Profit or patients' health benefit? Exploring the heterogeneity in physician altruism

Do physicians' attitudes toward prioritization predict poor-health patients' access to care?

Physicians often face tight resource constraints, meaning they have to make trade-offs between which patients they care for and the amount of care received. Studies show that patients requiring many resources disproportionately suffer a loss of care when resources are constrained. This study uncovers whether physicians' attitudes toward prioritization of healthcare predicts poor-health patients' access to care. We combine unique survey data on Danish GPs' preferred prioritization principle with register data on their patients' contacts in general practice. We consider different types of contacts as the required effort could impact the need for prioritization. Our results show variation in GPs' prioritization principles, where a majority prefers a principle that may lead to an unequal distribution of services. We further find that GPs' attitudes toward prioritization predict some poor-health patients' access to general practice. GPs who state they prefer the principle of prioritizing patients in the poorest health state when resources tightened provide more contacts to poor-health patients. The additional contacts are typically high-effort contacts such as annual status meetings and home visits, but also low-effort contacts such as emails. Our findings indicate inequity in poor-health patients' access to care across general practices.

The substitution effect of financial and non-financial incentives at different income levels in physician recruitment: evidence from medical students in China

BACKGROUND

Understanding how medical students respond to financial and non-financial incentives is crucial for recruiting health workers and attracting health talents in medical education. However, both incentives are integrated in working practice, and existing theoretical studies have suggested that various income levels may influence the substitution effect of both incentives, while the empirical evidence is lacking. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the intrinsic motivation. This study aimed to explore the substitution effect of extrinsic incentives at different income levels, also taking intrinsic altruism into account.

METHODS

We used the behavioral data from Zhang et al.'s experiments, which involved discrete choice experiments (DCEs) to assess the job preferences of medical students from six teaching hospitals in Beijing, China. The incentive factors included monthly income, work location, work environment, training and career development opportunities, work load, and professional recognition. Additionally, a lab-like experiment in the medical decision-making context was conducted to quantify altruism based on utility function. Furthermore, we separated the choice sets based on the actual income and distinguished the medical students on altruism. The willingness to pay (WTP) was used to estimate the substitution effect of incentives through conditional logit model.

RESULTS

There was a significant substitution effect between non-financial and financial incentives. As income increased, non-financial incentives such as an excellent work environment, and sufficient career development became relatively more important. The impact of the increase in income on the substitution effect was more pronounced among individuals with higher altruism. Concerning the non-financial incentive work environment, in contrast to the growth of 546 CNY (84 USD) observed in the low-altruism group, the high-altruism group experienced a growth of 1040 CNY (160 USD) in the substitution effect.

CONCLUSIONS

The increase in the income level exerted an influence on the substitution effect of non-financial incentives and financial incentives, especially in high-altruism medical students. Policymakers should attach importance to a favorable environment and promising career prospects on the basis of ensuring a higher income level. Medical school administrations should focus on promoting altruistic values in medical education, enhancing talent incentives and teaching strategies to encourage medical students to devote themselves to the medical professions.

How medical insurance payment systems affect the physicians' provision behavior in China-based on experimental economics

Background

It introduced an artefactual field experiment to analyze the influence of incentives from fee-for-service (FFS) and diagnosis-intervention package (DIP) payments on physicians' provision of medical services.

Methods

This study recruited 32 physicians from a national pilot city in China and utilized an artefactual field experiment to examine medical services provided to patients with different health status.

Results

In general, the average quantities of medical services provided by physicians under the FFS payment were higher than the optimal quantities, the difference was statistically significant. While the average quantities of medical services provided by physicians under the DIP payment were very close to the optimal quantities, the difference was not statistically significant. Physicians provided 24.49, 14.31 and 5.68% more medical services to patients with good, moderate and bad health status under the FFS payment than under the DIP payment. Patients with good, moderate and bad health status experienced corresponding losses of 5.70, 8.10 and 9.42% in benefits respectively under the DIP payment, the corresponding reductions in profits for physicians were 10.85, 20.85 and 35.51%.

Conclusion

It found patients are overserved under the FFS payment, but patients in bad health status can receive more adequate treatment. Physicians' provision behavior can be regulated to a certain extent under the DIP payment and the DIP payment is suitable for the treatment of patients in relatively good health status. Doctors sometimes have violations under DIP payment, such as inadequate service and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to innovate the supervision of physicians' provision behavior under the DIP payment. It showed both medical insurance payment systems and patients with difference health status can influence physicians' provision behavior.

Physician responses to insurance benefit restrictions: The case of ophthalmology

This study examines the impact of social insurance benefit restrictions on physician behaviour, using ophthalmologists as a case study. We examine whether ophthalmologists use their market power to alter their fees and rebates across services to compensate for potential policy-induced income losses. The results show that ophthalmologists substantially reduced their fees and rebates for services directly targeted by the benefit restriction compared to other medical specialists' fees and rebates. There is also some evidence that they increased their fees for services that were not targeted. High-fee charging ophthalmologists exhibited larger fee and rebate responses while the low-fee charging group raise their rebates to match the reference price provided by the policy environment.

The link between physician motivation and care

Studies report an unexplained variation in physicians' care. This variation may to some extent be explained by differences in their work motivation. However, empirical evidence on the link between physician motivation and care is scarce. We estimate the associations between different types of work motivation and care. Motivation is measured using validated questions from a nation-wide survey of Danish general practices and linked to high-quality register data on their care in 2019. Using a series of regression models, we find that more financially motivated practices generate more fee-for-services per patient, whereas practices characterised by greater altruistic motivation towards the patient serve a larger share of high-need patients and issue more prescriptions for antibiotics per patient. Practices with higher altruism towards society generate lower medication costs per patient and prescribe a higher rate of narrow-spectrum penicillin, thereby reducing the risk of antimicrobial resistance in the population. Together, our results suggest that practices' motivation is associated with several dimensions of healthcare, and that both their financial motivation and altruism towards patients and society play a role. Policymakers should, therefore, consider targeting all provider motivations when introducing organisational changes and incentive schemes; for example, by paying physicians to adhere to clinical guidelines, while at the same time clearly communicating the guidelines' value from both a patient and societal perspective.

