SARS-CoV-2 European resurgence foretold: interplay of introductions and persistence by leveraging genomic and mobility data

The phylodynamics of SARS-CoV-2 during 2020 in Finland

Background

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has caused millions of infections and fatalities globally since its emergence in late 2019. The virus was first detected in Finland in January 2020, after which it rapidly spread among the populace in spring. However, compared to other European nations, Finland has had a low incidence of SARS-CoV-2. To gain insight into the origins and turnover of SARS-CoV-2 lineages circulating in Finland in 2020, we investigated the phylogeographic and -dynamic history of the virus.

Methods

The origins of SARS-CoV-2 introductions were inferred via Travel-aware Bayesian time-measured phylogeographic analyses. Sequences for the analyses included virus genomes belonging to the B.1 lineage and with the D614G mutation from countries of likely origin, which were determined utilizing Google mobility data. We collected all available sequences from spring and fall peaks to study lineage dynamics.

Results

We observed rapid turnover among Finnish lineages during this period. Clade 20C became the most prevalent among sequenced cases and was replaced by other strains in fall 2020. Bayesian phylogeographic reconstructions suggested 42 independent introductions into Finland during spring 2020, mainly from Italy, Austria, and Spain.

Conclusions

A single introduction from Spain might have seeded one-third of cases in Finland during spring in 2020. The investigations of the original introductions of SARS-CoV-2 to Finland during the early stages of the pandemic and of the subsequent lineage dynamics could be utilized to assess the role of transboundary movements and the effects of early intervention and public health measures.

Quarantine and testing strategies to ameliorate transmission due to travel during the COVID-19 pandemic: a modelling study

BACKGROUND

Numerous countries have imposed strict travel restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic, contributing to a large socioeconomic burden. The long quarantines that have been applied to contacts of cases may be excessive for travel policy.

METHODS

We developed an approach to evaluate imminent countrywide COVID-19 infections after 0-14-day quarantine and testing. We identified the minimum travel quarantine duration such that the infection rate within the destination country did not increase compared to a travel ban, defining this minimum quarantine as "sufficient."

FINDINGS

We present a generalised analytical framework and a specific case study of the epidemic situation on November 21, 2021, for application to 26 European countries. For most origin-destination country pairs, a three-day or shorter quarantine with RT-PCR or antigen testing on exit suffices. Adaptation to the European Union traffic-light risk stratification provided a simplified policy tool. Our analytical approach provides guidance for travel policy during all phases of pandemic diseases.

INTERPRETATION

For nearly half of origin-destination country pairs analysed, travel can be permitted in the absence of quarantine and testing. For the majority of pairs requiring controls, a short quarantine with testing could be as effective as a complete travel ban. The estimated travel quarantine durations are substantially shorter than those specified for traced contacts.

FUNDING

EasyJet (JPT and APG), the Elihu endowment (JPT), the Burnett and Stender families' endowment (APG), the Notsew Orm Sands Foundation (JPT and APG), the National Institutes of Health (MCF), Canadian Institutes of Health Research (SMM) and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada EIDM-MfPH (SMM).

Quarantine and testing strategies to ameliorate transmission due to travel during the COVID-19 pandemic: a modelling study

BACKGROUND

Numerous countries imposed strict travel restrictions, contributing to the large socioeconomic burden during the COVID-19 pandemic. The long quarantines that apply to contacts of cases may be excessive for travel policy.

METHODS

We developed an approach to evaluate imminent countrywide COVID-19 infections after 0-14-day quarantine and testing. We identified the minimum travel quarantine duration such that the infection rate within the destination country did not increase compared to a travel ban, defining this minimum quarantine as "sufficient."

FINDINGS

We present a generalised analytical framework and a specific case study of the epidemic situation on November 21, 2021, for application to 26 European countries. For most origin-destination country pairs, a three-day or shorter quarantine with RT-PCR or antigen testing on exit suffices. Adaptation to the European Union traffic-light risk stratification provided a simplified policy tool. Our analytical approach provides guidance for travel policy during all phases of pandemic diseases.

INTERPRETATION

For nearly half of origin-destination country pairs analysed, travel can be permitted in the absence of quarantine and testing. For the majority of pairs requiring controls, a short quarantine with testing could be as effective as a complete travel ban. The estimated travel quarantine durations are substantially shorter than those specified for traced contacts.

