On Known Unknowns: Fluency and the Neural Mechanisms of Illusory Truth

Item-method directed forgetting and perceived truth of news headlines

Research on item-method directed forgetting (IMDF) suggests that memories can be voluntarily forgotten. IMDF is however usually examined with relatively simple study materials, such as single words or pictures. In the present study, we examined voluntary forgetting of news headlines from (presumably) untrustworthy sources. Experiment 1 found intact IMDF when to-be-forgotten headlines were characterised as untrustworthy and to-be-remembered headlines were characterised as trustworthy. Experiment 2 separated remember/forget cues and trustworthiness prompts. Forget cues alone had a large effect on memory, but only a small reducing effect on perceived truth. In contrast, trustworthiness prompts alone had essentially no effect on memory, but a large effect on perceived truth. Finally, Experiment 3 fully crossed forget/remember cues and trustworthiness prompts, revealing that forget cues can reduce memory irrespective of whether headlines are characterised as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Moreover, forget cues may bias source attributions, which can explain their small reducing effect on perceived truth. Overall, this work suggests that news headlines can be voluntarily forgotten. At least when people are motivated to forget information from untrustworthy sources, such forgetting may be helpful for curtailing the spread of false information.

Fake News and the Sleeper Effect in Social Media Posts: the Case of Perception of Safety in the Workplace

Fake news and misinformation on social media platforms are two of the biggest problems of the last few years. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of memory is of fundamental importance to develop specific intervention programs. In this study, 324 white-collar workers viewed Facebook posts focused on coronavirus disease-2019 prevention norms in the workplace. In a within-participants design, we manipulated the message and the source to expose each participant to real news, real news presented by a discounting cue (sleeper effect condition), and fake news. The results show that participants were more susceptible to fake news during a 1-week delayed posttest following a memory recall process. Furthermore, they remembered the message easily, but not the source, which did not differ in the real-news conditions. We discuss the results, mentioning the sleeper effect and fake news theories.

Lack of source memory as a potential marker of early assimilation of novel items into current knowledge

In daily life, humans process a plethora of new information that can be either consistent (familiar) or inconsistent (novel) with prior knowledge. Over time, both types of information can integrate into our accumulated knowledge base via distinct pathways. However, the mnemonic processes supporting the integration of information that is inconsistent with prior knowledge remain under-characterized. In the current study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the initial assimilation of novel items into the semantic network. Participants saw three repetitions of adjective-noun word pairs that were either consistent or inconsistent with prior knowledge. Twenty-four hours later, they were presented with the same stimuli again while undergoing fMRI scans. Outside the scanner, participants completed a surprise recognition test. We found that when the episodic context associated with initially inconsistent items was irretrievable, the neural signature of these items was indistinguishable from that of consistent items. In contrast, initially inconsistent items with accessible episodic contexts showed neural signatures that differed from those associated with consistent items. We suggest that, at least one day post encoding, items inconsistent with prior knowledge can show early assimilation into the semantic network only when their episodic contexts become inaccessible during retrieval, thus evoking a sense of familiarity.

The effect of mindfulness intervention on internet negative news perception and processing: An implicit and explicit approach

The internet facilitates the formation of the information society while also accelerating the viral spread of negative news and negative emotions, increasing public uncertainty and depression and impeding consensus, especially in the post-pandemic period. Mindfulness intervention, which has a positive effect on attention focus, self-regulation, and subjective wellbeing, is proven to mitigate negative emotional effects, and even alter mind patterns. The study aimed to give insight into the effect of mindfulness in the new media field, concerning trait mindfulness improvement, emotional arousal and regulation, and implicit attitudes from the perspective of intra-personal communication and positive communication. The study conducted a randomized pre-test-post-test control group design, with 3 (condition groups: mindfulness vs. placebo vs. control) × 2 (test times: pre vs. post). Participants who were exposed to negative news coverage with negative emotional arousal received 14 consecutive days of intervention. The results showed that mindfulness training can improve trait mindfulness effectively on the whole, especially in facets of describing, acting awareness, and non-judgment, and mitigate the negative effect from bad information coverage, while mindfulness intervention on mind patterns and expectations on controversial issues still awaited future empirical research. The present study intended to bridge the bonding between positive psychology and new media studies by focusing on individual attention improvement and negative emotion regulation, in the expectation that trait mindfulness can be beneficial in individual infodemic syndromes such as judgment bias and information exhaustion, and avoidance.

