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Honeybee as a food nutrition analysis model of neural development and gut microbiota

Research on the relationships between the gut microbiota and the neurophysiology and behavior of animals has grown exponentially in just a few years. Insect behavior may be controlled by molecular mechanisms that are partially homologous to those in mammals, and swarming insects may be suitable as experiment models in these types of investigations. All core gut bacteria in honeybees can be cultivated in vitro. Certain gut microflora of bees can be genetically engineered or sterilized and colonized. The bee gut bacteria model is established more rapidly and has a higher flux than other sterile animal models. It may help elucidate the pathogenesis of intestinal diseases and identify effective molecular therapeutic targets against them. In the present review, we focused on the contributions of the honeybee model in learning cognition and microbiome research. We explored the relationship between honeybee behavior and neurodevelopment and the factors determining the mechanisms by which the gut microbiota affects the host. In particular, we concentrated on the correlation between gut microbiota and brain development. Finally, we examined strategies for the effective use of simple animal models in animal cognition and microbiome research.

Cognitive bias in animal behavior science: a philosophical perspective

Emotional states of animals influence their cognitive processes as well as their behavior. Assessing emotional states is important for animal welfare science as well as for many fields of neuroscience, behavior science, and biomedicine. This can be done in different ways, e.g. through assessing animals’ physiological states or interpreting their behaviors. This paper focuses on the so-called cognitive judgment bias test, which has gained special attention in the last 2 decades and has become a highly important tool for measuring emotional states in non-human animals. However, less attention has been given to the epistemology of the cognitive judgment bias test and to disentangling the relevance of different steps in the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This paper sheds some light on both the epistemology of the methods and the architecture of the underlying cognitive abilities of the tested animals. Based on this reconstruction, we propose a scheme for classifying and assessing different cognitive abilities involved in cognitive judgment bias tests.

The Acute Pharmacological Manipulation of Dopamine Receptors Modulates Judgment Bias in Japanese Quail

We have studied the effects of dopamine antagonists and agonists on Japanese quail behavior in the spatial judgment task. Twenty-four Japanese quail hens were trained in the spatial discrimination task to approach the feeder placed in the rewarded location (Go response, feeder containing mealworms) and to not approach the punished location (No-Go response, empty feeder plus aversive sound). In a subsequent spatial judgment task, the proportion of Go responses as well as approach latencies to rewarded, punished, and three ambiguous locations (near-positive, middle, near-negative, all neither rewarded nor punished) were assessed in 20 quail hens that successfully mastered the discrimination task. In Experiment 1, each bird received five treatments (0.1 and 1.0 mg/kg of dopamine D1 receptor antagonist SCH 23390, 0.05 and 0.5 mg/kg of dopamine D2 receptor antagonist haloperidol, and saline control) in a different order, according to a Latin square design. All drugs were administered intramuscularly 15 min before the spatial judgment test, with 2 days break between the treatments. Both antagonists caused a significant dose-dependent increase in the approach latencies as well as a decrease in the proportion of Go responses. In Experiment 2, with the design analogous to Experiment 1, the hens received again five treatments (1.0 and 10.0 mg/kg of dopamine D1 receptor agonist SKF 38393, 1.0 and 10.0 mg/kg of dopamine D2 receptor agonist bromocriptine, and saline control), applied intramuscularly 2 h before the test. The agonists did not have any significant effect on approach latencies and the proportion of Go responses in the spatial judgment task, as compared to the saline control, except for 10.0 mg/kg SKF 38393, which caused a decrease in the proportion of Go responses. The approach latency and the proportion of Go responses were affected by the cue location in both experiments. Our data suggest that the dopamine D1 and D2 receptor blockade leads to a decrease in the reward expectation and the negative judgment of stimuli. The effect of dopamine receptor activation is less clear. The results reveal that dopamine receptor manipulation alters the evaluation of the reward and punishment in the spatial judgment task.

The cumulative effect of positive and negative feedback on emotional experience

The cumulative effect of positive or negative feedback on subsequent emotional experiences remains unclear. Elucidating this effect could help individuals to better understand and accept the change in emotional experience, irrespective of when they or others receive consecutive positive or negative feedback. This study aimed to examine this effect on 37 participants using self-reported pleasantness and event-related potential data as indicators. After completing each trial, the participants received predetermined false feedback; they were then assessed on a nine-point pleasantness scale. There were 12 false feedback conditions categorized into three valence types. The positive type consisted of three consecutive positive feedbacks and a fourth medium feedback; the medium type contained four consecutive medium feedbacks; the negative type consisted of three consecutive negative feedbacks and a fourth medium feedback. We abbreviated medium false feedback after three positive, medium, and negative false feedbacks as 3 pm, 3 mm, and 3 nm, respectively. The results showed that the score of self-reported pleasantness of 3mm was significantly lower than that of 3 pm and higher than that of 3 nm. The feedback-related negativity amplitude of 3 pm was significantly greater than that of 3 mm and 3 nm, and the late-positive potential amplitude of 3 nm was significantly greater than that of 3 pm and 3 mm. We found that individuals experienced medium feedback more positively and negatively after continuous positive and negative feedback, respectively. Our findings suggest that individuals should seek continuous positive feedback and avoid continuous negative feedback; this strategy may contribute to increased positive emotional experiences in the future.

