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Szablewski CM, Iwamoto C, Olsen SJ, Greene CM, Duca LM, Davis CT, Coggeshall KC, Davis WW, Emukule GO, Gould PL, Fry AM, Wentworth DE, Dugan VG, Kile JC, Azziz-Baumgartner E. Reported Global Avian Influenza Detections Among Humans and Animals During 2013-2022: Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Available Surveillance Data. JMIR Public Health Surveill 2023; 9:e46383. [PMID: 37651182 PMCID: PMC10502594 DOI: 10.2196/46383] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/17/2023] [Revised: 04/25/2023] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 09/01/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Avian influenza (AI) virus detections occurred frequently in 2022 and continue to pose a health, economic, and food security risk. The most recent global analysis of official reports of animal outbreaks and human infections with all reportable AI viruses was published almost a decade ago. Increased or renewed reports of AI viruses, especially high pathogenicity H5N8 and H5N1 in birds and H5N1, H5N8, and H5N6 in humans globally, have established the need for a comprehensive review of current global AI virus surveillance data to assess the pandemic risk of AI viruses. OBJECTIVE This study aims to provide an analysis of global AI animal outbreak and human case surveillance information from the last decade by describing the circulating virus subtypes, regions and temporal trends in reporting, and country characteristics associated with AI virus outbreak reporting in animals; surveillance and reporting gaps for animals and humans are identified. METHODS We analyzed AI virus infection reports among animals and humans submitted to animal and public health authorities from January 2013 to June 2022 and compared them with reports from January 2005 to December 2012. A multivariable regression analysis was used to evaluate associations between variables of interest and reported AI virus animal outbreaks. RESULTS From 2013 to 2022, 52.2% (95/182) of World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Member Countries identified 34 AI virus subtypes during 21,249 outbreaks. The most frequently reported subtypes were high pathogenicity AI H5N1 (10,079/21,249, 47.43%) and H5N8 (6722/21,249, 31.63%). A total of 10 high pathogenicity AI and 6 low pathogenicity AI virus subtypes were reported to the WOAH for the first time during 2013-2022. AI outbreaks in animals occurred in 26 more Member Countries than reported in the previous 8 years. Decreasing World Bank income classification was significantly associated with decreases in reported AI outbreaks (P<.001-.02). Between January 2013 and June 2022, 17/194 (8.8%) World Health Organization (WHO) Member States reported 2000 human AI virus infections of 10 virus subtypes. H7N9 (1568/2000, 78.40%) and H5N1 (254/2000, 12.70%) viruses accounted for the most human infections. As many as 8 of these 17 Member States did not report a human case prior to 2013. Of 1953 human cases with available information, 74.81% (n=1461) had a known animal exposure before onset of illness. The median time from illness onset to the notification posted on the WHO event information site was 15 days (IQR 9-30 days; mean 24 days). Seasonality patterns of animal outbreaks and human infections with AI viruses were very similar, occurred year-round, and peaked during November through May. CONCLUSIONS Our analysis suggests that AI outbreaks are more frequently reported and geographically widespread than in the past. Global surveillance gaps include inconsistent reporting from all regions and human infection reporting delays. Continued monitoring for AI virus outbreaks in animals and human infections with AI viruses is crucial for pandemic preparedness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christine M Szablewski
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Chelsea Iwamoto
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Sonja J Olsen
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Carolyn M Greene
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Lindsey M Duca
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - C Todd Davis
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Kira C Coggeshall
- Division of Global Health Protection, Global Health Center, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - William W Davis
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Gideon O Emukule
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Philip L Gould
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Alicia M Fry
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - David E Wentworth
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Vivien G Dugan
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - James C Kile
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
| | - Eduardo Azziz-Baumgartner
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States
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Yamaji R, Saad MD, Davis CT, Swayne DE, Wang D, Wong FYK, McCauley JW, Peiris JSM, Webby RJ, Fouchier RAM, Kawaoka Y, Zhang W. Pandemic potential of highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses. Rev Med Virol 2020; 30:e2099. [PMID: 32135031 PMCID: PMC9285678 DOI: 10.1002/rmv.2099] [Citation(s) in RCA: 62] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/20/2019] [Revised: 02/03/2020] [Accepted: 02/05/2020] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Abstract
The panzootic caused by A/goose/Guangdong/1/96‐lineage highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses has occurred in multiple waves since 1996. From 2013 onwards, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses of subtypes A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) emerged to cause panzootic waves of unprecedented magnitude among avian species accompanied by severe losses to the poultry industry around the world. Clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses have expanded in distinct geographical and evolutionary pathways likely via long distance migratory bird dispersal onto several continents and by poultry trade among neighboring countries. Coupled with regional circulation, the viruses have evolved further by reassorting with local viruses. As of February 2019, there have been 23 cases of humans infected with clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 viruses, 16 (70%) of which had fatal outcomes. To date, no HPAI A(H5) virus has caused sustainable human‐to‐human transmission. However, due to the lack of population immunity in humans and ongoing evolution of the virus, there is a continuing risk that clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses could cause an influenza pandemic if the ability to transmit efficiently among humans was gained. Therefore, multisectoral collaborations among the animal, environmental, and public health sectors are essential to conduct risk assessments and develop countermeasures to prevent disease and to control spread. In this article, we describe an assessment of the likelihood of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses gaining human‐to‐human transmissibility and impact on human health should such human‐to‐human transmission occur. This structured analysis assessed properties of the virus, attributes of the human population, and ecology and epidemiology of these viruses in animal hosts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Reina Yamaji
