Testing the effects of Facebook usage in an ethnically polarized setting

Morality in the anthropocene: The perversion of compassion and punishment in the online world

Although much of human morality evolved in an environment of small group living, almost 6 billion people use the internet in the modern era. We argue that the technological transformation has created an entirely new ecosystem that is often mismatched with our evolved adaptations for social living. We discuss how evolved responses to moral transgressions, such as compassion for victims of transgressions and punishment of transgressors, are disrupted by two main features of the online context. First, the scale of the internet exposes us to an unnaturally large quantity of extreme moral content, causing compassion fatigue and increasing public shaming. Second, the physical and psychological distance between moral actors online can lead to ineffective collective action and virtue signaling. We discuss practical implications of these mismatches and suggest directions for future research on morality in the internet era.

Misunderstanding the harms of online misinformation

The controversy over online misinformation and social media has opened a gap between public discourse and scientific research. Public intellectuals and journalists frequently make sweeping claims about the effects of exposure to false content online that are inconsistent with much of the current empirical evidence. Here we identify three common misperceptions: that average exposure to problematic content is high, that algorithms are largely responsible for this exposure and that social media is a primary cause of broader social problems such as polarization. In our review of behavioural science research on online misinformation, we document a pattern of low exposure to false and inflammatory content that is concentrated among a narrow fringe with strong motivations to seek out such information. In response, we recommend holding platforms accountable for facilitating exposure to false and extreme content in the tails of the distribution, where consumption is highest and the risk of real-world harm is greatest. We also call for increased platform transparency, including collaborations with outside researchers, to better evaluate the effects of online misinformation and the most effective responses to it. Taking these steps is especially important outside the USA and Western Europe, where research and data are scant and harms may be more severe.

The effects of Facebook and Instagram on the 2020 election: A deactivation experiment

We study the effect of Facebook and Instagram access on political beliefs, attitudes, and behavior by randomizing a subset of 19,857 Facebook users and 15,585 Instagram users to deactivate their accounts for 6 wk before the 2020 U.S. election. We report four key findings. First, both Facebook and Instagram deactivation reduced an index of political participation (driven mainly by reduced participation online). Second, Facebook deactivation had no significant effect on an index of knowledge, but secondary analyses suggest that it reduced knowledge of general news while possibly also decreasing belief in misinformation circulating online. Third, Facebook deactivation may have reduced self-reported net votes for Trump, though this effect does not meet our preregistered significance threshold. Finally, the effects of both Facebook and Instagram deactivation on affective and issue polarization, perceived legitimacy of the election, candidate favorability, and voter turnout were all precisely estimated and close to zero.

Variation in social media sensitivity across people and contexts

Social media impacts people's wellbeing in different ways, but relatively little is known about why this is the case. Here we introduce the construct of "social media sensitivity" to understand how social media and wellbeing associations differ across people and the contexts in which these platforms are used. In a month-long large-scale intensive longitudinal study (total n = 1632; total number of observations = 120,599), we examined for whom and under which circumstances social media was associated with positive and negative changes in social and affective wellbeing. Applying a combination of frequentist and Bayesian multilevel models, we found a small negative average association between social media use AND subsequent wellbeing, but the associations were heterogenous across people. People with psychologically vulnerable dispositions (e.g., those who were depressed, lonely, not satisfied with life) tended to experience heightened negative social media sensitivity in comparison to people who were not psychologically vulnerable. People also experienced heightened negative social media sensitivity when in certain types of places (e.g., in social places, in nature) and while around certain types of people (e.g., around family members, close ties), as compared to using social media in other contexts. Our results suggest that an understanding of the effects of social media on wellbeing should account for the psychological dispositions of social media users, and the physical and social contexts surrounding their use. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of social media sensitivity for scholars, policymakers, and those in the technology industry.

How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign?

We investigated the effects of Facebook's and Instagram's feed algorithms during the 2020 US election. We assigned a sample of consenting users to reverse-chronologically-ordered feeds instead of the default algorithms. Moving users out of algorithmic feeds substantially decreased the time they spent on the platforms and their activity. The chronological feed also affected exposure to content: The amount of political and untrustworthy content they saw increased on both platforms, the amount of content classified as uncivil or containing slur words they saw decreased on Facebook, and the amount of content from moderate friends and sources with ideologically mixed audiences they saw increased on Facebook. Despite these substantial changes in users' on-platform experience, the chronological feed did not significantly alter levels of issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or other key attitudes during the 3-month study period.