Strategic behaviour and decision making in competitive hospital markets: an experimental investigation

We investigate quality provision and the occurrence of strategic behaviour in competitive hospital markets where providers are assumed to be semi-altruistic towards patients. For this, we employ a laboratory experiment with a hospital market framing. Subjects decide on the quality levels for one of three competing hospitals respectively. We vary the organizational aspect of whether quality decisions within hospitals are made by individuals or teams. Realized monetary patient benefits go to real patients outside the lab. In both settings, we find that degrees of cooperation quickly converge towards negative values, implying absence of collusion and patient centred or competitive quality choices. Moreover, hospitals treat quality as a strategic complement and adjust their quality choice in the same direction as their competitors. The response magnitude for team markets is weaker; this is driven by non-cooperative or altruistic teams, which tend to set levels of quality that are strategically independent.

A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

Looking inside the lab: a systematic literature review of economic experiments in health service provision

Experimental economics is, nowadays, a well-established approach to investigate agents' behavior under economic incentives. In the last decade, a fast-growing number of studies have focused on the application of experimental methodology to health policy issues. The results of that stream of literature have been intriguing and strongly policy oriented. However, those findings are scattered between different health-related topics, making it difficult to grasp the overall state-of-the-art. Hence, to make the main contributions understandable at a glance, we conduct a systematic literature review of laboratory experiments on the supply of health services. Of the 1248 articles retrieved from 2011, 56 articles published in peer-review journals have met our inclusion criteria. Thus, we have described the experimental designs of each of the selected papers and we have classified them according to their main area of interest.

Changing preferences: An experiment and estimation of market-incentive effects on altruism

This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a laboratory experiment with a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benefits are experimental incentive parameters. In monopoly, subjects choose quality by trading off between profits and altruistic patient benefits. In duopoly and quadropoly, subjects play a simultaneous-move game. Uncertain about an opponent's altruism, each subject competes for patients by choosing qualities. Bayes-Nash equilibria describe subjects' quality decisions as functions of altruism. Using a nonparametric method, we estimate the population altruism distributions from Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities in different markets and incentive configurations. Competition tends to reduce altruism, but duopoly and quadropoly equilibrium qualities are much higher than monopoly. Although markets crowd out altruism, the disciplinary powers of market competition are stronger. Counterfactuals confirm markets change preferences.

Medical occupation preference under the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic: The role of risk and altruistic preferences

We examine the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on medical occupation preference, focusing on Wuhan, China. We conducted a survey of 5686 respondents in China regarding the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on medical occupation preference. We also conducted a complimentary survey in the UK with 1198 respondents, as well as a field experiment in Wuhan with 428 first and second-year medical students. We find a significant negative impact of the pandemic on the willingness to let a loved one choose a medical occupation. Individuals who were heavily influenced by the pandemic, that is, Wuhan residents, especially medical workers, express significantly lower medical occupation preference. Further analysis from Sobel-Goodman mediation tests reveals that around half of the total negative effect can be mediated by enhanced risk aversion and reduced altruism. The UK survey and the field experiment with medical students in Wuhan reinforce these findings. Our results suggest a shift in medical workers' risk- and altruistic-preferences has led to a reduced medical occupation preference. Non-medical workers and students who are more altruistic and risk-seeking are more likely to choose a medical occupation.

Provider responses to the expansion of public subsidies in healthcare: The case of oral chemotherapy treatment in Australia

We examine provider responses to the expansion of public subsidies in 2015 for innovative oral chemotherapy treatment, in a health system where providers were free to determine their own prices. The new treatment was known to have similar efficacy to its traditional intravenous alternative and was preferred by patients for its at-home administration. However, from a policymaker's perspective, the potential for misalignment between patient and provider preferences was significant given the shift to full reimbursement for the oral chemotherapy medication but no change in fee-for-service payments for associated chemotherapy services. Under this scenario, a shift away from traditional intravenous chemotherapy may entail reduced activity and revenues associated with infusions for providers, and we hypothesise that it may result in unintended policy consequences such as reduced take-up of the new therapy or higher prices. We implement a difference-in-difference model using national administrative data on services provided, and chemotherapy medications prescribed, by providers to 1850 patients in New South Wales, Australia. Our estimates indicate that the subsidies expanded access to oral chemotherapy for newly eligible patients by 15 percentage points. However, prices charged by providers for an episode of care rose by 23 percent, driven mostly by increases in service volumes. The results illustrate the importance of understanding differential provider responses to policy changes in financial incentives.

The impacts of altruism levels on the job preferences of medical students: a cross-sectional study in China

BACKGROUND

Rational allocation of human resources for health is crucial for ensuring public welfare and equitable access to health services. Understanding medical students' job preferences could help develop effective strategies for the recruitment and retention of the health workforce. Most studies explore the relationship between extrinsic incentives and job choices through discrete choice experiments (DCEs). Little attention has been paid to the influence of intrinsic altruism on job choice. This study aimed to explore the heterogeneous preferences of medical students with different levels of altruism regarding extrinsic job attributes.

METHODS

We conducted an online survey with 925 medical students from six hospitals in Beijing from July to September 2021. The survey combined job-choice scenarios through DCEs and a simulation of a laboratory experiment on medical decision-making behavior. Behavioral data were used to quantify altruism levels by estimating altruistic parameters based on a utility function. We fit mixed logit models to estimate the effects of altruism on job preference.

RESULTS

All attribute levels had the expected effect on job preferences, among which monthly income (importance weight was 30.46%, 95% CI 29.25%-31.67%) and work location (importance weight was 22.39%, 95% CI 21.14%-23.64%) were the most salient factors. The mean altruistic parameter was 0.84 (s.d. 0.19), indicating that medical students' altruism was generally high. The subgroup analysis showed that individuals with higher altruism levels had a greater preference for non-financial incentives such as an excellent work environment, sufficient training and career development opportunities, and a light workload. The change in the rate of the uptake of a rural position by individuals with lower levels of altruism is sensitive to changes in financial incentives.

