Mnemonic Introspection in Macaques Is Dependent on Superior Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex But Not Orbitofrontal Cortex

Memories or decisions? Bridging accounts of frontopolar function

Frontopolar cortex (FPC), for a long time elusive to functional description, is now associated with a wide range of cognitive processes. Prominent accounts of FPC function emerged from studies of memory (e.g., episodic and prospective memory; EM and PM, respectively) and of executive function (e.g., planning, multi-tasking, relational reasoning, cognitive branching, etc). In recent years, FPC function has begun to be described within the context of value-based decision making in terms of monitoring the value of alternatives and optimizing cognitive resources to balance the explore/exploit dilemma in the face of volatile environments. In this perspective, we propose that the broad counterfactual inference and behavioural flexibility account can help re-interpret findings from EM and PM studies and offer an explanatory bridge between the memory and executive function accounts. More specifically, we propose that counterfactual value monitoring in FPC modulates the reallocation of cognitive resources between present and past information and contributes to efficient episodic and prospective retrieval by concurrently assessing the value of competing memories in relation to the decision at hand and proactively evaluating future potential scenarios to anticipate optimal engagement of intentions.

Dissociating Frontal Lobe Lesion Induced Deficits in Rule Value Learning Using Reinforcement Learning Models and a WCST Analog

Distinct frontal regions make dissociable contributions to rule-guided decision-making, including the ability to learn and exploit associations between abstract rules and reward value, maintain those rules in memory, and evaluate choice outcomes. Value-based learning can be quantified using reinforcement learning (RL) models predicting optimal trial-wise choices and estimating learning rates, which can then be related to the intact functioning of specific brain areas by combining a modeling approach with lesion-behavioral data. We applied a three-parameter feedback-dependent RL model to behavioral data obtained from macaques with circumscribed lesions to the principal sulcus (PS), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), superior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (sdlPFC), and frontopolar cortex (FPC) performing a Wisconsin card sorting task (WCST) analog. Our modeling-based approach identified distinct lesion effects on component cognitive mechanisms contributing to WCST performance. OFC lesions decreased the rate of rule value updating following both positive and negative feedback. In contrast, we found no deficit in rule value updating following PS lesions, which instead made monkeys less likely to repeat correct choices when rule values were well established, suggesting a crucial role of the PS in the working memory maintenance of rule representations. Finally, ACC lesions produced a specific deficit in learning from negative feedback, as well as impaired the ability to repeat choices following highly surprising reward, supporting a proposed role for ACC in flexibly switching between a trial-and-error mode and a working memory mode in response to increased error likelihood.

Metacognition in nonhuman primates: a review of current knowledge

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitive processes, has long been considered a hallmark of human cognition. However, two decades of research have provided compelling evidence of metacognitive-like abilities in some nonhuman primates. This review synthesizes current knowledge on the subject, highlighting key experimental paradigms and empirical findings, with an emphasis on the latest studies. Thanks to advances in methods and efforts to counter alternative explanations, there is now a consensus that great apes and some macaque species can monitor and control some of their cognitive processes. Despite numerous investigations, however, whether capuchin monkeys are metacognitive remains unclear. Critical gaps persist in our understanding of metacognition across species. We discuss the importance of expanding research to include a wider range of primate species and the potential role of ecological factors in shaping metacognitive capacities. In addition, we consider some promising avenues for future research, including neurophysiological approaches, studies of metacognitive errors, and field experiments.

Metacognition in wild Japanese macaques: cost and stakes influencing information-seeking behavior

Metacognition allows us to evaluate memories and knowledge, thus enabling us to distinguish between what we know and what we do not. Studies have shown that species other than humans may possess similar abilities. However, the number of species tested was limited. Testing ten free-ranging Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) on a task in which they had to find food hidden inside one of the four opaque tubes, we investigated whether these subjects would seek information when needed. The monkeys could look inside the tubes before selecting one. We varied three parameters: the baiting process, the cost that monkeys had to pay to look inside the tubes, and the reward at stake. We assessed whether and how these parameters would affect the monkeys' tendency to look inside the tube before selecting one. When they were not shown which tube contained the reward, nine monkeys looked significantly more frequently in at least one condition. Half of them tended to reduce their looks when the cost was high, but only when they already knew the location of the reward. When a high-quality reward was at stake, four monkeys tended to look more inside the tubes, even though they already knew the reward's location. Our results are consistent with those of rhesus macaques, suggesting that metacognitive-like abilities may be shared by Cercopithecidae, and that, at least some monkeys may be aware of their lack of knowledge.

On some statistical and cerebral aspects of the limits of working memory capacity in anthropoid primates, with particular reference to Pan and Homo, and their significance for human evolution

Some comparative ontogenetic data imply that effective working-memory capacity develops in ways that are independent of brain size in humans. These are interpreted better from neuroscientific considerations about the continuing development of neuronal architecture in adolescents and young adults, than from one about gross brain mass which already is reached in childhood. By contrast, working-memory capacity in Pan never develops beyond that of three- or four-year-old children. The phylogenetic divergence begs the question of whether it is any longer plausible to infer from the fossil record, that over the past two million years, an ostensibly gradual increase in endocranial volumes, assigned to the genus Homo, can be correlated in a scientifically-meaningful manner with the gradual evolution of our effective executive working memory. It is argued that whereas Pan's effective working-memory capacity is relatively similar to that of its storage working-memory, our working memory is relatively larger with deeper executive control.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

The Scientific Study of Consciousness Cannot and Should Not Be Morally Neutral

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one's own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics-the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness.