Prior exposure increases judged truth even during periods of mind wandering

Much of our day is spent mind-wandering-periods of inattention characterized by a lack of awareness of external stimuli and information. Whether we are paying attention or not, information surrounds us constantly-some true and some false. The proliferation of false information in news and social media highlights the critical need to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying our beliefs about what is true. People often rely on heuristics to judge the truth of information. For example, repeated information is more likely to be judged as true than new information (i.e., the illusory truth effect). However, despite the prevalence of mind wandering in our daily lives, current research on the contributing factors to the illusory truth effect have largely ignored periods of inattention as experimentally informative. Here, we aim to address this gap in our knowledge, investigating whether mind wandering during initial exposure to information has an effect on later belief in the truth of that information. That is, does the illusory truth effect occur even when people report not paying attention to the information at hand. Across three studies we demonstrate that even during periods of mind wandering, the repetition of information increases truth judgments. Further, our results suggest that the severity of mind wandering moderated truth ratings, such that greater levels of mind wandering decreased truth judgements for previously presented information.

Misinformation: susceptibility, spread, and interventions to immunize the public

The spread of misinformation poses a considerable threat to public health and the successful management of a global pandemic. For example, studies find that exposure to misinformation can undermine vaccination uptake and compliance with public-health guidelines. As research on the science of misinformation is rapidly emerging, this conceptual Review summarizes what we know along three key dimensions of the infodemic: susceptibility, spread, and immunization. Extant research is evaluated on the questions of why (some) people are (more) susceptible to misinformation, how misinformation spreads in online social networks, and which interventions can help to boost psychological immunity to misinformation. Implications for managing the infodemic are discussed.

Reasoning strategies determine the effect of disconfirmation on belief in false claims

The dual-strategy model of reasoning proposes that people tend to use one of two reasoning strategies: either a statistical or a counterexample strategy, with the latter being more sensitive to potential counterexamples to a given conclusion. Previous studies have examined the effects of reasoning strategy in a variety of contexts. In the present study, we looked at the effects of gist repetition and disconfirmation on belief in an unknown claim. This is particularly interesting since there is no single normative analysis of this situation. We examine the hypotheses that (a) increasing gist repetition will result in higher levels of belief with both counterexample and statistical reasoners, and (b) that counterexample reasoners will have lower belief levels following a single disconfirming instance than will statistical reasoners. In a large-scale online study, over 2,000 adult participants received a False Claim procedure along with a Strategy Diagnostic. Results are consistent with the hypotheses. This provides strong evidence that the dual-strategy model captures a clear difference in information processing that is not captured by any normative/non-normative distinction.

Can pupillometry distinguish accurate from inaccurate familiarity?

Pupillometry, the measurement of pupil diameter, has become increasingly popular as a tool to investigate human memory. It has long been accepted that the pupil is able to distinguish familiar from completely novel items, a phenomenon known as "pupil old/new effect". Surprisingly, most pupillometric studies on the pupil old/new effect tend to disregard the possibility that the pupillary response to familiarity memory may not be entirely exclusive. Here, we investigated whether the pupillary response to old items correctly judged familiar (hits; accurate familiarity) can be differentiated from the pupillary response to new items wrongly judged familiar (false alarms; inaccurate familiarity). We found no evidence that the two processes could be isolated, as both accurate and inaccurate familiarity showed nearly identical mean and across-time pupillary responses. However, both familiarity hits and false alarms showed pupillary responses unequivocally distinct from those observed during either recollection or novelty detection, which suggests that the pupil measure of familiarity hits and/or false alarms was sufficiently sensitive. The pupillary response to false alarms may have been partially driven by perceptual fluency, since novel objects incorrectly judged to be old (i.e., false alarms) showed a higher degree of similarity to studied images than items correctly judged as novel (i.e., correct rejections). Thus, our results suggest that pupil dilation may not be able to distinguish accurate from inaccurate familiarity using standard recognition memory paradigms, and they also suggest that the pupillary response during familiarity feelings may also partly reflect perceptual fluency.

