as an intentional agent but not when it was presented as a mechanical artifact. EEG results show that the mechanism that influences the emergence of SoJA in the condition when the robot is presented as an intentional agent is the ability to form similarly accurate predictions about the sensory consequences of our own and others' actions, leading to similar modulatory activity over sensory processing. Together, our results shed light on the joint sensorimotor processing mechanisms underlying the emergence of SoJA in human-robot interaction and underscore the importance of attribution of intentionality to the robot in human-robot collaboration.

Obedience to authority reduces cognitive conflict before an action

How obeying orders impacts moral decision-making remains an open question, despite its significant societal implications. The goal of this study was to determine if cognitive conflict, indexed by mid-frontal theta activity observed before an action, is influenced by the context of obedience. Participants came in pairs and were assigned roles as either agent or victim. Those in the agent role could either decide freely or follow the experimenter's instructions to administer (or refrain from administering) a mildly painful electric shock to the victim in exchange for a small monetary reward. Mid-frontal theta activity was recorded before the agent made their keypress. Results indicated that mid-frontal theta activity was reduced when participants obeyed the experimenter's orders compared to when they acted of their own volition, even though the outcomes of the actions were similar. This finding suggests that obeying orders diminishes cognitive conflict preceding moral decisions that could harm another person. This study sheds light on a potential mechanism explaining how obedience can blurr morality and lessen our natural aversion to harming others.

Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency

The sense of agency refers to the experience of control over voluntary actions and their effects. There is growing interest in the notion of we-agency, whereby individual sense of agency is supplanted by a collective agentic experience. The existence of this unique agentic state would have profound implications for human responsibility, and, as such, warrants further scrutiny. In this paper, we review the concept of we-agency and examine whether evidence supports it. We argue that this concept entails multiplying hypothetical agentic states associated with joint action, thus ending up with an entangled phenomenology that appears somewhat speculative when weighted against the available evidence. In light of this, we suggest that the concept of we-agency should be abandoned in favor of a more parsimonious framework for the sense of agency in joint action.

Does the cowl make the monk? The effect of military and Red Cross uniforms on empathy for pain, sense of agency and moral behaviors

According to the embodied cognition framework, cognitive functions are not confined to the brain but are also shaped by the mutual interactions between the brain, body, and external environment. In this regard, a theory developed in 2012, called enclothed cognition, suggests an effect on wearing specific clothing on various psychological processes. However, the neuro-cognitive mechanisms underlying the impact of clothing on behavior have received less systematic investigation. The present study examined the influence of clothing on prosocial behaviors, and focused on sense of agency, and empathy for pain as neuro-cognitive processes of interest. Participants (40 in total) wore civilian, military, and Red Cross uniforms. They were paired up and assigned as either agents or victims. Agents had the option to administer real electric shocks to victims for a monetary reward of +€0.05. They could choose to shock freely (free condition) or follow the experimenter's instructions (coerced condition). We measured prosocial behavior by counting the number of shocks prevented, neural empathic response using electroencephalography with the P3 and the LPP, and sense of agency through an implicit method based on interval estimates. Findings showed that wearing the Red Cross uniform led to more prosocial behavior compared to civilian clothing. The Red Cross uniform also increased neural response to pain when participants witnessed shocks, compared to civilian or military clothing. Moreover, wearing a military uniform increased the sense of agency in the free condition, as compared to civilian clothing. This study broadens our knowledge on the impact of enclothed cognition on cognitive and psychological processes.