Social Drivers and Algorithmic Mechanisms on Digital Media

On digital media, algorithms that process data and recommend content have become ubiquitous. Their fast and barely regulated adoption has raised concerns about their role in well-being both at the individual and collective levels. Algorithmic mechanisms on digital media are powered by social drivers, creating a feedback loop that complicates research to disentangle the role of algorithms and already existing social phenomena. Our brief overview of the current evidence on how algorithms affect well-being, misinformation, and polarization suggests that the role of algorithms in these phenomena is far from straightforward and that substantial further empirical research is needed. Existing evidence suggests that algorithms mostly reinforce existing social drivers, a finding that stresses the importance of reflecting on algorithms in the larger societal context that encompasses individualism, populist politics, and climate change. We present concrete ideas and research questions to improve algorithms on digital platforms and to investigate their role in current problems and potential solutions. Finally, we discuss how the current shift from social media to more algorithmically curated media brings both risks and opportunities if algorithms are designed for individual and societal flourishing rather than short-term profit.

On the rise of fear speech in online social media

Recently, social media platforms are heavily moderated to prevent the spread of online hate speech, which is usually fertile in toxic words and is directed toward an individual or a community. Owing to such heavy moderation, newer and more subtle techniques are being deployed. One of the most striking among these is fear speech. Fear speech, as the name suggests, attempts to incite fear about a target community. Although subtle, it might be highly effective, often pushing communities toward a physical conflict. Therefore, understanding their prevalence in social media is of paramount importance. This article presents a large-scale study to understand the prevalence of 400K fear speech and over 700K hate speech posts collected from Gab.com. Remarkably, users posting a large number of fear speech accrue more followers and occupy more central positions in social networks than users posting a large number of hate speech. They can also reach out to benign users more effectively than hate speech users through replies, reposts, and mentions. This connects to the fact that, unlike hate speech, fear speech has almost zero toxic content, making it look plausible. Moreover, while fear speech topics mostly portray a community as a perpetrator using a (fake) chain of argumentation, hate speech topics hurl direct multitarget insults, thus pointing to why general users could be more gullible to fear speech. Our findings transcend even to other platforms (Twitter and Facebook) and thus necessitate using sophisticated moderation policies and mass awareness to combat fear speech.

Hatemongers ride on echo chambers to escalate hate speech diffusion

Recent years have witnessed a swelling rise of hateful and abusive content over online social networks. While detection and moderation of hate speech have been the early go-to countermeasures, the solution requires a deeper exploration of the dynamics of hate generation and propagation. We analyze more than 32 million posts from over 6.8 million users across three popular online social networks to investigate the interrelations between hateful behavior, information dissemination, and polarized organization mediated by echo chambers. We find that hatemongers play a more crucial role in governing the spread of information compared to singled-out hateful content. This observation holds for both the growth of information cascades as well as the conglomeration of hateful actors. Dissection of the core-wise distribution of these networks points towards the fact that hateful users acquire a more well-connected position in the social network and often flock together to build up information cascades. We observe that this cohesion is far from mere organized behavior; instead, in these networks, hatemongers dominate the echo chambers-groups of users actively align themselves to specific ideological positions. The observed dominance of hateful users to inflate information cascades is primarily via user interactions amplified within these echo chambers. We conclude our study with a cautionary note that popularity-based recommendation of content is susceptible to be exploited by hatemongers given their potential to escalate content popularity via echo-chambered interactions.