CONCLUSIONS

Medical students' altruism was generally high, and those with higher altruism paid more attention to non-financial incentives. This suggests that policymakers and hospital managers should further focus on nonfinancial incentives to better motivate altruistic physicians, in addition to appropriate economic incentive when designing recruitment and retention interventions. Medical school administrations could attach importance to the promotion of altruistic values in medical education.

Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics

We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients' responsiveness to quality is decisive.

Physician altruism under the change from pure payment system to mixed payment schemes: experimental evidence

BACKGROUND

Mixed payment schemes have become one of the effective measures to balance medical costs and quality of medical services. However, altruism as an intrinsic motivation may influence the effect of switching from a pure payment system to mixed payment schemes. This study aimed to quantify physicians' altruism and analyze the effect of changes of payment system on physicians' altruism and thus proposed references for the reform of payment system.

METHODS

We simulated an exogenous payment system in a controlled laboratory with five experimental groups and 150 medical student subjects. Physicians' altruism was measured by estimating altruistic parameter and marginal rate of substitution. The non-parametric test and the least square regression analysis were used to analyze the differences of altruistic parameters between pure payment systems and mixed payment schemes. Finally, we analyzed the effect of changes in payment system accompanied by changes in trade-off range on physicians' altruism.

RESULTS

We find that the mean value of individual altruistic parameter is 0.78 and the marginal rate of substitution is 1.078. Their estimates at the individual level were significantly positively correlated (Spearman's ρ = 0.715, p < 0.01). The shift from pure payment system to mixed payment scheme reduced the altruistic parameter. However, the altruistic parameter increased with the increase of the trade-off range. Physicians who were more altruistic generated higher patients' health benefit. For each unit increase in altruistic parameter, the increase in patients' health benefit was lower in mixed payment scheme than in the pure payment system.

CONCLUSION

The estimates of altruistic parameters are reliable. Physicians attach a higher weight to patients' benefit than to their own profit. Mixed payment schemes improve physicians' behavior and relate to lower altruistic parameters; physicians only need to sacrifice less personal profits to generate the same or even higher altruistic parameter as under the pure payment system. The design of mixed payment schemes that make the interests of physicians and patients close to each other by reducing the trade-off range can provide implication for the reform of payment system in which the physicians' interest and the patients' benefit are consistent.

The formation of physician altruism

We study how patient-regarding altruism is formed by medical education. We elicit and structurally estimate altruistic preferences using experimental data from a large sample of medical students (N = 733) in Germany at different progress stages in their studies. The estimates reveal substantial heterogeneity in altruistic preferences of medical students. Patient-regarding altruism is highest for freshmen, significantly declines for students in the course of medical studies, and tends to increase again for last year students, who assist in clinical practice. Also, patient-regarding altruism is higher for females and positively associated to general altruism. Altruistic medical students have gained prior practical experience in healthcare, have lower income expectations, and are more likely to choose surgery and pediatrics as their preferred specialty.

Motivation and competition in health care

Non-pecuniary sources of motivation are a strong feature of the health care sector and the impact of competitive incentives on behavior may be lower where pecuniary motivation is low. This paper measures the marginal utility of income (MUY) of physicians from a stated-choice experiment, and examines whether this measure influences the association between competition faced by physicians and the prices they charge. We find that physicians are more likely to exploit a lack of competition with higher prices if they have a high MUY.

Experimental evidence of physician social preferences

Physicians routinely face trade-offs among their own interests, the interests of their patients, and society’s interest in preserving medical resources. To manage these trade-offs, society relies on both traditional professional ethics and bureaucratic monitoring and control. Our results—that physicians are twice as likely to be altruistic as all other samples but indistinguishable from the general population in terms of equality–efficiency orientation—suggest that professional norms can meaningfully contribute to physicians putting patients first and highlight the importance of nurturing these norms of physician professionalism. However, our findings also suggest that policymakers may not rely on physician professionalism to ensure an efficient allocation of medical resources.

Physicians’ professional ethics require that they put patients’ interests ahead of their own and that they should allocate limited medical resources efficiently. Understanding physicians’ extent of adherence to these principles requires understanding the social preferences that lie behind them. These social preferences may be divided into two qualitatively different trade-offs: the trade-off between self and other (altruism) and the trade-off between reducing differences in payoffs (equality) and increasing total payoffs (efficiency). We experimentally measure social preferences among a nationwide sample of practicing physicians in the United States. Our design allows us to distinguish empirically between altruism and equality–efficiency orientation and to accurately measure both trade-offs at the level of the individual subject. We further compare the experimentally measured social preferences of physicians with those of a representative sample of Americans, an “elite” subsample of Americans, and a nationwide sample of medical students. We find that physicians’ altruism stands out. Although most physicians place a greater weight on self than on other, the share of physicians who place a greater weight on other than on self is twice as large as for all other samples—32% as compared with 15 to 17%. Subjects in the general population are the closest to physicians in terms of altruism. The higher altruism among physicians compared with the other samples cannot be explained by income or age differences. By contrast, physicians’ preferences regarding equality–efficiency orientation are not meaningfully different from those of the general sample and elite subsample and are less efficiency oriented than medical students.

Effect of clinician information sessions on diagnostic testing for Chagas disease

Background

Chagas disease is a potentially life-threatening neglected disease of poverty that is endemic in continental Latin America. Caused by Trypanosoma cruzi (T. cruzi), it is one of six parasitic diseases in the United States targeted by the Centers for Disease Control as a public health problem in need of action. An estimated 300,000 people are infected with T. cruzi in the United States (US). Although its morbidity, mortality and economic burden are high, awareness of Chagas disease is lacking among many healthcare providers in the US. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the number of diagnostic tests performed at a community health center serving an at-risk population for Chagas disease increased after information sessions. A secondary aim was to determine if there was a difference by provider type, i.e., nurse practitioner vs. physician, or by specialty in the number of patients screened.