The impact of facial expression and communicative gaze of a humanoid robot on individual Sense of Agency

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one's actions and their outcomes. A well-established implicit measure of SoA is the temporal interval estimation paradigm, in which participants estimate the time interval between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence. In the present study, we aimed to investigate whether the valence of action outcome modulated implicit SoA. The valence was manipulated through interaction partner's (i) positive/negative facial expression, or (ii) type of gaze (gaze contact or averted gaze). The interaction partner was the humanoid robot iCub. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the time interval between the onset of their action (head movement towards the robot), and the robot's facial expression (happy vs. sad face). Experiment 2 was identical, but the outcome of participants' action was the type of robot's gaze (gaze contact vs. averted). In Experiment 3, we assessed-in a within-subject design-the combined effect of robot's type of facial expression and type of gaze. Results showed that, while the robot's facial expression did not affect participants' SoA (Experiment 1), the type of gaze affected SoA in both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Overall, our findings showed that the robot's gaze is a more potent factor than facial expression in modulating participants' implicit SoA.

Vicarious ostracism reduces observers' sense of agency

Previous findings revealed that social ostracism reduces people's implicit sense of agency. Based on theoretical claims that observed behavior of others may be cognitively represented similarly to one's own behavior, we conducted two experiments to test whether people's own sense of agency can also be impaired by observed social exclusion of others. In Experiment 1, participants recalled episodes referring to vicarious ostracism or inclusion before completing a temporal interval estimation task to assess intentional binding effects (an established implicit measure of the sense of agency). In Experiment 2, participants immersed into a newly designed virtual Cyberball game, in which they witnessed a vicarious ostracism or inclusion scenario, before completing a Libet-style temporal estimation task and an agency questionnaire (an explicit measure of the sense of agency). The findings show, for the first time, that vicarious ostracism reduces both implicit and explicit measures of agency in observers.

Sense of agency predicts severity of moral judgments

Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the awareness of being the agent of our own actions. A key feature of SoA relies on the perceived temporal compression between our own actions and their sensory consequences, a phenomenon known as "Intentional Binding." Prior studies have linked SoA to the sense of responsibility for our own actions. However, it is unclear whether SoA predicts the way we judge the actions of others - including judgments of morally wrong actions like harming others. To address this issue, we ran an on-line pilot experiment where participants underwent two different tasks designed to tap into SoA and moral cognition. SoA was measured using the Intentional Binding task which allowed us to obtain both implicit (Intentional Binding) and explicit (Agency Rating) measures of SoA. Moral cognition was assessed by asking the same participants to evaluate videoclips where an agent could deliberately or inadvertently cause suffering to a victim (Intentional vs. Accidental Harm) compared with Neutral scenarios. Results showed a significant relation between both implicit and explicit measures of SoA and moral evaluation of the Accidental Harm scenarios, with stronger SoA predicting stricter moral judgments. These findings suggest that our capacity to feel in control of our actions predicts the way we judge others' actions, with stronger feelings of responsibility over our own actions predicting the severity of our moral evaluations of other actions. This was particularly true in ambiguous scenarios characterized by an incongruency between an apparently innocent intention and a negative action outcome.

The pursuit of the end: The effects of action-goal choices on temporal binding

The effect of action choice (whether one can choose their actions freely) on temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between a voluntary action and its effect, is controversial. The present study tried to distinguish action-goal choice (whether one could pursue the action-effect freely) from action choice. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the effect of action-goal choice on TB while the congruency between actions and outcomes was manipulated (i.e., 50% in Experiment 1 and 80% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the effect of action choice on TB when the outcome congruency was 80%. Results showed that free and instructed action-goals led to comparable magnitudes of TB while free actions led to a larger TB than instructed actions. Furthermore, the effect of outcome congruency on TB varied by action-goal choices (Experiment 2) but not action choices (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the potential differences between action choice and action-goal choice.

