Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 at the Huanan Seafood Market

Emergence of SARS and COVID-19 and preparedness for the next emerging disease X

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) are two human Coronavirus diseases emerging in this century, posing tremendous threats to public health and causing great loss to lives and economy. In this review, we retrospect the studies tracing the molecular evolution of SARS-CoV, and we sort out current research findings about the potential ancestor of SARS-CoV-2. Updated knowledge about SARS-CoV-2-like viruses found in wildlife, the animal susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2, as well as the interspecies transmission risk of SARS-related coronaviruses (SARSr-CoVs) are gathered here. Finally, we discuss the strategies of how to be prepared against future outbreaks of emerging or re-emerging coronaviruses.

SARS-CoV-2 and innate immunity: the good, the bad, and the "goldilocks"

An ancient conflict between hosts and pathogens has driven the innate and adaptive arms of immunity. Knowledge about this interplay can not only help us identify biological mechanisms but also reveal pathogen vulnerabilities that can be leveraged therapeutically. The humoral response to SARS-CoV-2 infection has been the focus of intense research, and the role of the innate immune system has received significantly less attention. Here, we review current knowledge of the innate immune response to SARS-CoV-2 infection and the various means SARS-CoV-2 employs to evade innate defense systems. We also consider the role of innate immunity in SARS-CoV-2 vaccines and in the phenomenon of long COVID.

Virology-the path forward

In the United States (US), biosafety and biosecurity oversight of research on viruses is being reappraised. Safety in virology research is paramount and oversight frameworks should be reviewed periodically. Changes should be made with care, however, to avoid impeding science that is essential for rapidly reducing and responding to pandemic threats as well as addressing more common challenges caused by infectious diseases. Decades of research uniquely positioned the US to be able to respond to the COVID-19 crisis with astounding speed, delivering life-saving vaccines within a year of identifying the virus. We should embolden and empower this strength, which is a vital part of protecting the health, economy, and security of US citizens. Herein, we offer our perspectives on priorities for revised rules governing virology research in the US.

The Question of the Origins of COVID-19 and the Ends of Science

Intense public interest in scientific claims about COVID-19, concerning its origins, modes of spread, evolution, and preventive and therapeutic strategies, has focused attention on the values to which scientists are assumed to be committed and the relationship between science and other public discourses. A much discussed claim, which has stimulated several inquiries and generated far-reaching political and economic consequences, has been that SARS-CoV-2 was deliberately engineered at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and then, either inadvertently or otherwise, released to the public by a laboratory worker. This has been pursued despite a clear refutation, through comprehensive genomic analysis, of the hypothesis that the virus was deliberately engineered and the failure of detailed investigations to identify any evidence in support of a laboratory leak. At the same time a substantial, established body of knowledge about the many factors underlying the emergence of novel zoonotic diseases has been largely ignored-including climate change and other mechanisms of environmental destruction, tourism, patterns of trade, and cultural influences. The existence and conduct of these debates have raised questions about the vulnerability of science to manipulation for political purposes. Scientific discourses are vulnerable because: (i) claims can be made with no more than probabilistic force; (ii) alleged "facts" are always subject to interpretation, which depends on social, ethical, and epistemological assumptions; and (iii) science and scientists are not inherently committed to any single set of values and historically have served diverse, and sometimes perverse, social and political interests. In the face of this complexity, the COVID-19 experience highlights the need for processes of ethical scrutiny of the scientific enterprise and its strategic deployment. To ensure reliability of truth claims and protection from corrupting influences robust ethical discourses are required that are independent of, and at times even contrary to, those of science itself.

Features of SARS-CoV-2 Replication in Various Types of Reptilian and Fish Cell Cultures

BACKGROUND

SARS-CoV-2 can enter the environment from the feces of COVID-19 patients and virus carriers through untreated sewage. The virus has shown the ability to adapt to a wide range of hosts, so the question of the possible involvement of aquafauna and animals of coastal ecosystems in maintaining its circulation remains open.

METHODS

the aim of this work was to study the tropism of SARS-CoV-2 for cells of freshwater fish and reptiles, including those associated with aquatic and coastal ecosystems, and the effect of ambient temperature on this process. In a continuous cell culture FHM (fathead minnow) and diploid fibroblasts CGIB (silver carp), SARS-CoV-2 replication was not maintained at either 25 °C or 29 °C. At 29 °C, the continuous cell culture TH-1 (eastern box turtle) showed high susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2, comparable to Vero E6 (development of virus-induced cytopathic effect (CPE) and an infectious titer of 7.5 ± 0.17 log10 TCID50/mL on day 3 after infection), and primary fibroblasts CNI (Nile crocodile embryo) showed moderate susceptibility (no CPE, infectious titer 4.52 ± 0.14 log10 TCID50/mL on day 5 after infection). At 25 °C, SARS-CoV-2 infection did not develop in TH-1 and CNI.

CONCLUSIONS

our results show the ability of SARS-CoV-2 to effectively replicate without adaptation in the cells of certain reptile species when the ambient temperature rises.

Genetic tracing of market wildlife and viruses at the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic

Zoonotic spillovers of viruses have occurred through the animal trade worldwide. The start of the COVID-19 pandemic was traced epidemiologically to the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, the site with the most reported wildlife vendors in the city of Wuhan, China. Here, we analyze publicly available qPCR and sequencing data from environmental samples collected in the Huanan market in early 2020. We demonstrate that the SARS-CoV-2 genetic diversity linked to this market is consistent with market emergence, and find increased SARS-CoV-2 positivity near and within a particular wildlife stall. We identify wildlife DNA in all SARS-CoV-2 positive samples from this stall. This includes species such as civets, bamboo rats, porcupines, hedgehogs, and one species, raccoon dogs, known to be capable of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. We also detect other animal viruses that infect raccoon dogs, civets, and bamboo rats. Combining metagenomic and phylogenetic approaches, we recover genotypes of market animals and compare them to those from other markets. This analysis provides the genetic basis for a short list of potential intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2 to prioritize for retrospective serological testing and viral sampling.