Beliefs That White People Are Poor, Above and Beyond Beliefs That Black People Are Poor, Predict White (But Not Black) Americans' Attitudes Toward Welfare Recipients and Policy

In past work, White Americans' beliefs about Black poverty have predicted lower perceived work ethic of the poor, and, thus, less welfare support. In this article, we examine whether beliefs about White poverty predict more positive attributions about the poor among three representative samples of White Americans. Study 1 reveals that White (but not Black) Americans' White-poor beliefs predict increased perceptions that welfare recipients are hardworking, which predict more welfare support. Study 2 demonstrates that the link between White Americans' White-poor beliefs and the humanization of welfare recipients is stronger among White Americans who feel intergroup status threat (i.e., those who hold racial zero-sum beliefs). Study 3 replicates and extends Study 2 by using an experimental approach. Together, these data suggest that White Americans' White-poor beliefs function to humanize welfare recipients as a means to justify policies that could help the ingroup, preserving the racial status quo.

Disease, Scapegoating, and Social Contexts: Examining Social Contexts of the Support for Racist Naming of COVID-19 on Twitter

In early 2020, when COVID-19 began to spread in the United States, many Twitter users called it the "Chinese virus," blaming racial outgroups for the pandemic. I collected tweets containing the "Chinese virus" derivatives posted from March to August 2020 by users within the United States and created a data set with 141,290 tweets published by 50,695 users. I calculated the ratio of users who supported the racist naming of COVID-19 per county and merged Twitter data with the county-level census. Multilevel regression models show that counties with higher COVID-19 mortality or infection rates have more support for the racist naming. Second, the mortality and infection rates effects are stronger in counties with faster minority growth. Moreover, it is mainly in poor counties that minority growth enlarges the effects of infection and mortality rates. These findings relate to the theories on disease-induced xenophobia and the debate between conflict and contact theories.

Early perceptions of COVID-19 intensity and anti-Asian prejudice among White Americans

Anecdotal reports suggested an uptick in anti-Asian prejudice corresponding with the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Examining responses from White U.S. citizens (N = 589) during the first months of the pandemic, this study tested: (a) whether actual intensity (official number of cases or deaths reported) or perceived intensity (participants' estimates of the same) of the COVID-19 outbreak predicted indicators of racial outgroup prejudice, particularly those associated with cross-group interaction, (b) whether outgroup prejudice was oriented toward Asian people specifically, or toward racial outgroups more broadly (e.g., toward both Asian people and Black people), and (c) whether contact with racial outgroups moderated relations between COVID-19 intensity and racial prejudice. Results showed that perceived COVID-19 intensity was associated with prejudice indicators representing the desire for social distance from Asian people, as well as from Black people, yet it was unrelated to reports of negative affect toward either racial outgroup. These patterns support the idea that prejudice during periods of disease outbreak might functionally serve to reduce willingness for interaction with, and likelihood of infection from, racial outgroups. Contact moderated the relation between official reports of COVID-19 intensity and support for anti-China travel policies, such that greater contact with Asian people was associated with less support for exclusionary, anti-China travel policies when actual COVID-19 intensity was high. Overall, these results suggest that intensity of disease threat can exacerbate racial outgroup prejudice and reduce willingness for cross-group interaction, but that intergroup contact may sometimes provide a prejudice-attenuating effect.

Perceived status threat and health among White Americans: A scoping review

Previous research on pre-COVID-19 pandemic rising White mortality in the United States suggests that White Americans' perceived decline in relative group status may have influenced worsening mortality. In conjunction with other social and economic indicators, social status threat is one determinant of this population-level health shift, yet it is unclear how perceptions of status threat shape individual health outcomes. Because of this, we sought to identify and synthesize research studies across disciplines that broadly explored how perceived threats to White Americans' social status affect their health. Our research objectives were to (1) examine how status threat (and related constructs) have been measured across the health and social sciences, (2) determine which health outcomes and behaviors are related to status threat, and (3) identify gaps in the existing knowledge base. We systematically searched six multidisciplinary databases. Only 12 studies met inclusion criteria, suggesting that status threat and Whites' health is an understudied topic that warrants continued investigation. Furthermore, there was inconsistency in how threats to status were measured and conceptualized across disciplines. Threat-related indicators evaluated changes in Democratic or Republican vote share, perceived racial treatment, financial status, personal identification with political party affiliation, perceptions of hypothetical "majority-minority" population shifts, racial awareness, and subjective social status. Studies primarily relied on self-rated measures of overall health, mental health status, and social determinants of health. Consequently, there is a gap in the literature concerning which specific health outcomes (besides mortality) are directly affected by status threat. Overall, included studies demonstrated that Whites' can experience negative health effects when they perceive threats in societal conditions, within their interpersonal social experiences, or related to their individual social standing. Moving forward, researchers should consider how Whites' beliefs about their position within social hierarchies potentially affect individual and group-level health outcomes.