Methodology/Principal findings

We conducted a retrospective data analysis of the number of Chagas serology tests performed at a community health center before and after information sessions for clinicians. A time series analysis was conducted focusing on the Adult and Family Medicine Departments at East Boston Neighborhood Health Center (EBNHC). Across all departments there were 1,957 T. cruzi tests performed before the sessions vs. 2,623 after the sessions. Interrupted time series analysis across departments indicated that testing volume was stable over time prior to the sessions (pre-period slope = +4.1 per month; p = 0.12), followed by an immediate shift after the session (+51.6; p = 0.03), while testing volume remained stable over time after the session (post-period slope = -6.0 per month; p = 0.11).

Conclusion/Significance

In this study, Chagas testing increased after information sessions. Clinicians who began testing their patients for Chagas disease after learning of the importance of this intervention added an extra, potentially time-consuming task to their already busy workdays without external incentives or recognition.

Chagas disease is a potentially fatal neglected disease of poverty. It is endemic in continental Latin America with an estimated 300,000 cases in the United States, primarily among low-income people who have immigrated to the US from Latin America. Few Chagas screening programs have been established in the US. Existing recommendations for Chagas disease testing and treatment are rarely followed for many reasons including a paucity of knowledge among providers. We aimed to determine if the number of Chagas tests performed increased after information sessions at a community health center. A secondary aim was to determine if there was a difference in number of tests performed by provider type. We found that the number of T. cruzi serologies performed in the ten months after information sessions increased significantly over that in the ten preceding months. Chagas testing increased across departments, though Chagas diagnostics were an extra and unmitigated time burden on clinicians. Increasing provider knowledge is a major step to increase diagnosis and treatment of this neglected disease, when clinicians are motivated by their inherent prosocial preferences including altruism i.e., by the positive impact of their work on patients’ lives.

Exploring physician agency under demand-side cost sharing-An experimental approach

The assumption of patient-regarding physicians has been widely adopted in the health economics literature. Physicians' patient-regarding preferences are often described as the concern for the health benefits of medical treatments, and thus closely related to the norms and ethics of the medical profession. In this paper, we ask whether physicians' patient-regarding preferences include a concern for their patient's consumption opportunities alongside patient's health benefits. To identify and quantify physicians' preferences, we design and conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment where choices determine separately the health benefits and the consumption opportunities of a real patient admitted to the nearest hospital. We find strong evidence that future physicians care about their patients' consumption opportunities.

Is physician location sensitive to changes in patients' financial responsibility?

This study examines how changes to patients' financial responsibility affect physicians' behavior. This is achieved by examining a health insurance reform that changes patients' relative financial responsibilities for a medical service that can be received at one of two locations. In particular, this study examines how physicians' treatment location decisions change after the reform. This study finds that physicians who previously work across the two locations are increasingly observed working at the location that becomes cheaper for patients. Thus, physicians' responsiveness to new policies may be an important lever by which certain demand-side health insurance reforms successfully operate.

Do Residents and Healthcare Providers Differ in Preference for Family Doctor Contract Service? Evidence From a Discrete Choice Experiment

Objective

Few are known on how and to what extent residents and healthcare providers have different preferences for family doctor contract service (FDCS). This study aimed to elicit and compare the residents' and healthcare providers' preferences for FDCS through a discrete choice experiment (DCE).

Methods

Residents and healthcare providers recruited for the DCE were asked to choose repeatedly between two hypothetical service plans, which differed in six attributes: cost, service package, service delivery, type of service, accessibility of medicine, and level of healthcare team. We use mixed logit regression models to determine preferences for potential attributes.

Results

A total of 2,159 residents and 729 healthcare providers completed valid DCE questionnaires. The mixed logit model results suggested that cost, service package, service delivery, type of service, accessibility of medicine, and level of healthcare team all had a significant impact on residents' and healthcare providers' preference. The level of healthcare team was the most important characteristic of FDCS to both residents and healthcare providers, followed by types of service. They have different preferences on the cost and way of service delivery.

Conclusions

This study provides new evidence on how and to what extent residents and healthcare providers have different preferences for FDCS by determining their perception of various service attributes. These findings suggested that the optimal design and improvement of FDCS plans should consider not only residents but also healthcare providers' preferences to maximize contract service uptake.

Factors affecting physicians using mobile health applications: an empirical study

Background

Mobile health applications (mHealth apps) have created innovative service channels for patients with chronic diseases. These innovative service channels require physicians to actively use mHealth apps. However, few studies investigate physicians’ participation in mHealth apps.

Objective

This study aims to empirically explore factors affecting physicians’ usage behaviors of mHealth apps. Based on the extended Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT2) and mHealth apps features, we propose a research model including altruism, cognitive trust, and online ratings.

Methods

We collected data from physicians who have used mHealth apps and conducted a factor analysis to verify the convergence and discriminative effects. We used a hierarchical regression method to test the path coefficients and statistical significance of our research model. In addition, we adopted bootstrapping approach and further analyzed the mediating effects of behavioral intention between all antecedent variables and physicians’ usage behavior. Finally, we conducted three robustness analyses to test the validity of results and tested the constructs to verify the common method bias.

Results

Our results support the effects of performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and altruism on the behavioral intentions of physicians using mHealth apps. Moreover, facilitating conditions and habits positively affect physicians using mHealth apps through the mediating effort of behavioral intention. Physicians’ cognitive trust and online rating have significant effects on their usage behaviors through the mediating efforts of behavioral intention.

Conclusions

This study contributes to the existing literature on UTAUT2 extension of physicians’ acceptance of mHealth apps by adding altruism, cognitive trust, and online ratings. The results of this study provide a novel perspective in understanding the factors affecting physicians’ usage behaviors on mHealth apps in China and provide such apps’ managers with an insight into the promotion of physicians’ active acceptance and usage behaviors.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12913-021-07339-7.

