Optimism and Wishful Thinking: Consistency Across Populations in Children's Expectations for the Future

Children Predict Improvement on Novel Skill Learning Tasks

Learning takes time: Performance usually starts poorly and improves with practice. Do children intuit this basic phenomenon of skill learning? In preregistered Experiment 1 (n = 125; 54% female; 48% White; collected 2022-2023), US 7- to 8-year-old children predicted improved performance, 5- to 6-year-old children predicted flat performance, and 4-year-old children predicted near-instant success followed by worse performance on a novel skill learning task. In preregistered Experiment 2 (n = 75; 47% female; 69% White; collected 2023), on a task with lowered cognitive demands, US 4- to 6-year-old children predicted improved performance. Thus, although children expect to improve on novel tasks, younger children need scaffolding to form these predictions and grasp this fundamental aspect of learning.

This too shall pass, but when? Children's and adults' beliefs about the time duration of emotions, desires, and preferences

This research investigated children's and adults' understanding of the mind by assessing beliefs about the temporal features of mental states. English-speaking North American participants, varying in socioeconomic status (Study 1: N = 50 adults; Study 2: N = 112, 8- to 10-year-olds and adults; and Study 3: N = 116, 5- to 7-year-olds and adults; tested 2017-2022), estimated the duration (seconds to a lifetime) of emotions, desires (wanting), preferences (liking), and control trials (e.g., napping and having eyes). Participants were 56% female and 44% male; 32% Asian, 1% Black, 13% Hispanic/Latino, 38% White (non-Hispanic/Latino), and 16% multiracial or another race/ethnicity. Children and adults judged that preferences last longer than emotions and desires, with age differences in distinguishing specific emotions by duration (η p 2 s > .03 ). By 5 to 7 years, ideas about the mind include consideration of time.

What lies ahead of us? Collective future thinking in Turkish, Chinese, and American adults

Collective future thinking, namely the anticipation of events for a group, is a relatively new research area in memory studies. Research to date with predominantly Western populations suggests that people tend to expect negative events for their country's future. In two studies, we investigated the emotional valence and perceived control of anticipated future events of one's country and examined the roles of country identification and national well-being in collective future thinking. US and Chinese college students (Study 1) and US, Chinese, and Turkish adults of a community sample (Study 2) imagined events that could happen to their respective countries in 1 week, 1 year, and 10-15 years. Participants rated each event on emotional valence and perceived control. They also completed measures for their country identification and perceived national well-being. Chinese participants imagined future events for their country to be more positive than did the US and Turkish participants, whereas US participants reported higher perceived control by their country for the future events than did Chinese and Turks. Country identification and national well-being predicted more positive future thinking and also mediated cultural differences in future-event valence and perceived country control. These original findings shed critical light on the characteristics of collective future thinking that are shaped by societal-cultural factors.

Evidence for Spinozan "Unbelieving" in the Right Inferior Prefrontal Cortex

Humans can think about possible states of the world without believing in them, an important capacity for high-level cognition. Here, we use fMRI and a novel "shell game" task to test two competing theories about the nature of belief and its neural basis. According to the Cartesian theory, information is first understood, then assessed for veracity, and ultimately encoded as either believed or not believed. According to the Spinozan theory, comprehension entails belief by default, such that understanding without believing requires an additional process of "unbelieving." Participants (n = 70) were experimentally induced to have beliefs, desires, or mere thoughts about hidden states of the shell game (e.g., believing that the dog is hidden in the upper right corner). That is, participants were induced to have specific "propositional attitudes" toward specific "propositions" in a controlled way. Consistent with the Spinozan theory, we found that thinking about a proposition without believing it is associated with increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus. This was true whether the hidden state was desired by the participant (because of reward) or merely thought about. These findings are consistent with a version of the Spinozan theory whereby unbelieving is an inhibitory control process. We consider potential implications of these results for the phenomena of delusional belief and wishful thinking.