An Examination of Factors Contributing to the Acceptance of Online Health Misinformation

This study examined factors including health-related anxiety, preexisting misinformation beliefs, and repeated exposure contributing to individuals’ acceptance of health misinformation. Through a large-scale online survey, this study found that health-related anxiety was positively associated with health misinformation acceptance. Preexisting misinformation beliefs, as well as repeated exposure to health misinformation, were both positively associated with health misinformation acceptance. The results also showed that demographic variables were significantly associated with health misinformation acceptance. In general, females accepted more health misinformation compared to males. Participants’ age was negatively associated with health misinformation acceptance. Participants’ education level and income were both negatively associated with their acceptance of health misinformation.

The Psychology of Fake News

We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share false or highly misleading news online. Contrary to a common narrative whereby politics drives susceptibility to fake news, people are 'better' at discerning truth from falsehood (despite greater overall belief) when evaluating politically concordant news. Instead, poor truth discernment is associated with lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge, and the use of heuristics such as familiarity. Furthermore, there is a substantial disconnect between what people believe and what they share on social media. This dissociation is largely driven by inattention, more so than by purposeful sharing of misinformation. Thus, interventions can successfully nudge social media users to focus more on accuracy. Crowdsourced veracity ratings can also be leveraged to improve social media ranking algorithms.

Medical disinformation and the unviable nature of COVID-19 conspiracy theories

The coronavirus pandemic has seen a marked rise in medical disinformation across social media. A variety of claims have garnered considerable traction, including the assertion that COVID is a hoax or deliberately manufactured, that 5G frequency radiation causes coronavirus, and that the pandemic is a ruse by big pharmaceutical companies to profiteer off a vaccine. An estimated 30% of some populations subscribe some form of COVID medico-scientific conspiracy narratives, with detrimental impacts for themselves and others. Consequently, exposing the lack of veracity of these claims is of considerable importance. Previous work has demonstrated that historical medical and scientific conspiracies are highly unlikely to be sustainable. In this article, an expanded model for a hypothetical en masse COVID conspiracy is derived. Analysis suggests that even under ideal circumstances for conspirators, commonly encountered conspiratorial claims are highly unlikely to endure, and would quickly be exposed. This work also explores the spectrum of medico-scientific acceptance, motivations behind propagation of falsehoods, and the urgent need for the medical and scientific community to anticipate and counter the emergence of falsehoods.

A database of general knowledge question performance in older adults

General knowledge questions are used across a variety of research and clinical settings to measure cognitive processes such as metacognition, knowledge acquisition, retrieval processes, and intelligence. Existing norms only report performance in younger adults, rendering them of limited utility for cognitive aging research because of well-documented differences in semantic memory and knowledge as a function of age. Specifically, older adults typically outperform younger adults in tasks assessing retrieval of information from the knowledge base. Here we present older adult performance on 421 general knowledge questions across a range of difficulty levels. Cued recall data, including data on the phenomenology of retrieval failures, and multiple-choice data are available. These norms will allow researchers to identify questions that are not likely to be known by older adult participants to examine learning or acquisition processes, or to select questions within a range of marginal accessibility, for example. Comparisons with young adult data from prior databases confirms previous findings of greater knowledge in older adults and indicates there is preservation of knowledge from early adulthood into older adulthood.