Animal affect and decision-making

The scientific study of animal affect (emotion) is an area of growing interest. Whilst research on mechanism and causation has predominated, the study of function is less advanced. This is not due to a lack of hypotheses; in both humans and animals, affective states are frequently proposed to play a pivotal role in coordinating adaptive responses and decisions. However, exactly how they might do this (what processes might implement this function) is often left rather vague. Here we propose a framework for integrating animal affect and decision-making that is couched in modern decision theory and employs an operational definition that aligns with dimensional concepts of core affect and renders animal affect empirically tractable. We develop a model of how core affect, including short-term (emotion-like) and longer-term (mood-like) states, influence decision-making via processes that we label affective options, affective predictions, and affective outcomes and which correspond to similar concepts in schema of the links between human emotion and decision-making. Our framework is generalisable across species and generates questions for future research.

Towards a comparative science of emotion: Affect and consciousness in humans and animals

The componential view of human emotion recognises that affective states comprise conscious, behavioural, physiological, neural and cognitive elements. Although many animals display bodily and behavioural changes consistent with the occurrence of affective states similar to those seen in humans, the question of whether and in which species these are accompanied by conscious experiences remains controversial. Finding scientifically valid methods for investigating markers for the subjective component of affect in both humans and animals is central to developing a comparative understanding of the processes and mechanisms of affect and its evolution and distribution across taxonomic groups, to our understanding of animal welfare, and to the development of animal models of affective disorders. Here, contemporary evidence indicating potential markers of conscious processing in animals is reviewed, with a view to extending this search to include markers of conscious affective processing. We do this by combining animal-focused approaches with investigations of the components of conscious and non-conscious emotional processing in humans, and neuropsychological research into the structure and functions of conscious emotions.

Insensitivity to reward shifts in zebrafish (Danio rerio) and implications for assessing affective states

Theory and empirical findings predict that individuals in a negative affective state are more sensitive to unexpected reward loss and less sensitive to unexpected reward gain compared to individuals in a neutral or positive affective state. We explore the use of sensitivity to reward shifts measured during successive contrast tasks as an indicator of affect in zebrafish (Danio rerio). In line with the assumption that exposure to rewarding stimuli induces a relatively positive affective state compared to exposure to stimuli that they do not prefer, we confirmed that zebrafish prefer enriched over barren environments, suggesting that the enriched environment is associated with positive affective states. We trained individuals to swim down a channel for food rewards of differing value and then presented them with unexpected increases or decreases in reward value. Contrary to our hypothesis, individuals conditioned to a high-value reward continued swimming at the same speed when reward value was downshifted, thus showing no successive negative contrast effect and appearing insensitive to reward loss. Individuals whose rewards were upshifted gradually increased their speed, but did not display successive positive contrast effects typical of sensitivity to reward gains. In both cases, housing type did not result in differences in swim time. One potential explanation is that goal-directed control of behaviour is necessary for an animal to show a successive contrast response to unexpected reward gain or loss, and the behaviour of zebrafish in this task was under habitual control, perhaps due to over-training. If so, refinements to task design and training procedures will allow further progress with this assay.

State-dependent judgement bias in Drosophila: evidence for evolutionarily primitive affective processes

Affective states influence decision-making under ambiguity in humans and other animals. Individuals in a negative state tend to interpret ambiguous cues more negatively than individuals in a positive state. We demonstrate that the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster, also exhibits state-dependent changes in cue interpretation. Drosophila were trained on a Go/Go task to approach a positive (P) odour associated with a sugar reward and actively avoid a negative (N) odour associated with shock. Trained flies were then either shaken to induce a purported negative state or left undisturbed (control), and given a choice between: air or P; air or N; air or ambiguous odour (1 : 1 blend of P : N). Shaken flies were significantly less likely to approach the ambiguous odour than control flies. This ‘judgement bias’ may be mediated by changes in neural activity that reflect evolutionarily primitive affective states. We cannot say whether such states are consciously experienced, but use of this model organism's versatile experimental tool kit may facilitate elucidation of their neural and genetic basis.

Animal emotion: Descriptive and prescriptive definitions and their implications for a comparative perspective

In recent years there has been a growing research interest in the field of animal emotion. But there is still little agreement about whether and how the word "emotion" should be defined for use in the context of non-human species. Here, we make a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive definitions. Descriptive definitions delineate the ways in which the word emotion is used in everyday life. Prescriptive definitions are used to pick out the set of events that scientific theories of emotion purport to explain. Picking out three prescriptive definitions, we show that the different ways in which emotions are defined correspond to processes that are distributed differentially across the animal kingdom. We propose that these definitions provide a useful starting point for investigating the varying emotional capacities of a wide range of animals, providing a basis for a new, comparative science of emotion.