Youth are watching: Adolescents' sociopolitical development in the Trump era

This study examined whether appraisals of 45th U.S. President Donald J. Trump by 1433 adolescents (M_age  = 16.1, SD_age  = 1.16, Female = 56.9%, Latinx = 43.6%, White = 35.7%, Black = 12.6%, Asian = 5.8%) predicted change from 2017 to 2018 across four dimensions of sociopolitical development (SPD): marginalization, critical analysis, civic efficacy, and political action. Trump supporters declined in awareness of inequality and race consciousness but increased in voting intentions. Trump detractors increased in awareness of inequality, race consciousness, and experiences of discrimination. Trump supporters and detractors increased in civic efficacy compared to youth with no opinion. Additional findings were moderated by race and ethnicity. Findings suggest adolescents' SPD has been shaped in distinct ways by the Trump era.

Protecting America’s borders: Christian nationalism, threat, and attitudes toward immigrants in the United States

Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies are divisive issues in American politics. These attitudes are influenced by factors such as political orientation and religiousness, with religious and conservative individuals demonstrating higher prejudice toward immigrants and refugees, and endorsing stricter immigration policies. Christian nationalism, an ideology marked by the belief that America is a Christian nation, may help explain how religious nationalist identity influences negative attitudes toward immigrants. The current research addresses this through four studies among participants in the US. Across studies, our results showed that Christian nationalism was a significant and consistent predictor of anti-immigrant stereotypes, prejudice, dehumanization, and support for anti-immigrant policies. These effects were robust to inclusion of other sources of anti-immigrant attitudes, including religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and political ideology. Further, perceived threats from immigrants mediated the relationship between Christian nationalism and dehumanization of immigrants, and attitudes toward immigration policies. These findings have implications for our understanding of the relations between religious nationalism and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy in the US, as well as in other contexts.

Composition of place, minority vs. majority group-status, & contextualized experience: The role of level of group representation, perceiving place in group-based terms, and sense of belonging in shaping collective behavior

The current studies (N = 1,709) explore why demographic composition of place matters. First, this work demonstrates that relative level of group representation affects one’s experience of place in the form of self-definition (self-categorization), perceptions of place being representative or characteristic of factors that distinguish the group from others (place-prototypicality), and sense of belonging (place-identification; Studies 1a-1e; Studies 2a & 2b). Second, the studies illustrate that group representation within place shapes the way group member’s approach (i.e., expectations of group-based treatment and procedural justice; Studies 2a-2c), understand (i.e., attribution for group-based events, Study 2b; responsiveness to bias-reduction intervention, Study 4a; sense of solidarity, Study 4b), and behave (i.e., prejudice, Studies 3a & 3b; collective action, Study 4c). More broadly, I present a Social identityParadigm forContextualizedExperience (SPACE) that provides an organizing framework for the study of the impact of characteristics of place on social identity-based contextualized experience and (in turn) collective behavior. Taken together, the findings provide evidence of distinct psychological experience and orientation as a function of minority versus majority-group status within place, as well as for a group-based approach to place. Implications for the study of collective and intergroup behavior are discussed.

Politicians’ Ideology Matters More Than Their Race in Determining the Association Between White Identity and Evaluation of the Politicians

White Americans’ racial identity can predict their sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors, demonstrating an emergent trend of White identity politics. However, when it comes to predicting support for political candidates, it remains an unclarified question whether the effects of White identity politics are determined more by candidates’ ideology or race. This article disentangles and compares the role of candidates’ ideology and race. Four studies using White American samples consistently support the ideology hypothesis, which suggests that White identity predicts support for conservative politicians and opposition to liberal politicians because of their ideology. The evidence is limited for the racial hypothesis, which suggests that White identity predicts support for White politicians but opposition to Black politicians because of their race. Thus, this article complements theories of White identity politics and clarifies implications for who might benefit from its growing influence.