On the cognitive mechanisms supporting prosocial disobedience in a post-genocidal context

The aim of the present study was to offer a first investigation of the neuro-cognitive processes and the temporal dynamics at the neural level, together with cultural, social and psychological dimensions, that may support resistance to orders to harm another person. Using a novel experimental approach to study experimentally disobedience, we recruited individuals from the first generation born after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Seventy-two were recruited and tested in Rwanda and 72 were recruited and tested in Belgium. Results indicated that a higher neural response to the pain of others and a higher feeling of responsibility when people obeyed orders were associated with more resistance to immoral orders. We also observed that participants who had a higher processing, as measured through mid-frontal theta activity, when listening to the orders of the experimenter disobeyed less frequently to immoral orders. Further, participants experiencing a higher conflict before administering a shock to the 'victim' also disobeyed more frequently to immoral orders. Finally, a low cultural relationship to authority and a high estimated family suffering during the genocide were also associated with more disobedience to immoral orders. The present study opens new paths for interdisciplinary field research dedicated to the study of obedience.

Neuromodulation of the right temporoparietal junction alters amygdala functional connectivity to authority pressure

Past historical events and experimental research have shown that complying with orders from an authority has a strong impact on harming/destructive behavior, but no one has ever looked into the potential intervention and its neural underpinning to reveal the toll of coercion. We used a paradigm of virtual obedience to authority, in which an experimenter ordered a volunteer to press a handheld button to initiate actions that carried different consequences, including harming or helping others. In this study, we scanned the brain with functional neuroimaging and applied transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to modulate the activation of the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) in healthy volunteers in a single-blinded, sham-controlled, crossover trial with anodal, cathodal, and sham stimulation. We observed that cathodal stimulation, compared to anodal and sham stimulation, significantly reduced reaction times (RTs) to initiating harming actions. The effect of tDCS on the rTPJ, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex had opposite directions depending on coercive harming or helping actions. Cathodal tDCS-induced changes in the strength of the functional connectivity between the rTPJ and amygdala predicted the effect of cathodal tDCS on harming RTs. The findings provide evidence supporting the rTPJ having a role in coercion-induced changes in the sense of agency. Neuromodulation with tDCS might help in unveiling the power of authority and assisting in the emergence of prosocial behavior, thus shedding light on coping strategies against coercion beyond merely examining its effects.

The anti-anxiety drug lorazepam changes implicit behaviors but not explicit evaluations of sense of agency under authoritative pressure: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study

Previous research on coercion has neglected the fact that agents under authoritative pressure may also suffer from coercive power, which can trigger anxiety-like emotional negativity on its victims. Furthermore, high levels of neuroticism and/or anxiety have been found to be associated with the compliance of various forms of social pressure. In this study, we investigate the effects of the anxiolytic GABA A (gamma-Aminobutyric acid) modulator, lorazepam, on behavioral and neural responses to coercive power. Here, we applied a virtual obedience to authority paradigm alongside lorazepam administration (versus placebo), and during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. Our results show that lorazepam administration exerted differential effects on the reaction times (RTs) when initiating harming versus helping behaviors, with longer harming RTs compared to helping RTs, despite comparable subjective ratings regarding perceived coercion. Coercive harming significantly increased activity in the amygdala, hippocampus, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Lorazepam administration decreased amygdala and hippocampus activity, but increased dlPFC and right temporoparietal junction activations. The lower activity in the hippocampus predicted higher ratings for perceived coercion. Furthermore, lorazepam significantly decreased the functional connectivity of the hippocampus with the dlPFC during coercive harming. In conclusion, we provide evidence -by incorporating multimodal indices, including neuroimaging, neuropharmacological interventions, and behavioral assessments- to posit that the GABA A agonist, lorazepam, might aid as a possible intervention in service of coping strategies against coercion.

Commanding or Being a Simple Intermediary: How Does It Affect Moral Behavior and Related Brain Mechanisms?