Evidence-Based Medicine and Healthcare Quality in the Context of Information Failure: The Case of the UK Fertility Sector

Economic incentives in the context of a particular type of market failure-asymmetric information (which takes place when quality information relating to treatment is not available to patients before purchasing the treatment)-are highly relevant to the understanding of the lack of clinics' incentives to disclose reliable evidence (relating to treatment quality) in the practice of evidence-based medicine. Based on the case study of the UK in vitro fertilisation (IVF) sector, I show that inadequate quality provision (relating to treatment effectiveness and safety) can be associated with a lack of voluntary disclosure of reliable evidence in the practice of evidence-based medicine. In the absence of sufficient economic incentives on clinics to voluntarily acquire and disclose evidence, I discuss the rationale for legislation requiring mandatory evidence disclosure as a possible mechanism to facilitate the acquisition and revelation of evidence. I do so by drawing evidence from the economic literature relating to the impact of such legislation on firms' quality improvement. Practical implications for implementation are discussed (and illustrated with examples in the context of the UK IVF sector) with the purpose to facilitate the role of regulators in setting the standards for evidence disclosure to improve interpretability of such evidence, together with the role of patients in engaging with clinics and verifying such evidence to improve its reliability and, ultimately, quality of care.

Providers preferences towards greater patient health benefit is associated with higher quality of care

Standard theories of health provider behavior suggest that providers are motivated by both profit and an altruistic interest in patient health benefit. Detailed empirical data are seldom available to measure relative preferences between profit and patient health outcomes. Furthermore, it is difficult to empirically assess how these relative preferences affect quality of care. This study uses a unique dataset from rural Myanmar to assess heterogeneous preferences toward treatment efficacy relative to provider profit and the impact of these preferences on the quality of provider diagnosis and treatment. Using conjoint survey data from 187 providers, we estimated the marginal utilities of higher treatment efficacy and of higher profit, and the marginal rate of substitution between these outcomes. We also measured the quality of diagnosis and treatment for malaria among these providers using a previously validated observed patient simulation. There is substantial heterogeneity in providers' utility from treatment efficacy versus utility from higher profits. Higher marginal utility from treatment efficacy is positively associated with the quality of treatment among providers, and higher marginal utility from profit are negatively associated with quality of diagnosis. We found no consistent effect of the ratio of marginal utility of efficacy vs marginal utility of profit on quality of care. Our findings suggest that providers vary in their preferences towards profit and treatment efficacy, with those providers that place greater weight on treatment efficacy providing higher quality of care.

Trust me; I know what I am doing investigating the effect of choice list elicitation and domain-relevant training on preference reversals in decision making for others

One core assumption of standard economic theory is that an individual's preferences are stable, irrespective of the method used to elicit them. This assumption may be violated if preference reversals are observed when comparing different methods to elicit people's preferences. People may then prefer A over B using one method while preferring B over A using another. Such preference reversals pose a significant problem for theoretical and applied research. We used a sample of medical and economics students to investigate preference reversals in the health and financial domain when choosing patients/clients. We explored whether preference reversals are associated with domain-relevant training and tested whether using guided 'choice list' elicitation reduces reversals. Our findings suggest that preference reversals were more likely to occur for medical students, within the health domain, and for open-ended valuation questions. Familiarity with a domain reduced the likelihood of preference reversals in that domain. Although preference reversals occur less frequently within specialist domains, they remain a significant theoretical and practical problem. The use of clearer valuation procedures offers a promising approach to reduce preference reversals.

Allocation of health care under pay for performance: Winners and losers

Many physicians receive a payment for their performance (P4P). This performance is often linked to a health target that triggers a bonus when met. For some patients the target is easily met, while others require a significant amount of care to reach the target (if ever). This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of how P4P affects allocation of care across patients with low and high responsiveness to treatment compared to a fixed payment, such as capitation and salary, under different degrees of resource constraint. Our evidence is based on a controlled laboratory experiment involving 143 medical students in Denmark in 2019. We find that patients who have the potential to reach the health target, gain care under P4P, whereas patients with no potential to reach it, may receive less care. Redistribution of care between patients under P4P arises when physicians are resource constrained. As many physicians are currently operating under tight resource constraints, policymakers should be careful to avoid unintended inequalities in patients' access to health care when introducing P4P. Risk-adjusting the performance target may potentially solve this issue.

Assessing social preferences in reimbursement negotiations for new Pharmaceuticals in Oncology: an experimental design to analyse willingness to pay and willingness to accept

Background

Price negotiations for specialty pharmaceuticals take place in a complex market setting. The determination of the added value of new treatments and the related societal willingness to pay are of increasing importance in policy reform debates. From a behavioural economics perspective, potential cognitive biases and other-regarding concerns affecting outcomes of reimbursement negotiations are of interest. An experimental setting to investigate social preferences in reimbursement negotiations for novel, oncology pharmaceuticals was used. Of interest were differences in social preferences caused by incremental changes of the patient outcome.

Methods

An online experiment was conducted in two separate runs (n = 202, n = 404) on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. Populations were split into two (run one) and four (run two) equally sized treatment groups for hypothetical reimbursement decisions. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of a public price regulator for pharmaceuticals (buyer) or a representative of a pharmaceutical company (seller). In run two, role groups were further split into two different price magnitude framings (“real world” vs unconverted “real payoff” prices). Decisions had real monetary effects on other participants (in the role of premium payers or investors) and via charitable donations to a patient organisation (patient benefit).

Results

56 (run one) and 59 (run two) percent of participants stated strictly monotone preferences for incremental patient benefit. The mean incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) against standard of care (SoC) was higher than the initial ICER of the SoC against no care. Regulators stated lower reservation prices in the “real world” prices group compared to their colleagues in the unconverted payoff group. No price group showed any reluctance to trade. Overall, regulators rated the relevance of the patient for their decision higher and the relevance of their own role lower compared to sellers.

Conclusions

The price magnitude of current oncology treatments affects stated preferences for incremental survival, and assigned responsibilities lead to different opinions on the relevance of affected stakeholders. The design is useful to further assess effects of reimbursement negotiations on societal outcomes like affordability (cost) or availability (access) of new pharmaceuticals and test behavioural policy interventions.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12913-021-06231-8.

Resource scarcity and prioritization decisions in medical care: A lab experiment with heterogeneous patient types

During the COVID-19 pandemic, health care systems around the world have received additional funding, while at other times, financial support has been lowered to consolidate public spending. Such budget changes likely affect provision behavior in health care. We study how different degrees of resource scarcity affect medical service provision and, in consequence, patients' health. In a controlled lab environment, physicians are paid by capitation and allocate limited resources to several patients. This implies a trade-off between physicians' profits and patients' health benefits. We vary levels of resource scarcity and patient characteristics systematically and observe that most subjects in the role of physician devote a relatively stable share of budget to patient treatment, implying that they provide fewer services when they face more severe budget constraints. Average patient benefits decrease in proportion to physician budgets. The majority of subjects chooses an allocation that leads to equal patient benefits as opposed to allocating resources efficiently.