The “Great Replacement” conspiracy: How the perceived ousting of Whites can evoke violent extremism and Islamophobia

Increased immigration and demographic changes have not only resulted in political pushback, but also in violent attacks against immigrants. Several recent terrorist attacks committed by White supremacists invoke rhetoric around a deliberate attempt to make Whites extinct and replace them with non-Western immigrants. Yet, while it is widely acknowledged among extremism researchers that this perception of orchestrated extinction or replacement has tremendous potential to lead to violent extremism, its consequences have not yet been directly examined. Using the Scandinavian context (e.g., Denmark and Norway), in two correlational studies and one experiment, we provide evidence that this perception is associated with the persecution of Muslims, violent intentions, and Islamophobia. Further, we demonstrate that these associations are mediated by symbolic threats. Conspiracy beliefs that one’s group is being replaced seem to drive hostile intergroup attitudes. We discuss the societal implications of this finding (i.e., generating fear, polarization, and hostile public opinion towards immigrants).

When White Americans see “non-Whites” as a group: Belief in minority collusion and support for White identity politics

White Americans may find diversity threatening in part because they construe non-White Americans as a coherent social and political force. We argue that this perception manifests in a belief that minority groups collude against White people and that White people should act as a political bloc to defend ingroup interests. In a 3-year longitudinal study, the belief in minority collusion and support for White identity politics increased significantly among a nationally representative sample of 2,635 White Americans. Compared to White Democrats, White Republicans more strongly endorsed minority collusion beliefs and White identity politics, and increased more in these beliefs over time. Essentialist perceptions of the White ingroup were associated with longitudinal increases in minority collusion beliefs, but not in support for White identity politics. Endorsement of minority collusion and support for White identity politics both predicted lower support for Black Lives Matter and greater support for the Alt-Right movement. Implications for race relations, stigma-based solidarity, and the psychology of partisanship and ideology are discussed.

Demographic change and the 2016 presidential election

The election of Donald Trump raised many questions about the impact of immigration on American politics. This article asks whether backlash to demographic change in counties undergoing rapid growth in foreign-born, Hispanic, and/or Asian populations may have played a role in his election. I use techniques accounting for selection into treatment to examine the relationship between demographic changes at the county level and voting patterns in the 2016 presidential election. Analyzing individual-level survey data and controlling for voting patterns in 2012, I find that people living in counties with a rapid percentage point increase in the Hispanic population since 2000 were more likely to vote for Trump in the general and primary elections. For non-Hispanic Whites in the general election, Hispanic growth is predictive of Trump voting among those with lower levels of education and higher family incomes, as well as those living in counties with smaller Hispanic populations in 2000 ("new destinations"). There is also evidence of backlash to Hispanic growth among Asian voters. When analyzing county-level election results, I again find an uptick in Trump voting in high Hispanic growth counties for the general election, but these results do not replicate for the swing states, or for the primaries. This provides reason to be cautious about claims that backlash against local demographic trends "won" Trump the election, though data limitations prevent me from analyzing all key locations individually. Regardless, this study provides clear evidence of an impact of local demographic change on contemporary U.S. politics.

The effect of perceived interracial competition on psychological outcomes

There remains a dearth of research on causal roles of perceived interracial competition on psychological outcomes. Towards this end, this research experimentally manipulated perceptions of group-level competition between Black and White individuals in the U.S. and tested for effects on negative psychological outcomes. In Study 1 (N = 899), participants assigned to the high interracial competition condition (HRC) reported perceiving more discrimination, behavioral avoidance, intergroup anxiety, and interracial mistrust relative to low interracial competition (LRC) participants. Study 2 -a preregistered replication and extension-specifically recruited similar numbers of only Black and White participants (N = 1,823). Consistent with Study 1, Black and White participants in the HRC condition reported more discrimination, avoidance, anxiety, and mistrust. Main effects for race also emerged: Black participants perceived more interracial competition and negative outcomes. Racial income inequality moderated effects; competition effects were stronger in areas with higher levels of inequality. Implications for theory development are discussed.

The perceived threat of demographic shifts depends on how you think the economy works

Research shows that people exhibit a conservative shift in their politics when their majority group status is threatened. We reasoned that perceptions of threat posed by shifting demographics might depend on individuals’ folk economic beliefs. Across three experiments, White Americans read about projected demographic changes (“threat”) or changes in online dating (“control”) before expressing support for political policies. They also indicated whether they viewed the U.S. economy as a zero- or non-zero-sum system. Relative to controls, participants in the threat condition expressed more support for conservative policies, but only if they conceptualized the economy in zero-sum terms; those who conceptualized the economy in non-zero-sum terms actually endorsed slightly more liberal positions under “threat.” However, these effects obtained only when participants expressed their economic views before their political attitudes. This suggests folk economic beliefs shape how people respond to threats to their majority status, provided those beliefs are first made explicit.