An initial accuracy focus reduces the effect of prior exposure on perceived accuracy of news headlines

The illusory truth effect occurs when the repetition of a claim increases its perceived truth. Previous studies have demonstrated the illusory truth effect with true and false news headlines. The present study examined the effects that different ratings made during initial exposure have on the illusory truth effect with news headlines. In two experiments, participants (total N = 575) rated a set of news headlines in one of two conditions. Some participants rated how interesting they were, and others rated how truthful they were. Participants later rated the perceived accuracy of a larger set of headlines that included previously rated and new headlines. In both experiments, prior exposure increased perceived accuracy for participants who made initial interest ratings, but not for participants who made initial truthfulness ratings. The increase in perceived accuracy that accompanies repeated exposure was attenuated when participants considered the accuracy of the headlines at initial exposure. Experiment 2 also found evidence for a political bias: participants rated politically concordant headlines as more accurate than politically discordant headlines. The magnitude of this bias was related to performance on a cognitive reflection test; more analytic participants demonstrated greater political bias. These results highlight challenges that fake news presents and suggest that initially encoding headlines’ perceived truth can serve to combat the illusion that a familiar headline is a truthful one.

Cheaters claim they knew the answers all along

Cheating has become commonplace in academia and beyond. Yet, almost everyone views themselves favorably, believing that they are honest, trustworthy, and of high integrity. We investigate one possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy between people's actions and their favorable self-concepts: People who cheat on tests believe that they knew the answers all along. We found consistent correlational evidence across three studies that, for those particular cases in which participants likely cheated, they were more likely to report that they knew the answers all along. Experimentally, we then found that participants were more likely to later claim that they knew the answers all along after having the opportunity to cheat to find the correct answers - relative to exposure to the correct answers without the opportunity to cheat. These findings provide new insights into relationships between memory, metacognition, and the self-concept.

Not just conspiracy theories: Vaccine opponents and proponents add to the COVID-19 'infodemic' on Twitter

In February 2020, the World Health Organization announced an 'infodemic' -- a deluge of both accurate and inaccurate health information -- that accompanied the global pandemic of COVID-19 as a major challenge to effective health communication. We assessed content from the most active vaccine accounts on Twitter to understand how existing online communities contributed to the 'infodemic' during the early stages of the pandemic. While we expected vaccine opponents to share misleading information about COVID-19, we also found vaccine proponents were not immune to spreading less reliable claims. In both groups, the single largest topic of discussion consisted of narratives comparing COVID-19 to other diseases like seasonal influenza, often downplaying the severity of the novel coronavirus. When considering the scope of the 'infodemic,' researchers and health communicators must move beyond focusing on known bad actors and the most egregious types of misinformation to scrutinize the full spectrum of information -- from both reliable and unreliable sources -- that the public is likely to encounter online.

Does evaluating belief prior to its retraction influence the efficacy of later corrections?

News stories unfold over time, with initial reports sometimes containing mistaken accounts of the newsworthy outcome that are ultimately revised or corrected. Because facts associated with newsworthy events are accumulated in this piecemeal fashion, readers often have repeated opportunities to reflect upon, discuss, and evaluate their belief in these accounts before they learn that initial news reports have been revised or retracted. The primary goal of the present study was to assess whether rating the strength of one's belief in the initially reported, mistaken cause might influence the efficacy of a later correction. In the current study, participants evaluated their belief in the target cause by either rating how much they believed it caused the outcome (Experiment 1) or rating the probability that the target caused the outcome (Experiment 2). The results showed that evaluating belief in a target cause prior to its retraction (relative to not doing so) rendered the correction more effective. This enhanced correction effect was not observed when participants generated the target information prior to its retraction (Experiment 3). Collectively, the results suggest that it is not how much people believe something, but whether they have thought about why they do or do not believe it, that affects their later willingness to revise their mistaken beliefs.

Judging Truth

Deceptive claims surround us, embedded in fake news, advertisements, political propaganda, and rumors. How do people know what to believe? Truth judgments reflect inferences drawn from three types of information: base rates, feelings, and consistency with information retrieved from memory. First, people exhibit a bias to accept incoming information, because most claims in our environments are true. Second, people interpret feelings, like ease of processing, as evidence of truth. And third, people can (but do not always) consider whether assertions match facts and source information stored in memory. This three-part framework predicts specific illusions (e.g., truthiness, illusory truth), offers ways to correct stubborn misconceptions, and suggests the importance of converging cues in a post-truth world, where falsehoods travel further and faster than the truth.