- Global Influenza Programme, Infectious Hazards Management, WHO Emergency Programme, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Magdi D Saad
- Global Influenza Programme, Infectious Hazards Management, WHO Emergency Programme, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Charles T Davis
- Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - David E Swayne
- Department of Agriculture, OIE Collaborating Centre for Research on Emerging Avian Diseases, U.S. National Poultry Research Center, Agricultural Research Service, Athens, Georgia, USA
| | - Dayan Wang
- National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, China
| | - Frank Y K Wong
- CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory, Geelong, Australia
| | - John W McCauley
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, Crick Worldwide Influenza Centre, The Francis Crick Institute, London, UK
| | - J S Malik Peiris
- School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Richard J Webby
- Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA
| | - Ron A M Fouchier
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Yoshihiro Kawaoka
- Division of Virology, Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Institute of Medical Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.,Department of Pathobiological Sciences, School of Veterinary Medicine, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.,Department of Special Pathogens, International Research Center for Infectious Diseases, Institute of Medical Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Wenqing Zhang
- Global Influenza Programme, Infectious Hazards Management, WHO Emergency Programme, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland
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Biggerstaff M, Cauchemez S, Reed C, Gambhir M, Finelli L. Estimates of the reproduction number for seasonal, pandemic, and zoonotic influenza: a systematic review of the literature. BMC Infect Dis 2014; 14:480. [PMID: 25186370 PMCID: PMC4169819 DOI: 10.1186/1471-2334-14-480] [Citation(s) in RCA: 311] [Impact Index Per Article: 31.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/11/2014] [Accepted: 08/28/2014] [Indexed: 12/19/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The potential impact of an influenza pandemic can be assessed by calculating a set of transmissibility parameters, the most important being the reproduction number (R), which is defined as the average number of secondary cases generated per typical infectious case. METHODS We conducted a systematic review to summarize published estimates of R for pandemic or seasonal influenza and for novel influenza viruses (e.g. H5N1). We retained and summarized papers that estimated R for pandemic or seasonal influenza or for human infections with novel influenza viruses. RESULTS The search yielded 567 papers. Ninety-one papers were retained, and an additional twenty papers were identified from the references of the retained papers. Twenty-four studies reported 51 R values for the 1918 pandemic. The median R value for 1918 was 1.80 (interquartile range [IQR]: 1.47-2.27). Six studies reported seven 1957 pandemic R values. The median R value for 1957 was 1.65 (IQR: 1.53-1.70). Four studies reported seven 1968 pandemic R values. The median R value for 1968 was 1.80 (IQR: 1.56-1.85). Fifty-seven studies reported 78 2009 pandemic R values. The median R value for 2009 was 1.46 (IQR: 1.30-1.70) and was similar across the two waves of illness: 1.46 for the first wave and 1.48 for the second wave. Twenty-four studies reported 47 seasonal epidemic R values. The median R value for seasonal influenza was 1.28 (IQR: 1.19-1.37). Four studies reported six novel influenza R values. Four out of six R values were <1. CONCLUSIONS These R values represent the difference between epidemics that are controllable and cause moderate illness and those causing a significant number of illnesses and requiring intensive mitigation strategies to control. Continued monitoring of R during seasonal and novel influenza outbreaks is needed to document its variation before the next pandemic.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthew Biggerstaff
- />Epidemiology and Prevention Branch, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road NE, MS A-32, Atlanta, 30333 Georgia
| | - Simon Cauchemez
- />Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases Unit, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
| | - Carrie Reed
- />Epidemiology and Prevention Branch, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road NE, MS A-32, Atlanta, 30333 Georgia
| | - Manoj Gambhir
- />National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia
| | - Lyn Finelli
- />Epidemiology and Prevention Branch, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road NE, MS A-32, Atlanta, 30333 Georgia
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Mohan M, Ulaganathan V, Rodricks IM, Bhuvanakumar CK, Iyue M. Reproduction rate and viability of Merino, Nilagiri and halfbred Merino. I. Fertility, prolificacy and viability. JMIR Public Health Surveill 1986; 18:171-6. [PMID: 3765118 PMCID: PMC10502594 DOI: 10.1007/bf02359530] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/17/2023] [Revised: 04/25/2023] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 01/07/2023] Open
Abstract
Lambing records from 482 Merino ewes, 533 Nilagiri ewes and 192 halfbred Merino ewes were used to estimate the number of ewes lambing per ewe inseminated, number of lambs born per ewe lambing, number of lambs weaned per lamb born and number of ewe lambs reaching joining age per ewe lamb weaned. Adult viability was studied by following through the life of 385 Merino ewes, 192 Nilagiri ewes and 61 halfbred ewes in the breeding flock from one and a half to seven and a half years of age. The genetic groups differed significantly for all the reproductive traits but not for adult viability. Lower values of number of ewes lambing per ewe inseminated compared to the number weaned and the number reaching joining age indicate that infertility and embryonic mortality were the main sources of loss.
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