The effect of metacognitive training on confidence and strategic reminder setting

Cognitive offloading bias in primary and secondary school students and its relationship with metacognitive monitoring

Individuals often use external aids to assist with information storage, a process known as cognitive offloading. Prior research has indicated that adults sometimes fail to utilize internal and external cognitive resources judiciously, resulting in cognitive offloading bias, which is often linked to metacognition. However, it remains experimentally unverified whether primary and secondary school students exhibit cognitive offloading bias and how this relates to metacognition. This study aimed to address these gaps. In Experiment 1, we examined cognitive offloading bias in primary and secondary school students (aged 7-15 years) using a word-pair memory task. The results revealed that primary school students tended to rely excessively on internal memory in comparison to the optimal strategy, while secondary school students leaned towards an overreliance on external reminders. In Experiment 2, we incorporated metacognitive judgements to explore the relationship between metacognition and cognitive offloading bias. Results indicated that the cognitive offloading bias observed in primary school students was linked to the accuracy of their metacognitive monitoring.

Influence of the physical effort of reminder-setting on strategic offloading of delayed intentions

Intention offloading involves using external reminders such as diaries, to-do lists, and digital alerts to help us remember delayed intentions. Recent studies have provided evidence for various cognitive and metacognitive factors that guide intention offloading, but little research has investigated the physical cost of reminder-setting itself. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments investigating how the cost of physical effort associated with reminder-setting influences strategic intention offloading under different levels of memory load. At all memory loads, reminder-setting was reduced when it was more effortful. The ability to set reminders allowed participants to compensate for the influence of memory load on accuracy in the low-effort condition; this effect was attenuated in the high-effort condition. In addition, there was evidence that participants with less confidence in their memory abilities were more likely to set reminders. Contrary to prediction, physical effort had the greatest effect on reminder-setting at intermediate memory loads. We speculate that the physical costs of reminder-setting might have the greatest impact when participants are uncertain about their strategy choice. These results demonstrate the importance of physical effort as one of the factors relevant to cost-benefit decision-making about cognitive offloading strategies.

Overreliance on inefficient computer-mediated information retrieval is countermanded by strategy advice that promotes memory-mediated retrieval

With ubiquitous computing, problems can be solved using more strategies than ever, though many strategies feature subpar performance. Here, we explored whether and how simple advice regarding when to use which strategy can improve performance. Specifically, we presented unfamiliar alphanumeric equations (e.g., A + 5 = F) and asked whether counting up the alphabet from the left letter by the indicated number resulted in the right letter. In an initial choice block, participants could engage in one of three cognitive strategies: (a) internal counting, (b) internal retrieval of previously generated solutions, or (c) computer-mediated external retrieval of solutions. Participants belonged to one of two groups: they were either instructed to first try internal retrieval before using external retrieval, or received no specific use instructions. In a subsequent internal block with identical instructions for both groups, external retrieval was made unavailable. The 'try internal retrieval first' instruction in the choice block led to pronounced benefits (d = .76) in the internal block. Benefits were due to facilitated creation and retrieval of internal memory traces and possibly also due to improved strategy choice. These results showcase how simple strategy advice can greatly help users navigate cognitive environments. More generally, our results also imply that uninformed use of external tools (i.e., technology) can bear the risk of not developing and using even more superior internal processing strategies.

An observational treatment study of metacognition in anxious-depression

Prior studies have found metacognitive biases are linked to a transdiagnostic dimension of anxious-depression, manifesting as reduced confidence in performance. However, previous work has been cross-sectional and so it is unclear if under-confidence is a trait-like marker of anxious-depression vulnerability, or if it resolves when anxious-depression improves. Data were collected as part of a large-scale transdiagnostic, four-week observational study of individuals initiating internet-based cognitive behavioural therapy (iCBT) or antidepressant medication. Self-reported clinical questionnaires and perceptual task performance were gathered to assess anxious-depression and metacognitive bias at baseline and 4-week follow-up. Primary analyses were conducted for individuals who received iCBT (n=649), with comparisons between smaller samples that received antidepressant medication (n=82) and a control group receiving no intervention (n=88). Prior to receiving treatment, anxious-depression severity was associated with under-confidence in performance in the iCBT arm, replicating previous work. From baseline to follow-up, levels of anxious-depression were significantly reduced, and this was accompanied by a significant increase in metacognitive confidence in the iCBT arm (β=0.17, SE=0.02, p<0.001). These changes were correlated (r(647)=-0.12, p=0.002); those with the greatest reductions in anxious-depression levels had the largest increase in confidence. While the three-way interaction effect of group and time on confidence was not significant (F(2, 1632)=0.60, p=0.550), confidence increased in the antidepressant group (β=0.31, SE = 0.08, p<0.001), but not among controls (β=0.11, SE = 0.07, p=0.103). Metacognitive biases in anxious-depression are state-dependent; when symptoms improve with treatment, so does confidence in performance. Our results suggest this is not specific to the type of intervention.