Custom-made health-care: an experimental investigation

BACKGROUND

Physicians' financial interests might conflict with the best service to patients. It is essential to gain a thorough understanding of the effect of remuneration systems on physician behaviour.

METHODS

We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment using a within-subject design to investigate physician behaviour underpayment heterogeneity. Each physician provided medical care to patients whose treatments were paid for under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP).

RESULTS

We observed that physicians customized their care in response to the payment system. FFS patients received considerably more medical care than did CAP patients with the same illness and treatment preference. Physicians over-served FFS patients and under-served CAP patients. After a CAP payment reduction, we observed neither a quantity reduction under CAP nor a spillover in FFS patients' treatment.

CONCLUSIONS

The results suggest that, in our experimental model, fee regulation can be used to some extent to control physician spending since we did not identify a behavioural response to the CAP payment cut. Physicians did not recoup lost income by altering treatment behaviour toward CAP and/or FFS patients. Experimental economics is an excellent tool for ensuring the welfare of all those involved in the health system. Further research should investigate payment incentives as a means of developing health care teams that are more efficient.

The effects of unexpected changes in demand on the performance of emergency departments

Crowding in emergency departments (EDs) is increasing in many health systems. Previous studies of the relationship between crowding and care quality are limited by the use of data from single hospitals, a focus on particular patient groups, a focus on a narrow set of quality measures, and use of crowding measures which induce bias from unobserved hospital and patient characteristics. Using data from 139 hospitals covering all major EDss in England, we measure crowding using quasi-exogenous variation in the volume of EDs attendances and examine its impacts on indicators of performance across the entire EDs care pathway. We exploit variations from expected volume estimated using high-dimensional fixed effects capturing hospital-specific variation in attendances by combinations of month and hour-of-the-week. Unexpected increases in attendance volume result in substantially longer waiting times, lower quantity and complexity of care, more patients choosing to leave without treatment, changes in referral and discharge decisions, but only small increases in reattendances and no increase in mortality. Causal bounds under potential omitted variable bias are narrow and exclude zero for the majority of outcomes. Results suggest that physician and patient responses may largely mitigate the impacts of demand increases on patient outcomes in the short-run.

Performance Pay in Hospitals: An Experiment on Bonus-Malus Incentives

Recent policy reforms in Germany require the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives in the inpatient care sector. We conduct a controlled online experiment with real hospital physicians from public hospitals and medical students in Germany, in which we investigate the effects of introducing a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to a simplified version of the German Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) system using a sequential design with stylized routine cases. In both parts, participants choose between the patient optimal and profit maximizing treatment option for the same eight stylized routine cases. We find that the introduction of bonus–malus incentives only statistically significantly increases hospital physicians’ proportion of patient optimal choices for cases with high monetary baseline DRG incentives to choose the profit maximizing option. Medical students behave qualitatively similar. However, they are statistically significantly less patient oriented than real hospital physicians, and statistically significantly increase their patient optimal decisions with the introduction of bonus–malus incentives in all stylized routine cases. Overall, our results indicate that whether the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to the (German) DRG system has a positive effect on the quality of care or not particularly depends on the monetary incentives implemented in the DRG system as well as the type of participants and their initial level of patient orientation.

Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes-Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments

Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party which represents the health insurance that finances medical service provision under a prospective payment scheme. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical care. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as in medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly and are more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.

Doctors' response to queues: Evidence from a Portuguese emergency department

We evaluate how doctors in an emergency department react to the number of patients waiting for treatment. Our outcomes reflect the time spent with the patient, the intensity of treatment, and discharge destination. Using visit-level data in a Lisbon-area hospital, we use a fixed effects model to exploit variation in the queue size while addressing endogeneity using the number of arrivals to the hospital in the previous 60 min as an instrumental variable. Furthermore, we estimate doctors' reactions separately for patients with different degrees of urgency, as measured by the Manchester triage system. Results show that doctors discharge patients more rapidly as queues become longer, and this effect is stronger for patients that do not have life-threatening conditions. We also find that the intensity of diagnosis/treatment procedures decreases when patients face longer queues, driven by the extensive margin. Finally, doctors are less likely to admit patients to inpatient care. We interpret the results in the light of the doctors' incentives literature, explaining how these agents behave in the context of a National Health Service, with no financial incentives.

Relationship of pay-for-performance and provider pay

BACKGROUND

Policymakers and health care leaders search for a payment model to balance the interests of providers, patients, and payers. This has shifted reimbursement from a fee-for-service (FFS) to pay-for-performance (P4P) model. The FFS model of reimbursement may lead to provider overuse. The P4P model incentivizes quality, not quantity, of care. However, the payer's reimbursement shift to P4P has not affected compensation of individual providers.

OBJECTIVES

To explore the effects of payment compensation models on provider behavior and employment.

DATA SOURCES

CINAHL, Cochrane, and EBSCO databases were searched. To ensure accuracy, a PRISMA flow diagram was used. A thematic analysis was performed using 52 articles.

CONCLUSIONS

Four themes emerged: health care as an economic anomaly, the ability to incentivize value, ethics, and provider-employer-payer alignment. Basic economic principles are distorted in health care because of payment layers and competing goals. Although payment structure affects health care provider (HCP) performance, the correlation is not understood. There is a lack of knowledge on several key areas: 1) HCP behavioral research, 2) how employment may be influencing existing HCP attitudes and actions, 3) how nurse practitioners (NPs) differ from physicians, and 4) P4P outcome data. There is also a lack of literature involving NP's and reimbursement.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

Nurse practitioners must be included in compensation model research. Payment reform should address all individual HCP compensation. Reforms will be limited if focus remains on payer-organization reform and ignores HCP compensation. As HCPs, it is imperative to understand how payers reimburse services to establish guiding principles for equitable and ethical compensation negotiations.