Time-sensitive prefrontal involvement in associating confidence with task performance illustrates metacognitive introspection in monkeys

Metacognition refers to the ability to be aware of one's own cognition. Ample evidence indicates that metacognition in the human primate is highly dissociable from cognition, specialized across domains, and subserved by distinct neural substrates. However, these aspects remain relatively understudied in macaque monkeys. In the present study, we investigated the functionality of macaque metacognition by combining a confidence proxy, hierarchical Bayesian meta-d' computational modelling, and a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation technique. We found that Brodmann area 46d (BA46d) played a critical role in supporting metacognition independent of task performance; we also found that the critical role of this region in meta-calculation was time-sensitive. Additionally, we report that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage.

Metacognition as a Consequence of Competing Evolutionary Time Scales

Evolution is full of coevolving systems characterized by complex spatio-temporal interactions that lead to intertwined processes of adaptation. Yet, how adaptation across multiple levels of temporal scales and biological complexity is achieved remains unclear. Here, we formalize how evolutionary multi-scale processing underlying adaptation constitutes a form of metacognition flowing from definitions of metaprocessing in machine learning. We show (1) how the evolution of metacognitive systems can be expected when fitness landscapes vary on multiple time scales, and (2) how multiple time scales emerge during coevolutionary processes of sufficiently complex interactions. After defining a metaprocessor as a regulator with local memory, we prove that metacognition is more energetically efficient than purely object-level cognition when selection operates at multiple timescales in evolution. Furthermore, we show that existing modeling approaches to coadaptation and coevolution-here active inference networks, predator-prey interactions, coupled genetic algorithms, and generative adversarial networks-lead to multiple emergent timescales underlying forms of metacognition. Lastly, we show how coarse-grained structures emerge naturally in any resource-limited system, providing sufficient evidence for metacognitive systems to be a prevalent and vital component of (co-)evolution. Therefore, multi-scale processing is a necessary requirement for many evolutionary scenarios, leading to de facto metacognitive evolutionary outcomes.

Conversion of concept-specific decision confidence into integrative introspection in primates

Introspection based on the integration of uncertain evidence is critical for acting upon abstract thinking and imagining future scenarios. However, it is unknown how confidence read-outs from multiple sources of different concepts are integrated, especially considering the relationships among the concepts. In this study, monkeys performed wagering based on an estimation of their performance in a preceding mnemonic decision. We found that the longer the response times for post-decision wagering, the more relieved the impairments having been caused by frontal disruption. This suggests the existence of a time-consuming compensatory metacognitive process. We found posterior inferior parietal lobe (pIPL) as its candidate, which was not coding the wagering per se (i.e., just high bet or low bet), but became more active when monkeys successfully chose the optimal bet option based on mnemonic decision performance. Thereafter, the pIPL prompts dorsal anterior cingulate cortex to carry the chosen wagering option. Our findings suggest a role for the pIPL in metacognitive concept integration.

Rats use memory confidence to guide decisions

Memory enables access to past experiences to guide future behavior. Humans can determine which memories to trust (high confidence) and which to doubt (low confidence). How memory retrieval, memory confidence, and memory-guided decisions are related, however, is not understood. In particular, how confidence in memories is used in decision making is unknown. We developed a spatial memory task in which rats were incentivized to gamble their time: betting more following a correct choice yielded greater reward. Rat behavior reflected memory confidence, with higher temporal bets following correct choices. We applied machine learning to identify a memory decision variable and built a generative model of memories evolving over time that accurately predicted both choices and confidence reports. Our results reveal in rats an ability thought to exist exclusively in primates and introduce a unified model of memory dynamics, retrieval, choice, and confidence.

Diffusion property and functional connectivity of superior longitudinal fasciculus underpin human metacognition

Metacognition as the capacity of monitoring one's own cognition operates across domains. Here, we addressed whether metacognition in different cognitive domains rely on common or distinct neural substrates with combined diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques. After acquiring DTI and resting-state fMRI data, we asked participants to perform a temporal-order memory task and a perceptual discrimination task, followed by trial-specific confidence judgments. DTI analysis revealed that the structural integrity (indexed by fractional anisotropy) in the anterior portion of right superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) was associated with both perceptual and mnemonic metacognitive abilities. Using perturbed mnemonic metacognitive scores produced by inhibiting the precuneus using TMS, the mnemonic metacognition scores did not correlate with individuals' SLF structural integrity anymore, revealing the relevance of this tract in memory metacognition. To further verify the involvement of several cortical regions connected by SLF, we took the TMS-targeted precuneus region as a seed in a functional connectivity analysis and found the functional connectivity between precuneus and two SLF-connected regions (inferior parietal cortex and precentral gyrus) mediated mnemonic metacognition performance. These results illustrate the importance of SLF and a putative white-matter grey-matter circuitry that supports human metacognition.

Explicit memory and cognition in monkeys

Taxonomies of human memory, influenced heavily by Endel Tulving, make a fundamental distinction between explicit and implicit memory. Humans are aware of explicit memories, whereas implicit memories control behavior even though we are not aware of them. Efforts to understand the evolution of memory, and to use nonhuman animals to model human memory, will be facilitated by better understanding the extent to which this critical distinction exists in nonhuman animals. Work with metacognition paradigms in the past 20 years has produced a strong case for the existence of explicit memory in nonhuman primates and possibly other nonhuman animals. Clear dissociations of explicit and implicit memory by metacognition have yet to be demonstrated in nonhumans, although dissociations between memory systems by other behavioral techniques, and by brain manipulations, suggest that the explicit-implicit distinction applies to nonhumans. Neurobehavioral studies of metamemory are beginning to identify neural substrates for memory monitoring in the frontal cortex of monkeys. We have strong evidence that at least some memory systems are explicit in rhesus monkeys, but we need to learn more about the distribution of explicit processes across cognitive systems within monkeys, and across species.