Sexism, racism, and nationalism: Factors associated with the 2016 U.S. presidential election results?

After the generally unexpected outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many explanations were proposed to account for the results. Three narratives that received a considerable amount of media attention were that sexist, racist, and/or nationalist attitudes influenced voting decisions. Some empirical work has supported each of these accounts. However, sexism, racism, and nationalism are interrelated, and most studies about the 2016 election have not examined these three factors in conjunction to determine the unique contribution of each. Thus, we investigated the extent to which each factor (assessed as sexism toward women, Modern Racism, and U.S. nationalism) was uniquely related to evaluations of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, voting intentions, and actual voting behavior. Participants completed online questionnaires before (N = 489) and after (N = 192) the 2016 U.S. election. More positive evaluation of Clinton and intentions to vote for Clinton were associated with lower levels of Modern Racism. More positive evaluation of Trump was associated with greater sexism toward women, Modern Racism, and U.S. nationalism. Intent to vote for Trump was associated with greater sexism toward women and Modern Racism. However, only Modern Racism significantly predicted voting behavior. Greater Modern Racism was associated with greater likelihood of voting for Trump and lower likelihood of voting for Clinton. When considered in conjunction, Modern Racism was the most consistent predictor across the different election outcome variables. Sexism toward women and U.S. nationalism were generally not significantly related to evaluations, intentions to vote, or voting behavior when accounting for Modern Racism. Thus, our data indicate that Modern Racism was correlated with vote choice in the 2016 election.

Growing sense of social status threat and concomitant deaths of despair among whites

Background

A startling population health phenomenon has been unfolding since the turn of the 21st century. Whites in the United States, who customarily have the most favorable mortality profile of all racial groups, have experienced rising mortality rates, without a commensurate rise in other racial groups. The two leading hypotheses to date are that either contemporaneous economic conditions or longer-term (post-1970s) economic transformations have led to declining economic and social prospects of low-educated whites, culminating in “deaths of despair.” We re-examine these hypotheses and investigate a third hypothesis: mortality increases are attributable to (false) perceptions of whites that they are losing social status.

Methods

Using administrative and survey data, we examined trends and correlations between race-, age- and, education-specific mortality and a range of economic and social indicators. We also conducted a county-level fixed effects model to determine whether changes in the Republican share of voters during presidential elections, as a marker of growing perceptions of social status threat, was associated with changes in working-age white mortality from 2000 to 2016, adjusting for demographic and economic covariates.

Findings

Rising white mortality is not restricted to the lowest education bracket and is occurring deeper into the educational distribution. Neither short-term nor long-term economic factors can themselves account for rising white mortality, because parallel trends (and more adverse levels) of these factors were being experienced by blacks, whose mortality rates are not rising. Instead, perceptions – misperceptions – of whites that their social status is being threatened by their declining economic circumstances seems best able to reconcile the observed population health patterns.

Conclusion

Rising white mortality in the United States is not explained by traditional social and economic population health indicators, but instead by a perceived decline in relative group status on the part of whites – despite no actual loss in relative group position.

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Rising U.S. white mortality is wide-sweeping, spanning all education levels.

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Economic conditions of whites are declining in absolute, but not relative terms.

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Declining absolute economic conditions of whites do not explain their rising mortality.

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Rising white Mortality is better explained by perceived loss of relative status.

Whites' racial identity centrality and social dominance orientation are interactively associated with far-right extremism

This paper presents evidence from five studies (total White N = 7,209) that White American's racial identity centrality is related to self-reported levels of far-right extremism. Furthermore, evidence from two of the studies shows that social dominance orientation (SDO) is another robust predictor of far-right extremism. Results also show that SDO can moderate the relationship between White identity and extremism such that the association is stronger for Whites with a higher level of SDO. Therefore, evidence suggests that the role of Whites' racial identity centrality is particularly relevant, and SDO is an important variable that may moderate the association between Whites' racial identity centrality and their far-right extremism in the contemporary political era.

Ecological and cultural factors underlying the global distribution of prejudice

Prejudiced attitudes and political nationalism vary widely around the world, but there has been little research on what predicts this variation. Here we examine the ecological and cultural factors underlying the worldwide distribution of prejudice. We suggest that cultures grow more prejudiced when they tighten cultural norms in response to destabilizing ecological threats. A set of seven archival analyses, surveys, and experiments (∑N = 3,986,402) find that nations, American states, and pre-industrial societies with tighter cultural norms show the most prejudice based on skin color, religion, nationality, and sexuality, and that tightness predicts why prejudice is often highest in areas of the world with histories of ecological threat. People’s support for cultural tightness also mediates the link between perceived ecological threat and intentions to vote for nationalist politicians. Results replicate when controlling for economic development, inequality, conservatism, residential mobility, and shared cultural heritage. These findings offer a cultural evolutionary perspective on prejudice, with implications for immigration, intercultural conflict, and radicalization.