To Group or Not to Group? Good Practice for Housing Male Laboratory Mice

Simple Summary

Wild mice live in territories inhabited by one adult male, several females, and their offspring. This cannot be replicated in the laboratory, so male mice are usually housed in single-sex groups or individually. However, there can be serious animal welfare problems associated with both these approaches, such as lack of social contact when housed individually or aggression between males when kept in groups. Group housing is widely recommended to give male laboratory mice the opportunity to behave as ‘social animals’, but social stress can be detrimental to the welfare of these animals, even without injurious fighting. All of this can also affect the quality of the science, giving rise to ethical concerns. This review discusses whether it is in the best welfare interests of male mice to be housed in groups, or alone. We conclude that it is not possible to give general recommendations for good practice for housing male laboratory mice, as responses to single- and group-housing can be highly context-dependent. The welfare implications of housing protocols should be researched and considered in each case.

Abstract

It is widely recommended to group-house male laboratory mice because they are ‘social animals’, but male mice do not naturally share territories and aggression can be a serious welfare problem. Even without aggression, not all animals within a group will be in a state of positive welfare. Rather, many male mice may be negatively affected by the stress of repeated social defeat and subordination, raising concerns about welfare and also research validity. However, individual housing may not be an appropriate solution, given the welfare implications associated with no social contact. An essential question is whether it is in the best welfare interests of male mice to be group- or singly housed. This review explores the likely impacts—positive and negative—of both housing conditions, presents results of a survey of current practice and awareness of mouse behavior, and includes recommendations for good practice and future research. We conclude that whether group- or single-housing is better (or less worse) in any situation is highly context-dependent according to several factors including strain, age, social position, life experiences, and housing and husbandry protocols. It is important to recognise this and evaluate what is preferable from animal welfare and ethical perspectives in each case.

Do Insects Have Emotions? Some Insights from Bumble Bees

While our conceptual understanding of emotions is largely based on human subjective experiences, research in comparative cognition has shown growing interest in the existence and identification of "emotion-like" states in non-human animals. There is still ongoing debate about the nature of emotions in animals (especially invertebrates), and certainly their existence and the existence of certain expressive behaviors displaying internal emotional states raise a number of exciting and challenging questions. Interestingly, at least superficially, insects (bees and flies) seem to fulfill the basic requirements of emotional behavior. Yet, recent works go a step further by adopting terminologies and interpretational frameworks that could have been considered as crude anthropocentrism and that now seem acceptable in the scientific literature on invertebrate behavior and cognition. This change in paradigm requires, therefore, that the question of emotions in invertebrates is reconsidered from a cautious perspective and with parsimonious explanations. Here we review and discuss this controversial topic based on the recent finding that bumblebees experience positive emotions while experiencing unexpected sucrose rewards, but also incorporating a broader survey of recent literature in which similar claims have been done for other invertebrates. We maintain that caution is warranted before attributing emotion-like states to honey bees and bumble bees as some experimental caveats may undermine definitive conclusions. We suggest that interpreting many of these findings in terms of motivational drives may be less anthropocentrically biased and more cautious, at least until more careful experiments warrant the use of an emotion-related terminology.

Pavlovian influences on learning differ between rats and mice in a counter-balanced Go/NoGo judgement bias task

Judgement bias tests of animal affect and hence welfare assume that the animal's responses to ambiguous stimuli, which may herald positive or negative outcomes, are under instrumental control and reflect 'optimism' or 'pessimism' about what will happen. However, Pavlovian control favours responses (e.g. approach or withdrawal) according to the valence associated with a stimulus, rather than the anticipated response outcomes. Typically, positive contexts promote action and approach whilst negative contexts promote inhibition or withdrawal. The prevalence of Go-for-reward (Go-pos) and NoGo-to-avoid-punishment (NoGo-neg) judgement bias tasks reflects this Pavlovian influence. A Pavlovian increase or decrease in activity or vigour has also been argued to accompany positive or negative affective states, and this may interfere with instrumental Go or NoGo decisions under ambiguity based on anticipated decision outcomes. One approach to these issues is to develop counter-balanced Go-pos/NoGo-neg and Go-neg/NoGo-pos tasks. Here we implement such tasks in Sprague Dawley rats and C57BL/6J mice using food and air-puff as decision outcomes. We find striking species/strain differences with rats achieving criterion performance on the Go-pos/NoGo-neg task but failing to learn the Go-neg/NoGo-pos task, in line with predictions, whilst mice do exactly the opposite. Pavlovian predispositions may thus differ between species, for example reflecting foraging and predation ecology and/or baseline activity rates. Learning failures are restricted to cues predicting a negative outcome; use of a more powerful air-puff stimulus may thus allow implementation of a fully counter-balanced task. Rats and mice achieve criterion faster than in comparable automated tasks and also show the expected generalisation of responses across ambiguous tones. A fully counter-balanced task thus offers a potentially rapidly implemented and automated method for assessing animal welfare, identifying welfare problems and areas for welfare improvement and 3Rs Refinement, and assessing the effectiveness of refinements.