Physician altruism and moral hazard: (no) Evidence from Finnish national prescriptions data

We test the physicians' altruism and moral hazard hypotheses using a national panel register containing all 2003-2010 statins prescriptions in Finland. We estimate the likelihood that physicians prescribe generic versus branded versions of statins as a function of the shares of the difference between what patients have to pay out of their pocket and what is covered by the insurance, controlling for patient, physician, and drug characteristics. We find that the estimated coefficients and the average marginal effects associated with moral hazard and altruism are nearly zero, and are orders of magnitude smaller than the ones associated with other explanatory factors such as the prescriptions' year and the physician specialization. When the analysis distinctly accounts for both the patient and the insurer shares of expenditure, the estimated coefficients directly reject the altruism and moral hazard hypotheses. Instead, we find strong and robust evidence of habits persistence in prescribing branded drugs.

Testing the myth of fee-for-service and overprovision in health care

Paying on the basis of fee-for-service (FFS) is often associated with a risk of overprovision. Policymakers are therefore increasingly looking to other payment schemes to ensure a more efficient delivery of health care. This study tests whether context plays a role for overprovision under FFS. Using a laboratory experiment involving medical students, we test the extent of overprovision under FFS when the subjects face different fee sizes, patient types, and market conditions. We observe that decreasing the fee size has an effect on overprovision under both market conditions. We also observe that patients who are harmed by excess treatment are at little risk of overprovision. Finally, when subjects face resource constraints but still have an incentive to overprovide high-profit services, they hesitate to do so, implying that the presence of opportunity costs in terms of reduced benefits to other patients protects against overprovision. Thus, this study provides evidence that the risk of overprovision under FFS depends on fee sizes, patients' health profiles, and market conditions.

Impact of the Global Budget Payment System on Expenditure of Cardiovascular Diseases: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis in Shanghai, China

Since few studies evaluated the impact of the global budget payment system (GBPS) over time, and by expenditure type, this paper aims to evaluate the impact of the GBPS on expenditure of inpatients, and explores how hospitals curb the expenditure in patients with cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) in Shanghai. We built a time series model with the monthly expenditure of CVDs from 2009 to 2012. We evaluated the instant impact and trends impact of the GBPS and analyzed results based on medical expenditure types (e.g., drug, examination, cure, unclassified items), discharge number, and expenditure per capita. We found GBPS instantly dropped the medical expenditure by Chinese Yuan (CNY) 55.71 million (p < 0.001), and decreased the monthly increasing trend by CNY 4.23 million (p = 0.011). The discharge number had 10.4% instant reduction and 225.55 monthly decrease (p = 0.021) while the expenditure per capita experienced fewer changes. Moreover, the expenditure of drug and cure had an instant reduction of CNY 28.31 million and 16.28 million (p < 0.001). In conclusion, we considered the GBPS is an effective solution to control the expenditure of CVDs by decreasing the discharge number, and a focus on the drug and cure expenditures lead to greater spend reduction than other types of expenditures.

Healing the poor: The influence of patient socioeconomic status on physician supply responses

A longstanding literature explores how altruism affects the way physicians respond to incentives and provide care. We analyze how patient socioeconomic status mediates these responses. We show theoretically that patient socioeconomic status systematically influences the way physicians respond to reimbursement changes, and we identify the channels through which these effects operate. We use two Medicare reimbursement changes to investigate these insights empirically. We confirm that a given physician facing an increase in reimbursement boosts utilization by more when treating richer patients. We show that average supply price elasticities vary from 0.02 to 0.18 for a given physician, depending on the patient's socioeconomic status. Finally, we show that the Medicare reforms we study led to overall reimbursement increases that raised healthcare utilization by 10% more for high-income patients compared to their low-income peers.

Does an economic incentive affect provider behavior? Evidence from a field experiment on different payment mechanisms

AIMS

This study analyzed discrepancies in the quantity of medical services supplied by physicians under different payment systems for patients with different health statuses and illnesses by means of a field experiment.

METHODS

Based on the laboratory experiment of Heike Hennig-Schmidt, we designed a field experiment to examine fee-for-service (FFS), capitation (CAP), and diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment systems. Medical students were replaced with 220 physicians as experimental subjects, which more closely reflected the clinical choices made by physicians in the real world. Under the three payment mechanisms, the quantity of medical services provided by physicians when they treated patients with different health statuses and illnesses were collected. Finally, relevant statistics were computed and analyzed.

RESULTS

It was found that payment systems (sig. = 0.000) and patient health status (sig. = 0.000) had a stronger effect on physicians' choices regarding quantity of medical services than illness types (sig. = 0.793). Additionally, under the FFS and CAP payment systems, physicians overserved patients in good and intermediate health while underserving patients in bad health. Under the DRG payment system, physicians overserved patients in good health and underserved patients in intermediate and bad health. Correspondingly, under FFS and CAP, the proportional loss of benefits was the highest for patients in bad health and the lowest for patients in good and intermediate health; while under DRGs, patients in good and intermediate health had the largest and smallest loss of benefits, respectively.

LIMITATIONS

In order to increase external effects of experiment results, we used the field experiment to replace laboratory experiment. However, the external effects still existed because of the blurring and abstraction of the parameters.

CONCLUSIONS

Medical treatment cost and price affected the quantity of medical services provided by physicians. Therefore, we proposed that a mix of payment systems could address the common interests of physicians and patients, as well as influence incentives from payment systems.

Uncertainty about the effort-performance relationship in threshold-based payment schemes

Incentive schemes often feature a threshold beyond which providers receive no additional payment for performance. We investigate whether providers' uncertainty about the relationship between effort and measured performance leads to financially unrewarded performance in such schemes. Using data from the British Quality and Outcomes Framework, we proxy general practitioners' uncertainty about the effort-performance relationship by their experience with the scheme and their span of control. We find evidence that providers respond to uncertainty by exerting financially unrewarded performance, suggesting that uncertainty may be a mechanism by which payers can extract unrewarded performance.