Psychology and neuroscience research have shown that fractioning operations among several individuals along a hierarchical chain allows diffusing responsibility between components of the chain, which has the potential to disinhibit antisocial actions. Here, we present two studies, one using fMRI (Study 1) and one using EEG (Study 2), designed to help understand how commanding or being in an intermediary position impacts the sense of agency and empathy for pain. In the age of military drones, we also explored whether commanding a human or robot agent influences these measures. This was done within a single behavioral paradigm in which participants could freely decide whether or not to send painful shocks to another participant in exchange for money. In Study 1, fMRI reveals that activation in social cognition-related and empathy-related brain regions was equally low when witnessing a victim receive a painful shock while participants were either commander or simple intermediary transmitting an order, compared with being the agent directly delivering the shock. In Study 2, results indicated that the sense of agency did not differ between commanders and intermediary, no matter whether the executing agent was a robot or a human. However, we observed that the neural response over P3 event-related potential was higher when the executing agent was a robot compared with a human. Source reconstruction of the EEG signal revealed that this effect was mediated by areas including the insula and ACC. Results are discussed regarding the interplay between the sense of agency and empathy for pain for decision-making.

I Hear My Voice; Therefore I Spoke: The Sense of Agency Over Speech Is Enhanced by Hearing One's Own Voice

The subjective experience of causing an action is known as the sense of agency. Dysfunctional sense of agency over speech has been suggested as a cause of auditory hallucinations. However, agency over speech has not been extensively characterized in previous empirical studies. Here, we manipulated self-voice identity, an indicator of self, embedded in the acoustic quality of voice and examined implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency. Experiment 1 (N = 29 adults) demonstrated more compression of a perceived interval between action and outcome when participants heard their undistorted voices than their pitch-distorted voices. Experiment 2 (N = 28 adults) revealed a strong top-down effect of self-voice identity: Specifically, the judgment of agency over speech was more resistant than the judgment of agency over hand/limb movement to low-level sensorimotor inconsistency. Our findings provide new insight into the sense of agency over speech and an informative perspective for understanding aberrant experience in auditory hallucinations.

A novel experimental approach to study disobedience to authority

Fifty years after the experiments of Stanley Milgram, the main objective of the present paper is to offer a paradigm that complies with up-to-date ethical standards and that can be adapted to various scientific disciplines, ranging from sociology and (social) psychology to neuroscience. Inspired by subsequent versions of Milgram-like paradigms and by combining the strengths of each, this paper presents a novel experimental approach to the study of (dis)obedience to authority. Volunteers are recruited in pairs and take turns to be ‘agents’ or ‘victims’, making the procedure fully reciprocal. For each trial, the agents receive an order from the experimenter to send a real, mildly painful electric shock to the ‘victim’, thus placing participants in an ecological set-up and avoiding the use of cover stories. Depending on the experimental condition, ‘agents’ receive, or do not receive, a monetary gain and are given, or are not given, an aim to obey the experimenter’s orders. Disobedience here refers to the number of times ‘agents’ refused to deliver the real shock to the ‘victim’. As the paradigm is designed to fit with brain imaging methods, I hope to bring new insights and perspectives in this area of research.

The obedient mind and the volitional brain: A neural basis for preserved sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion

Milgram’s classical studies famously suggested a widespread willingness to obey authority, even to the point of inflicting harm. Important situational factors supporting obedience, such as proximity with the victim, have been established. Relatively little work has focused on how coercion affects individual cognition, or on identifying the cognitive factors that underlie inter-individual differences in the tendency to yield to coercion. Here, we used fMRI to investigate the neural systems associated with changes in volitional processes associated with sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion. Participants either freely chose, or were instructed by the experimenter, to give mildly painful electric shocks to another participant, or to refrain from doing so. We have previously shown that coercion reduces temporal binding, which has been proposed as an implicit proxy measure of sense of agency. We tested how reduced agency under coercion related to differences in neural activity between free choice and coercion. In contrast to previous studies and to participants performing the task outside the MRI scanner, on average there was no effect of coercion on agency for participants in the scanner. However, greater activity in the medial frontal gyrus was reliably associated with greater agency under coercion. A similar association was found using explicit responsibility ratings. Our findings suggest that medial frontal processes, perhaps related to volition during action planning and execution, may help to preserve a sense of accountability under coercion. Further, participants who administered more shocks under free choice showed reduced activity during free choice trials in brain areas associated with social cognition. Possibly, this might reflect participants cognitively distancing themselves from the recipient of the shocks under free choice, whereas this was not observed under coercion.