Familiarity with visual stimuli boosts recency bias in macaques

To probe how non-human primates (NHPs) decode temporal dynamic stimuli, we used a two-alternative forced choice task (2AFC), where the cue was dynamic: a movie snippet drawn from an animation that transforms one image into another. When the cue was drawn from either the beginning or end of the animation, thus heavily weighted towards one (the target) of both images (the choice pair), then primates performed at high levels of accuracy. For a subset of trials, however, the cue was ambiguous, drawn from the middle of the animation, containing information that could be associated to either image. Those trials, rewarded randomly and independent of choice, offered an opportunity to study the strategy the animals used trying to decode the cue. Despite being ambiguous, the primates exhibited a clear strategy, suggesting they were not aware that reward was given non-differentially. More specifically, they relied more on information provided at the end than at the beginning of those cues, consistent with the recency effect reported by numerous serial position studies. Interestingly and counterintuitively, this effect became stronger for sessions where the primates were already familiar with the stimuli. In other words, despite having rehearsed with the same stimuli in a previous session, the animals relied even more on a decision strategy that did not yield any benefits during a previous session. In the discussion section we speculate on what might cause this behavioral shift towards stronger bias, as well as why this behavior shows similarities with a repetition bias in humans known as the illusory truth effect.

An initial accuracy focus prevents illusory truth

News stories, advertising campaigns, and political propaganda often repeat misleading claims, increasing their persuasive power. Repeated statements feel easier to process, and thus truer, than new ones. Surprisingly, this illusory truth effect occurs even when claims contradict young adults' stored knowledge (e.g., repeating The fastest land animal is the leopard makes it more believable). In four experiments, we tackled this problem by prompting people to behave like "fact checkers." Focusing on accuracy at exposure (giving initial truth ratings) wiped out the illusion later, but only when participants held relevant knowledge. This selective benefit persisted over a delay. Our findings inform theories of how people evaluate truth and suggest practical strategies for coping in a "post-truth world."

Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

Who falls for fake news? The roles of bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking

OBJECTIVE

Fake news represents a particularly egregious and direct avenue by which inaccurate beliefs have been propagated via social media. We investigate the psychological profile of individuals who fall prey to fake news.

METHOD

We recruited 1,606 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk for three online surveys.

RESULTS

The tendency to ascribe profundity to randomly generated sentences-pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity-correlates positively with perceptions of fake news accuracy, and negatively with the ability to differentiate between fake and real news (media truth discernment). Relatedly, individuals who overclaim their level of knowledge also judge fake news to be more accurate. We also extend previous research indicating that analytic thinking correlates negatively with perceived accuracy by showing that this relationship is not moderated by the presence/absence of the headline's source (which has no effect on accuracy), or by familiarity with the headlines (which correlates positively with perceived accuracy of fake and real news).

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that belief in fake news may be driven, to some extent, by a general tendency to be overly accepting of weak claims. This tendency, which we refer to as reflexive open-mindedness, may be partly responsible for the prevalence of epistemically suspect beliefs writ large.

The neural mechanism of fluency-based memory illusions: the role of fluency context

Recognition memory judgments can be influenced by a variety of signals including fluency. Here, we investigated whether the neural correlates of memory illusions (i.e., misattribution of fluency to prior study) can be modulated by fluency context. Using a masked priming/recognition memory paradigm, we found memory illusions for low confidence decisions. When fluency varied randomly across trials, we found reductions in perirhinal cortex (PrC) activity for primed trials, as well as a (pre)cuneus-PrC (BA 35) connectivity. When the fluency context was unchanging, there was increased PrC activity for primed trials, with the (pre)cuneus showing greater connectivity with PrC (BA 36). Thus, our results tentatively suggest two neural mechanisms via which fluency can lead to memory illusions.

Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news

The 2016 U.S. presidential election brought considerable attention to the phenomenon of "fake news": entirely fabricated and often partisan content that is presented as factual. Here we demonstrate one mechanism that contributes to the believability of fake news: fluency via prior exposure. Using actual fake-news headlines presented as they were seen on Facebook, we show that even a single exposure increases subsequent perceptions of accuracy, both within the same session and after a week. Moreover, this "illusory truth effect" for fake-news headlines occurs despite a low level of overall believability and even when the stories are labeled as contested by fact checkers or are inconsistent with the reader's political ideology. These results suggest that social media platforms help to incubate belief in blatantly false news stories and that tagging such stories as disputed is not an effective solution to this problem. It is interesting, however, that we also found that prior exposure does not impact entirely implausible statements (e.g., "The earth is a perfect square"). These observations indicate that although extreme implausibility is a boundary condition of the illusory truth effect, only a small degree of potential plausibility is sufficient for repetition to increase perceived accuracy. As a consequence, the scope and impact of repetition on beliefs is greater than has been previously assumed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Neural basis of goal-driven changes in knowledge activation

Depending on a person's goals, different aspects of stored knowledge are accessed. Decades of behavioral work document the flexible use of knowledge, but little neuroimaging work speaks to these questions. We used representational similarity analysis to investigate whether the relationship between brain activity and semantic structure of statements varied in two tasks hypothesized to differ in the degree to which knowledge is accessed: judging truth (semantic task) and judging oldness (episodic task). During truth judgments, but not old/new recognition judgments, a left-lateralized network previously associated with semantic memory exhibited correlations with semantic structure. At a neural level, people activate knowledge representations in different ways when focused on different goals. The present results demonstrate the potential of multivariate approaches in characterizing knowledge storage and retrieval, as well as the ways that it shapes our understanding and long-term memory.

Knowledge supports memory retrieval through familiarity, not recollection

Semantic memory, or general knowledge of the world, guides learning and supports the formation and retrieval of new episodic memories. Behavioral evidence suggests that this knowledge effect is supported by recollection-a more controlled form of memory retrieval generally accompanied by contextual details-to a greater degree than familiarity-a more automatic form of memory retrieval generally absent of contextual details. In the current study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the role that regions associated with recollection and familiarity play in retrieving recent instances of known (e.g., The Summer Olympic Games are held four years apart) and unknown (e.g., A flaky deposit found in port bottles is beeswing) statements. Our results revealed a surprising pattern: Episodic retrieval of known statements recruited regions associated with familiarity, but not recollection. Instead, retrieval of unknown statements recruited regions associated with recollection. These data, in combination with quicker reaction times for the retrieval of known than unknown statements, suggest that known statements can be successfully retrieved on the basis of familiarity, whereas unknown statements were retrieved on the basis of recollection. Our results provide insight into how knowledge influences episodic retrieval and demonstrate the role of neuroimaging in providing insights into cognitive processes in the absence of explicit behavioral responses.

A 'curse of knowledge' in the absence of knowledge? People misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers

Knowledge can be a curse: Once we have acquired a particular item of knowledge it tends to bias, or contaminate, our ability to reason about a less informed perspective (referred to as the 'curse of knowledge' or 'hindsight bias'). The mechanisms underlying the curse of knowledge bias are a matter of great import and debate. We highlight two mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie this bias-inhibition and fluency misattribution. Explanations that involve inhibition argue that people have difficulty fully inhibiting or suppressing the content of their knowledge when trying to reason about a less informed perspective. Explanations that involve fluency misattribution focus on the feelings of fluency with which the information comes to mind and the tendency to misattribute the subjective feelings of fluency associated with familiar items to the objective ease or foreseeability of that information. Three experiments with a total of 359 undergraduate students provide the first evidence that fluency misattribution processes are sufficient to induce the curse of knowledge bias. These results add to the literature on the many manifestations of the curse of knowledge bias and the many types of source misattributions, by revealing their role in people's judgements of how common, or widespread, one's knowledge is. The implications of these results for cognitive science and social cognition are discussed.