Plastic surgery or primary care? Altruistic preferences and expected specialty choice of U.S. medical students

Understanding physicians' decisions when faced with conflicts between their own financial self-interest and patients' economic or health interests is of key importance in health economics and policy. This issue is especially salient in certain medical specialties where less altruistic behavior of physicians can yield significant financial gains. This study examines experimentally measured altruistic preferences of medical students from schools around the U.S., and whether these preferences predict those students' expected medical specialty choice. The experimental design consists of a set of computer-based revealed preference decision problems, which ask the experimental subjects to allocate real money between themselves and an anonymous person. These data are used to derive an innovative measure of altruism for each participant. I then examine the association between altruism and expected specialty choice, after controlling for an extensive set of covariates collected from an accompanying survey questionnaire. Medical students with a lower degree of altruism are significantly more likely to choose high-income specialties, conditioning on an extensive set of covariates. This altruism measure is more predictive of income of specialty choice than a wide range of other characteristics, including parental income, student loan amount and Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) score. On the other hand, the altruism measure does not predict choosing primary care specialties. I also find that altruism predicts students' self-reported likelihood of practicing medicine in an underserved area.

Altruism in preventive health behavior: At-scale evidence from the HIV/AIDS pandemic

Preventive behavior with regards to disease transmission offers a promising context in which to provide empirical evidence on altruism in human populations. I examine the association between HIV status, own knowledge about status, and preventive health behavior using household survey data from over 200,000 individuals in 25 sub-Saharan African countries. I find that individuals who are HIV positive and have taken a standard HIV test are much more likely to engage in efforts to prevent HIV transmission than are individuals who are HIV negative and have taken a standard HIV test. Moreover, this difference is greater than the difference between HIV positives and HIV negatives for individuals who have not taken a standard HIV test. Consistent with an altruistic motivation, this double-difference is larger for individuals who are married than for individuals who are not married. These results appear to be the first evidence on the change in risky sexual behavior associated with HIV testing at scale and are consistent with altruism dominating any self-interested response to HIV testing.

Sorting into payment schemes and medical treatment: A laboratory experiment

In this study, we introduce the opportunity for physicians to sort into capitation or fee-for-service payment. Using a controlled medically framed laboratory experiment with a sequential within-subject design allows isolating sorting from incentive effects. We observe a strong preference for fee-for-service payment, which does not depend on subjects' prior experience with one of the two payment schemes. Further, we identify a significant sorting effect. Subjects choosing capitation deviate ex ante less from patient-optimal medical treatment than subjects who sort into fee-for-service payment. Particularly the latter become even less patient-oriented after introducing the choice option. Consequently, the opportunity to choose between fee-for-service and capitation payment worsens patient treatment, if at all. Our results hold for medical and for nonmedical students.

Quality competition and hospital mergers-An experiment

On the basis of a Salop model with regulated prices, we investigate quality provision behaviour of competing hospitals before and after a merger. For this, we use a controlled laboratory experiment where subjects decided on the level of treatment quality as head of a hospital. We find that the post-merger average quality is significantly lower than the average pre-merger quality. However, for merger insiders and outsiders, average quality choices are significantly higher than predicted for pure profit-maximising hospitals. This upward deviation is potentially driven by altruistic behaviour towards patients. Furthermore, we find that in the case where sufficient cost synergies are realised by the merged hospitals, there is a significant increase in average quality choices compared to the scenario without synergies. Finally, we find that our results do not change when comparing individual decisions to team decisions.

The effects of competition on medical service provision

We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient-optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee-for-service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee-for-service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition.

Risk attitudes in medical decisions for others: An experimental approach

The aim of this paper is to investigate how risk attitudes in medical decisions for others vary across health contexts. A lab experiment was designed to elicit the risk attitudes of 257 medical and nonmedical students by assigning them the role of a physician who must decide between treatments for patients. An interval regression model was used to estimate individual coefficients of relative risk aversion, and an estimation model was used to test for the effect of type of medical decision and experimental design characteristics on elicited risk aversion. We find that (a) risk attitudes vary across different health contexts, but risk aversion prevails in all of them; (b) students enrolled in health-related degrees show a higher degree of risk aversion; and (c) real rewards for third parties (patients) make subjects less risk-averse. The results underline the importance of accounting for attitudes towards risk in medical decision making.

Social preferences of future physicians

This paper advances scientific understanding of social preference—a topic of longstanding cross-disciplinary interest—by studying the preferences of future physicians. In making treatment decisions, physicians make fundamental tradeoffs between their own (financial) self-interest, patient benefit, and stewardship of social resources. These tradeoffs affect patient health, adoption of new scientific medical technologies, and the equity and efficiency of our health care system. Understanding physicians’ decisions about these tradeoffs requires understanding the social preferences that are behind them. Our main finding that future physicians are substantially less altruistic and more efficiency focused than the average American challenges notions of physician altruism, the fundamental feature of medical professionalism, and has potential implications for policy in a host of health care areas.

We measure the social preferences of a sample of US medical students and compare their preferences with those of the general population sampled in the American Life Panel (ALP). We also compare the medical students with a subsample of highly educated, wealthy ALP subjects as well as elite law school students and undergraduate students. We further associate the heterogeneity in social preferences within medical students to the tier ranking of their medical schools and their expected specialty choice. Our experimental design allows us to rigorously distinguish altruism from preferences regarding equality–efficiency tradeoffs and accurately measure both at the individual level rather than pooling data or assuming homogeneity across subjects. This is particularly informative, because the subjects in our sample display widely heterogeneous social preferences in terms of both their altruism and equality–efficiency tradeoffs. We find that medical students are substantially less altruistic and more efficiency focused than the average American. Furthermore, medical students attending the top-ranked medical schools are less altruistic than those attending lower-ranked schools. We further show that the social preferences of those attending top-ranked medical schools are statistically indistinguishable from the preferences of a sample of elite law school students. The key limitation of this study is that our experimental measures of social preferences have not yet been externally validated against actual physician practice behaviors. Pending this future research, we probed the predictive validity of our experimental measures of social preferences by showing that the medical students choosing higher-paying medical specialties are less altruistic than those choosing lower-paying specialties.