Confidence, accuracy judgments and feedback in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder: a time series network analysis

BACKGROUND

Inaccurate self-assessment of performance is common among people with serious mental illness, and it is associated with poor functional outcomes independent from ability. However, the temporal interdependencies between judgments of performance, confidence in accuracy, and feedback about performance are not well understood.

METHODS

We evaluated two tasks: the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and the Penn Emotion recognition task (ER40). These tasks were modified to include item-by-item confidence and accuracy judgments, along with feedback on accuracy. We evaluated these tasks as time series and applied network modeling to understand the temporal relationships between momentary confidence, accuracy judgments, and feedback. The sample constituted participants with schizophrenia (SZ; N = 144), bipolar disorder (BD; N = 140), and healthy controls (HC; N = 39).

RESULTS

Network models for both WCST and ER40 revealed denser and lagged connections between confidence and accuracy judgments in SZ and, to a lesser extent in BD, that were not evidenced in HC. However, associations between feedback regarding accuracy with subsequent accuracy judgments and confidence were weaker in SZ and BD. In each of these comparisons, the BD group was intermediate between HC and SZ. In analyses of the WCST, wherein incorporating feedback is crucial for success, higher confidence predicted worse subsequent performance in SZ but not in HC or BD.

CONCLUSIONS

While network models are exploratory, the results suggest some potential mechanisms by which challenges in self-assessment may impede performance, perhaps through hyperfocus on self-generated judgments at the expense of incorporation of feedback.

Depressive Symptoms are Associated with More Negative Global Metacognitive Biases in Combat Veterans, and Biases Covary with Symptom Changes over Time

Metacognitive awareness, insight into one's abilities, is thought to be disrupted in depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), with more negative metacognitive biases and reduced awareness, respectively. However, studies have rarely examined global aspects of metacognitive awareness in depression and PTSD, instead using task-specific measures. In 467 trauma-exposed post-9/11 veterans, we administered assessments of PTSD and depression, self-report and objective measures of cognitive functioning (neuropsychological battery of memory, attention, and executive function measures), and self-report and objective measures of general health (index of five cardiometabolic factors). We used self-report/objective correlations to measure metacognitive sensitivity and 'self-report minus objective' scores to measure bias. We also examined associations between changes in metacognitive awareness and changes in PTSD and depression over time. Metacognitive sensitivity was comparable between individuals with and without PTSD and depression. However, metacognitive bias was significantly more negative in those with greater depressive symptoms (i.e., underconfidence) across cognition and health, independent of PTSD symptoms. Notably, metacognitive bias changes covaried with depressive and PTSD symptom changes two years later. This shows that, in trauma-exposed veterans, negative metacognitive biases are specifically related to depressive symptoms and these biases may be relatively domain general. Further, our longitudinal results suggest that, rather than being a stable trait, metacognitive biases change with PTSD/depressive symptoms over time.

Identifying Transdiagnostic Mechanisms in Mental Health Using Computational Factor Modeling

Most psychiatric disorders do not occur in isolation, and most psychiatric symptom dimensions are not uniquely expressed within a single diagnostic category. Current treatments fail to work for around 25% to 40% of individuals, perhaps due at least in part to an overreliance on diagnostic categories in treatment development and allocation. In this review, we describe ongoing efforts in the field to surmount these challenges and precisely characterize psychiatric symptom dimensions using large-scale studies of unselected samples via remote, online, and "citizen science" efforts that take a dimensional, mechanistic approach. We discuss the importance that efforts to identify meaningful psychiatric dimensions be coupled with careful computational modeling to formally specify, test, and potentially falsify candidate mechanisms that underlie transdiagnostic symptom dimensions. We refer to this approach, i.e., where symptom dimensions are identified and validated against computationally well-defined neurocognitive processes, as computational factor modeling. We describe in detail some recent applications of this method to understand transdiagnostic cognitive processes that include model-based planning, metacognition, appetitive processing, and uncertainty estimation. In this context, we highlight how computational factor modeling has been used to identify specific associations between cognition and symptom dimensions and reveal previously obscured relationships, how findings generalize to smaller in-person clinical and nonclinical samples, and how the method is being adapted and optimized beyond its original instantiation. Crucially, we discuss next steps for this area of research, highlighting the value of more direct investigations of treatment response that bridge the gap between basic research and the clinic.

Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.

Framing cognitive offloading in terms of gains or losses: achieving a more optimal use of reminders

Nowadays individuals can readily set reminders to offload intentions onto external resources, such as smartphone alerts, rather than using internal memory. Individuals tend to be biased, setting more reminders than would be optimal. We address the question whether the reminder bias depends on offloading scenarios being framed as either gains or losses, both between-participants (Experiment 1) and within-participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, framing of reminders in terms of gains resulted in participants employing a risk-averse strategy and using more reminders than would be optimal. Importantly, however, participants used reminders more optimally and were more willing to choose the risk-seeking option of remembering internally when reminders implied a loss. Based on metacognitive measures in Experiment 2, the reminder bias increased the more underconfident participants were about their memory abilities in both framing scenarios. Framing did not alter this relationship between erroneous metacognitive underconfidence and reminder bias but provides an additional influence. We conclude that emphasizing the losses (costs) associated with external reminders helps in achieving more optimal decisions in offloading situations, and that in addition to cognitive effort and metacognitive judgments, framing needs to be considered in improving individuals’ offloading behavior.

Impact of Intrinsic Cognitive Skills and Metacognitive Beliefs on Tool Use Performance

Cognitive tools (e.g., calculators) provide all users with the same potential. Yet when people use such cognitive tools, interindividual variations are observed. Previous findings have indicated that 2 main factors could explain these variations: intrinsic cognitive skills (i.e., the “non–tool use” cognitive skills associated with the task targeted) and metacognitive beliefs about one's performance with tool use. In this study we sought to reproduce these findings and to investigate in more detail the nature of the relationships (i.e., linear vs. exponential) between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills. In Experiment 1, 200 participants completed 2 cognitive tasks (calculation and geography) in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use). In Experiment 2, 70 participants performed a geography task in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use) and estimated their performance in each condition before completing the task. Results indicated that intrinsic cognitive skills and, to a lesser extent, metacognitive beliefs improved tool use performance: The higher the intrinsic cognitive skills and the higher participants estimated their tool use performance, the higher this tool use performance was. The nature of the relationship between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills appeared to be linear rather than exponential. These findings extend previous research showing a strong impact of intrinsic cognitive skills on the performance associated with the use of cognitive tools or external aids.

How Local and Global Metacognition Shape Mental Health

Metacognition is the ability to reflect on our own cognition and mental states. It is a critical aspect of human subjective experience and operates across many hierarchical levels of abstraction-encompassing local confidence in isolated decisions and global self-beliefs about our abilities and skills. Alterations in metacognition are considered foundational to neurologic and psychiatric disorders, but research has mostly focused on local metacognitive computations, missing out on the role of global aspects of metacognition. Here, we first review current behavioral and neural metrics of local metacognition that lay the foundation for this research. We then address the neurocognitive underpinnings of global metacognition uncovered by recent studies. Finally, we outline a theoretical framework in which higher hierarchical levels of metacognition may help identify the role of maladaptive metacognitive evaluation in mental health conditions, particularly when combined with transdiagnostic methods.

Individual differences in cognitive offloading: a comparison of intention offloading, pattern copy, and short-term memory capacity

The cognitive load of many everyday life tasks exceeds known limitations of short-term memory. One strategy to compensate for information overload is cognitive offloading which refers to the externalization of cognitive processes such as reminder setting instead of memorizing. There appears to be remarkable variance in offloading behavior between participants which poses the question whether there is a common factor influencing offloading behavior across different tasks tackling short-term memory processes. To pursue this question, we studied individual differences in offloading behavior between two well-established offloading paradigms: the intention offloading task which tackles memory for intentions and the pattern copy task which tackles continuous short-term memory load. Our study also included an unrelated task measuring short-term memory capacity. Each participant completed all tasks twice on two consecutive days in order to obtain reliability scores. Despite high reliability scores, individual differences in offloading behavior were uncorrelated between the two offloading tasks. In both tasks, however, individual differences in offloading behavior were correlated with the individual differences in an unrelated short-term memory task. Our results therefore show that offloading behavior cannot simply be explained in terms of a single common factor driving offloading behavior across tasks. We discuss the implications of this finding for future research investigating the interrelations of offloading behavior across different tasks.