FUNDING

EasyJet (JPT and APG), the Elihu endowment (JPT), the Burnett and Stender families' endowment (APG), the Notsew Orm Sands Foundation (JPT and APG), the National Institutes of Health (MCF), Canadian Institutes of Health Research (SMM) and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada EIDM-MfPH (SMM).

Rapid incidence estimation from SARS-CoV-2 genomes reveals decreased case detection in Europe during summer 2020

By October 2021, 230 million SARS-CoV-2 diagnoses have been reported. Yet, a considerable proportion of cases remains undetected. Here, we propose GInPipe, a method that rapidly reconstructs SARS-CoV-2 incidence profiles solely from publicly available, time-stamped viral genomes. We validate GInPipe against simulated outbreaks and elaborate phylodynamic analyses. Using available sequence data, we reconstruct incidence histories for Denmark, Scotland, Switzerland, and Victoria (Australia) and demonstrate, how to use the method to investigate the effects of changing testing policies on case ascertainment. Specifically, we find that under-reporting was highest during summer 2020 in Europe, coinciding with more liberal testing policies at times of low testing capacities. Due to the increased use of real-time sequencing, it is envisaged that GInPipe can complement established surveillance tools to monitor the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. In post-pandemic times, when diagnostic efforts are decreasing, GInPipe may facilitate the detection of hidden infection dynamics.

Delayed epidemic peak caused by infection and recovery rate fluctuations

Forecasting epidemic scenarios has been critical to many decision-makers in imposing various public health interventions. Despite progresses in determining the magnitude and timing of epidemics, epidemic peak time predictions for H1N1 and COVID-19 were inaccurate, with the peaks delayed with respect to predictions. Here, we show that infection and recovery rate fluctuations play a critical role in peak timing. Using a susceptible-infected-recovered model with daily fluctuations on control parameters, we show that infection counts follow a lognormal distribution at the beginning of an epidemic wave, similar to price distributions for financial assets. The epidemic peak time of the stochastic solution exhibits an inverse Gaussian probability distribution, fitting the spread of the epidemic peak times observed across Italian regions. We also show that, for a given basic reproduction number R₀, the deterministic model anticipates the peak with respect to the most probable and average peak time of the stochastic model. The epidemic peak time distribution allows one for a robust estimation of the epidemic evolution. Considering these results, we believe that the parameters' dynamical fluctuations are paramount to accurately predict the epidemic peak time and should be introduced in epidemiological models.

Spatiotemporal invasion dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 emergence

Understanding the causes and consequences of the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants of concern is crucial to pandemic control yet difficult to achieve because they arise in the context of variable human behavior and immunity. We investigated the spatial invasion dynamics of lineage B.1.1.7 by jointly analyzing UK human mobility, virus genomes, and community-based polymerase chain reaction data. We identified a multistage spatial invasion process in which early B.1.1.7 growth rates were associated with mobility and asymmetric lineage export from a dominant source location, enhancing the effects of B.1.1.7's increased intrinsic transmissibility. We further explored how B.1.1.7 spread was shaped by nonpharmaceutical interventions and spatial variation in previous attack rates. Our findings show that careful accounting of the behavioral and epidemiological context within which variants of concern emerge is necessary to interpret correctly their observed relative growth rates.

The Antigenicity of Epidemic SARS-CoV-2 Variants in the United Kingdom

To determine whether the neutralization activity of monoclonal antibodies, convalescent sera and vaccine-elicited sera was affected by the top five epidemic SARS-CoV-2 variants in the UK, including D614G+L18F+A222V, D614G+A222V, D614G+S477N, VOC-202012/01(B.1.1.7) and D614G+69-70del+N439K, a pseudovirus-neutralization assay was performed to evaluate the relative neutralization titers against the five SARS-CoV-2 variants and 12 single deconvolution mutants based on the variants. In this study, 18 monoclonal antibodies, 10 sera from convalescent COVID-19 patients, 10 inactivated-virus vaccine-elicited sera, 14 mRNA vaccine-elicited sera, nine RBD-immunized mouse sera, four RBD-immunized horse sera, and four spike-encoding DNA-immunized guinea pig sera were tested and analyzed. The N501Y, N439K, and S477N mutations caused immune escape from nine of 18 mAbs. However, the convalescent sera, inactivated virus vaccine-elicited sera, mRNA vaccine-elicited sera, spike DNA-elicited sera, and recombinant RBD protein-elicited sera could still neutralize these variants (within three-fold changes compared to the reference D614G variant). The neutralizing antibody responses to different types of vaccines were different, whereby the response to inactivated-virus vaccine was similar to the convalescent sera.