Exploring the relationship between perceived Action-Outcome distance and Agency: Evidence from temporal binding

Intentional actions are usually accompanied by a sense of agency (SoA), along with a perceived shortening of action-outcome intervals known as the intentional binding (IB) effect. This is at least partly associated with the perceived strength of action-outcome relationships, which have been described in terms of distance (e.g., a 'distancing effect'). Given that actions in the modern world are increasingly distant from their outcomes, the current study aimed to explore the effect of perceived spatial distance on the strength of IB. Participants voluntarily triggered, or passively observed, a circle on a background that was either flat or appeared three-dimensional, and estimated action-outcome delays. Depth cues modified the circle's perceived distance while the circle itself did not change. When viewed on a forced-perspective background, interval estimates increased with apparent distance, but only when outcomes were caused by intentional actions. This suggests that agency is reduced for outcomes that appear further away.

Psychopathic traits mediate guilt-related anterior midcingulate activity under authority pressure

Coercive power has different effects on individuals, and which were unable to be fully addressed in Milgram’s famous studies on obedience to authority. While some individuals exhibited high levels of guilt-related anxiety and refused orders to harm, others followed coercive orders throughout the whole event. The lack of guilt is a well-known characteristic of psychopathy, and recent evidence portrays psychopathic personalities on a continuum of clustered traits, while being pervasive in a significant proportion in the population. To investigate whether psychopathic traits better explain discrepancies in antisocial behavior under coercion, we applied a virtual obedience paradigm, in which an experimenter ordered subjects to press a handheld button to initiate successive actions that carry different moral consequences, during fMRI scanning. Psychopathic traits modulated the association between harming actions and guilt feelings on both behavioral and brain levels. This study sheds light on the individual variability in response to coercive power.

Disappearing and appearing: Temporal binding effects are consistent across situations

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over actions and action outcomes. Previous studies were mostly confined to the situation of performing actions to make objects appear, while it remains unexplored whether we experience sense of agency when making objects disappear. Here, we examined the temporal binding effect, an implicit index of sense of agency, in performing actions to make objects disappear and compared the magnitude of this effect in the appearing and disappearing situations. Results showed that the temporal binding effect emerged when object's disappearances served as action outcomes. Moreover, the temporal binding effects in the appearing and disappearing situations did not differ significantly. Our findings extend the temporal binding effect to the situation of voluntarily making objects disappear, suggesting a comparable level of implicit sense of agency when voluntarily making objects disappear and appear.

Social Agency as a continuum

Sense of Agency, the phenomenology associated with causing one's own actions and corresponding effects, is a cornerstone of human experience. Social Agency can be defined as the Sense of Agency experienced in any situation in which the effects of our actions are related to a conspecific. This can be implemented as the other's reactions being caused by our action, joint action modulating our Sense of Agency, or the other's mere social presence influencing our Sense of Agency. It is currently an open question how such Social Agency can be conceptualized and how it relates to its nonsocial variant. This is because, compared with nonsocial Sense of Agency, the concept of Social Agency has remained oversimplified and underresearched, with disparate empirical paradigms yielding divergent results. Reviewing the empirical evidence and the commonalities and differences between different instantiations of Social Agency, we propose that Social Agency can be conceptualized as a continuum, in which the degree of cooperation is the key dimension that determines our Sense of Agency, and how it relates to nonsocial Sense of Agency. Taking this perspective, we review how the different factors that typically influence Sense of Agency affect Social Agency, and in the process highlight outstanding empirical questions within the field. Finally, concepts from wider research areas are discussed in relation to the ecological validity of Social Agency paradigms, and we provide recommendations for future methodology.