Optimistic Children Engage in More Constructive Risk-Taking Behaviors

Optimism is linked to persistence and resilience in adults; however, how optimism might relate to children’s evaluations of potentially challenging situations and risk-taking behaviors is unknown. This study examined the role of optimism in 4- to 8-year-old children’s ( N = 121) perceptions of and willingness to engage in physical activities that ranged from low to high risk. Overall, children perceived activities with more risky elements as more dangerous and were less willing to try them, with this pattern strongest in older children. Moreover, children higher in optimism were (1) more willing to engage in moderate-risk activities relative to children lower in optimism, but (2) less willing to engage in the highest-risk activities—even though they perceived those highest-risk activities as less dangerous than children lower in optimism. These findings support the possibility that optimism motivates children to engage in beneficial moderately challenging activities and protects them from engaging in severe injury-inflicting activities.

This is not what I expected: The impact of prior expectations on children's and adults' preferences and emotions

We examined the influence of prior expectations on 4- to 10-year-olds' and adults' preferences and emotions following an undesirable outcome (N = 205; 49% female, 51% male; 6% Asian, 1% Black, 13% Hispanic/Latino [non-White], 57% White, 18% multiracial, and 5% another race/ethnicity; 75% with a college-educated parent). Participants attempted to win a chance game with multiple prizes; the worst prize being a pencil. The game was rigged so that half of the participants lost, and the other half won. Regardless of the game outcome, everyone received a pencil. For winning participants (high-expectation condition), the pencil was worse than the prize they expected; whereas for losing participants (low-expectation condition), the pencil was better than the "nothing" they expected. Participants rated how much they liked and felt about the pencil preoutcome, postoutcome, when imagining having held an alternative prior expectation, and after learning that everyone received a pencil. Results showed that 6- to 10-year-olds and adults with low (vs. high) expectations liked the pencil more, with emotion ratings trending in the same direction. Prior expectations did not influence younger children's affective experiences. More participants with low (vs. high) expectations also expressed a positive outlook about the pencil, which increased with age and correlated with higher postoutcome emotions. More adults than children explained emotions as caused by thoughts, and only adults consistently reasoned that their preferences and emotions would have differed had they held alternative prior expectations. Once knowing that everyone received a pencil, 6- to 10-year-olds and adults liked the pencil more and felt better. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Young children's future-oriented reasoning for self and other: Effects of conflict and perspective

Young children reason more adaptively about the future (e.g., predicting preferences and delaying gratification) when they are asked to think about another person's perspective versus their own perspective. An explanation for this "other-over-self" advantage is that in contexts where current (e.g., small reward now) and future (e.g., larger reward later) desires conflict, adopting the perspective of another person provides psychological distance and hence more adaptive decision making by reducing conflict. We tested this hypothesis in 158 preschoolers using a battery of representative future-oriented reasoning tasks (Preferences, Delay of Gratification, Picture Book, and "Spoon") in which we varied the perspective children adopted (self or other) and the level of conflict between current and future desires (high or low). We predicted that perspective and conflict would interact such that children would benefit most from taking the perspective of "other" when conflict was high. Although results did not support this hypothesis, we found significant effects of conflict; children reasoned more optimally on our low-conflict task condition than on our high-conflict task condition, and these differences did not appear to be related to inhibitory control. The effect of conflict was most marked in younger preschoolers, resulting in Age × Conflict interactions on two of our four tasks. An other-over-self advantage (i.e., perspective effect) was detected on the Preferences task only. These results add to the growing body of literature on children's future thinking by showing the important role of conflict (and its interaction with age) in the accuracy with which children reason about the future.

Children's and Adults' Beliefs about the Stability of Traits from Infancy to Adulthood: Contributions of Age and Executive Function

We examined developmental differences and sources of variability in trait reasoning. Four- to 10-year-olds and adults (N=198) rated how mean or nice "medium-mean" and "medium-nice" babies, kids, and teenagers were earlier in their lifetime and would be at older ages. Participants expected nice-labeled characters to be nice throughout their lives (participant age effects were null). In contrast, we documented age-related differences in judgments about meanness. With increasing participant age, individuals expected that meanness present in infancy, childhood, and adolescence would persist into adulthood. We discovered a curvilinear pattern in assessments of whether meanness originates during infancy: Four- to 5-year-olds and adults expected mean-labeled kids and teenagers to have been nicer as babies than did 6- to 10-year-olds. Controlling for age and working memory, participants with better inhibitory control more frequently expected mean-labeled individuals to remain mean across the lifespan, but inhibitory control was unrelated to judgments about nice-labeled individuals.