The case for and causes of intraminority solidarity in support for reparations: Evidence from community and student samples in Canada

In three studies, we examined how racial/ethnic majority (i.e., White) and non-Indigenous minority participants in Canada responded to reparations for Indigenous peoples in Canada. Our goal was to understand whether and why there may be intraminority solidarity in this context. In Study 1, with a large, national survey (N = 1,947), we examined the extent to which participants agreed the government should be responsible for addressing human rights violations committed by previous governments as well as whether the government has done enough to address the wrongs committed against Indigenous peoples in Canada. With a sample of undergraduate students in Study 2 (N = 144) and another community sample in Study 3 (N = 233), we examined possible mediators of the relationship between ethnic status and support for reparations. Taken together, the results of three studies suggest that, compared to White majority Canadians, non-Indigenous minority Canadians were more supportive of providing reparations to Indigenous peoples through a complex chain of collective victimhood, inclusive victim consciousness, continued victim suffering, and solidarity.

The effects of race/ethnicity and racial/ethnic identification on general trust

General trust in others can facilitate social cooperation and reduce uncertainty on a personal level. However, those from the dominant group in society are more likely to trust than those from minority groups. We examine the gap in trust for whites compared to blacks and Hispanics in the U.S., with special attention to how strongly individuals identify with their racial/ethnic group, which may help restore trust for some when it is lacking. Using the 2014 GSS Identity Module, we find, as have others, that whites show higher trust than blacks and Hispanics, but when we examine people's identification with their racial/ethnic group, whites show lower trust than blacks and Hispanics. A strong racial/ethnic identification among the majority (whites) is associated with group threat and reduced trust. We discuss how identification with one's racial/ethnic group appears to have different effects depending on whether one is of a minority or majority status.

Attitudes Toward Presidential Candidates in the 2012 and 2016 American Elections: Cognitive Ability and Support for Trump

Using data from the American National Election Studies, we investigated the relationship between cognitive ability and attitudes toward and actual voting for presidential candidates in the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections (i.e., Romney, Obama, Trump, and Clinton). Isolating this relationship from competing relationships, results showed that verbal ability was a significant negative predictor of support and voting for Trump (but not Romney) and a positive predictor of support and voting for Obama and Clinton. By comparing within and across the election years, our analyses revealed the nature of support for Trump, including that support for Trump was better predicted by lower verbal ability than education or income. In general, these results suggest that the 2016 U.S. presidential election had less to do with party affiliation, income, or education and more to do with basic cognitive ability.

Endorsing a Civic (vs. an Ethnic) Definition of Citizenship Predicts Higher Pro-minority and Lower Pro-majority Collective Action Intentions

Europe has witnessed a polarization of intergroup attitudes and action tendencies in the context of the refugee crisis of 2015 and the rise of right-wing populism. Participation in both pro-minority collective action and right-wing nationalist movements has increased among members of ethnic majority groups. We analyzed these collective action intentions toward Roma people and Muslim immigrants in Hungary related to concepts of citizenship. In an online survey relying on a probabilistic sample that is demographically similar to the Hungarian population (N = 1069), we tested whether relying on the concept of ethnic citizenship predicted higher intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action, and lower intentions to engage in pro-minority collective action, and whether the connection was mediated by fear and empathy. We expected that the connections would be the opposite for civic citizenship. Our results supported the hypotheses, but we found that the ethnic definition was a stronger predictor of intergroup action intentions toward the immigrant group, and the civic definition a stronger predictor in case of the Roma minority group. In a second study (N = 320) we collected experimental evidence to show that civic and ethnic citizenship affected both types of collective action tendencies. We found that the manipulation had an effect on the concept of citizenship only in the ethnic dimension. Nevertheless, it influenced pro-minority collective action intentions especially in the presence of high empathy and low fear in the expected direction, that is, pro-minority collective action intentions were higher in the civic citizenship condition than in the ethnic citizenship condition. The effect was not found with regard to pro-majority collective action intentions. These findings highlight the potential consequences of nationalist rhetoric on intergroup action intentions and point out both the scope and the limits of influencing its effect.