Directing smartphone use through the self-nudge app one sec

Research suggests various associations of smartphone use with a range of physical, psychological, and performance dimensions. Here, we test one sec, a self-nudging app that is installed by the user in order to reduce the mindless use of selected target apps on the smartphone. When users attempt to open a target app of their choice, one sec interferes with a pop-up, which combines a deliberation message, friction by a short waiting time, and the option to dismiss opening the target app. In a field-experiment, we collected behavioral user data from 280 participants over 6 wk, and conducted two surveys before and after the intervention span. one sec reduced the usage of target apps in two ways. First, on average 36% of the times participants attempted opening a target app, they closed that app again after one sec interfered. Second, over the course of 6 wk, users attempted to open target apps 37% less than in the first week. In sum, one sec decreased users' actual opening of target apps by 57% after six consecutive weeks. Afterward, participants also reported spending less time with their apps and indicated increased satisfaction with their consumption. To disentangle one sec's effects, we tested its three psychological features in a preregistered online experiment (N = 500) that measured the consumption of real and viral social media video clips. We found that providing the additional option to dismiss the consumption attempt had the strongest effect. While the friction by time delay also reduced consumption instances, the deliberation message was not effective.

A systematic review of worldwide causal and correlational evidence on digital media and democracy

One of today's most controversial and consequential issues is whether the global uptake of digital media is causally related to a decline in democracy. We conducted a systematic review of causal and correlational evidence (N = 496 articles) on the link between digital media use and different political variables. Some associations, such as increasing political participation and information consumption, are likely to be beneficial for democracy and were often observed in autocracies and emerging democracies. Other associations, such as declining political trust, increasing populism and growing polarization, are likely to be detrimental to democracy and were more pronounced in established democracies. While the impact of digital media on political systems depends on the specific variable and system in question, several variables show clear directions of associations. The evidence calls for research efforts and vigilance by governments and civil societies to better understand, design and regulate the interplay of digital media and democracy.

How does framing influence preference for multiple solutions to societal problems?

Solutions to environmental and social problems are often framed in dichotomous ways, which can be counterproductive. Instead, multiple solutions are often needed to fully address these problems. Here we examine how framing influences people's preference for multiple solutions. In a pre-registered experiment, participants (N = 1,432) were randomly assigned to one of four framing conditions. In the first three conditions, participants were presented with a series of eight problems, each framed with multiple causes, multiple impacts, or multiple solutions to the problem. The control condition did not present any framing information. Participants indicated their preferred solution, perceived severity and urgency of the problem, and their dichotomous thinking tendency. Pre-registered analyses showed that none of the three frames had a significant impact on preference for multiple solutions, perceived severity, perceived urgency, or dichotomous thinking. However, exploratory analyses showed that perceived severity and urgency of the problem were positively correlated with people's preference for multiple solutions, while dichotomous thinking was negatively correlated. These findings showed no demonstrable impact of framing on multi-solution preference. Future interventions should focus on addressing perceived severity and urgency, or decreasing dichotomous thinking to encourage people to adopt multiple solutions to address complex environmental and social problems.

Technology and democracy: a paradox wrapped in a contradiction inside an irony

Democracy is in retreat around the globe. Many commentators have blamed the Internet for this development, whereas others have celebrated the Internet as a tool for liberation, with each opinion being buttressed by supporting evidence. We try to resolve this paradox by reviewing some of the pressure points that arise between human cognition and the online information architecture, and their fallout for the well-being of democracy. We focus on the role of the attention economy, which has monetised dwell time on platforms, and the role of algorithms that satisfy users' presumed preferences. We further note the inherent asymmetry in power between platforms and users that arises from these pressure points, and we conclude by sketching out the principles of a new Internet with democratic credentials.

Field Experiments on Social Media

Online behavioral data, such as digital traces from social media, have the potential to allow researchers an unprecedented new window into human behavior in ecologically valid everyday contexts. However, research using such data is often purely observational, which limits its usefulness for identifying causal relationships. Here we review recent innovations in experimental approaches to studying online behavior, with a particular focus on research related to misinformation and political psychology. In hybrid lab-field studies, exposure to social-media content can be randomized, and the impact on attitudes and beliefs can be measured using surveys, or exposure to treatments can be randomized within survey experiments, and their impact on subsequent online behavior can be observed. In field experiments conducted on social media, randomized treatments can be administered directly to users in the online environment (e.g., via social-tie invitations, private messages, or public posts) without revealing that they are part of an experiment, and the effects on subsequent online behavior can then be observed. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are discussed, along with practical advice and central ethical constraints on such studies.

How social media shapes polarization

This article reviews the empirical evidence on the relationship between social media and political polarization. We argue that social media shapes polarization through the following social, cognitive, and technological processes: partisan selection, message content, and platform design and algorithms.